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It may be a case unique to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that an aspect of 
accession to the organization became an issue in itself. Since the                                                           
WTO came into being in 1995, the process of accession has been a subject of intensive 
debate.  It has been like this because of the extremely complicated nature of the process.  
The reason for such complexity is dual.  On the one hand, an accession issue under 
consideration will be scrutinised in a manner that exceeds traditional trade concerns such 
as customs law, tariff schedule and related regulations on imports and exports to include 
items that might penetrate domestic legal and social boundaries.  Such scrutiny, on the 
other hand, must satisfy all interested incumbent WTO members before accession is 
granted.  This is normally done through an extensive and lengthy bilateral negotiation 
between the acceding country and the members with an interest in its application. 
Thus, the question of the WTO accession has become of attention grapping nature.  In 
fact, following the establishment of the organization, the question of accession emerged 
as one of the various pressing WTO-related issues that attracted attention at both 
academic and practical levels.  In this thesis, the WTO accession question will be 
examined with regard to the accession of Saudi Arabia.  This was one of the most 
difficult and protracted accession processes and the thesis will concentrate on the factors 
that determined the WTO accession of this case. 
The literature on the WTO argues that the decision on any country’s accession is based 
on a set of generic factors.  These include, for instance, integration in the world 
economy, locking in domestic reforms, opening new markets and attracting foreign 
investment.  Although very important, the attempt to investigate the factors that shape a 
country’s desire to accede to the WTO– as examined in this study with respect to Saudi 
Arabia (seeking an accession in the face of the inherent complexities, liabilities and 
potential penetration of internal affairs) – requires answers that go further than these 
factors introduced in the literature.  It is not the case that a country decides to join the 
WTO for particular reasons and the actual accession follows immediately.  Accession is 
a process that takes a very long time and the issue of a country’s accession cannot 
possibly remain static throughout the time until its application is officially approved.  
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This should be taken into account because it can produce some important questions.  For 
example, will the internal perception and position of the parties involved remain the 
same during the period in which accession is being negotiated?  Will the accession 
factors change over time to become more or less important?  What are the politics 
involved? 
The answers to such questions will necessarily lead to a realisation that more elements 
than the aforementioned direct factors indicated in the literature need to be considered in 
order to understand WTO accession.  However, examining questions of this nature, such 
as the politics involved in an accession case, would conceivably lead to some 
considerable particularities attached to a specific accession case and this applies to Saudi 
Arabia.  The main question, then, that the study aims to answer is: what were the 
specific factors that shaped this accession case? 
In fact, the importance of the Saudi accession case is generally due to four factors: (a) 
the periods of varying intensity with respect to the negotiations themselves; (b) the 
protracted length of time taken to complete the accession process; (c) Saudi Arabia’s 
unique characteristics as a country; and (d) the fact that not much has been written about 
this accession process. 
Since the decision to join the WTO is intrinsically linked to trade policy, and as this 
normally involves a great deal of internal politics, the thesis supposes that studying the 
domestic interaction that was at play during the years of the accession process can best 
explain the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO.  With regard to the importance of 
internal politics to the case, the thesis will focus on the domestic institutions and 
interests that the affected Saudi Arabia’s accession.  In the process of doing this, 





“Those who do not thank people, they do not thank God” 
     Prophet Muhammad 
I am grateful to many people for their guidance, assistance, cooperation and 
encouragement with this project.  My first thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. Stephen 
Woolcock.  I undertook this project as a part-time student and, as a result, Steve had to 
bear with me for years.  I cannot forget that, although it was vague, he took an interest in 
my subject and helped me to refine the main question that I was aiming to answer.  Over 
many years, Steve maintained interest and constantly gave me pointed advice throughout 
this endeavour.  He never showed doubts, in this regard, that I could make it, despite the 
full-time commitment at the time of my job at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia.  
Therefore, I am indebted to Steve for his intellectual guidance, supervision and 
encouragement. 
I also record my appreciation of all those LSE professors and lecturers present at 
different times on my Panel.  In this, particular thanks go to Dr. Razeen Sally.  He joined 
my Panel in 2005 and I felt that because of him that Panel was the most important.  He 
made very constructive and valuable comments that helped in reshaping the analytical 
framework of the thesis. 
As a large part of my study’s material comes from the meaningful discussions I had with 
the individuals I interviewed, I shall extend my thanks to all those who granted me 
interviews,  including ministers, senior officials, businesspersons, religious scholars and 
foreign officials and figures.  Overall, they were generous in terms of allowing me the 
time and satisfying my inquiries.  
At work, Dr. Nizar Madani, Saudi State Minister for Foreign Affairs; Prince Khalid bin 
Saud, Saudi Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Ambassador Muhammad Tayeb, 
Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs branch in Makkah Region, deserve special 
acknowledgement and thanks.  They all helped at different times, permitting me a post 
extension so that I could stay a little longer in London to finish some of the PhD 
 8
requirements.  I cannot forget, in this regard, the former Saudi Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, who allowed me some time off work so that I could 
concentrate on writing parts of my thesis.  For that, I am very thankful to him. 
A colleague from the LSE, who was a PhD candidate, said while preparing his final draft 
that undertaking doctoral research is a rather lonely process, but its burden is not the 
author’s only.  I think this is very true, especially in the case of my marvellous and 
beloved wife, Samar.  She is the one who shared most of the burden of this project and I 
deeply thank her for her patience, support and love.  I thank my father, Ibrahim, who I 
always think is an exceptional person.  For some time, I thought that finishing my PhD 
was even more important to him than it was to me.  I also thank my sisters, Nariman and 
Amal, for their eagerness to see this work through.  Last but by no means least, I thank 
my daughter, Sarah, whose birth in 2010 gave me new momentum and stamina. 
       Riyadh, 18thJune 2012 
 
 9
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 17 
1.1 The Research Assumptions ............................................................................... 19 
1.2 The Significance of the Saudi Accession Question ........................................... 22 
1.3 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 24 
1.4 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 33 
1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study .................................................................. 38 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis ....................................................................................... 39 
Chapter 2 Accession Aspects in the WTO Literature ............................................. 41 
2.1 Rationale of WTO Accession ............................................................................ 44 
2.2 WTO Accession Process ................................................................................... 54 
2.3 Track Record of Acceding Experiences ............................................................ 67 
2.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 3 Analytical Framework ............................................................................. 81 
3.1 Society-Centred and State-Centred Approaches ............................................... 84 
3.2 Internal Factors .................................................................................................. 94 
3.3 External Factors ............................................................................................... 118 
3.4 Historical Overview and Political Economy’s Perceptions ............................ 129 
3.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 139 
Chapter 4 Phase One: 1985-1996 ............................................................................ 141 
4.1 Managing the Process ...................................................................................... 142 
4.2 Internal and External Context .......................................................................... 147 
4.3 Limited Interests – Limited Concerns ............................................................. 152 
4.4 Momentum Building Up ................................................................................. 161 
4.5 Analysis ........................................................................................................... 163 
4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 172 
  
 10
Chapter 5 Phase Two: 1997-2000 ........................................................................... 175 
5.1 The Phase’s Context ........................................................................................ 176 
5.2 Issues ............................................................................................................... 183 
5.3 The Pause ........................................................................................................ 237 
5.4 Analysis ........................................................................................................... 241 
5.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 250 
Chapter 6 Phase Three 2001-2005 .......................................................................... 255 
6.1 Internal Situation after the ‘Pause’ .................................................................. 255 
6.2 9/11 .................................................................................................................. 267 
6.3 Resuming Negotiations ................................................................................... 274 
6.4 The Membership .............................................................................................. 285 
6.5 Analysis ........................................................................................................... 286 
6.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 289 
Chapter 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 293 
References ..................................................................................................................... 310 




Table of Tables 
Table  2-1: GATT Rounds ................................................................................................ 41 
Table  2-2: On-going Accessions ...................................................................................... 68 
Table  3-1: Development of Companies and Firms .......................................................... 96 
Table  3-2: Contribution to the GDP by Sectors over 1970-2004 .................................... 99 
Table  3-3: Contribution of SABIC's Exports to Manufactured Non-oil Exports .......... 102 
Table  3-4: Share of Service Sector to the GDP in Saudi Arabia ................................... 105 
Table  3-5: Oil Export Revenues and Oil Contribution to  Public Budget Revenues 
(SR million) ................................................................................................. 119 
Table  3-6: World Oil Demand Since 1991 .................................................................... 121 
Table  4-1: Elements Important to Phase 1 ..................................................................... 174 
Table  5-1: Benefits and Costs of Accession .................................................................. 179 
Table  5-2: First Comprehensive Offer ........................................................................... 184 
Table  5-3: Industrial Goods ........................................................................................... 187 
Table  5-4: Industry ......................................................................................................... 189 
Table  5-5: Offer in Tariffs on Industrial Goods ............................................................. 192 
Table  5-6: Agricultural Goods ....................................................................................... 199 
Table  5-7: Agriculture .................................................................................................... 200 
Table  5-8: Tariff Offer on Goods ................................................................................... 203 
Table  5-9: Tariff Offer on Agriculture ........................................................................... 204 
Table  5-10: Action Plan ................................................................................................. 209 
Table  5-11: Elements Important to Phase 2 ................................................................... 254 
Table  6-1: Elements Important to Phase 3 ..................................................................... 292 
 
Table of Figures 
Figure  3-1: Trend of Services Output in Saudi Arabia over 1985 - 2005 ...................... 103 




ARAMCO Arabian American Oil Company 
ATC Agreement on Textile and Clothing 
BLG Basic Law of Governance 
CH Chemical Harmonisation 
CIT Countries in Transition 
COM Council of Ministers 
CSCC Council of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce 
DOE American Department of Energy 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
EEC European Economic Community 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FSC Foreign Sales Corporations Law 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP Gross Domestic Production 
GPA Government Procurement Agreement 
GPL Government Purchases Law 
 13
GSFMO Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation 
Gulf War II Second Gulf War 
HMC Higher Ministerial Committee 
IFIs International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INR Initial Negotiating Rights 
IR International Relations 
IP Intellectual Property 
IPE International Political Economy 
IT Information Technology 
KACST King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology 
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
LDCs Least Developed Countries 
MCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
MFA Multifibre Agreement  
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
MFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
MOC Ministry of Commerce 
MOA Ministry of Agriculture 
 14
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOJ Ministry of Justice 
MOI Ministry of Interior 
MOIE Ministry of Industry and Electricity 
MOP Ministry of Planning 
MPMR Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources  
MTAs Multilateral Trade Agreements 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PTT Ministry of Post Telegraph and Telephone 
RTA  Regional Trade Agreement 
SABIC Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation 
SAGIA Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
SCPM Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals 
SCT Supreme Commission of Tourism 
S&D Special and Different Treatment 
SEC Supreme Economic Council 
SIDF Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
 15
SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Establishments 
SNT Saudi Negotiating Team 
TRIMS Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPs Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UR Uruguay Round 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WP Working Party 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 17
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a complicated matter.  This has been 
the case for countries currently applying for accession and will be for those who are 
planning to.  The reason for this is of a dual, though intrinsic, nature.  The organization 
requests that the applicant country submit relevant legislation on a variety of subjects for 
its deliberation.  The issues under scrutiny have extended beyond traditional trade 
subjects such as customs law, tariff schedule and related regulations on imports and 
exports to include items such as laws on joint stock companies, central banks and credit 
institutions, licensing of economic activities, domestic taxation, patent and copyright 
protection, etc. (Michalopoulos, 1997: 7; Michalopoulos, 2001: 179-180).  More 
importantly perhaps, on the part of the applicant this entails that the submissions would 
be scrutinised for consistency with the provisions of the WTO agreements.  If the 
accession is secured, the applicant will further be subject to extended contractual 
obligations, as its policies of trading in goods and services and intellectual property 
rights have to be formulated in such a way as to be compatible with the standards of the 
WTO (Schott and Buurman, 1994: 9-13). 
Hence, any country that wishes to accede to the WTO should brace itself for a long and 
exhaustive process.  According to practice, this process would take two years at least, 
but the period could easily be drawn out to well more than a decade.  It took China, for 
example, fifteen years to finalise its accession.  Russia and Algeria have been 
negotiating theirs since 19931 (www.wto.org). 
As such, the accession question, in general, became particularly inciting in the case of 
this organization.  In fact, following its establishment in 1995, the question of accession 
emerged as one of the various pressing WTO-related issues that attracted attention at 
different levels, both academic and practical2.  Even the on-going Doha Round of the 
multilateral trade negotiations placed it as an item in the Ministerial Declaration that 
launched the round in 2001. 
                                                 
1
 Russia became a member in 2011 after completing 18 years of negotiations for the accession to the 
WTO. 
2
 The treatment of accession to the WTO in secondary literature will mainly be the focus of Chapter 2.  
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Generally, exploring the WTO accession issue is wide-ranging.  It perhaps can provide 
an insight to a wider theoretical concern in the field of International Relations (IR) with 
regard to nation-states ceding part of their authority to international organisations.  
Specifically, investigating the factors of a desired WTO accession has sometimes 
prompted scepticism. Sceptics would wonder how an acceding country would come to 
wish to join this organization when its high demands penetrate domestic boundaries and 
impose external restrictions (Sampson, 2001: 6).  Related to such scepticism, one should 
recall the massive street protests against the organization in Seattle in 1999 that proved 
the extent its negative public image, as an intruder in local affairs, had reached (Jones, 
2004:4).  Therefore, in addition to the insight that can generally be generated, addressing 
the accession question can also help to disperse scepticism on the practical or public 
level. 
Moreover, the process of accession was very intensely discussed, for some time, as some 
major economies were experiencing extremely difficult negotiations to join the WTO.  
Among these were China, Russia, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.  The case of China’s 
accession, in particular, sparked a big debate3.  The question of accession may be less 
prominent now after China, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia have joined, but that does not 
make it less important.  Not only because Russia and several regionally important 
countries such as Kazakhstan, Algeria and Iran are still aiming to accede, but because 
the WTO as an organization will not be able to live up to its claim of universality until 
all the approximately thirty countries currently applying are admitted.4  In fact, the 
WTO’s current troubles caused by the impediments in the on-going Doha Round’s 
negotiations should only increase the importance of the accession aspect as it proves the 
continual importance that countries attach to the organization. 
In this thesis, the WTO accession question will be examined with regard to the accession 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (sometimes referred to as the Kingdom).  It was one of 
                                                 
3
 As a rising economic and political power on the global stage, China’s accession among all acceding 
countries received the largest written coverage.  A simple search on the web will demonstrate how 
extensive the debate was over the accession of this second largest economy in the world.  
4
 See note No.1 on Russia’s accession 
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the most difficult accession processes.  The focus will basically be on the factors that 
determined Saudi Arabia’s accession decision over the years of its accession process. 
1.1 The Research Assumptions 
The literature on the WTO argues that the accession decision of any acceding country is 
based on a set of generic factors.  They include, for instance, integration in the world 
economy, locking in internal reforms, opening new markets for domestic products and 
attracting foreign investment (Bacchetta and Drabek, 2002; Lanoszka, 2001; Yang, 
1999; Krueger, 1999; Michalopoulos, 1997).  These are important contributions.  
However, the attempt to investigate the factors that shape a country’s desire to accede to 
the WTO– as examined in this study with respect to Saudi Arabia (seeking an accession 
in the face of the inherent complexities, liabilities and potential penetration of internal 
affairs) – requires answers that go further than these factors introduced in the literature. 
With the WTO, it is not the case that a country decides to join the organization for 
particular reasons, and then the actual accession follows immediately.  Accession is a 
process that takes a very long time.  On average, the process will take six years 
(Anderson, 2000: 22).  The issue of a country’s accession cannot possibly remain static 
during such a long period of time until its application is officially approved.  The 
negotiations are likely to keep going among the domestic authorities involved, and with 
those who have interests.  That is in addition to the negotiations with the WTO 
incumbent members, of course.  At another level, the on-going accession process is 
probably susceptible to major events even if they are not directly connected with the 
accession issue itself.  
Thus, the period of time that the accession takes should be taken into account because it 
can produce some important questions.  For example, will the internal perception and 
position of the parties concerned remain the same during the period in which the 
accession is negotiated?  Will the accession factors, or some of them, change overtime in 
terms of becoming more or less important?  What are the politics involved?  Will 
surrounding events, whether internal or external, have an effect on the acceding 
country’s position as far as its WTO application is concerned? 
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The answers to such questions will necessarily lead to the assumption that more 
elements need to be considered to understand the WTO accession than the direct ones 
provided in the literature.  The questions aim at clarifying the real and most effective 
factors that shape an accession issue, to be able to deliver a comprehensive account of 
the case examined.  However, the aim to know the real factors shaping a WTO accession 
would most likely, at the same time, demonstrate specifics.  In other words, such 
original factors of an accession issue will almost certainly have some specific 
characteristics due to domestic differences in the acceding countries.    
From experience, Drabek and Bacchetta observed that each accession process is unique 
(2004: 1086).  For this study, examining questions like the politics involved in an 
accession case would normally disclose, in the process, some considerable particularities 
about the acceding country subject to similar study.  One major indication, in this 
respect, is the diversity in the length of the accession negotiations although they are 
supposedly subject to the same procedures.  For instance, the finalisation of accession 
took only two years in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, while it extended for a whole 
fifteen years in the case of China (WTO, 2001:10).  Thus, the accession’s time length is 
probably a reflection of the volume of internal politics that were in operation in a 
particular case.  
Taking into account the complexity and extended time period of its accession 
negotiations, this thesis assumes that there were some factors of accession particular to 
the case of Saudi Arabia.  The main question, then, that the study aims to answer is: 
what were the specific factors that shaped this accession case?  It will be argued that 
understanding the nature of the factors that shaped an accession case over a particular 
length of time actually provides a new lens through which domestic politics can explain 
the international behaviour of the country of that case.  According to Montano, such 
accounts are important, but difficult to find in integrated works for most accession cases. 
Related data is usually scattered among a set of formal and informal sources (Montano, 
Interview, 06 March 2007). 
Unlike most sources on the Saudi accession, the starting point of this study goes as far 
back as 1985 when Saudi Arabia first contemplated joining the multilateral trading 
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system represented at the time by the GATT.  Taking this into account, the process took 
longer than the twelve or ten years indicated in other sources, as they adopted as starting 
point either 1993, the year when the Saudi government officially applied to join the 
GATT, or 1995, when the government converted its application into a bid to join the 
WTO.  The reason for adopting an earlier date is consistent with the thesis’ main 
concern.  As mentioned, the accession decision is not a spontaneous as the accession is, 
in fact, a process that would take years.  Thus, the aim to identify the factors of the 
accession would require going further back in date and seeing how these factors of 
joining either the GATT or the WTO were forming. 
During this long period of time (1985-2005), Saudi Arabia experienced different 
economic and political changes.  The windfall of oil benefits in the 1970s came to a 
substantial and consecutive decline during the 1980s and 1990s (Spero and Hart, 2003: 
299-335).  This led Simmons to comment that the interest in Saudi Arabia and other 
producers generated by the oil boom began to fade away (2005: 68).  However, the 
decline in oil prices began to unexpectedly take a reversed course with the advent of the 
third millennium.  Major reasons for this were the continual growth of oil consumption 
in the emerging economies like China and India, and the worldwide shortage of refinery 
installations (Berman, 2005: 6-9).  Thus, the upward spiral in the prices between 2000 
and 2005 brought back the interest in Saudi Arabia. 
Within the course of these economic changes, the concept of economic reform was 
widely on the rise.  According to Haggard, the 1980s and 1990s were a period of 
unprecedented economic reform in the developing countries (1995: 6).  Typically, the 
kind of reform adopted was based on a capitalist vision, which preached an open market 
and free trade. Saudi Arabia did not escape this trend of reform.  In fact, economic 
reform became an issue in the mid 1990s that drew real domestic attention. 
Likewise, the time period of the Saudi accession, as defined in this study, saw some 
major internal and external political events.  The Second Gulf War in 1991 resulted in 
economic and political pressure on the Saudi government.  The official end of the Cold 
War, as the old Soviet Union collapsed in the beginning of the 1990s, shuffled the 
priorities of the chief Saudi allies.  The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. 
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had substantial effects on Saudi political life.  In addition, the country experienced in 
2005 an important change in the leadership when King Abdullah assumed the throne 
after King Fahd had ruled for a quarter of a century. 
The thesis assumes that these economic and political elements were not neutral as far as 
the Saudi WTO accession was concerned.  It supposes that they interacted with the 
process of accession in a way that might have assisted it at particular times and hindered 
it at others.  In fact, out of such interaction, the thesis would argue that the Saudi 
accession experienced three different phases.  The first phase ran from 1985-1996, and 
was generally characterised by a lack of enthusiasm.  The second phase took place 
between 1997 and 2000, and was largely shaped, as far as this study is concerned, by the 
overall salience of economic factors.  The third phase was from 2001 to 2005, the date at 
which Saudi Arabia officially acceded to the WTO, and it was broadly characterised, as 
will be explained later, by political involvement.   
This assumed metamorphosis that characterised the Saudi accession process will be 
examined in detail later in the chapters.  In doing so, the thesis will investigate the 
factors that were at work in each phase, and because of which the phase has taken that 
specific characterisation as indicated above.  Sometimes, an inactive factor shaped the 
characteristics of a particular phase, too.  
1.2 The Significance of the Saudi Accession Question 
The importance of the Saudi accession case is due, in short, to four factors: (a) the 
periods of varying intensity with respect to the negotiations themselves (at one point 
they came to a complete halt); (b) the protracted length of time it took to complete the 
accession process; (c) Saudi Arabia’s unique characteristics as a country; and (d) the fact 
that, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, not much has been written about Saudi 
Arabia’s accession process. 
The different phases are one of the significant features of the Saudi accession.  Overall, 
the accession was of a slow pace.  It reached its all-time low when the whole negotiation 
process came to a halt in the year 2000.  This signalled a real pessimism about the 
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accession as a whole.5  In 2003, however, the Saudi government announced resuming 
the negotiations.  What was striking about this was, in fact, the enthusiasm and speed 
with which the negotiations were taken up again on all sides – the Saudis and the WTO 
incumbent members.  This metamorphosis indicated that the WTO accession induces a 
genuine internal and external interaction, which it will be interesting to identify. 
As mentioned, this study claims that the Saudi WTO accession process began when the 
country first contemplated joining the multilateral trade system in 1985.  This placed it 
among the most protracted WTO accessions.  It rivalled those of China and Russia, 
which took well over a decade to finalise.  The WTO has generally been based on the 
principles of the free market (Jackson, 1997).  As Saudi Arabia never experienced a 
communist regime, it was not to be expected that its accession process would take this 
long.  It shall also be interesting to understand how this can be accounted for. 
The backdrop of the Saudi case has some particular elements that further pique the 
researcher’s interest in this case.  Saudi Arabia is one of the few monarchies in the world 
where monarchs possess absolute power especially in formulating internationally related 
policies.  Economically, it has the world’s largest oil reserves, which was largely 
thought, for some time, to be out of the domain of the WTO.  Culturally, the Saudi state 
enjoys a distinctive religious status, as it adopts precepts of Islamic law, the Shariah, 
which may occasionally be expected to make compromises with international norms not 
an easy affair. 
Lastly, the above-mentioned statement by Montano about the lack of integrated studies 
on the accession process of most acceding countries would make any such attempt, in 
principle, a legitimate project for research.  As to Saudi Arabia in particular, very little 
has been written on its WTO accession process.  This has been the case despite the fact 
that until its official accession in December 2005, it was considered one of the few 
major economies that were still out of the WTO.  The literature on Saudi Arabia and the 
WTO has mainly embarked on issues within the framework of this organization, but not 
the process itself.  For instance, it focused on issues related to Saudi Arabia as a member 
                                                 
5Such pessimism was particularly reflected in some of the interviews conducted for the purpose of this 
thesis in Saudi Arabia prior to resuming the WTO accession negotiations in 2003. 
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in the Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC); or 
related to the country and the application of anti-dumping; or related to expected 
economic challenges of membership on the Saudi economy.6  Unlike such studies, the 
focus of this thesis will be on the Saudi accession process, the internal interaction, and 
the factors that affected it the most. 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, no comprehensive study has embarked on this 
aspect.  Therefore, rendering this research is a valuable contribution to the literature on 
the WTO and the accession of a special state like Saudi Arabia. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
Probably more than any other policies, trade policy has a direct domestic consequence.  
Its tools such as tariffs, quotas and non-tariff barriers affect the interest of a broad range 
of groups in the society and can redistribute gains among them.  Hence, trade policy will 
usually involve a great deal of internal politics, or as Spero and Hart put it: “Trade 
policy is the stuff of domestic politics” (2003: 66).  As to trade policy and the WTO 
accession, they are intrinsically related as the accession is of a great effect on 
formulating trade policies.  This leads, as far as this study is concerned, to see in 
examining internal politics a good approach to the providing of an inclusive and 
plausible perspective of a WTO accession case rather than relying only on the general 
factors laid in the literature of rationalising the effort made by acceding countries to join 
the organization.  Accordingly, this thesis will hypothesise that studying the domestic 
interaction that were at play throughout the years of the accession process can better 
explain the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO.  As it will come in Chapter Three, 
adopting one level of analysis in the IR should not exclude the consideration of other 
levels.  Hence, the focus of this study on the internal interaction shall not preclude 
considering the effect of externalities. 
 
                                                 
6Among these studies see: “The Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)”, Eyad Reda, ILA British Branch 2005 Spring Conference, Royal Society of 
Edinburgh 27-28 May 2005.  “Anti-Dumping Regulations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
their Applications in Some Prominent Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)” Eyad Reda, LLM Dissertation 
2004, University of Sheffield. 
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The internal interaction intended to be examined according to the above-mentioned main 
hypothesis occurred, as far as this case is concerned, in a particular political, economic 
and cultural context.  Taking this assumption, in addition to bringing in externalities in 
the examination, should lead to generate further hypotheses or rather sub-hypotheses.  
They are related to the feature of the political system in Saudi Arabia, the expected 
position of the societal interest groups relevant to the WTO accession, the structure of 
the official institutions closely involved in the accession process, the economic situation 
and the surrounding events during the years of the accession process.  
Saudi Arabia is, as indicated, a ruling monarchy.  In such a regime, it would be expected 
that one person or a small circle of persons unitarily make decisions.  The expectation is 
that once such decisions have been made, they will be immediately and smoothly 
enforced.  As such, one may assume that the internal politics would have been limited, 
and this may undermine the main hypothesis laid above.  However, the extended years 
of the Saudi case, as argued in this study, cannot but contradict the assumption of the 
limitation of internal politics.  
Some indications of the existence of such politics are in the characteristics of the 
economic and legal systems of the country.  Saudi Arabia has generally been classified 
in the literature of political economy as a ‘rentier’ state.  In this kind of economy, 
segments of the society, especially the business community, would live off 
government’s rents – a status quo which the GATT/WTO would likely threaten.  Hence, 
resistance to an official acceding decision would be expected from such a community.  
Similarly, the GATT/WTO and legality matters could provoke some societal objections, 
as well, to any governmental decision favouring a timely accession to the multilateral 
trading system.  In this, Saudi Arabia has been legally and culturally governed by the 
Islamic Shariah.  Thus, the expansion over time of the WTO’s jurisdictions to include 
subjects of legal and cultural nature will have been disturbing to groups within the Saudi 
society.  Depending on their stance to the accession throughout the years, therefore, the 
societal interest groups, as they will be defined in Chapter Three, should have been of an 
essential impact on the Kingdom’s accession process.   
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Apart from the possible confrontational effect on some societal groups, the central type 
of government that the Saudi authoritative monarchy represents can itself experience a 
political interaction among its agents.  Although centrality might imply a limited number 
of effective agents, the number and nature of such agents would essentially depend, 
according to Tsebelis, on the issue at hand. 
Tsebelis called the agents or the actors he studied ‘veto players’.  He gave an example 
on how the issue impacts the nature of the veto players.  According to him, for example, 
U.S. monetary policy, where swift adjustments are important, is handled by a non-
political independent actor (Tsebelis, 1995: 307-308). 
The veto players in Tsebelis’ view are “an individual or collective actor whose 
agreement is required for a policy decision”.  A policy decision or change in policy, 
according to Tsebelis, is a function of one or more of the following three factors: the 
number of veto players, their congruence and the internal cohesion of each one of them.  
The chance to make a decision or to have a change is inversely affected by these factors 
(1995: 293).  Therefore, a decision or a change in policy will, for example, be more 
likely if the number of veto players is small, and vice versa. 
In the case of the WTO accession of Saudi Arabia, several governmental agents were 
directly involved.  They were: the Council of Ministers (COM), the ‘Higher’ Ministerial 
Committee (HMC), the Ministerial Committee (MC) and the Saudi Negotiating Team 
(SNT).  As far as this study is concerned, they will be treated herein, as explained in 
Chapter Three, as the formal institutions whose work was immediate and vital to the 
accession issue.  In any event, their number seems, as far as this thesis is concerned, 
quite large, which might have had the effect of the number of ‘veto players’ mentioned-
above.  
As mentioned, the element of time is important as far as accessions are concerned.  It 
exposes such processes to the surrounding internal and external changes.  The years of 
the Saudi Arabian accession process have mostly coincided with an international 
momentum gained by the concept of economic reform over the two previous decades.  
Reform programmes differ in scope and pace, but their concept would normally imply a 
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departure from an old practice and generally relate to structural adjustments.  
Remarkably, the 1980s and 1990s were, according to Haggard, a period of 
unprecedented economic reform in the history of developing countries (1995: 6). 
In general, there is no theory with regard to causes of reform.  Yet, there have been 
economic conditions that would usually be related to reform.  One of the most frequent 
stimuli to reform has been crisis (Bates and Krueger, 1993: 452).  In fact, it has been the 
most cited reason for reform, or as Rodrik put it: “Indeed, if there is one single theme 
that runs through the length of the political economy literature it is the idea that crisis is 
the instigator of reform” (1996: 26).  Triggers of crisis were different; they ranged from 
balance-of-payment difficulties to accelerating inflation to loss of economic control 
(Bates and Krueger, 1993: 452-453).  One other single major trigger of crisis was debt.  
Most of the developing countries experienced a traumatic debt burden in the 1980s, 
which led to a worldwide “debt crisis” (Krueger, 1993: 1). 
Another important instigator for reform was the prevalence of the ideas of integration 
with the world economy, which entailed openness and liberalisation.  Such prevalence 
was largely a result of the perception of failure of old policies.  After a wave of gaining 
independence in the 1950s and 1960s, most developing countries searched for policies 
that would work to enhance that independence and their efforts of state-building.  In that 
context, developing countries adopted policies of state planning that provided for import 
substitution industrialisation, protection, infant industry, subsidies etc.  Though not 
unanimously agreed upon, the weak growth and debt problem of the 1980s were 
attributed to the adoption of such polices and were incrementally abandoned for the sake 
of liberalising, which came to be perceived as the remedy (Sachs et al, 1995; Rodrik, 
1996; Drabek and Laird, 1998; Krueger, 1993; Rodrik, 2001). 
The change in perception – from adopting state planning strategies to embracing 
liberalisation that entailed less governmental intervention – has usually been attributed 
to an approach that stressed the primacy of the impact of technocrats.  This approach 
emphasised that policy reform resulted from technocrats’ diagnosis of economic 
maladies (Bates and Krueger, 1993: 455).  According to other approaches, the idea of 
the superior worth of liberalisation was also promoted by international organisations.  In 
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their implementation of reform programmes, many developing countries, according to 
Drabek and Laird, were following advice proposed or supported by the IMF and the 
World Bank (1998: 243).  In referring to the important role played by the World Bank, 
as far as reform was concerned, Rodrik stated that the bank became “the most important 
conduit of economic ideas to developing-country policy makers” (1996:27). 
From another point of view, Henderson argued that one should go beyond the 
framework of ideas in explaining reform.  He pointed out that the trend towards 
liberalisation could largely be attributed not only to ideas, but also to the combined 
impact of ideas and events on the prevailing climate of opinion.  Events, according to 
Henderson, are usually external (1998: 90-93). 
In fact, Saudi Arabia was not exempt from the economic difficulties, which swept oil-
based economies in the middle of the 1980s, according to Haggard (1995: 15).  The 
consecutive decline in oil prices over the decade put the Kingdom in debt for the first 
time and contributed to making it reach 120% of the GDP in 1999 (U.S. Department of 
State, 2002).  In the process of rectifying this critical situation, the Kingdom was no 
exception.  The aforementioned predominance of economic liberalisation and integration 
with the world economy on the basis of free market principles had made its mark in 
Saudi Arabia as well.  In this, a large section of high-ranking educated officials and non-
officials were backing the idea of opening and liberalising. 
As to the importance of external events on inciting reform, which Henderson argued for, 
the Kingdom has naturally been sensitive to such events.  The fact that it has been a key 
state in terms of exporting a strategically important item (oil) linked the country to the 
international markets, particularly those of the major world traders like Japan, the EU 
and the U.S.  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia had been tied to the U.S. in what is widely 
referred to as ‘special relations’.  Maintaining such a described relation became an 
important determinant in the Saudi Arabian foreign policy.  In this regard, the events of 
9/11 contributed to the first endeavour to push the limits of reform in the Kingdom to 
include some political aspects.  Accordingly, and because accession to the WTO is key 
to reform in general as it will be explained in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, the thesis 
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will postulate that such an endeavour of reform by Saudi Arabia was probably of a 
positive effect on its accession process. 
Finally, in the course of generating sub-hypotheses, the WTO as an organization 
expanded, over the years of the Saudi accession case, the terms of its accession 
requirements, to include areas that were not covered by the old GATT.  The expansion 
seemed to impinge on domestic legal affairs of acceding countries in general.  In 
addition to this, although multilateral, the WTO gave way to the bilateral dimension 
when it came to the issue of accession specifically.  In the WTO, no application can be 
approved without being individually accepted by all interested members.  In this, 
negotiations of accession would be held between an acceding country and all interested 
members represented in a Working Party (WP) set up to consider the applicant’s request 
for joining the organization.  
Generally, the WTO major traders have been the U.S., the EU, Japan and Canada.  They 
have customarily been referred to as the ‘Quad’ countries and have usually participated 
in every WP set up to consider an accession case (Jawara and Kwa, 2003: 23-79).  Their 
globally influential trading position, in addition to their status as incumbent members, 
gave them an upper hand in approximately each accession negotiation.  In many cases, 
they were able to push applicants to make very heavy commitments.  In light of this, it 
will be assumed herein that the jurisdictional enlargement of the WTO as an 
organization and the in practice influence conceded to the Quad in accession 
negotiations might have retarded the progress of the accession case of Saudi Arabia. 
To summarise, the above-mentioned main hypothesis and the sub-hypotheses will be 
examined in the main argument of the thesis: in spite of the generic factors mentioned in 
the literature on accession, particularly concerning the aspect of attracting nation-states 
to WTO membership, the accession cases are primarily characterised by distinctive 
factors.  In the case of Saudi Arabia’s WTO accession, such peculiarities are exemplified 
by indigenous societal interests and formal institutions in addition to another group of 
internal and external factors.  All were generally particular to the case.  Examining those 
elements will provide, as the thesis argues, a systemic account on how the WTO 
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accession of Saudi Arabia was shaped over the years of its endeavour to join the 
organization. 
Before having the main hypothesis and sub-hypotheses closely investigated starting 
from Chapter Four, the following is a try to provide tentative answers to the enquiries 
implied in the hypotheses.  In the main argument of the thesis, the accession of Saudi 
Arabia was the result of a domestic interplay throughout the years of the process.  As 
those years extended over a very long time, especially as far as the scope of this study 
defines the period in question, the Kingdom’s accession saw changes in its internal and 
external context, which in turn affected the factors that were important to the Saudi 
Arabian’s WTO accession process.  Therefore, this accession was, as this study argues, 
characterised by multiple metamorphoses. 
Having divided the Kingdom’s accession process into phases according to the 
metamorphoses observed by the researcher, the thesis will argue that the early years of 
the Kingdom’s accession to the multilateral trading system (represented at the time by 
the GATT), were characterised by a lack of enthusiasm, especially on the Saudi side.  
This was largely a reflection to domestic realities.  Around this time, the highest 
authority began to experience what some called it a ‘collective leadership’ in this ruling 
monarchical system.  In such a milieu, something unique had developed in the internal 
political affairs of Saudi Arabia.  The sponsorship of a senior royal sometimes became 
essential for a major project to make a progress.  From following the accession issue of 
Saudi Arabia, the GATT/WTO accession case did not, for a long time of the Kingdom’s 
accession process, enjoy such a mentorship. 
The GATT, in particular, was not internally perceived as a potential solution to the 
economic challenges of the time or even as a threat to the existing interests.  Thus, there 
was neither an overt keenness to advocate accession, nor was there such an endeavour to 
oppose it.  Likewise, external issues, though their impact was indirect, were also of no 
help in furthering the accession at that early stage of the process.  The consecutive wars 
in the region at the time were critical enough to divert internal attention.  Moreover, in a 
time when relationships in the Middle East were still defined by the polarisation of the 
Cold War, which gave regional states some political manoeuvre, major trading allies to 
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Saudi Arabia, particularly the U.S., would likely not put pressure on the Saudis to join 
their semi-organization, the GATT. 
The internal interaction was also decisive when the accession process took a different 
turn, as this thesis will argue.  The sharp deterioration in oil prices in 1998 was a clear 
sign to the Saudi leadership that the economic booming era of the 1970s would not 
return.  Looking for new economic opportunities became crucial for the government.  
Unlike the GATT, the newly established WTO was expanding to become important, as a 
signal at least, as far as attracting foreign investments and opening new international 
markets were concerned.  Both were increasingly needed by the Saudi Arabian 
economy.  In addition, by now more familiar with the process, the Saudi negotiators 
realised first-hand the complexity of the accession negotiations and that the demands of 
the WP members were increasing as time passed.  Hence, there was almost certainly no 
place for laxity that shaped the previous years.   
Such developments coincided with compatible external factors.  The collapse of the old 
Soviet Union, and with it the prestige of communism and the philosophy of the direct 
governmental management of the economy, led to a more interdependent world 
economy based on free market principles.  Therefore, a wave of economic reform swept 
the developing world including Saudi Arabia, as this study will show.  For non-member 
countries, joining the WTO has been essential part of any economic reforming attempt 
and this implies the enhancement that reform can offer to an accession endeavour.  
However, the same evolution of the multilateral trading system from the GATT to the 
WTO, which increased its functional importance, resulted in an expansion in the 
organization’s legal jurisdictions, and in the leverage given to its incumbent members in 
negotiating accessions.  Such an aspect should have prevented the Kingdom’s accession 
from making a real progress.  The protraction of the process was significant in pointing 
to such hindrance.  The expansion of the organization’s coverage must have worked at 
some junctures to trigger an overlapping between the economic factors, which enhanced 
the Kingdom’s willingness to join the multilateral trading system in Phase Two, and 
some other political and religious factors unique to Saudi Arabia.  In the long absence of 
a strong mentor, as mentioned above, the economic factors could not presumably 
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overcome the political and religious ones.  It might be added to this the multiplicity of 
the governmental agents involved7. The creation of even more of such agents 
particularly around this point of time would probably, according to Tsebelis’s 
assumption, widen the domestic arguing over the aforementioned overlapping of 
economic, political and religious issues.  
In addition to this situation, the external developments that occurred approximately 
around the same time of Phase Two raised some domestic questions about the value of 
the accession.  On the one hand, the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle in 1999 was an indication of an unpromising future for the organization.  On the 
other hand, the unexpected upward trend of the oil prices since the year 2000 led to an 
internal claim that Saudi Arabia could do well without being a member of the 
demanding WTO.  Perhaps, the intensity of such difficult internal and external factors 
ushered in the ‘pause’ in the accession negotiations at the end of this phase.  
The negotiations for accession resumed in 2003.  Of course, the ‘pause’ should not mean 
that the Kingdom’s accession issue was completely dead as the economic factors that 
had previously prompted the effort to join the WTO in Phase Two were still there.  What 
it was most striking, however, was the rapid pace with which the negotiation had 
resumed.   
In fact, Phase Three was of a quite different set up.  The phase took place around the 
event of 9/11, which in turn worked to re-shape the Saudi politics in general.  One 
important aspect in this respect is the manner of applying reform.  Unlike what had been 
occurring up to that point, the boundaries of reform transcended for the first time the 
economy to include some new political arrangements.  Moreover, it was very important 
that such a new reality found in King Abdullah, the crown prince at the time, an 
influential champion.  Therefore, it would be plausible to anticipate that the expansion of 
the framework of reform to include political aspects and the leadership provided by 
Abdullah, in this regard, helped to overcome the political and religious inhibitions that 
                                                 
7They are presented herein as institutions, based on the conceptualisation that assigns the quality of agency 
to institutions.   
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had previously caused, as far as the WTO issue was concerned, the halt in the accession 
negotiations. 
In addition to this, the more powerful effect of politics should have applied to the U.S. as 
well as it did to Saudi Arabia at the final stages of the accession process.  In spite of the 
special bilateral relations, the U.S. was the most difficult incumbent member that the 
Saudis negotiated the WTO accession with, and it was the last to sign a bilateral 
agreement.  However, the new realities shaped by the events of 9/11 made it all the more 
important to have the Kingdom’s co-operation in the U.S. world-wide war on terrorism, 
which should have opened new space for some political trade-offs between the two 
countries that likely included, in the process, the issue of the WTO accession. 
Overall, these tentative answers offered to the preliminary satisfaction of the arguments 
implied in the hypotheses of the thesis were provided in light of the researcher’s initial 
taking of the Saudi Arabian’s WTO accession issue.  An extended investigation of the 
case throughout the study, starting from Chapter Three specifically, shall further reflect 
on the applicability of such answers. 
1.4 Methodology 
This research aims to identify the factors that were at work in shaping the Saudi WTO 
accession during a specific period of time.  It is a new in-depth account generating 
insight about a single case study.  As is often the situation with case studies, it is 
important to refer to the empirical insight generated by conducting interviews.   
As the thesis is to examine how internal elements affected international policy, as far as 
the Kingdom’ accession to the WTO was concerned, the focus of the interviews was 
principally on Saudi figures from both: governmental institutions and societal interests.  
At the level of the former, the aim was to meet as many as possible with formal figures 
of official interest in the accession.  Specifically, the researcher intended to meet with 
members from the MC and the SNT as they were the formal agents (institutions) of the 
immediate dealing with the negotiation process.  In fact, fifteen interviews were 
conducted with such figures, including those from the aforementioned formal agents. 
The range of the authority of the interviewees ran from two former ministers of 
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commerce, whom by virtue of their position were important members of the MC and led 
the SNT, to a member in the Shura, to officials in the SNT with deputy minister ranking, 
to the top negotiator in the SNT, to some immediate effective negotiators.8  Conducting 
those interviews required two different visits to Saudi Arabia and most of them were 
held in the major cities of Riyadh and Jeddah. 
As to societal interests, the interviews’ focus was on two elements: the business 
community and the religious establishment.  Nineteen interviews were held with 
prominent Saudi businesspersons and with some that their type of work relates to 
business such as consultancy.  The aim was to have a variety of business interests in the 
interviews as the WTO’s subjects have very much been diverse. In fact, the nature of the 
interviewees’ interests in this thesis covered a wide range of economic activities 
including finance, industry, agriculture, construction, trade agency and services.  The 
great majority of the interviews were conducted in Riyadh and Jeddah during the 
aforementioned two fieldwork trips to Saudi Arabia. 
The religious interests were presented by two interviewees.  As it will come in the 
following section, it is not an easy task to hold interviews with figures from the religious 
establishment.  For those two interviews to be conducted, the researcher took the 
permission of the minister of justice.  In addition, the religious establishment’s concern 
with regard to joining the WTO came, as it will be explained in examining the phases of 
the Kingdom’s accession, out of the worry about the continual protraction that some had 
attributed it to the organization’s demands to make concessions in religious-related 
subjects.  As such, it developed a general position of objection.  Therefore, not many in 
the religious establishment would know beyond the potential threats they perceived.  
The significance of the two interviewees, with whom the researcher was able to meet 
after an official permission, was that they were exposed to a wider knowledge about the 
WTO.  As it will come later, the formation of the HMC included the ministry of justice 
to accommodate the wider concern of the religious establishment.  As the ministry of 
justice was to report to the HMC about its opinion, it was important to study the 
                                                 
8
 The details of the interviewees and the interviews will be provided in the bibliography. 
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organization and its main issues.  In fact, such a task was assigned to one of the two 
aforementioned interviewees. 
Generally, the questions asked revolved around five broad points.  First, it was about the 
idea of joining the WTO in the first place in terms of how positive or negative it was 
perceived.  Second, on what terms it was thought that the Kingdom should join the 
organization.  Third, what factors that had been viewed to affect the accession 
negotiations.  Fourth, how well it was considered the Saudi management of the 
negotiations.  Fifth, it was about the degree of co-ordination between the formal 
institutions and the societal interests. 
As differences occurred between the categories to which the interviewees belonged, 
some specific questions were specifically posed.  For instance, the interviewees from the 
formal institutions were asked about the position of their encounters in the negotiations 
regarding the agricultural religious-related items, the Kingdom’s self-proclaimed 
developing status and the issue of Israel.  As to the business community, the 
businesspersons interviewed were asked about their reflection on the accession issue as 
far as their types of business were concerned.  The religious establishment’s 
representatives in the interviews received, in this regard, questions about the religious 
structure of the Kingdom and the effect of the Hanbali thread of Islamic thought. 
Although they were the majority, the interviews were neither confined to Saudis nor to 
those with official or societal interest’s affiliation, as in the above.  Thus, fifteen 
interviews were held with non-Saudi figures and with Saudis with no direct official or 
interest in the accession.  First of all, and as it was possible, the interviews aimed at 
learning about the opposite views particularly that of the American negotiators.  The US 
is the most important member of the Quad and as it will come later in the chapters it was 
a major reason for the protraction of the Saudi accession case although of the historically 
close relations between the two countries.  Also, the thesis will briefly introduce in 
Chapter Two examples from other accession experiences particularly that of Jordan, 
Oman and Bahrain.  Therefore, it was important to enquire about such experiences from 
people with close involvement in them.  In addition to all of this, it was helpful 
sometimes to hear from either Saudis or non-Saudis whom the researcher knew that they 
 36
were of an extended knowledge about the political and religious life of Saudi Arabia or 
the WTO even if they were not directly involved in the Saudi accession case as a whole. 
A few of the interviews in this category – the non-Saudi – were conducted in London.  
Some other few interviews were held over the phones as the interviewees were 
responding from their countries like the ones from Bahrain.  However, the majority of 
the interviews took place during a fieldwork trip to Geneva and to the Head Quarter of 
the WTO. 
In General, resorting to interviews appears essential in such a research.  Since 
confidentiality is at the heart of the WTO accession process, accession negotiations are 
closed, and no documents about what goes on between the WTO and its incumbent 
members, on the one hand, and the applicant country, on the other, can be disclosed.  
Only after the completion of the negotiations and upon the official accession of an 
applicant is a report of the outcomes be published.  Likewise, confidentiality usually 
shapes the internal interaction among the concerned agents as well, particularly the 
governmental ones among them, lest the official negotiating plans be exposed.  
Accordingly, conducting interviews provides necessary relevant data. 
However, the extended years of negotiations with the WP members and the internal 
interaction that coincided with the negotiations are difficult to cover by interviews alone, 
as what took place over the time was, in addition to its secretive nature, very dense.  
Thus, other sources such as documents will be important.  In this, the study will often 
refer to official documents that a large number of them have not been considered 
previously in the literature of the Kingdom’s accession.  They will provide essential 
primary sources with regard to the negotiating positions of Saudi Arabia and the WTO 
incumbent members. 
The documents are more of official records than of letters or diaries, for example.  As 
they often registered exact positions, they were generally original in representing facts.  
In other words, they were not letters exchanged between involved parties, for instance, 
where opinions are usually heavily represented.  However, those documents were not at 
the same time as value-free as records such as banking statements or driving licenses.  In 
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fact, they were produced in a context of an on-going event.  Thus, this study will attempt 
a fair and balanced interpretation of the documents available in light of the wider related 
context of the time. 
As this research is aiming to investigate particular factors in order to provide a systemic 
interpretation and evaluation of a case, it shall adhere to the qualitative category of the 
empirical method.  Interpretation and evaluation are best provided by qualitative 
methods, and they are important to generate accounts (Austvik, 2009), which is what 
this case intends to do pertaining to the Saudi Arabian accession.  Moreover, qualitative 
methods generally rely on the researcher’s knowledge of the case (Austvik, 2009).  
Although not directly involved, the fact that the researcher belongs to the Saudi civil 
service affords him with a reasonable knowledge in this matter.  
Adopting this empirical/qualitative method, the thesis will further achieve its objective 
through two dimensions.  First, it will incorporate a review of the literature on the WTO 
accession aspect with an examination of the main factors indicated in this literature as a 
rationale for accession, and to what extent they applied to Saudi Arabia’s accession 
endeavour.  The thesis declares, as set out earlier, that the complexity of the accession 
process is an important element in embarking on this study in the first place.  Such 
complexity can only be solved by referring to the accession aspect in the WTO 
literature, and giving some examples from other accessions, namely Jordan, Oman and 
Bahrain. 
Second, as the importance of internal politics, political and economic, for the case 
constitutes the main hypothesis, and as the WTO accession is largely shaped by political 
and economic interplay, the study will include a discussion of the concept of 
International Political Economy (IPE).  It will focus on concepts such as institutions and 
interests.  These concepts became increasingly important in the study of the IR.  To this 
field, domestic institutions and interests have developed as essential variables in 
determining states’ foreign policies (Milner, 1997: 3-11).  The study will review such 
domestically related concepts for the purpose of developing an analytical framework for 
the case.   
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1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study intends to identify the factors shaping the Saudi WTO accession.  It will look, 
for this purpose, into the internal politics among concerned institutions and interests.  In 
addition, it will consider the events, whether internal or external, which affected the case 
over the specified time period. 
Thus, the study has a political focus.  Although referring to economic components such 
as sectors of the Saudi economy and the opinion of those belonging to them, the thesis 
will not study the economic effects of the WTO accession on the sectors of the economy 
per se, nor anticipate their condition post accession.  What will be presented, however, 
are the overall trends in those sectors pertaining to the accession, in their importance to 
the internal interaction throughout the years of the process. 
Single case studies rely, to a large extent, on interviews and documents.  Although this 
will be an important source for collecting related data, it has to be established that this is 
not an easy task as far as this case is concerned.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, it 
is the above-mentioned confidentiality with which the WTO as an organization tries to 
treat the process of accession.  Second, it is because it deals with politics inside Saudi 
Arabia.  Saudi Arabia is not customarily open when it comes to its internal politics.  
According to Kechichian, the political system in the Kingdom is in large part centred on 
the ruling family, and the family politics go undocumented (23-25).  This must be taken 
into consideration particularly when interviewing people of religious interest.  
Accordingly, there might be sometimes gaps in the information about specific moments 
in the time period of the accession.  However, the researcher believes that such gaps will 
not affect the general context of this account. 
Finally, the examples referred to in the methodology section (Jordan, Oman and 
Bahrain) are not meant to render the thesis a comparative one.  As mentioned, this is a 
single case study.  The examples herein serve to illustrate the complexity of the 
accession process and its general application to acceding countries, not to study the 
internal politics in those examples during their accession negotiations.  In any event, any 
such an attempt would be extremely difficult.  As noted, the secretive nature of the WTO 
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accession process is a chief obstacle in the face of trying to meticulously uncover an 
accession case.  The help that the researcher’s position with respect to the Saudi case can 
offer, in this respect, is not available as far as other accessions are concerned.  In 
addition to this, the customary time length of accession cases would require any 
comparative attempt to have a huge amount of information, and extended resources that 
might not be easily available to a single researcher. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis will be divided into seven chapters.  This introductory chapter shall include 
the main features of what is to follow.  The structure of the thesis is as follows. 
Chapter Two will review the accession aspect in the literature about the WTO.  It will 
examine the rationale of accession.  What, in general, attracts nation-states to seek 
membership in this organization?  It will also discuss the process itself and the different 
stages that it normally takes.  In addition, it will assess the organization’s rules and 
regulations that govern the whole process.  The arguments and counter-arguments over 
those rules, and the general complexity of the process will be discussed as well.  The 
chapter will end with a brief review of the GATT/WTO accession of Jordan, Oman and 
Bahrain.  It will cite them as examples for the rationale to join the organization, and the 
complexity that characterises its accession. 
Chapter Three will provide an analytical framework for the study.  Thus, the chapter will 
briefly review the concept of the IPE and locate the Saudi political economy’s position 
in the literature.  In this respect, the chapter will consider the approaches that they could 
provide a plausible answer to the WTO accession question.  They are the society-centred 
and state-centred approaches.  The focus, as far as the framework is concerned, will be 
on the concepts of institutions and interests. 
After laying the ground, the chapters to follow Chapter Three will concentrate on 
analysing the case itself, which extended, as far as this study is concerned, from 1985-
2005.  As mentioned above, the researcher observed that the Saudi accession 
experienced three different phases at three specified periods of the accession years.  
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Thus, starting from the next chapter to Chapter Three, each phase will be examined in an 
independent chapter.   
Chapter Four will tackle the first phase that lasted from 1985 to 1996.  This phase was, 
as argued above, characterised by general lack of enthusiasm particularly on the Saudi 
part.  Chapter Five will cover the second phase between 1997 and 2000.  The phase was 
distinguished, as mentioned earlier, significantly by economic factors.  It was the phase 
where the negotiations with the WP members were first held.  Thus, the chapter will 
examine the main negotiated issues.  This phase, however, ended with a hiatus in the 
negotiation process as a whole.  Chapter Six will cover the third and last phase of the 
Saudi accession as defined by the author.  Phase Three experienced a surprising 
recommencement of the accession negotiation in 2003, and ended with the Saudi official 
accession in 2005.  This phase was, in the study’s view, typified by political 
involvement. 
The aim of these empirical chapters will be to interpret the metamorphoses that the 
Saudi accession experienced.  In each of these chapters, the main internal and external 
factors, whether economic or political, that had an effect during the phase examined will 
be identified.  This will also include some inactive factors that, had they been different, 
could have, at least partially, changed the course of the process.  To simplify the 
demonstration, each chapter from Chapter Four to Chapter Six will end with a square 
diagram in which the active or inactive (but effective) factors during the phase will be 
illustrated.  The outcome of these chapters will be the in-depth account of the Saudi 
WTO accession, which is the overall aim of the thesis. 
Chapter Seven is the conclusion.  The chapter will highlight the major turns in Saudi 
Arabia’s WTO accession, as they happened in the case’s phases, and the main factors 
behind them.  It will also discuss how the Saudi case fits in the analytical framework 
provided in Chapter Three.  The conclusion will end with the results that can be 
stemmed from the examination of the main hypothesis and sub-hypotheses of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Accession Aspects in the WTO Literature 
The WTO was established in 1995 and was basically built on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and its core idea of trade liberalisation.  The old 
GATT was an agreement signed by 23 developed and developing countries that decided 
to reduce tariff rates on goods traded among them after the meetings in Bretton Woods 
in 1944, which created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
failed to agree on a scheme to create an international organisation for trade (Winters, 
1990: 1289).  Based on the principles of non-discrimination and most favoured nation 
(MFN) status, the GATT went through consecutive rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations, as illustrated in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: GATT Rounds 
Year Place/Name Countries 
1947 Geneva 23 
1949 Annecy 13 
1951 Torquay 38 
1956 Geneva 26 
1960-1961 Geneva  Dillon Round 26 
1964-1967 Geneva Kennedy Round 62 
1973-1979 Geneva Tokyo Round 102 
1986-1994 Geneva Uruguay Round 123 
2001- Doha Round  
 
The major ones among them were: the Dillon Round (1960-1961) that marked the 
beginning of a shift from the technical domain to the political domain as the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 raised concerns of 
possible discrimination (Winters, 1990: 1290-1292); the Kennedy Round (1963-1967), 
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which was successful in making tariff concessions that covered US$40 billion worth of 
trade (Deardorff and Stern, 1994: 31-34); and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), which 
made the non-tariff barriers a priority after the significant reduction in tariff rates that 
GATT had been able to achieve up to that point (Jackson, 1990: 36-37). 
Led by the U.S., the initiative to launch a new round came immediately after the 
conclusion of the Tokyo Round.  Moved by domestic pressure to increase protection, the 
U.S. government endeavoured to have a new round that would include rather new issues 
in which the U.S. had a clear comparative advantage.  After initial hesitance on the part 
of the EU countries that feared difficult compromises on agriculture, and refusal from 
the developing countries that thought GATT had not yet delivered on promises it made, 
the U.S.’s endeavour succeeded in the end in launching a new round in 1986, which 
came to be called the Uruguay Round (UR) (Croome, 1995: 11; Schott, 1994: 4-5; 
Hudec, 1993: 180-181). 
The UR included the old traditional issues, such as the reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, and the non-traditional issues related to trade in services and intellectual 
property rights.  The round resulted in the conversion of the multilateral trading system 
from an agreement represented by the GATT to an organization represented by the 
WTO.  The new WTO was to administer the agreements about the new issue areas 
negotiated in the round.  The most prominent among them were: the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) in addition to the GATT or, as it came to be called, GATT 1994, which 
was generally built, with some modifications and supplements, on the old GATT 1947.  
Unlike previous rounds, the results of the UR were to be approximately adhered to as a 
whole according to the principle of ‘single undertaking’ where all provisions should be 
applied to all members.  To ensure non-violation, the UR created an effective dispute-
settlement mechanism and made it available to the WTO (Ostry, 1997: 175-200; 
Jackson, 2000: 7; Brack and Clegg, 2001: 14; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 1-50). 
The birth of the WTO came approximately at a time when globalisation as a 
phenomenon became prevalent. Because of its purpose of removing trade barriers across 
national boundaries, the WTO was perceived as the only multilateral organization 
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explicitly created for a global and wholly interdependent economy (Sutherland et al, 
2004: 9).  In contrast to the GATT, as pointed out above, the WTO had more authority 
over national policies than most other international organisations and the power of its 
dispute-settlement body was unprecedented (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 3). 
Initially comprising 23 countries, the multilateral trading system represented by 
GATT/WTO grew in terms of the number of parties and members over the years and 
through the successive rounds of negotiations.9  The figures were: 39 contracting parties 
in the Dillon Round, 74 contracting parties in the Kennedy Round and 99 contracting 
parties in the Tokyo Round (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 101).  Contracting parties to 
the GATT automatically became founder-members of the WTO when it was established 
on 1 January 1995.  This was because they had signed the Marrakesh Agreement in 
April 1994, which announced the creation of the organization; or because they joined the 
GATT after the signings, but before the WTO was officially effective in January 1995.  
These were then 128 countries and customs territories who are referred to as ‘original’ 
WTO members.  The Marrakesh Agreement permitted new members to join the 
organization “on terms to be agreed” between the applicant country and the WTO 
(Kennett et al., 2005: 17).   
For acceding countries, the process of the WTO accession demonstrated how much the 
environment of international trade had changed.  Fundamentally, accession to the WTO 
became more complex.  Acceding to the old GATT meant solving issues of market 
access for goods, and, therefore, negotiations tended to concentrate mainly on border 
barriers.  As international trade was no longer about goods and border measures only, 
the process of the WTO accession expanded to include, among other things, such new 
issues negotiated in the UR as services, intellectual property rights and investments.  
Hence, this process increasingly came to deal with the domestic regulatory regime of the 
acceding countries (Lanoszka, 2001: 6-7). 
This chapter will focus on the accession to the WTO in generally relying on the existing 
literature of this aspect of the organization.  In this, it will consider why nation-states 
                                                 
9
 As the GATT was an agreement, members to it were called “contracting parties”.  As the WTO is an 
organization, its members are referred to as “members”. 
 44
have sought, and continue to seek, accession to the WTO.  Also, it will examine the 
WTO accession procedures and the arguments for and against their ambiguity and 
complexity.  At the end of the chapter, a track record of accession negotiations of 
Jordan, Oman and Bahrain will be reviewed.  They are all Arab countries and relatively 
similar to Saudi Arabia in terms of being economically dependent on a single 
commodity.  However, their accession cases are not used to make a fully-fledged 
comparison with that of Saudi Arabia, but rather as concise examples for the two main 
elements of this chapter, the rationale and complexity of accession. 
2.1 Rationale of WTO Accession 
The countries seeking accession to the WTO, since its establishment in 1995, have been 
either developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs) or countries in transition 
(CIT) from planned to market economies (Gibbs, 2001: 163).  Despite the fact that each 
has had its specifics, there have been generic factors that have individually or 
collectively led nation states to seek an accession to the WTO, as generally agreed in the 
literature.10  For instance, in the run-up to launch a new comprehensive round after the 
UR, Krueger set out elements that commonly interested developing countries, in 
particular, in the multilateral trading system.  She mentioned elements such as enhancing 
a rule-based system, attracting foreign investments, increasing coherence among 
multilateral institutions, participating in future major decisions, etc. (Krueger, 1999). 
Similarly, Evenett and Braga summarised the reasons typically given for seeking the 
WTO membership.  They maintain:  
“The expectation is that more predictable access to foreign markets, which 
WTO membership can bring, will result in higher exports.  Another 
economic rationale is to attract more foreign direct investment and, more 
generally, to use WTO membership as a seal of approval recognized by the 
international business community.  The legal advantages of accessing a 
rule-based system and of using the WTO dispute-settlement process are also 
often mentioned.  It is also the case that many nations join the WTO for 
political reasons.  Transition economies, for example, often see WTO 
                                                 
10
 Most of the sources in this section have mentioned at least one or more of the incentives discussed here 
(see for example: Marc Bacchetta and ZdnenekBrabek, 2002; Lanoszka, 2001; Yang, 1999; Krueger, 
1999; Michalopoulos, 1998). 
 45
membership as a means to signal their commitment to joining the 
international community of market-based economies.  In short, many see 
WTO accession as facilitating both political and economic reform processes 
within their countries” (Evenett and Braga, 2005: 1-2). 
This section will elaborate the factors set out by Krueger and by Evenett and Braga.  It 
will show, in the process, how each factor relates to Saudi Arabia in its efforts to join the 
WTO.  
2.1.1 Integration with the world economy 
Prior to establishing the WTO, most developing countries had focused their attention 
and efforts throughout the GATT’s previous successive rounds on obtaining special and 
differential treatment rather than actively participating in the process of trade 
liberalisation (Martin and Winters, 1996:1; Michalopoulos, 2001: 2).  This stance started 
to shift in the 1980s.  The developing countries realised that their previous economic 
policies of not engaging in the economic openness had not resulted in prosperity.  In 
that, the majority among them were crippled by their massive debt crisis in the 1980s 
(Hudec, 1993: 115-116).  In addition, the successful example of the outward-oriented 
economies of Far East Asia helped developing countries see the defect in their economic 
policies and encouraged them to open up and economically integrate with the world 
(Bhagwati, 1994: 575). 
As a result, a large number of developing countries adopted more open trade policies in 
the 1980s, and unilaterally started to reduce trade restrictions.  During this process, there 
was growing recognition among a large number of developing countries of the value of 
participating in the multilateral trade negotiations, which was virtually represented by 
the GATT.  That led them to participate actively in the UR and subsequently seek an 
accession to the WTO (Michalopoulos, 2001:31-176).  There were 68 developing 
countries in the GATT at the start of the UR in 1986, and they became 98 developing 
countries at the end of that round in 1994 (Short, 2001: 59). 
In the beginning of 1995, approximately one-half of the 43 countries applying for 
admission to the newly established WTO were CIT countries.  In general, the integration 
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in the world economy through the WTO came second for most of these countries 
compared with their regional integration with Europe represented by the EU.  
Nevertheless, however, meeting the requirements of the WTO was still central to this 
group of countries as the requirements of the EU were generally consistent with the 
WTO (Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004: 1083-1089). 
Apart from EU accession, the CIT realised the importance of WTO membership in itself.  
It was advocated that such a membership would advance the integration of the CIT in 
the global economy and end their economic isolation (Hoogmartens, 2002: 23).  Thus, 
the CIT countries believed the WTO membership to be a means that would help 
terminate their classification as non-market economies, mainly and frequently repeated 
by the U.S. and the EU (Michalopoulos, 1998:3). 
For both developing and CIT countries, the national economic failure and the desire to 
recover by becoming integrated into the international economy was an important 
incentive for seeking an accession to the WTO.  While the massive national debts in the 
developing world in the 1980s were a clear indication of the failure in their national 
economic policies, the collapse of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s brought an end 
to the adoption of central planning in the CIT (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001:348-391).  
The WTO has become the most tangible sign of globalisation (Wolf, 2001: 183) and for 
many acceding countries, its membership symbolised a gate to global economic 
integration.  In light of the fast pace of economic progress in the industrial world, 
acceding countries felt that they could not afford to be excluded from the international 
trade system represented by the WTO (Lanoszka, 2001: 596). 
As for the LDCs, their economies have been small, but highly reliant on trade.  Unlike 
the other two categories, developing and CIT countries, the LDCs were reluctant to 
unilaterally liberalise their economies (Sally, 1999: 6-11).  The governments of LDCs 
had been concerned about the impact of globalisation on their fragile economies that 
were characterised by poverty (Michalopoulos, 2001: 3).  Nonetheless, the concerns of 
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LDCs did not prevent them from being nevertheless willing to integrate their economies 
in the global trading system represented by the WTO.11 
Saudi Arabia, in fact, thought of joining the WTO as a means of integrating with the 
global economy.  Upon the conclusion of the accession negotiation, the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry reiterated the Saudi government’s accession motivations.  He 
said, concerning this matter, that the WTO membership “would help to merge the Saudi 
Arabian economy with the rest of the world” (OPEC Bulletin, 2005: 60).  Nonetheless, 
integrating with the world economy was not in itself a major incentive and it cropped up 
less often in the subsequent official statements.  That was largely due to the fact that 
Saudi Arabia was not isolated from the international economy in the first place.  As a 
matter of fact, the Saudis were heavily involved in it.  In 2003, for instance, international 
trade accounted for 90% of the Saudi Arabian GDP (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2003: 11).  
2.1.2 ‘Locking in’ domestic reform 
There is general agreement in the literature of the WTO accession on the importance of 
the factor discussed in this part (Hoogmartens, 2002; Sally, 2003; Sally, 1999; 
Lanoszka, 2001; Langhammer and Lucke, 1999; Michalopoulos, 1998).  Whereas 
integration with international trade was the main incentive for the previous factor, 
politics is the predominant element in this factor, as it treats power relations in societies.  
Basically, the ‘locking in’ effect has been related to the interaction between applicant 
governments and the private sector in their respective countries (Bacchetta and Drabek, 
2002: 5).  It has been contended that membership in an institutional agreement such as 
the WTO can help to ‘lock in’ international commitments made by governments.  In 
their economic reforms and trade liberalising commitments, WTO membership is, 
according to this argument, the governments’ insurance against domestic business 
groups pressuring for protectionist measures and can help governments to continue 
implementing reforms (Yang, 1999: 522). 
                                                 
11
 Review, for example, WP on the accession of Vanuatu (WT/ACC/VUT/13); WP on the accession of 
Lao People’s (WT/ACC/LAO/3); WTO Press Release on the Accession of Tonga, Press/431, 15 
December 2005). 
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The frequent appearance of this factor in the literature on the rationale of the WTO 
accession might be seen as an exaggeration due to the general nature of the political 
structure in the acceding countries.  Most of those countries have been either non-
democratic or countries with little democratic experience, thus they would be potentially 
less responsive to their societies and would, therefore, not need an international 
commitment to lock in policies embarked on domestically.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, however, the unitary assumption of the state, irrespective of its 
political system, could not be held, and societies, including non-democratic ones, had 
their unique channels to exert a certain influence on states’ policies.  Indeed, Nabli has 
argued that for economic reform to progress in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, 
the Arab governments needed the membership of an organisation such as the WTO to 
lock in reform efforts (2004).  
2.1.3 Market access 
WTO accession improves market access to major foreign markets, and thus strengthens 
the export sector in acceding countries.  More importantly, however, accession would 
renders the access to international markets permanent (Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004: 
1090). Most acceding countries have enjoyed the MFN in foreign markets as established 
by trade agreements signed on a bilateral basis.  Hence, accession might possibly not 
increase the number of overseas markets already open to acceding countries 
(Medvedkov, 2001:69).  However, the significance of accession would be, as far as 
market access was concerned, that it would make it difficult for foreign trade partners to 
renege on any MFN treatment granted to acceding countries, or to be in a position to 
apply discriminatory tariffs against them (Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004: 1090-1091; 
Hazimeh, Interview, 25 February 2010).   
Moreover, WTO accession would restrain the frequently exercised ability of the 
developed countries to use anti-dumping measures against products imported from 
acceding countries (Langhammer and Lucke, 1999: 861) as the latter would be eligible 
as a member to take such cases to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
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WTO.12Also, the WTO introduced disciplines concerning products in which developing 
countries had a comparative advantage, such as textiles and apparel.  During the GATT 
era, such items exported to industrial countries were subject to quotas under the 
Multifibre Agreement (MFA).  In 1995, the WTO dictated that such quotas be phased 
out over a ten-year period under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
(Srinivasan, 1999:1052-1053; WTO, 2007). 
Having better access to foreign markets was one of the major incentives that led Saudi 
Arabia to the WTO, which also repeatedly sprung up in the argument of the Saudis who 
were in favour of the WTO (COSC, 2000; Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in 
Washington, 2003: 3; the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, 2004: 1; Al-Aali and 
Al-Sa’doun, 1998: 70; Al-Saleh, 1999: 10; Al-Zuhd, 2006: 6).  It also resonated with the 
country’s new perception of economic reform, which, as already mentioned, was 
influenced by the globally prevailing idea of economic liberalisation that began to seize 
economic policy since the 1980s.  Accordingly, Buhulaiga argued for Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to the WTO as a way of boosting its exports to foreign markets.  He pointed 
out that the country had been trying to achieve diversification through import 
substitution for the past 30 years, but at present the focus should be on export promotion.  
To that end, he explained, “Saudi Arabia needs to ensure that its non-oil exports face 
minimal tariff discrimination in foreign markets” (Arab News, 2004: 14). 
Among the non-oil products whose access to international markets Saudi Arabia hoped 
to promote through the WTO accession, the petrochemicals came first.  Petrochemical 
industrial products have long been the dominant Saudi non-oil exports.  After oil, as a 
matter of fact, petrochemicals yield the greatest revenue for the Saudi Arabian economy.  
The opportunity of expanding market access through WTO membership was foreseen by 
the largely state-owned Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), which 
managed most of the petrochemical industries in the country.  Accordingly, the company 
worked beforehand on projects to expand capacity at some of its affiliates (Arab News, 
2004: 15).  
                                                 
12
 Dumping generally occurs when a firm sells products on a foreign market for less than what is charged 
locally.   
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2.1.4 Attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) 
It may be argued based on overwhelming evidence that FDI fosters economic growth, 
especially in developing countries, through capital, technology and expertise.  In fact, 
the great majority of acceding countries, including developing countries, have been 
welcoming foreign inward investments and encouraging more of them (Short, 2001: 69).  
In spite of this favourable attitude towards foreign investments, these countries have 
encountered difficulties in attracting the desired level of investments.  This is partly due 
to the lack of the proper climate for such investments (Ricupero, 2001: 53).  In their 
endeavour to integrate with the world economy, acceding countries have been, in 
essence, endeavouring to set up the right investment climate.  Yet, even if such an 
environment were in place, it would not be of much use without WTO membership.  
Credibility has been a crucial factor not only to foreign investors, but to domestic 
investors as well. Accession to the WTO has become a decisive sign for attaining such 
credibility (Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004: 1090). 
Prior to the year 2000, Saudi Arabia experienced a period of severe financial difficulty 
due to deterioration in oil prices.  As the infrastructure built over the years of the 
country’s successive five-year development plans was growing old, fresh investments 
were critically needed to upgrade the economy.  Hence, the government turned to 
facilitate the inflow of foreign investments.  Indeed, it made it one of its economic 
priorities (UBS, 2003: 103).  For that, Saudi Arabia recognised the importance of the 
WTO membership in signalling credibility, transparency and predictability to investors 
(Financial Times, 2005; Reuters, 2005).  In a statement after signing the protocol of 
accession, for instance, the Deputy Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA)13 pointed out that ‘membership’ was a sign of credibility to national and 
foreign investors alike (Al-Eqtisadiah, 2005: 1).  
2.1.5 Achieving universal trade co-ordination 
In practice as well as in theory, the great majority of countries, irrespective of the 
categories to which they belonged, should have a stake in strong and smooth world trade 
                                                 
13
 SAMA assumes the role of central banks in other countries. 
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relations.  In the absence of trade agreements, governments might find themselves in a 
position to impose externalities on their trade partners.  That would normally be done by 
changing the terms of trade in a manner that would maximise their gains at the expense 
of their partners, a case usually referred to as ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’.  However, there 
was no reason for those partners not to simply adopt similar courses of action to 
retaliate, especially if their economies were large enough to do so.  A situation like that 
could eventually lead to trade wars between countries and, as a result, the erosion of 
national welfare in each of them.  Hence, becoming partners in an international trade 
agreement as universal, influential and inclusive as the agreements of the WTO is 
important for ensuring co-ordination between governments and the mitigation of any 
adverse trade conditions that might occur (Bacchetta and Drabek, 2002: 5). 
Due to its involvement with international trade, Saudi Arabia has generally had a stake 
in the stability of the world trade and, hence, in achieving a sort of international co-
ordination.  As mentioned above, the trade percentage share reached 90% of the 
country’s GDP in 2003.  According to Lamy, Saudi Arabia was the world’s 13th-largest 
merchandise exporter and the 23rd-largest importer (Associated Press, 2005).  In this 
situation, the interest in enhancing international trade co-ordination via an instrument 
such as the WTO would be expected.  
2.1.6 Benefiting from a rule-based system 
Lash has claimed that the benefit of its regulation was the area where the WTO had 
succeeded most (1999: 3).  Jackson argued, from the beginning, that there was a real 
need for the GATT rules to provide the means of discipline to the world trading system 
(1990: 38).  Broadly, two approaches may be identified for how this trading system can 
work.  The first is to hold negotiations and sign agreements with reference, explicitly or 
implicitly, to the relative power status of the parties.  The second is to negotiate with 
reference to rules.  The world generally developed, according to Jackson, a propensity 
towards a rule-oriented diplomacy, and the rules of GATT reflected that to a 
considerable extent (1997: 109-111).  As GATT evolved into the WTO, the latter 
naturally reflected the same propensity or even enhanced it. 
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The ability of the WTO to enforce discipline in the international trading system has 
mainly been derived from its mechanism of dispute-settlement as embodied in the work 
of the DSB.  The DSB could establish panels to investigate disputes among member 
states, demand and scrutinise the implementation of panels’ reports, and authorise 
measures of retaliation if convicted parties did not abide by the panels’ findings 
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 76).  Only member states could exercise the right to refer 
to this mechanism of solving disputes (Ognivtsev et al., 2001: 177).  Such a fact would 
normally generate an interest in becoming a member, especially among developing 
countries and LDCs.  Generally, the negligible international impact of the acceding 
countries’ small economies have made them particularly interested in the rule-based 
system that the WTO should be representing (Whalley, 1996: 409; Drabek and 
Bacchetta, 2004: 1091; Michalopoulos, 1998: 2; Langhammer and Lucke, 1999: 861). 
As the country with the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, Saudi Arabia has had a clear 
comparative advantage in terms of its petrochemical industry.  Throughout the accession 
process, the Saudi negotiators fought hard not to compromise that advantage, which 
some members in the WP argued was due to Saudi governmental subsidies.  The Saudis 
have often thought that accession to the WTO with its dispute-settlement mechanism 
would help prevent jeopardising the condition of this vital sector in the future (Samba, 
2005; Arab News, 2004: 16).  
2.1.7 Participating in the formulation of the WTO regulations 
WTO membership gives acceding countries the right to take part in the multilateral 
negotiations and participate in formulating the rules and regulations of the organization, 
especially in matters of particular importance to them and where they have relative 
strength.  A relatively small economy like Argentina’s, for instance, has enjoyed more 
influence on decisions pertaining to trade in grain because Argentina is an important 
grain exporter (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 58).  The importance of this factor made it 
the most positive effect of joining the WTO for some acceding countries (Medvedkov, 
2001: 69).  To them, it was a way of ensuring that new rules and amendments of existing 
rules were compatible with the interests of all members (Ognivtsev et al., 2001: 177). 
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As a member, Saudi Arabia would have the right to voice its concerns regarding issues 
in which it was interested.  Moreover, it would have the opportunity to have a say in 
WTO decision-making related to such issues.  That would especially be the case in oil-
related issues due to its status as the world biggest oil exporting country.  Although 
Saudi Arabia, along with the other GCC countries, has generally been of the conviction 
that oil should not be a subject for negotiation (COSC, 2001), it certainly preferred to be 
present if oil ever was being brought into the WTO negotiations.  This has been an 
important argument of the pro-WTO Saudis all along, and it was defended in a 
governmental document by the highest-ranking official in the oil sector, the Minister of 
Oil and Mineral Resources (Sub-HMC, 2001). 
2.1.8 Relations with IMF and World Bank 
As indicated earlier, the idea of creating an international organisation for trade was first 
envisioned in the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944 that resulted in the IMF and the 
World Bank.  The vision of having a permanent organisation for trade only materialised 
50 years later when the WTO was established in 1994.  As they were thought of as 
pillars of the post-WWII economic structure, the new organization called for co-
ordination with the IMF and the World Bank.  Indeed, the provisions of the WTO 
provided for co-operation with the other two organisations to attain greater coherence in 
the policy making of global economy (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 68).  
The fact that the great majority of acceding countries were developing, least developed 
or in economical transition makes this factor one of the main incentives for WTO 
accession.  Most countries from these categories generally had a cliental relation with 
the IMF and the World Bank.  If coherence among the three organisations were to be 
strictly adhered to, staying out of the WTO might lead to even more stringent adjustment 
programmes imposed by the other two organisations with all of their concomitant 
political implications.  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, however, this logic could not be similarly applied.  Unlike 
many other acceding countries, Saudi Arabia is rich and was not in the position of 
receiving aid from the IMF or the World Bank.  On the contrary, Saudi Arabia has been 
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an important contributor to international aid.  In the IMF, for instance, it ranked sixth in 
terms of its financial share (Al-Eqtisadiah, 2005: 1). 
The way in which the relation between the WTO on one side and the IMF and the World 
Bank on the other worked as an accession motivation for the Saudis was different.  From 
the start, when the Saudi government was contemplating accession to GATT in the 
1980s, important members of the IMF and the World Bank were already urging Saudi 
Arabia to join the GATT system.  They indicated that the absence from such a growing 
provisional organization did not accord with Saudi Arabia’s economic and financial 
status.  In fact, this was one of the main reasons cited by WTO advocates among Saudi 
top officials to justify accession to the multilateral trading system represented by 
GATT/WTO (MOFA, 1989: 6-7). 
These factors have generally been important as far as accession was concerned.  After 
deciding to join the WTO, the next step is to initiate the application process.  The 
following section will examine this process in terms of its rules and procedures.  It will 
also review related disputes over its ambiguity and complexity. 
2.2 WTO Accession Process 
The evolution of the world trading system from GATT to WTO was fundamental.  It 
witnessed the expansion of the WTO to include under its regulation not only the trade in 
goods, but also new subjects, such as the trade in services and intellectual property 
rights.  With such an expansion of the subjects covered and the enhancement of the 
dispute-settlement mechanism embodied by the DSB, a profound change in the nature of 
the WTO had taken place.  In due course, it affected the accession procedure.   
However, the effect concerned the practice of the accession process more than it did its 
rules (Grynberg et al., 2002: 1).  Bacchetta and Drabek pointed out that the expansion of 
the WTO entailed a better structure for the accession process.  In their view, the limited 
rules-change and the absence of a detailed accession process in the agreement 
establishing the WTO meant that the accession had been governed by ‘unwritten rules’ 
(2002: 4).   
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2.2.1 Rules Governing the Accession Procedures 
According to Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, a state or a 
separate customs territory may accede to the organization.  Acceding governments have 
normally been those of sovereign states.  As for separate customs territories, such as 
Hong Kong, they can also become members of the WTO, provided that they possess full 
autonomy in the conduct of their external relations (WTO, 2001: 23.2).  The above-
mentioned Article XII is the only article of the Marrakesh Agreement dealing with the 
accession to the WTO.  It reads as follows: 
“1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may 
accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.  
Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed thereto. 
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference.  The 
Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of 
accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 
3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 
provisions of that Agreement.” (WTO: 15). 
There are a number of other WTO provisions relevant to accession.  Article XVI.1, for 
instance, states that “Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures 
and customary practices followed by the Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 and the 
bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.”  Pertaining to the aforementioned 
Article XII.2, which states that “Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial 
Conference”, Article IV.2 makes it clear that “In intervals between meetings of the 
Ministerial Conference, its function shall be conducted by the General Council.”  Also, 
Article XIII dealing with the non-application of the Marrakesh Agreement and the 
multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) between particular members, determines that the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the MTAs shall not apply between a member of the WTO 
and another member acceding under Article XII: “Only if the Member not consenting to 
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the application has so notified the Ministerial Conference before the approval of the 
agreement on the terms of accession by the Ministerial Conference.” (WTO: 8-18). 
Those are the only references in the agreement regarding the accession.  Perhaps the 
most striking point is the brevity with which the agreement dealt with this issue. Article 
XII gives no guidance regarding the “terms to be agreed”, leaving them to be negotiated 
between the applicant and the WTO members.  Nor does it lay down any specific 
procedures to be used for negotiating these terms, leaving them to be agreed on by the 
individual working parties established for applications assessment (WTO, 2001: 7). 
Leaving the terms of accession to be negotiated individually gives leverage to those 
members of large-size economies and political power.  Acceding countries with strained 
political relations with important current WTO members should expect protracted 
negotiations, especially with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) members who can exert a strong influence on accession negotiations 
(Langhammer and Lucke, 1999: 843).  Since the U.S. was not inclined to discuss it, the 
General Council agreed in 2001, for instance, to postpone considering Iran’s request for 
accession (BBC, 2001).  It was not the first time, as the American veto against Iran’s 
application had been used for years (Focus, 1998: 2). 
The limitation of the accession rules did not apply, as mentioned, to the practice of 
accession.  In that respect, the WTO extended its practiced accession procedures far 
beyond those applied during the time of GATT (Grynberg et al., 2002: 1).  The WTO 
Secretariat has been playing a noticeable role in this regard.  In order to increase 
predictability and transparency in the process, the Secretariat would provide notes that 
gave detailed descriptions of the information required from acceding governments at 
each stage of the negotiations and outlined the expectations of the WTO members from 
the new entrants on market-access issues.  This has been helping acceding governments 
with action plans and synoptic tables to assess the requirements that needed to be met.  
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In this, the Secretariat would provide technical assistance to all applicants, with special 
attention given to the LDCs (Focus, 1998: 3; UNCTAD, 2001: 10).14 
2.2.2 Procedures of Accession 
As indicated, any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations might accede to the WTO.  The procedures 
for such states or separate territories to accede to the organization under Article XII 
requires the examination of a schedule of their concessions and commitments to GATT 
1994 and a schedule of their specific commitments to GATS.  They also require 
agreement on the report of the WP established to examine an application, and agreement 
on a decision and a protocol setting out the terms of accession (WTO, 1995: 1).  
Although overlapping at some stages, the accession procedures will normally involve 
four distinct steps. 
The starting point for an applicant country is the submission of a communication to the 
Director-General of the WTO expressing its desire to accede to the WTO under Article 
XII.  The communication will then be circulated to all members.  The WTO General 
Council will consider the application and the establishment of a WP.  The WP will be set 
up to examine the application for accession to the WTO under Article XII and to submit 
to the General Council/Ministerial Conference recommendations, which may include a 
draft protocol of accession.  Membership in the WP is open to all interested members.  
The chairperson of the WP is appointed following consultations with incumbent WTO 
members and the applicant (WTO, 2001: 23.2).  The time between sending the 
applicant’s communication and setting up the WP can be quite short and is mostly a 
matter of formalities (Michalopoulos, 1998: 5).  
Once the WP has been established, the applicant will provide a memorandum describing 
in detail its external trade regime, together with information on the currently applicable 
tariff schedule and copies of relevant laws and regulations.  Following the circulation of 
the memorandum, members of the WP are invited to ask questions in order to obtain 
                                                 
14
 Among the guidelines provided by the WTO Secretariat pertaining to accession are: WT/ACC/1, 
WT/ACC/4, WT/ACC/5, WT/ACC/8, WT/ACC/9. 
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more information about the applicant’s trade system (WTO, 2001).  More than one 
round of questions and answers might be organised before the first meeting of the WP is 
scheduled (WTO, 1995: 2).  This phase is usually very demanding because of the range 
of issues that the memorandum has to address and the degree of detail required 
(Michalopoulos, 1998: 5). 
At the initial meeting of the WP – and after the replies to the questions have been 
received – representatives from the members of the WP and the applicant examine the 
memorandum and the questions and answers so that they might further clarify points that 
emerged worthy of clarification.  At the end of the first and each subsequent meeting of 
the WP, the chairperson outlines the next steps required for the preparation of future 
meetings.  The preparation should be carried out through informal consultations with 
members of the WP and the Secretariat, as necessary (WTO, 1995: 3). 
When the examination of the foreign trade regime has advanced sufficiently, the 
applicant will be requested to submit its so-called initial schedule of ‘offers’ in goods 
and services.  This consists of: (a) the detailed schedule of tariffs proposed to levy on 
goods and level at which the tariffs are ‘bound’.  This is the level beyond which a 
prospective member cannot raise tariffs except in some defined circumstances, such as 
in a balance of payments emergency.  (b) The commitments the applicant makes with 
regard to opening its market for services.  Once these offers are tabled, the accession 
process enters its final phase, which involves specific bilateral negotiations between the 
applicant and each WTO member that wishes to discuss issues regarding the tariff level 
or the degree of openness of the service sector that the applicant has proposed.  In most 
cases, bilateral negotiations will take place in parallel with formal meetings of the WP 
that continue to deal with questions and answers concerning the applicant’s foreign trade 
regime.  This phase can be very lengthy (Michalopoulos, 1998: 8-9).  
The discussions in the WP are summarised in the report of the WP together with a draft 
decision and protocol of accession.  The protocol of accession contains the terms of 
accession which the applicant and members of the WP have agreed on.  Following the 
conclusion of bilateral negotiations between interested members and the applicant, the 
schedule of concessions and commitments made by the applicant on goods and the 
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schedule of specific commitments on services will be prepared.  These schedules are 
annexed to and are part of the draft protocol of accession, which contains the terms of 
accession agreed by the applicant and members of the WP.  After the draft report, draft 
protocol and schedules on goods and services have been finalised, the WP will submit 
the package to the WTO General Council/Ministerial Conference for approval.  When 
the General Council/Ministerial Conference has decided to adopt the package, the 
protocol of accession enters into force.  Thirty days after acceptance by the applicant’s 
government, the applicant will become a WTO member (WTO, 2011). 
2.2.3 Arguments over Accession   
For many applicants, accession to the WTO has been a frustratingly complicated and 
slow process.  China, for instance, was admitted to the organization after fifteen years of 
negotiations.  Russia, as another example, negotiated its accession for more than twenty 
years.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, the accession process officially took twelve years to 
come to a successful conclusion.   
By its very nature, the WTO, as the main instrument of the multilateral trading system, 
aims to be universal (Langhammer and Lucke, 1999: 837).  The WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005 renewed the commitment to make the 
organization truly global (WTO, 2005).  Discussions on the issue of accession were held 
in all of the ministerial conferences from Singapore (December 1996), to Geneva (May 
1998), to Seattle (December1999), and Doha (2001) and most recently Hong Kong 
(2005).  During these discussions, many welcomed the trend of joining the WTO, saying 
that this demonstrated the viability of the rule-based system and represented a challenge 
to the organization and its evolution as a truly global one.  Furthermore, they believed 
that the more widespread the WTO membership became, the greater the benefits that 
would be enjoyed by its members and the more global welfare would increase.  In this 
regard, the Ministerial Conference customarily pledged to conclude on-going accessions 
as smoothly and rapidly as possible (WTO, 2001: 4-5).  Yet, many believed that the 
accession process was lengthy, too demanding and slow-moving. 
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There have been several factors that contributed to the slow nature of the accession 
process.  From the outset, as discussed, the agreement establishing the WTO itself was 
non-specific in terms of setting out the rules and process of accession.  The terms of any 
individual country’s accession were left to the negotiations between the applicant and 
the WTO members.  As such, every case has become a unique one (Bacchetta and 
Drabek, 2002: 4).  In the case of the application by Saudi Arabia, the lack of specificity, 
for instance, has been, as Al-Sa’doun indicated, an obstacle for the Saudi negotiating 
team and the official Saudi efforts to join the WTO (Al-Sa’doun, Interview, 26 April 
2002).  As mentioned earlier, the pace of processing applications to the WTO have 
varied from two years to more than twenty years.  Were the rules of the WTO accession 
more specific, it is doubtful that the length of time to process applications would vary so 
greatly. 
Another factor lies in the applicant’s memorandum.  The memorandum and its related 
questions and answers have usually been exhaustive in their details.  The applicant 
country would be requested to submit for the deliberation of the WP relevant legislation 
on a variety of subjects covered by the WTO.  These subjects extended far beyond the 
obvious such as the customs law, the tariff schedule and related regulations on imports 
and exports, to include items such as the laws on joint stock companies, the central bank 
and credit institutions, licensing of economic activities, domestic taxation, patent and 
copyright protection etc.  Then the applicant’s submission is placed under detailed 
review for its consistency with the provisions of the WTO agreements (Michalopoulos, 
1998:7). 
Agreeing with what Lanoszka claimed earlier, VanGrasstek pointed out that the 
extended subjects reflected the evolution that took place in the accession process from 
the years of the GATT to establishing the WTO.  Echoing what was mentioned above 
about the inclusion of new non-traditional issues, VanGrasstek argued that the evolution 
of this process had resulted in a shift in the global trading system’s emphasis from “the 
height of global tariff walls and other border measures” to the “depth of issues that fall 
within its jurisdiction”.  The height of tariff walls mattered the most during the period 
from the 1950s to the 1970s.  Accession was relatively easy for the economically small 
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countries during that period, as the emphasis was on negotiating the reduction of tariffs 
between large economies. It seemed that small reduction in the tariffs imposed by a large 
economy would have more weight than a huge reduction by a small one (2001: 115-
125). 
In the UR (1986-1994), according to VanGrasstek, attention shifted to the depth of the 
world trading system represented by the WTO, which meant an expansion in the 
definition of trade to include, in addition to cross-border movement of goods, a wide 
range of issues.  As a result, the calculations pertaining to accession became quite 
different from merely assessing the impact of reduction in tariffs.  As the focus turned to 
the issues that would come within the scope of the WTO, applications came under 
intense scrutiny, and the terms of their accessions were correspondingly stringent so as 
to set good precedents and block bad ones (2001: 115-125). 
In addition to its inherent complexity, the shift in focus to the depth of the system has 
been particularly difficult for applicant countries that lacked the required resources and 
expertise.  As mentioned, all current applicants are either developing, LDCs or CIT.  
The limitation of resources has been a common element in these categories of countries, 
which made it difficult for them to cover all the variety of subject areas outlined by the 
WTO.  This limitation did not only apply to the applicant governments, but also 
extended to include the Secretariat of the WTO itself.  The administrative resources 
available to the Secretariat have been insufficient to offer the adequate technical 
assistance to each case of accession (Langhammer and Lucke, 1999: 837; Ostry, 1998).  
Being subject to what has been called ‘WTO-plus’ was, some argued, another reason for 
protracting applications for accession.  The ‘WTO-plus’ referred to the situation where 
new applicants were asked to undertake more stringent obligations than existing 
members.  For instance, membership in the plurilateral agreements was, in some cases, 
made to be one of the conditions to admit an applicant – although Article XII, which 
dealt with accession, separated the procedures for accession to the plurilateral 
agreements from accession to the WTO itself (WTO, 2001: 6-7).  In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, Al Sa’doun argued that the economy of his country was more open than some of 
those incumbent WTO members.  Yet, the country was asked during the negotiations to 
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join some of the plurilateral agreements as a prior condition, which, along with some 
other factors, resulted in the delay in bringing Saudi Arabia to the multilateral trading 
system (Al Sa’doun, Interview, 26 April 2002). 
As acceding countries have been asked to commit themselves to matters that members 
were not committed to (WTO-plus), they have also sometimes been denied some of the 
rights available to incumbent members under the WTO agreements such as the Special 
and Different treatment (S&D).  This arrangement has been referred to as ‘WTO-minus’.  
The provisions of S&D treatment took into consideration the conditions of developing 
countries, LDCs and CIT, and aimed to ensure that they could carry out their obligations 
within the framework of the WTO.  Therefore, those provisions enabled such countries 
in the implementation process during various transition periods.  For instance, for 
developing countries Agreements on Customs Valuation, Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) and TRIPS allowed for a five-year transition period.  However, 
several acceding countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Mongolia were not allowed to take full advantage of that (Butkeviciene et al., 2001: 
230-232).  
Another factor that explains the long process of accession to the WTO has nothing to do 
with the applicant’s trade regime.  It is of political nature.  As mentioned above, 
countries with large economies and political power could exert a considerable influence 
on the process of accession.  In some cases, this influence has been exerted for reasons 
not related to economic factors.  In fact, GATT/WTO accession has never been a purely 
economic matter.  In the past, there was a political dimension to the Russian accession, 
for example.  The U.S. along with some other Western powers tended to impose a form 
of conditionality in relation to Jewish emigration that was essentially a residue of the 
Cold War era (Dyker, 2004: 5). 
Despite the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
political security issues remained important in the process of WTO accession (Yang, 
1999: 514).  For instance, the U.S. has shown a desire to have all Arab applicants, 
including Saudi Arabia, remove their boycott on Israeli products, although Article XIII 
of the Agreement establishing the WTO consented to the non-application of the 
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Agreement between particular members, provided that they notify the organization of it 
(MOC, 2000: 14).  Thus, it is legitimate to assume here that the political position of an 
applicant could affect its WTO accession negotiations in a positive or negative way.  For 
this reason, Gibbs advised the delegations of acceding countries to have a clear 
understanding of the attitude of the major trading members in the WTO with respect to 
their political background (2001: 169). 
These factors, which complicated the process of accession, have caused the whole 
process of accession to be viewed as unfair to acceding countries (Al-Hasher, Interview, 
18 April 2002).  In his speech to the third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 
1999, the Saudi Minister of Commerce, at the time, stated that “doubts about the 
fairness of the multilateral trading system are increasing especially among the 
developing countries”.  He attributed this to the occasional absence of and non-
adherence to some of the organization’s provisions (COSC, 1999).  This view was 
shared at the highest level in the Saudi government to the extent that King Abdullah, 
then Crown Prince, drew attention to it in his speech at the UN Millennium Summit in 
New York in 2000, where he said: 
“At a time when we have hopes that the World Trade Organization will 
rectify defects in world trade, it is unfortunate that we note that this 
organization is not based on specific and objective rules with respect to the 
process of joining its membership.  We therefore demand that this Summit 
ensure the internationalism of the World Trade Organization and strive to 
facilitate the accession of states currently negotiating to join the agreement 
under terms that do not burden these countries more than do obligations 
undertaken by WTO’s earlier members” (MOI, 2000). 
According to Naray, the WTO accession process included the use of double standards.  
He argued that for instance in agriculture developed countries, which had all been 
members of the WTO, maintained high trade barriers and justified them by the 
specification of this sector and the economic, social and political implications of a 
speedy liberalisation.  The ‘transition periods’ they needed in this matter have already, 
as Naray pointed out, spanned decades, while acceding governments have been required 
to comply with WTO rules upon accession with no or only a very short period of time 
regardless of the potential economic, social and political implications (2001: 148-149). 
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In addition, the WTO accession negotiations have required acceding countries to make 
substantial concessions that could have an immediate impact on the access of foreign 
products and services to their markets, but not vice versa.  The benefit of WTO 
membership in terms of increased market access to foreign markets could only be felt in 
a longer term (Ognivtsev et al., 2001: 186).  This situation, in which acceding countries 
have been exposed to greater pressure from the WTO members particularly the Quad 
countries, is due to the ‘inherent flaws’ of the accession process.  This made the 
candidate countries vulnerable to influential WTO members, irrespective of their 
conditions or economic significance (Grynberg et al., 2002: 1).  As Cambodia’s Minister 
of Commerce, Cham Prasidh, said about the terms of his country’s accession: “This is a 
package of concessions and commitments that goes far beyond what is commensurate 
with the level of development of an LDC like Cambodia” (Oxfam, 2003: 1). 
Slow though it may be, the current process of accession has not been without merit from 
the viewpoint of some participants in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha 2001.  
Although they acknowledged the slow pace of this process, they contended that this did 
not mean that the system was not working.  From their standpoint, the time that the 
accession process took allowed the applicant to prepare better.  More importantly, the 
pace of each individual accession depended overwhelmingly on the applicant’s 
willingness and capacity to meet the requirements of the WTO.  In response to those 
who said that the exhaustive detail on economic and trade regimes required by the WTO 
constituted a burden on the applicant governments, this viewpoint asserted that the WP 
needed such detailed information so that it could examine the trade and legal regimes of 
an applicant to identify possible areas of inconsistency with the WTO agreements.  As to 
the ‘WTO-plus’ as a critical factor in complicating the process of accession, this point of 
view argued that incumbent members were still adding to their commitments under the 
WTO and some order of reciprocity was, therefore, a reasonable request (WTO, 2001: 1-
6). 
Thus, VanGrasstek argued that it was misleading to employ the common terminology 
‘concessions’ on the commitments made by an acceding country during the process of 
its accession.  It implied, according to him, that such a country was surrendering 
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something of value, and cast trade relations in a zero-sum framework.  This obscured the 
accession process’s ultimate aim of enhancing the competitiveness of applicant countries 
in the world economy.  As he indicated, the costs of WTO accession would be better 
appreciated if an observer viewed the benefits of the organization’s membership in their 
larger context (2001: 118). 
Along similar lines of appreciating the accession process through the overall advantages, 
Kreid argued that applicants to the WTO enjoyed two types of benefits: pre-accession 
and post-accession.  The benefits of post-accession were those related to increasing 
market access and attracting foreign investment; issues that were largely behind 
attracting nation states to the WTO in the first place, and were the subject of the first 
section of this chapter.  As far as the process of accession itself was concerned, the 
benefits of pre-accession were more relevant.  Those benefits were derived, in Kreid’s 
view, from a necessary reform of the economic system, the introduction of rules and 
regulations compatible with the WTO that represented the multilateral trading system, 
and the strengthening of the administrative and institutional infrastructure.  To the credit 
of the accession process, all of these were in the acceding countries’ interests 
independently of whether or not they would join the organization (2001: 78). 
Where did the WTO as an organization stand concerning the debate on the difficulty of 
the accession process?  Generally, it seemed to side with the arguments justifying the 
complexity of the whole process.  In a special report in Focus, the WTO’s newsletter, 
the pace of a particular accession was, according to the report, the responsibility of the 
acceding country: 
“The pace of each accession depends on the capacity of the applicant to 
negotiate actively at all levels.  Even more importantly, it depends on the 
applicant’s ability and commitment to put the needed legal and 
administrative infrastructure in place to ensure that it would be able to 
participate in the WTO framework of rights and obligations” (Focus, 1998: 
3). 
From the discussion about arguments and counterarguments, three points can be 
presented.  First, the parameters of the bilateral negotiations seemed to transcend into a 
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multilateral area when pressing acceding countries to adopt WTO standards.  
Confirming WTO compatibility should always be the task of the multilateral 
negotiation, as the bilateral one should mainly concern itself with specific bilateral 
concessions and commitments regarding trade in goods and services. 
Second, it has been easy for current members not to adhere to the organization’s 
decisions, which acceding countries have been asked to unfailingly adhere to such 
decisions.  The accession of Cambodia is one example.  It was forced upon accession to 
stop using affordable generic versions of new medicines immediately, even though the 
Doha declaration of 2001 permitted LDCs to wait until 2016 to end this practice 
(Oxfam, 2003: 1). 
Third, acceding countries might have sometimes shown more firmness regarding 
negotiating some issues especially those with no support from the provisions of the 
WTO agreements, such as the WTO incumbent members’ constant request to sign the 
plurilateral agreements in the process of the accession.  A top Saudi negotiator, Al-
Alamy, said that it was in the very nature of negotiations that any subject could be put 
on the negotiating table (Al-Alamy, Interview, 2 May 2002).  This view, however, runs 
counter to the intuitive logic that negotiations should have some kind of indication that 
governs the general process.  In accession negotiations, this indication should be the 
rules and regulations of the very same organization to which applicant countries aim to 
accede.  From this perspective, it is worth asking why acceding countries consent to 
have the plurilateral agreements as a negotiation item in the first place, if the WTO rules 
and regulation did not make them compulsory. 
In the context of examining the accession rationale and complexity, the following 
section will review some accession experiences.  As indicated, the accessions of Jordan, 
Oman and Bahrain are used as examples.  This sub-section will concisely relate the 
examples to the argument in the previous chapter concerning the reasoning and 
difficulty of the accession.  Thus, the section will also highlight similarities with the 
Saudi accession. 
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2.3 Track Record of Acceding Experiences 
Approximately 25 countries have joined the WTO since its establishment in 1995, 
including Saudi Arabia (Table 2-2).  As mentioned earlier, they have been either 
developing countries, LDCs or CIT.  In this section, the focus will be on the first 
category among the three, as Saudi Arabia is also a developing country.  For the reasons 
indicated earlier, this section will cite the accessions of Jordan, Oman and Bahrain as 
examples for the rationale and complexity of the WTO accession mentioned in the 
literature.  The outcomes will serve to indicate the complexity of the accession process.  
As to the example of Bahrain specifically, it joined the WTO through what is called 
‘succession’, which will be explained later.  This example will demonstrate how far the 
WTO accession process has come in terms of difficulty.  With every example, the 
section will observe the difference and parallels with the situation in the Saudi case.
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Table 2-2: On-going Accessions 
 Country Application Submission  Country 
Application 
Submission  Country 
Application 
Submission 
1 Afghanistan Nov 2004 12 Iran Jul 1996 23 Serbia Dec 2004 
2 Algeria Jun 1987 13 Iraq Sep 2004 24 Seychelles May 1995 
3 Andorra Jul 1999 14 Kazakhstan Jan 1996 25 Sudan Oct 1994 
4 Azerbaijan Jun 1997 15 Lao People's Democratic Republic Jul 1997 26 Tajikistan May 2001 
5 Bahamas May 2001 16 Lebanese Republic Jan 1999 27 Uzbekistan Dec 1994 
 
  17 Liberia, Republic of Jun 2007 28 Vanuatu Jul 1995 
6 Belarus Sep 1993 18 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Jun 2004 30 Yemen Apr 2000 
7 Bhutan Sep 1999 19 Montenegro Dec 2004    
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina May 1999 20 Russian Federation Jun 1993    
9 Comoros Feb 2007 21 Samoa Apr 1998    
10 Equatorial Guinea Feb 2007       
11 Ethiopia Jan 2003 22 Sao Tome and Principe Jan 2005    
Source:www.wto.org- updated January 2010 
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2.3.1 Three Experiences and Accession’s Rationale 
Jordan joined the WTO in April 2000 after six years of negotiations, the average number 
of years for the WTO accession.  As for Oman, it joined the WTO in November of the 
same year, but needed four and a half years to complete its accession negotiations.   
Facing severe economic problems caused by the economic and political situation in the 
region, such as the drop of aid from the Arab oil countries in the Gulf and the war on 
Iraq in 1991, the Jordanian government decided in 1992 to change economic policy 
significantly.  The basic aim of the new policy was to attract foreign investment and to 
encourage exports (Broude, 1998: 148-149).  To achieve that, government officials were 
aware of the importance of WTO membership as an assurance of Jordan’s suitability for 
investment.  They also hoped that membership would lead to the increase of exports of 
phosphate and other mining products, the country’s most important industry, and open 
new market opportunities for the growing industry of pharmaceuticals (International 
Trade Centre, 2001: 6).  Even in the area of agriculture, Jordan thought that any 
agricultural subsidies in the developed world abolished by the multilateral trade 
negotiations within the WTO would potentially provide their own agricultural products 
with a competitive edge in some of the world markets (ARABDATANET, 2003).  
In addition to enticing foreign investment and increasing market opportunities, Jordan 
regarded WTO membership as an effective means for integrating with the global 
economy.  The desire to integrate globally found a strong supporter in King Abdullah II.  
Since he became king in 1999, Abdullah II displayed an unquestioning belief in free 
market and globalisation as a way for progress and prosperity in his interviews, speeches 
and actions.  For that matter, he was an important factor in pushing the process of 
Jordan’s WTO accession (Halaiqa, Interview, 03 April 2006). 
The three factors outlined above (attracting investments, accessing new markets and 
integrating with the world economy) largely stemmed from the needs of the Jordanian 
economy.  Nonetheless, the external aspect in Jordan’s accession was also of great 
importance and was represented by the role of the international financial institutions 
(IFI).  Jordan turned to the IMF for financial support in 1989.  It coincided with the idea 
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of economic reform gaining momentum worldwide and the IMF pressing on key policies 
such as trade liberalisation.  Thus, liberalising trade within the principles of the WTO 
was important for Jordan to maintain a smooth relationship with the IMF (El Said and 
Harrigan, 2006: 447-455). 
Oman, in turn, is an oil-based economy.  Oman’s oil production capacity is small, 
however, and its oil reserves have been projected to last for approximately two decades 
only.  As such, the Omani government realised the need to reduce its dependence on oil 
(Country Commercial Guide, 2003: 3).  Consequently, it made the diversification of the 
economy the key issue of its economic policy.  The government also realised that, to be 
effective, the diversification policy would have to entail a parallel solid privatisation 
policy (EIU, 1999:3).  Both policies, diversification and privatisation, were elemental in 
advancing the case of the WTO accession, as diversifying the economy needed new 
markets for any non-oil domestic products, and privatising required new investments in 
any government divested projects. 
In addition, Oman, according to Flyfel, thought that the WTO membership would 
protect its exports from discriminatory procedures that might be imposed if Oman kept 
out of the organization.  Furthermore, the country would benefit from the mechanism of 
dispute-settlements available in the WTO.  That, Flyfel claimed, would minimise the 
possibility of any possible foreign unilateral pressure (2000: 35). 
The case of Bahrain is generally similar to those of Oman and Saudi Arabia in terms of 
its economy’s dependence on oil.  However, Bahrain has been less dependent on oil than 
the other two, especially compared to Saudi Arabia.  The share of oil to the country’s 
GDP was 16% in 2006, but the rate reached 64% in terms of the total exports.  In 
general, the oil production capacity of Bahrain has been diminishing (Bird, 2006). 
Thus, similar to Oman, Bahrain realised the importance of diversifying its economy.  
Due to the lack of other natural resources, the government of Bahrain activated the 
services sector and expanded the industrial base as an essential element in its economic 
policies.  In fact, Bahrain became the oldest hub in the Gulf region with regard to the 
field of providing services, particularly financial services.  Also, the government of 
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Bahrain worked to build major non-oil industrial projects especially in the aluminium 
sector, which accounted for 5% of the GDP and 60% of the non-oil exports (Gulf Centre 
for Strategic Studies, 2007). 
With taking into account that Bahrain has generally adopted an unrestricted economic 
system, the substantial reliance on these two factors, services sector and aluminium 
industry, has tightened the outward orientation of the Bahrain economy.  Thus, it 
became important for the country to integrate with the world economy and have better 
access to foreign markets.  In the process, it was important for the country to be part of 
the multilateral trading system represented by GATT, which Bahrain joined in 1993 
(Roshdy, Interview, 12 June 2007). 
In addition, the small capacity of oil and the lack of other natural resources, which 
prompted the country to establish itself as the centre of financial services in the Gulf 
region, made it necessary for Bahrain continually to change its rules and regulations for 
the purpose of achieving that aim.  However, this necessity often faced a tenacious 
opposition within the society, especially from the business community.  For instance, 
repealing the Commercial Agency Law in 1997 was extremely difficult due to 
objections from local traders.  According to Roshdy, if it had not been for the obligations 
within GATT/WTO, it would have been difficult for the government to transcend such 
protests (Interview, 12 June 2007).  That was, in other words, an embodiment of what 
has been called the ‘lock in’ effect of GATT/WTO.  
The rationale for the WTO accession in the three examples above agreed, in general, 
with what has been cited in the literature about the factors that had usually brought 
various nation-states into the WTO.  Among them, the factors of market access, foreign 
investment, a rule-based trading system and the ‘lock in’ effect were particularly 
important in the three cases.  In comparison with the Saudi rationale for joining the 
WTO, some similarities and differences can be underlined. 
In Saudi Arabia as in Jordan, the internal economic conditions were very important 
driving factors for joining the WTO.  Both countries agreed on the importance of 
attracting foreign investment to improve these conditions.  Regarding other factors, 
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Saudi Arabia saw WTO membership as a new market opportunity for its petrochemical 
industry, as did Jordan regarding its mining products exports.  As to the importance of 
the IFI, however, Saudi Arabia differed from Jordan.  In liberalising its economic regime 
within the framework of the WTO, Jordan aimed, inter alia, to maintain smooth 
relations with international institutions such as the IMF.  Saudi Arabia did not need to do 
so.  The role of the IMF was confined to urging that Saudi Arabia should not delay its 
accession to the WTO because its absence from such growing organization did not 
reflect the weight of the Saudi economy. 
Similarly, Oman focused its justification of WTO accession on market access and 
foreign investment as the two essential key elements in its economic policy: 
diversification and privatisation.  As explained above, market access and foreign 
investment were crucial to Saudi Arabia as well.  The fact that Omani oil was less 
abundant and its reserves were expected to be depleted sooner, however, made it more 
difficult for Oman to afford finding alternatives for its economy. 
The case of Bahrain was a little different.  Like Saudi Arabia, it wanted to integrate with 
the global economy.  The early choice of Bahrain to be a central point in the region for 
services, particularly those related to the financial sector, made it all the more important 
for the Bahraini government to eagerly seek integration with international markets.  
Proof of this can be seen in the fact that Bahrain joined the multilateral trading system 
long before Saudi Arabia. 
The ‘lock in’ effect was, as noted above, important in the case of Bahrain.  Free from the 
religious restrictions of Saudi Arabia, the Bahraini government mainly used such an 
effect to thwart objections from the business community.  The presence of a strong 
religious establishment in Saudi Arabia made it more difficult for the Saudi government 
to resort to the ‘lock in’.  Although this factor can persuade a group like the business 
community that the government cannot do much after making international 
commitments, it probably cannot do the same in the case of groups like the religious 
establishment. 
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2.3.2 Subjects Negotiated and Difficulty  
The focus will be on Jordan and Oman, as Bahrain joined through the means of 
‘succession’, which will be discussed later in the section.  In the examples of Jordan and 
Oman, the outcomes of the accession process could be used as a good reflection of the 
complexity of that process.  As for tariff bindings, Jordan agreed to bind its tariffs 
ceiling at 20% by the year 2010, with the exception of certain items that were to be 
bound at 25% and 35% (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2001: 5; 
www.jftp.gov.jo). Apart from a few items of vital importance to Oman such as milk and 
dates, the Omani government agreed in the accession negotiations to bind its agricultural 
tariffs at 15%.  As to industrial products, Oman bound, with some exceptions, its tariffs 
at 15%, as well (Flyfel, 2000: 42-43).  
The tariff bindings of Jordan were not low compared with the tariff ceilings of some 
other acceding countries like Oman (ESCWA, 2003: 19).  The reasons for that were that 
Oman’s tariff rates were from the beginning generally lower than those of Jordan and 
that Oman was preparing to lower its applied tariff rates even further due to the GCC’s 
plan to unify the applied tariff rates in its member countries at a rate not exceeding 
6.5%.  In addition, in order to have relatively high tariff bindings, Jordan had to make a 
sound linkage between its tariff concessions and commitments in the services sector 
(Broude, 1998: 152). 
Among the 12 main sectors in services, Jordan committed itself to open 11 main sectors 
(ESCWA, 2003: 24).  With regard to services sub-sectors, from a total of 155 sub-
sectors, Jordan made commitments in 128 sub-sectors (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, 2001: 5).  Also in GATT, Jordan accepted the commitment that its central 
government was the sole authority on foreign trade policy issues and that it would 
eliminate or nullify measures taken by its local governments.  The demand for such a 
commitment was a new move on the part of the WTO, and a few acceding countries 
could manage not to accommodate (Al Hinai, Interview, 16 August 2005).   
In the last meeting of its WP before the accession, some members indicated in December 
1999 that Jordan should use the period of its accession negotiations to make the 
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necessary efforts in the area of TRIPS without taking recourse to any transitional period 
of non-application (WTO, 1999: 51).  Like Jordan, Oman did not manage to secure any 
transition period as far as TRIMs were concerned.  Oman agreed during its accession 
negotiations to apply TRIMs from the date of accession without recourse to any 
transition period (WTO, 2000: 20). 
Transitional periods are part of the S&D provision in the WTO agreements, which are 
intended to ensure that the multilateral obligations are consistent with the development 
in the developing countries, LDCs and CIT.  Therefore, to stipulate that a developing 
country could not take recourse to such transitional periods was, in principle, denying a 
right that was embedded in the agreements.  As mentioned, this arrangement is referred 
to in the accession literature as ‘WTO-minus’. 
In a commitment reflecting another ‘WTO-minus’, Jordan agreed in the accession 
negotiations not to apply any anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures to 
imports from WTO members.  It would continue doing so until laws in conformity with 
the provisions of the WTO had been enacted, notified and implemented (U.S. Agency 
for International Development, 2001: 6).  Likewise, Oman made the same commitment 
(WTO, 2000: 14).  According to Al Hinai, such a ‘WTO-minus’ condition implies an 
inability to protect local industries (Al Hinai, Interview, 16 August 2005). 
As to ‘WTO-plus’, Jordan agreed during its accession negotiations to go beyond the 
WTO framework of rules in several respects.  For instance, Jordan made a commitment 
to gradually remove price controls on certain commodities with a view to the eventual 
liberalisation of all prices at the retail level.  It committed itself to complete the 
negotiations for membership in the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within 
a year of its accession, although the agreement was a plurilateral one and not 
compulsory like the multilateral agreements (WTO, 1999: 6-47).  While there was no 
obligation regarding privatisation or ownership of enterprises, the WTO members 
exerted pressure on Jordan to privatise as many state-owned companies as possible, and 
it was agreed that the latter would periodically provide the organisation with reports on 
the progress of the privatisation (Butkeviciene et al., 2001: 237). 
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A similar ‘WTO-plus’ situation prevailed in the case of Oman.  Oman was requested in 
the accession negotiations to sign the plurilateral agreements.  Indeed, Oman agreed to 
join the GPA within one year of its accession and to join the Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft within three years of accession (WTO, 2000: 22-24). 
The demand was imposed on Jordan and Oman to examine domestic regulations before 
being officially enacted.  Although some said that Jordan had submitted to this (WTO, 
1999: 26), Jordanian officials indicated otherwise.  They stressed that Jordan had not 
accepted the request to share draft legislations with its WP (Hazimeh, Interview, 25 
February 2010).  Oman agreed to submit drafts of some of its new laws to the 
examination of its WP members (WTO, 2000: 9-13). 
Saudi Arabia committed itself to tariff binding rates of 17.7% for agricultural products 
and 12.2% for industrial products.  In its offer on agricultural goods, Saudi Arabia 
fiercely refused to include items that were religiously prohibited and joined the WTO 
without making any offer regarding them (Al-Alamy, 2006: 392-395).  In general, Saudi 
Arabia did not manage to secure any transitional period to implement agreements such 
as TRIPS and TRIMS.  As to ‘WTO-minus’, it agreed not to apply any anti-dumping, 
countervailing or safeguard measures to imports from WTO members until related rules 
were being enacted and the organization had been notified of these.  With regard to 
‘WTO-plus’, Saudi Arabia agreed to sign some plurilateral agreements.  For instance, it 
agreed to initiate negotiations for membership in the GPA and, if the results of the 
negotiations were satisfactory to its interests and the other parties to the Agreement, it 
would complete negotiations for membership in the Agreement within a year of 
accession.  Concerning the new trend of requesting the submission of any WTO-related 
rules to the organization before being officially adopted, Saudi Arabia consistently 
refused throughout the process to do so (WTO, 2005). 
In general, Saudi Arabia was exposed, like other acceding countries, to a difficult 
accession process.  In comparison to the other three accessions reviewed in this section, 
Saudi Arabia broadly accepted most of what was accepted by Jordan and Oman.  In 
doing so, Saudi Arabia was subject to demands of both a ‘WTO-minus’ and ‘WTO-plus 
nature’.  It also had to agree to adhere to some plurilateral agreements.  As to transitional 
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periods, Saudi Arabia was not, in general, granted any of them as they had all expired 
years before its accession in 2005.  In terms of its tariff rate bindings, however, it was 
expected that Saudi Arabia would set its binding rates at a much lower level than those 
countries that had joined the WTO years earlier.  This is not exactly what happened, 
however. 
Saudi Arabia bound its tariff rates slightly lower than those of Jordan and Oman in 
particular.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia managed not to include items in its agricultural 
offers that were viewed as prohibited according to Islam.  It also managed, unlike Oman 
and Jordan, to refuse submission of its proposed rules and regulations to the WTO 
members before adopting them officially.  Without discounting the agreement in the 
accession literature that a longer accession process meant an increasing complexity of 
that process, the fact that Saudi Arabia managed to hold on to its initial positions in 
some issues might suggest that a lengthy accession process can, if accompanied by a 
decisive stance, sometimes result in important gains for the acceding countries. 
With Bahrain, the case was different.  Bahrain joined GATT in December 1993 before 
the establishment of the WTO through a procedure called ‘succession’.  In general, 
‘succession’ has to do with changes within the territories of members, whereas 
‘accession’ has to do with new territories joining the organization.  Before the WTO 
came into being, a simplified procedure existed for gaining contracting party status 
under the provisions of GATT Article XXVI: 5(c), as opposed to the generally 
applicable procedure for accession under GATT Article XXXIII (GATT, 1993). 
The Article XXVI: 5(c) procedure allowed former territories of the original contracting 
parties, which had gained independence or commercial autonomy (i.e. mostly former 
colonies), to succeed to contracting party status.  Thus, to become a contracting party in 
their own right, former colonies merely needed to invoke Article XXVI: 5(c) and get the 
original contracting party (i.e. metropolitan government) to sponsor their application.  It 
should be noted that contracting parties that acceded under Article XXVI: 5(c) had to 
accept the terms and conditions previously accepted by the metropolitan government.  
Alternatively, former territories could negotiate new terms if choosing to accede under 
the provisions of Article XXXIII.  The ‘succession’ mechanism envisaged by GATT 
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Article XXVI: 5(c) does not exist under the WTO.  The GATT accession provisions 
contained in GATT Article XXXIII were largely incorporated, as mentioned, into the 
WTO framework, in which accession is governed by the provisions of Article XII of the 
Marrakesh Agreement (WTO, 2007; UN, 2002: 88-89). 
Joining the multilateral trading system through ‘succession’ saved Bahrain from going 
through the complex WTO accession process.  Whereas the average has been six years 
for the completion of the process of WTO accession, it took Bahrain only one day to 
complete its succession to GATT’s contracting party status.  The Bahraini government 
applied under the XXVI: 5(c) in 13 December 1993 and joined as a contracting party the 
following day (Roshdy, Interview, 12 June 2007; Al-Awadi, Interview, 11 June 2007). 
As such, Bahrain was also saved from the high demands for concessions presented by 
incumbent members, which are inherent to the WTO accession process.  Accordingly, 
Bahrain opened only 44% of its services sector to foreign investment, compared with 
72% in Oman and 85% in Jordan (Alamy, 2006: 279).  As a result of the UR, Bahrain 
bound more than 77% of its tariff rates at 35%.  It was possible for Bahrain to bind its 
tariff rates at a higher level as in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), another ‘succeeded’ 
country, which bound its tariff rates at 40%.  As mentioned, however, in furtherance of 
its aim to be the central base in the Gulf region for economic and financial services, 
Bahrain from the start adopted a relatively low rate of tariffs (Gulf Centre for Strategic 
Studies, 1999). 
With regard to TRIPS, Bahrain, as a developing member of the WTO, was given four 
years to implement the agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1996 (Al-Awadi, 
Interview, 11 June 2007).  The other three, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia were, as 
acceding countries, to apply the agreement from the date of accession.  Also, Bahrain 
was not subject to the ‘WTO-plus’ or ‘WTO-minus’ arrangements discussed above.  For 
example, it was not requested to sign plurilateral agreements, particularly those of the 
government procurement, which constituted a real difficulty during the accession 
process of Saudi Arabia. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The completion of the UR resulted in the WTO.  The new permanent organization 
extended its jurisdiction to include, in addition to trade across borders, issues of 
domestic nature, such as the legal systems in acceding states.  Unlike the GATT, the 
WTO was armed with an effective dispute-settlement mechanism to ensure non-
violation of commitments made during accessions. 
The establishment of the WTO came at the heyday of globalisation.  It was perceived as 
the only multilateral organization that was explicitly created for a global and wholly 
interdependent economy.  The acceding countries largely considered the WTO to be an 
important gate to integration with the international economy that was plainly growing 
interdependent.  In the process, they viewed membership in the organization as vital for 
finding new markets and attracting investments.  In a globalised economy, this 
membership seemed to provide the protection of a rule-based system to acceding 
countries that were mainly developing, LDCs or CIT.  Since many of them were in a 
state of making economic reforms, they believed that WTO accession could be useful 
for locking in reform measures.  Accession was also viewed as being important for 
building smooth relationships with IFIs, of which the applicants frequently were clients.  
Finally, acceding states with economic potential thought that WTO membership was a 
means to participate in formulating international regulations of importance to them. 
However, such factors are faced with limitation of rules and absence of detailed 
procedures when it comes to the actual accession process.  In fact, the WTO has largely 
left this aspect to the negotiations with WP members when it stated that any state or 
customs territory may accede to the Marrakesh Agreement “on terms to be agreed 
between it and the WTO” without giving guidance on those terms.  This gave leverage to 
the WTO incumbent members, especially those with large economies and considerable 
political power.  As a result, applicants were to undergo an exhaustive scrutiny of their 
trade and economic regimes.  Because of the expansion of issues covered by the 
organization, such scrutiny occasionally impinged on political issues.  The leverage that 
the WTO incumbent members have in the negotiations would allow them to impose 
what is referred to as ‘WTO-plus’ and ‘WTO-minus’, in getting further concessions 
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from acceding countries.  Some of the previous examples from the accessions of Jordan 
and Oman specifically illustrated this well. 
Complex as it might be, there were those who argued that the accession process had, 
nonetheless, not been without merit.  They pointed out that the average time required for 
completing the process allows for better preparation on the part of acceding states.  It is 
argued that the negativity about the difficult nature of the process obscures the ultimate 
aim of enhancing the competitiveness of applicant countries in the world economy. 
In any event, it is a complicated process, and it is the contention of this thesis that the 
case for justifying such complexity is a matter of internal interplay.  As mentioned 
earlier, the WTO accession decision, as a trade policy decision, is a matter of domestic 
politics.  Thus, the following chapter will set the framework for this internal interaction.  
It will do so by considering concepts that the study regards important as far as such a 
case is concerned.  
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Chapter 3 Analytical Framework 
Chapter Two illustrated in some of its parts the complicated nature of the WTO 
accession process.  Indeed, Saudi Arabia had to submit approximately 7000 documents 
during the years of negotiation.  It went through nearly 379 rounds of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, and had to provide answers to more than 3400 questions (Al-
Alamy, Interview, 02 May 2002; Al-Hasher, Interview, 18 April 2002). 
In a comparative study on accession to the WTO, Kennett et al. found that although 
other acceding countries had followed a similar process, the exact terms of accession for 
those countries had been very different (2005: 12).  In fact, the examples of Jordan and 
Oman compared with the Saudi case reflect such a difference.  In support of Kennet’s 
thesis is the argument of Williamson about policies of economic reform.  WTO 
accession has usually been associated with economic reform.  Williamson thought that 
inasmuch as there has been a fairly widespread agreement on the principles upon which 
reform must be based, there has been less understanding on the political process through 
which reform could be achieved (1994: 1). 
Both conclusions can be attributed to the particular circumstances either in acceding or 
reforming countries.  Because of such diversity in circumstances, the WTO accession 
would not be expected to neatly fit a single paradigm.  In discussing the application of 
theories to particular events, Brown said, “It is still asking a lot to expect of even a very 
strong theory that it actually predicts single events” (1997: 210).  Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the case is more difficult with an instance like the WTO accession, as it is 
not even an event, but a process that might involve multiple events over the years.  
In this study, the assumption is that those above-mentioned documents, negotiations and 
answers provided during the Saudi accession case issued from an internal interplay that 
was not neutral to external factors.  As the introductory chapter indicates, the decision to 
accede to the WTO can be considered to be a matter of trade policy for an acceding 
country, or – as Spero and Hart said –trade policy is arguably an object of domestic 
politics (2003: 66).  With regard to the external dimension in such politics, Goldstein 
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pointed out that the interaction between domestic and international affairs has nowhere 
been more evident than in trade policies (1998: 138). 
Internal politics in all its guises, political and economic, and its receptivity to external 
impact is, in essence, related to political economy.  This is applied to the WTO 
accession.  A top Russian WTO accession negotiator, Maxim Medvedkov, stated in this 
regard: 
“Any acceding country, when deciding whether or not to join the WTO, 
should evaluate all pluses and minuses of this exercise.  Some countries are 
driven by political considerations, some by economic ones and some by a 
combination of both” (Medvedkov, 2001: 69). 
Political economy is a term denoting the interplay of politics and economics illustrated 
in the behaviour and interests of the state at the domestic and international levels.  At the 
domestic level, scholars have acknowledged the impact of economics on the state’s 
politics and its society.  Political economists normally operate beyond the conventional 
acceptance of economic activities as rational maximisation of interests by individuals 
through supply and demand.  They consider other factors that help an economy produce 
goods that grow and impact the political and economic welfare of the state.  The factors 
include national institutions, political ideology, cooperation, economic power, human 
psychology and culture (Pressman and Neill, 1999: 854-5). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of IPE became a notable interdisciplinary 
approach that attempted to tie politics and economics to international relations.  The IPE 
became a perspective that addresses political bargaining over economic issues (Mingst, 
2004: 233) or the intersection of politics and economics and changes in the distribution 
of states’ wealth and power through identifying the political determinants of 
international economic relations (Kegley, 2007: 302).  Others viewed IPE as “the study 
of inequality in power and wealth between peoples and nations, and of patterns of 
collective learning and positioning that preserve or change this inequality or 
asymmetry” (Isaak, 1995: 2). 
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The IPE today emphasises the belief that in a globalised world economy, the spread of 
liberal political and economic concepts and institutions has profound effects on the 
policies of every country.  Interdependence links governments, firms, socio-economic 
groups and individuals.  The links and changes in the world economy create pressures on 
decision-makers and governments to alter policies and to create or remodel institutions 
in order to enhance or protect the interests of the individual as much as those of the 
nation (Keohane and Milner, 1996: 03-24). 
In light of such changes in the global political economy and the modern pressure on 
policy-makers, Krasner claimed that there were two general lines of enquiry when it 
comes to analysing the impact of domestic variables on international economic policy.  
The first examines the influence of international systems on domestic political structure 
and groups.  The second investigates how domestic political structures, group interests 
and ideas affect foreign policies (Krasner, 1996: 192). 
Related to Krasner’s claim, Viotti and Kauppi have identified three levels of analysis in 
international relations: international system, state and society, and individual.  It has 
been quite typical, as Viotti and Kauppi suggested, for these levels to be used in 
explaining foreign policies of states.  In the process, the adoption of one level of analysis 
does not mean dismissing factors operating at other levels (1999: 13-14). 
In light of what Krasner and Viotti and Kauppi emphasise, this study will take the level 
of state and society as the point of analysis.  Therefore, this chapter will develop an 
analytical framework that is based on internal politics of the Saudi WTO accession, 
taking into account the impact of external effects.  Accordingly, the chapter will focus 
on two elements frequently presented in the approaches that concentrate on domestic 
variables in making international policy: interests and institutions.  As the length of time 
of the accession process in general, and that of Saudi Arabia in particular, is a key to this 
study, those indicated elements were not isolated from interaction with international 
events that were taking place over the years of the Saudi case. 
Therefore, the chapter will set out the approaches that have the society and state as the 
point of analysis.  In line with such approaches, the chapter will elaborate on the two 
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elements indicated above: interests and institutions.  After theoretically discussing 
interests and institutions, within and by which the factors shaping the Saudi accession 
emerged, the chapter will spell out those factors that the thesis assumes contributed to 
the case.  The chapter will end by giving a historical overview of Saudi Arabia and a 
brief discussion of its political economy.  This is important because it will help to 
understand the application of theoretical concepts of state/society approaches to the 
Saudi accession case. 
3.1 Society-Centred and State-Centred Approaches 
There are two main approaches that strive to explain the state’s international behaviour.  
One focuses on societal elements.  The other concentrates on the state (Bayne and 
Woolcock, 2003: 10). 
The society-centred approaches argue that explanations of foreign economic policy are 
found in the on-going struggle for influence among domestic social forces or political 
groups.  While there have been several variants of society-centred explanations, the 
variant that refers to those non-governmental domestic actors with a direct stake in the 
WTO accession, called interest groups in this thesis, is particularly dominant in the 
literature of foreign economic policy.  The interest group within the society-centred 
approaches viewed policy as the outcome of a competitive struggle among affected 
groups for influence over a specific policy decision (Ikenberry et al. 1988: 7).  The state 
is primarily viewed as an arena within which economic interest groups contend with one 
another to shape the making of policy.  The state actions, in this regard, are explained by 
the interplay of such groups (Gabriel, 1988: 859).  In McKeown’s model for tariff 
policy, for instance, tariff policy was not treated as a function of governmental objective, 
but as a function of the constraints imposed on governmental decision-makers by the 
demands of actors in civil society (1984: 216). 
This approach has mainly been criticised for overlooking the importance of the state in 
shaping foreign economic policy and the unexpectedness of an independent state action.  
As far as developing countries are concerned, there are concerns over the applicability of 
this approach where it is harder for groups to co-ordinate their activities and positions 
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than it is in the developed countries.  The approach is also criticised for not reflecting the 
influence politicians have on the process of shaping policies (Sutton, 1999: 26). 
The critique of society-centred approaches has emphasised the role of state institutions 
in shaping interest groups’ ability to gain access to the policy arena (Ikenberry et al. 
1988: 9).  According to Petracca, a return to institutions is not only for the sake of clarity 
and precision, but also because they have important effects on shaping political beings 
and their behaviour (1990: 568).  In this regard, in her article on the influence of ideas 
and institutions on American foreign trade policy, Goldstein contended that any 
assessment of trade policy would be incomplete without the consideration of state 
institutions (1988: 186). 
The other approaches, then, have brought to the fore what society-centred approaches 
have overlooked.  In her description of this attempt, Sutton stated that “there was an 
effort to bring the state back in” (1999: 26).  The state-centred approaches, unlike the 
society-centred ones, did not accept that states can merely be pure agents and that policy 
outcomes are a function of political conflict shaped by the preferences of different actors 
in the society (Hall, 1993: 275).  The state in the state-centred approaches is an 
institutional ensemble in its own right, independent of the society.  For statists, 
according to Das, the autonomy of state stems from its specific interest by virtue of its 
insertion into an international state system and its unique responsibility for maintaining 
public order (1996).Generally, the central contention to theorists from these approaches 
is that the state has an important impact of its own on the nature of public policy and 
substantial independence from organised social interests (Hall, 1993: 275).  
The state-centred approaches have, to a large extent, focused on the institutional 
structures of decision-making in foreign economic policy (Bayne and Woolcock, 2003: 
29).  As such, the state has primarily been conceived as an organisational structure, or as 
a set of laws and institutional arrangements.  According to this view, institutions, once 
formed, tend to endure and are not susceptible to linear change.   
In addition, another line of scrutiny has been developed within the state-centred 
approaches.  Here, the state is conceived as an actor, and the immediate focus is on 
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politicians and administrators as autonomous in the policy process.  An underlying 
presumption is that the preferences of politicians and administrators are, to a noticeable 
extent, distinct from the concerns of either societal groups or specific governmental 
institutions.  Such preferences, according to this line of reasoning, are tied to the concept 
of ‘national interest’ (Ikenberry et al. 1988: 10). 
In Hall’s view, although state-centred approaches have offered a useful correction to the 
pluralist emphasis on the societal influence on public policy, they have occasionally 
been overstated.  Thus, such approaches leave some questions unanswered about the 
motives of the state’s actions if they are not the factors identified by society-centred 
approaches (1993: 275).  The interests of influential societal actors like the business 
community cannot be neglected, as Kim pointed out.  He indicated that contemporary 
works of theorists of state, such as Peter Evans, have focused on the ties between 
societal actors and institutions (Kim, 1999: 441-442). 
Both approaches have their strengths and limitations.  The state-centred approaches 
emerged as a corrective effort to the society-centred approaches’ overemphasis on the 
influence of societal elements on foreign economic policy.  By the same token, state-
centred approaches themselves seemed to sometimes overstate the impact of the state.  
As some critics of statists pointed out that there cannot be a state for itself, a state which 
is not a partner of anyone (Das, 1996).  The fact that societal elements could not be 
glossed over had led some statists, as indicated, to focus on the ties of both societal 
actors and governmental institutions (Kim, 1999: 441-443). 
Thus, to avoid this artificial state-society dichotomy, it will be useful for this study to 
consider such ties by focusing on the interests and institutions that were closely involved 
in the Kingdom’s accession.  The fact that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, which assumes 
an absolute power, implies that certain politicians or administrators, from the ruling 
family or close to it, had an important role in the country’s accession to the WTO.  This 
was important, as indicated, to state-centred approaches.  Accordingly, in addition to 
institutions, the analytical framework of this study looks at the potentially influential 
roles of individual actors.  
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It is worth mentioning, in this connection, that the literature of international relations has 
largely focused on democratic states when examining the significance of domestic 
variables on economic foreign policy.  More specifically, the focus has been on states 
where democracy has been well established and domestic actors have been well defined.  
Even where the literature has been generally discussing the topic, it reflected in its 
models and examples an assessment of democratic systems, such as referring to formal 
separation of powers, political parties, interest groups, labour unions, etc. (Milner, 1997; 
Hall, 1993; Ikenberry et al. 1988). 
As far as this study is concerned, however, domestic variables can, in fact, also have 
effects in countries not commonly classified as democratic.  This is reflected in the 
tangible effects of interests and institutions in such states as Saudi Arabia. 
3.1.1 Interests 
The term ‘interests’ has sometimes been interchangeably used with the term 
‘preferences’.  More often, however, a specific different meaning would be assigned to 
each term (Clark, 1998: 252).  Milner, for instance, has perceived ‘preferences’ as being 
derived from ‘interests’ (1997: 33).  This means that ‘interests’ are values, pecuniary or 
other, and ‘preferences’ are the strategies or policies designed to maximise those values.  
On the other hand, Clark has stated the opposite.  In arguing for the applicability of 
rational choice theories, Clark pointed out that much of the criticism against them has 
been driven by confusion of the terms ‘preferences’ and ‘interests’.  Accordingly, he 
tried to disperse that confusion by pointing out that the former was about the 
dispositional trait of an actor or his ends, whilst the latter was about the strategies or 
means to secure those ends (1998: 252).  In any event, this study will use the term 
‘interests’ to refer to those non-governmental domestic actors with a direct stake, 
economic or other, in the WTO accession of Saudi Arabia, and their role. 
In analysing the relations between changes in domestic interests and the responsiveness 
of formal institutions, Garrett and Lange stressed the importance of democracy.  They 
suggested that democracy has been a pre-condition for economic pluralism (1995: 649).  
In other words, interests, which have been a chief element in the society-centred 
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approaches that draw heavily on pluralism, as explained earlier, would rather need a 
democratic system to operate tangibly.  The reason for this mainly lies, according to 
Garrett and Lange, in the ease with which political incumbents in the government could 
be accessed, as in democracies (1995: 641).  
Common political sense would tend to regard democracy as the most suitable set for any 
societal interests to plainly emerge.  That can be seen, as mentioned, in the literature that 
– even when it generally discusses societal interests – would normally refer in its models 
and examples to interests that are officially active in democratic societies.  Nonetheless, 
having a democracy as a pre-condition for pluralism, as Garrett and Lange stated, cannot 
be interpreted as if societal interests did not exist in non-democracies.  Even though the 
dynamic of replacing government is absent, societal interests in non-democracies still 
have a channel through which they can exert some influence.  In the case of Saudi 
Arabia’s WTO accession, for instance, it would be difficult to assume that no element in 
the society had any concerns about the accession, or that such an element would remain 
passive throughout the accession process, which officially lasted for years.  
Irrespective of specific countries or regime types, foreign economic policy generally has 
domestic distributional consequences.  This distributional effect is the primary reason 
that motivates societal interests to make an impact on the government’s foreign 
economic policies.  In their effort to do so, they employ tools available to them.  For 
instance, they contribute campaign funds and mobilise voters, but obviously only in a 
state with a democratic administrative arrangement.  They could also serve as 
information providers to formal political actors, especially those in the legislating bodies 
of the government (Milner, 1997: 60-61).  Depending on the culture of a society and its 
formal and informal political arrangements, different tools of exerting influence could be 
added in this respect.  In Saudi Arabia, for instance, interest groups could make use of 
what will be discussed ahead, the Majlis, where they could directly reach the highest 
level of leadership in the country.15 
                                                 
15
 Majlis is an Arabic word that in Saudi politics means “public audience”. 
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Societal interests are not usually homogeneous in their efforts to gain the support of 
policy-makers.  The creation and goals of interests are primarily a function of the issue 
area.  As Browne put it, “interests define themselves in terms of carefully constructed 
issue niches”, which are necessary, according to him, in lobbying a particular group or 
groups (1990: 477-478).  In the case of an accession to the WTO, what sort of interests 
would one expect to be relevant? 
The WTO has been the subject of a controversy concerning the limit of its jurisdictions 
(Bhagwati, 2001; Sally, 2003).  Yet, there has been no doubt that economy in general, 
and trade in particular, have been the primary issues of this organization.  Therefore, 
business communities in all countries would normally constitute the principal societal 
interest groups that would be involved in and concerned with the matter of those 
countries’ accession.  Taking into account the nature of the domestic economy and the 
degree of its openness towards the global market, the business community in a given 
country would differ in its position towards international economic institutions such as 
the WTO, for example (Milner, 1997: 33-66).  
The general purpose of the WTO is the expansion of international trade liberalisation.  
The decision to accede to the WTO is a matter of foreign economic policy that has 
distributional consequences.  While normative economic theory advocates the aggregate 
benefit of trade liberalisation, its expected positive effect would normally be diffused to 
the extent that many might not even be aware of it.  On the other hand, the negative 
consequences of liberalising trade are commonly concentrated and, thus, those whose 
interests were negatively affected have a stronger motive to endeavour to resist it 
(Coughlin et al, 2000; Oatley, 2006: 77). Accordingly, the business community in an 
acceding country could be divided with regard to the WTO accession into two broad 
categories: proponents and opponents.  
Recent works on IPE have defined the two camps as being import-competing and 
export-oriented businesses, respectively.  The former kind of business activity depended 
on the domestic market, and thus, would seek protection from foreign competition 
brought by trade liberalisation.  The latter, on the other hand, would most likely 
welcome the WTO accession, as trade liberalisation can be expected to pave the way for 
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its business activities to reach new foreign markets (Mckeown, 1984; Milner, 1988: 15; 
Oately, 2006).  Because those who might be injured by liberalisation had a stronger 
motive to resist, it could be assumed that they would exercise more pressure on policy-
makers for protection.  In fact, as Coughlin et al. have pointed out, such a motivation 
could explain why protectionism endured in spite of the theoretical case for trade 
liberalisation (2000: 312).  Nevertheless, the effect of each group would most likely be a 
function of the state of the acceding country’s economy. 
As established in Chapter One, investigating questions related to a WTO accession case, 
such as questions on the internal politics involved, would usually reveal some 
considerable particularities.  This can be applied, inter alia, to the type of groups that 
might get involved in the issue of joining the multilateral trading system.  A specific 
type will largely depend, as in the aforementioned example of the Majlis, on the specific 
accession case under examination.  In fact, interests, as already indicated, are not always 
of a pecuniary nature.  This will especially be true, as far as interests in the WTO 
accession are concerned, because the organization has indeed extended its rules and 
regulations beyond the limits of economic issues.  It is why Bhagwati and Sally pointed 
out above that the WTO is controversial when it comes to the subjects it covers. Based 
on such aground, this study will introduce in the following sections an interest group that 
is particular to the case of Saudi Arabia.  That is the religious establishment. 
In the aforesaid thesis’s sub-hypotheses, Saudi Arabia has been legally and culturally 
governed by precepts of the Islamic religion, and because of which the expansion of the 
WTO into similar areas might have been, to some in the Kingdom, incompatible. 
Although possible contradictions between the WTO regulations and Islam could be 
thought of as an ideational or ideological matter, they will be treated here as a part of 
societal interests in Saudi Arabia arising from the existence of this religious 
establishment.  The concept of ideology, according to Bawn, has generally been centred 
on people having preferences and opinions about issues in which they have no direct 
stake.  Such opinions do not need to be driven by material interests (1999: 303-304).  
The religious establishment did have a specific interest.  It was the aim, as it will be 
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explained in the following sections, to preserve the alliance between religion and politics 
in Saudi Arabia, as it was depicted in 1744. 
3.1.2 Institutions 
As mentioned, institutions have primarily been the focus of the state-centred approaches.  
North has defined institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction” (1991: 97).  Likewise, there is the view that 
politics has conspicuously been influenced by the institutional structure within which 
politics occurred, or as March and Olsen claimed: “political institutions define the 
framework within which politics takes place” (1989: 16-18).  In line with this 
conception, Knight indicated that social institutions relied on an array of social 
conventions, rules and norms that structured relations at the most basic level of society, 
such as affairs of family life, standards of behaviour among members of a community 
and transmission of social knowledge and information.  Upon such informal 
conventions, according to Knight, a vast range of formal institutions organised and 
influenced economic and political life.  For the purpose of deriving a working definition 
from this, Knight presented the common features of institutions:  
“First, an institution is a set of rules that structure social interactions in 
particular way.  Second, for a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of 
these rules must be shared by the members of the relevant community or 
society” (1992: 1-2). 
Such broad definitions have generally been agreed on in the area of treating institutions 
as structures.  Structures do have a crucial impact on a country’s foreign policy in 
general, and foreign economic policy in particular.  They, according to Hill, condition 
foreign policy-making (2003: 26).  In his book “Between Power and Plenty”, 
Katzenstein studied the foreign economic policies to manage the terms of global 
interdependence in six different industrial countries.  He observed, in the process, that 
foreign economic policies in industrial states, especially after the 1960s, had reflected 
their own different domestic structures.  For instance, the federalism and decentralisation 
of the political and economic systems in the U.S. have affected its foreign economic 
policy in a way that is different from the governmental bureaucracy-business community 
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partnership style of Japan (1978: 297-313).  Katzenstein’s conclusion about the 
importance of domestic structures broadly agreed with Garrett and Lange’s view of the 
significance of regime type with respect to how responsive foreign economic policy was 
to domestic preferences (1995: 632). 
In addition to institutions being perceived as structures, some theorists thought of them 
as actors or agents who may formulate and pursue goals (Clark, 1998: 248).  In light of 
the broad definitions introduced above, institutions could range from the rules of a 
constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the 
conventions governing trade union behaviour or firm relations, which would allow, as 
some institutionalists did, an association of institutions with organisations (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 6-7).  In this regard, Knight explained that whereas institutions were sets 
of rules, organisations were collective actors.  According to him, however, some 
organisations had an internal structure or institutional framework governing the 
interactions of their members.  Therefore, some collective entities could be 
conceptualised as both institutions and organisations, such as firms and governmental 
bureaucracies (1992: 3). 
To March and Olsen, the argument that institutions could be treated as political actors 
was a claim of institutional coherence and autonomy.  They thought that a claim of 
coherence would be necessary for an attempt to treat institutions as decision-makers.  
Pragmatically, March and Olsen pointed out, coherence of institutions varied, but was 
sometimes substantial enough to justify viewing a collectivity as acting coherently 
(1989: 17-18).  In other words, March and Olsen did not deny the possibility of treating 
institutions as actors or agents.  In fact, even Clark, who generally criticised the 
perception of assigning agency to institutions, did not, in principle, rule out the idea of 
attributing human agency to collectivities.  His criticism was primarily about turning the 
state as a whole, as some structure-based institutionalists did, into an actor, as that would 
enhance the unconvincing conceptualisation of the state as a unitary actor (1998: 248). 
For the purpose of this study, thinking of institutions as both structures and agents would 
be of benefit.  To reflect on them as structures could provide a wider picture of the 
political context of the WTO accession of Saudi Arabia ,e.g., how has the framework of 
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power been shaped and how have political decisions been made?  Interpreting 
institutions as actors or agents would allow for identifying the main formal actors who 
were directly involved in the accession issue, as well as analysing the interaction that 
took place among them throughout the years of the country’s accession experience.  In 
this respect, the fact that some theorists from state-centred approaches who conceived 
institutions as agents paid particular attention to politicians and administrators in the 
policy process would lead this study to examine the role of significant political 
individuals in the accession. 
With regard to institutions as structures in the Saudi Arabian WTO accession case, the 
following sections of this chapter will look at the kind of domestic political structure that 
contributed as a factor in shaping the accession.  It will consider the role of religion, 
which constitutes the country’s highest law.  In addition, the sub-sections ahead will 
examine the monarchy’s influence as another structural factor.  The assessment of 
structure will also explore some settings particular to Saudi Arabia, within which a 
significant part of domestic politics is enacted.  
In terms of perceiving institutions as agents, as stated in discussing the theoretical 
perceptions of institutions, in addition to structures, would allow studying the main 
formal actors who were directly involved in the issue of WTO accession.  In examining 
institutions, Milner stressed the relevance of four key powers for domestic players: “the 
ability to initiate and set the agenda, to amend any proposed policy, to ratify or veto 
policy, and to propose public referendums” (1997: 18).  Milner treated institutions in her 
study as actors and focused mainly on the general governmental institutions, namely the 
executive and the legislature. 
The four key powers of Milner are not universally applicable.  Some countries, for 
instance, never experienced the practice of conducting referendums. Others might 
combine or subdivide the four powers identified by Milner into more or less actors than 
she did.  As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, the COM has combined the executive 
power and, to a great extent, the legislative power as well.  The Shura (consultative 
council) established in 1992 has performed some parliamentary functions like 
conducting hearing sessions and ratifying treaties, but with no full enacting power. 
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In addition to the degree of concentration or diffusion of the four powers identified by 
Milner, there is no reason to think of formal actors exclusively as always being at that 
level of the general governmental powers, such as the executive and the legislature.  As 
mentioned, Tsebelis claimed that the nature of an agent depended on the issue at hand. 
He further pointed out that that the number of actors varied broadly depending on the 
issue area (1995: 307-308). 
As stated above, interests and institutions constitute the direct frame of reference for this 
study.  After introducing them as concepts, the following sections will elaborate on the 
elements that they contained, as far as this study is concerned (e.g. business community, 
monarchy, COM, influential individuals etc.).  Indeed, they and their interaction 
throughout the years of the study formed the main factors that are argued in this thesis to 
have shaped the Kingdom’s WTO accession.  Since the protracted Saudi accession 
process was not sealed off from the international context, the entire related factors will 
basically be divided into two main categories: internal and external.   
3.2 Internal Factors 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the Saudi Arabian WTO accession resulted 
from a primarily domestic interplay.  Hence, the internal factors constituted, in terms of 
number, the bulk of the factors shaping the accession of the Kingdom.  They are 
elaborated in the following.   
3.2.1 Business Community   
Trading is one of the ancient and respected activities in the Arabian Peninsula that 
predates Islam.  Traditionally, traders exercised considerable influence in shaping 
leaders’ policies that affected commercial activities.  From the outset, King Abdul Aziz, 
Ibn Saud,16 needed money for his military campaign and had to rely on several sources 
of income including foreign subsidies (i.e. Great Britain) and on the merchant 
community.  Consequently, his realisation of the need to have a prosperous traders’ 
community became a standard government practice, which helped traders acquire an 
important social and political status.  The alliance between Ibn Saud and traders, 
                                                 
16
 The last section in the Chapter will give a brief Saudi history including the founder, Abdul Aziz.  
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particularly those of the Hejaz region, was seen as a reinforcement for the Saudi state 
and was instrumental in structuring the modern Saudi Kingdom (Menoret, 2005: 94).  
However, with the evolution of the oil sector and increased government revenues, the 
picture started to change when the king no longer depended on the traders’ financial 
support.  This impacted their influence on policy and decision-making for a while until 
the government was obliged by the dictates of its development plans to reinstate at least 
some of the traders’ important old role. The development plans that began in the 1970s 
ushered in a transformation stage in Saudi society where traders slowly became 
businessmen and industrialists and the government gradually moved towards 
encouraging the growth and contributions of the private sector through government 
contracts and loan facilities.  In fact, the government’s developmental policy in the 
1970s was to transform the predominantly tribal society through creating a middle class 
where the business community would constitute a major section (Islami, 1984:43-68; 
Wilson, 2004: 22).  This was further enhanced by the trend that the development plans 
had taken.  They generally copied the trend prevalent in most of the developing world 




Table 3-1: Development of Companies and Firms 
Over 1967-1976 in Saudi Arabia 
*Comprises Saudi and Foreign investments 
Source: Central Department of Statistics and Information" Statistical Yearbook" 1970-1980 
 
Mainly because of oil, the characterisation of a ‘rentier’ state has become the dominant 
paradigm in the study of Saudi Arabia’s political economy (Hertog, 2006: 112).  As this 
paradigm assumes that the political system is independent of its society and at the same 
time the sole distributor of oil wealth,17 the welfare generated from that wealth becomes 
a source of the system’s legitimacy (Huyette, 1985; Kechichian, 2001:86).  According to 
                                                 
17
 A perception of the Saudi political economy in the literature will be discussed at the end of the Chapter. 
Year 
Saudi and Foreign Companies Individual Firms 
Saudi Foreign Mixed* Total Rate% Saudi Foreign Total Rate% 
1967 642 40 73 755 
 
15663 1370 17033 
 
1968 683 41 84 808 7.0 17121 1463 18584 9.1 
1969 710 43 87 840 4.0 18420 1498 19918 7.2 
1970 739 44 95 878 4.5 19436 1514 20950 5.2 
1971 766 48 100 914 4.1 20948 1534 22482 7.3 
1972 783 49 110 942 3.1 21961 1719 23680 5.3 
1973 814 48 116 978 3.8 23662 1761 25423 7.4 
1974 886 51 132 1068 9.2 25659 17761 43420 70.8 
1975 987 53 160 1200 12.4 28172 1764 29936 -31.1 
1979 1188 54 250 1492 24.3 34298 1762 36060 20.5 
Total 8198 471 1207 9875 
 
225340 32146 257486 
 
Rate 
% 83.0 4.8 12.2 100.0  87.5 12.5 100.0  
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Wilson, if a ‘rentier’ existed, it would typically seek to obtain a monopoly and look for 
protection by the private sector (2004: 8). 
As it will be argued later in reviewing the perceptions of the Saudi political economy, 
this thesis does not take the ‘rentier’ paradigm at face value.  It rather claims that 
interests and institutions in the state interact and mutually, but not necessarily equally, 
influence each other.  In any event, however, whether it is a case of mutual influence 
between these elements, or a ‘rentier’ classification where supposedly not much 
interaction takes place, as is the dominant argument in the literature, the government 
would be attentive to what the business community thinks.  In fact, the Saudi 
government in this case has generally accommodated the perspectives of businessmen 
and has occasionally yielded to their rejection of some of its policies as the one related 
to imposing income taxes on national businesses around the end of the 1980s. 
What added to the influence of the business community in general was the concomitant 
trend of having important royal businesspersons.  Prior to the oil boom, neither Abdul-
Aziz nor his sons were involved in any business activities.  However, when the central 
government began to take shape, the royal family was bound to benefit from available 
opportunities.  Outside of government, many members of the ruling family established 
bases of power in the economic and social sub-systems (Glosemeyer, 2005: 218).  As 
they played prominent roles both in the civil society and in the state, it was customary 
for some members of the family to hold audiences, receive petitions and have their own 
mini-courts to settle issues between citizens (Fandy, 1999: 35).  Their status and easy 
access to the power structure of the government allowed princes overall to maintain a 
leverage that facilitated their business ventures particularly at the domestic level. 
The government promoted the interest of the royal businesspersons through land grants, 
financing, and granting of contracts.  The royal entrepreneurs, along with other 
businessmen, indeed managed at times to alter the COM decisions, as was the case in 
1991, when the government withdrew its decision to implement several austerity 
measures such as eliminating subsidies and imposing income taxes (Sabri, 2001: 32-3).  
They also exerted their influence in their request for protection from foreign competition 
that resulted, for example, in imposing import restrictions, trade barriers and high tariffs 
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– which in turn created difficulties when the Kingdom was negotiating with the WTO 
(Anonymous, Interview, 06April2006). 
All in all, the business community has been characterised as an ally of the political 
system that worked to have this community constituted the core of the middle class in 
the country.  Assigning infrastructure projects gave the government the power of 
patronage over businesspersons, which in turn worked to enhance personal contacts 
(Champion, 2003: 88; Wilson, 2004: 16; Huyette, 1985: 32).  Personal contacts helped 
big businesses to become the focus of government.  They were able to secure more 
direct support in the form of governmental contracts, financial facilities and loans from 
specialised agencies such as the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) (The 
Economist, 1997; Dr. M. Hasan, Interview, 27 April 2004; Arab News, 2004). 
In addition, the great majority of business establishments in the Kingdom have been 
small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  According to the eighth development plan, 
SMEs accounted for about 93% of business firms in 2004.  The wholesale and retail 
enterprises accounted for 48% of the total, with 14% of SMEs in agriculture, 13% in 
manufacturing, and 9% in services sector (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2005: 
122).  Individuals owned about 94.8% of the commercially registered firms (Al-Hayat, 
2004).  The problem of such firms has been that their relatively limited capacities do not 
encourage high-level technology and professional management.  
Approximately a year before the official accession to the WTO, the private sector’s 
contributions to the GDP reached 43% of the total, albeit having been wholly dependent 
on the domestic market.  For the last few decades, it concentrated on import 
substitutions to meet domestic demands rather than on export promotion (Arab news, 
2004).  Even with such a concentration, the private sector was not able fully to meet 
domestic demands, which led to a significant volume of goods and services being 
imported (CCTI, 2002), a trend that reflected the fact that the majority of firms in the 
Saudi economy were medium- and small-sized. 
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Table 3-2: Contribution to the GDP by Sectors over 1970-2004 
(Value at Constant Prices 1999) 
Year Oil Private Government Total (SR) 
1970 65.8 12.9 21.3 145037 
1975 46.9 35.7 17.4 365829 
1980 48.0 36.7 15.4 512403 
1985 22.9 51.5 25.6 404685 
1990 35.7 41.4 22.9 476225 
1995 37.6 39.6 22.8 549963 
2000 34.1 42.8 23.1 623237 
2001 32.5 43.9 23.6 629265 
2002 30.0 45.7 24.3 629772 
2003 32.7 44.1 23.2 678183 
2004 33.1 44.1 22.8 713899 
Source: Saudi Monetary Agency "Forty Three Annual Report" 2007 
Another feature of the business community has been the general tendency of making 
hasty deals with quick profits rather than long-term investment strategies.  Hence, trade 
rather than industrial activities have particularly flourished.  The wholesale and retail 
trades have become essential to a large number of businesses and given rise to the 
phenomenon of agency representation.  Many businesses flourished because of their 
operation as sole agents/distributors (Wilson, 2004: 127; RCCI: 1997), which partially 
constituted an obstacle to joining the WTO and to economic progress (Arab News, 
2004). 
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3.2.2 Religious Establishment 
Another interest group that is particular to the case of Saudi Arabia is the religious 
establishment.  How could the GATT/WTO accession attract the attention of such a 
group?  As it will be discussed at the end of the chapter, Saudi Arabia is ideologically 
built on the religious-political alliance of 1744 between Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab 
and Muhammad bin Saud.  This made it, as far as this research is concerned, a unique 
aspect in this accession case.  The legacy of the mentioned alliance serves as a source of 
legitimacy for the rule of Saud’s family to rule over the Arabian Peninsula (Islami, 1984: 
7-8; Kechichian, 1986: 53).  The religious establishment, as far as this thesis is 
concerned, consists of those who have an interest in preserving the religious-political 
alliance of 1744. 
They are the group of religious clerics, or the Ulama.  The Ulama is a plural Arabic 
word of which the singular is Alim.  It is a title given to those who carefully studied, 
over the years, the Qur’an and the Sunnah and other sources of Islam so as to be able to 
establish laws and offer interpretation according to the religion’s view (Kechichian, 
1986: 55). 
In the Saudi context, as the state has adopted Wahhabism18 as the general official 
interpretation of religion, those scholars –the Ulama– who shared in their work of 
scholarship the legacy of the 1744 alliance became influential.  The Ulama constituted 
no specific organisation, but spread in a variety of positions in official and social 
institutions such as ministries and authorities responsible for religious affairs, courts, 
universities and mosques.  Individually, they held no equal status and influence.  Certain 
of their members have, due to scholarship and social status, gained more weight and 
importance (Obaid, 1999). 
Because the Ulama supervise the judiciary authority through bodies like the Higher 
Board of Ulama and the Ministry of Justice, as well as other reasons, they became 
responsible for observing compliance with the Sharia in the society, including in 
government policies.  Thus, in theory the role of the Ulama as a whole is to help the 
                                                 
18It will be defined in the last section of the Chapter. 
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king in his primary duty of applying the Sharia.  It is after all a central source of the 
king’s legitimacy, and the legitimacy of his family as a ruling family.  No wonder, then, 
that their blessing was needed even in matters not directly related to religion such as the 
Saudi accession to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations 
(Tamim, 1998: 430).  Furthermore, their approval is occasionally sought in purely 
political issues, such as Fahd’s decision to admit foreign troops into the Kingdom to help 
in the campaign against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
The WTO, as indicated, expanded in its jurisdictions to include domestic legal matters.  
In Saudi Arabia, this was basically the field of the Ulama.  Accordingly, the latter was 
attentive to any advances from this organization.  From its side, the government should 
have been sensitive, in this case, to what the Ulama might feel or say. 
3.2.3 Domestic Sector Interests 
As will be explained in the examination of the phases, there were several important 
sectors that had an effect.  However, two of them were decisive at particular moments in 
the process to the extent that they could make or break the deal.  These were 
petrochemicals and services. 
The petrochemical industry was designed to lead the industrialisation of Saudi Arabia.  
It was considered an industry that could utilise the comparative advantage of an energy-
endowed country and was developed by joint ventures with foreign companies (Presely, 
1984: 50).  The most important entity in petrochemical industry has been SABIC, which 
was a joint venture between the government and multinational corporations including 
Mobil, Shell, Dow Chemicals and Mitsubishi.  SABIC produced primary 
petrochemicals, fertilisers, iron and steel that provided precursor products or raw 
materials for most Saudi manufacturing industries.  In addition, it processed the 
country’s abundant gas reserves for domestic consumption and export purposes. 
Although non-oil exports became important, exports of petrochemicals have accounted 
for about half the country’s non-oil exports (Arab News, 2004).  SABIC has been the 
dominant producer of these products (Arab News, 2004).  This dominance is 
exemplified by the growth rate in SABIC’s industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu, which 
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was 4.16% in 2004, when the WTO accession negotiations were at an intensive stage, 
whereas the rate of growth in the non-oil sectors in different regions of the kingdom was 
only 1.7% (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004). 
Table 3-3: Contribution of SABIC's Exports to Manufactured Non-oil Exports 
2000-2004 
Year Manufacturing Exports SABIC Exports 
SABIC/Total 
% 
2000 22572 14168 62.8 
2001 26596 17558 66.0 
2002 28359 18109 63.9 
2003 35720 24274 68.0 
2004 47965 24370 50.8 
Source: CDS, Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2004 
As to services, during the period 1970-2005, the services sector had higher shares of the 
GDP, compared to sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, ranging between 27 
and 56% of the total.  The services sector included the wholesale and retail trades, 
restaurants, hotels, transport, telecommunications, storage, finance, insurance and 
business services, community, social and personal and government-oriented services.  In 
comparison, during the same period the manufacturing industry, construction, and 
agricultural sectors provided the GDP with rates between a minimum of 1.9% for 
agriculture and a maximum of 11.2%for manufacturing.  The percentages indicate that 
the service sector received more benefits from revenues distributed through the national 
budgets, a trend that was mirrored in many oil-producing countries (Douglas, 1996). 
Services activities in foreign and domestic markets have usually been diverse and are 
generated by the public and private sectors.  They comprise heterogeneous businesses 
that range from traditional retail trade practices to the most modern information 
technology business activities.  In the last few years, these activities have been governed 
by the GATS. 
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According to GATS, the tradable or commercially traded services are divided into 12 
groups consisting of business, financial and distribution services, environmental 
services, educational, cultural, sporting, health-related services, social services, tourism 
and many other miscellaneous services (International Trade Centre, 1995: 3-17).  
However, the main groups of services were further classified into 155 activities that 
covered a wide spectrum of services. 
The services sector in the Kingdom has considerably expanded with the enlargement of 
the private sector.  The majority of its activities are provided by the private sector, while 
some of them were achieved by public enterprises.  For example, sea, air and inland 
transportation services were widely dominated by government enterprises, whilst private 
investments in educational services, health care services, and hospitality industries were 
usually supported by government measures like interest-free credits or charges.  
Nevertheless, during the period 1985-2005, the sector contributed to the GDP at rates 
ranging between 34 and 59% as indicated by Table 3-4.  The statistics in this diagram 
reveal a positive annual contribution for the sector and a marked increase since 1993. 

























































Banking and financial services were prominent among the services activities.  Local and 
foreign currency transfers and trading were not restricted, although some types of 
commerce were completely restricted for native investors due to religious prohibition.  
Nonetheless, many reforms were introduced in this domain, particularly during the 
accession negotiations, which will be mentioned in upcoming chapters.  
Government procurement played a significant role in wealth creation within the private 
sector, which became the main provider of supplies and services to government 
departments.  In the oil sector, even though the up-stream and down-stream operations 
were run by ARAMCO, the government’s giant corporation, construction and 
engineering services were largely provided by the private sector without any economic 
or managerial restrictions or barriers (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2004). 
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Table 3-4: Share of Service Sector to the GDP in Saudi Arabia 
Over 1985-2005(SR Million Saudi Riyals) 
Year GDP Value (SR) (+/-) % % GDP 
1985 372408 208921  56.1 
1986 318775 188404 -9.8 59.1 
1987 317478 178354 -5.3 56.2 
1988 322283 182175 2.1 56.5 
1989 350325 184734 1.4 52.7 
1990 430334 200413 8.5 46.6 
1991 484853 228553 14.0 47.1 
1992 501359 219778 -3.8 43.8 
1993 485630 229336 4.3 47.2 
1994 494766 234986 2.5 47.5 
1995 526004 244313 4.0 46.4 
1996 581873 253676 3.8 43.6 
1997 608802 274038 8.0 45.0 
1998 536635 276124 0.8 51.5 
1999 593955 285875 3.5 48.1 
2000 697007 294438 3.0 42.2 
2001 679163 305878 3.9 45.0 
2002 699680 314351 2.8 44.9 
2003 796561 337966 7.5 42.4 
2004 929946 366866 8.6 39.5 
2005 1150627 393898 7.4 34.2 
Source: SAMA, Ibid 
3.2.4 Religion 
This factor belongs to the concept of institutions as structure.  Religion is different, in 
this aspect, from the religious establishment introduced in the preceding section.  Herein, 
it refers to Islam, the religion, not to the group of the Ulama.  The main sources of Islam 
are the Qur’an19 and the Sunnah.20  As both contain various principles relating to the 
social, economic and political life of individuals and communities, Islam can be 
                                                 
19
 Literally, this means “the recitation”. Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the verbal book of divine 
guidance and direction for mankind, and consider the original Arabic verbal text to be the final revelation 
of God. 
20
 This is an Arabic word that means “habit” or “usual practice”. The Muslim usage of this term refers to 
the sayings and living habits of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).  
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considered to constitute the main structure for those individuals and communities that 
proclaim adherence to it.  
In its proclaimed adoption of Islam as the paramount institution, the Kingdom embraced 
the Hanbali school of Fiqh, or religious law, within Islam.  The choice was not 
accidental.  The Hanbali jurisprudence was the school that Muhammad bin Abdul-
Wahhab had studied, and on which he had drawn for his interpretation of Islam, which is 
known as Wahhabism, as it will be indicated in the final section of this chapter.   
The Hanbali jurisprudence is considered very strict and conservative, especially in terms 
of social codes. However, it allows a large margin of freedom in economic issues.  
Hanbali, like other Islamic jurisprudences, recognises and upholds the individual’s right 
to private ownership. At the same time, however, the Hanbali stands out among other 
schools in arguing that if private ownership endangers public interest, then the state can 
limit the amount an individual is allowed to own.  Related to this is an essential element 
of this school of Islamic thought, which grants an important status to the consent of the 
community (Hammad, Interview, 28 January 2009).  One important form of this, 
according to current Wahhabi doctrine, is rendering obedience to the leader of the 
community, the king and his government. 
Reverting to sacred texts as institutions that direct life was not solely a decision taken by 
the Saudi leadership; there have been, as some argued, more reasons to it.  First, it was 
the absence of colonialism from the history of Saudi Arabia.  Second, there was a strong 
sense of identification between religion and general social conventions (Doumato, 1992: 
3). 
3.2.5 Monarchy 
Like religion, monarchy is considered in its structural nature in this study.  Scholars like 
Joseph Kechichian noted that the political system of Saudi Arabia has in large part been 
concentrated on the monarchy (2001).  This was particularly true when the Kingdom 
was first established in 1932 and in the following decades.  With almost no written rules, 
Ibn Saud was an absolute monarch around whom the whole system revolved (Al-
Rasheed, 2002: 108).   
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After securing authority, Ibn Saud put in motion a gradual programme of building the 
Kingdom and its government apparatus.  By the time of his death in 1953, the Kingdom 
exhibited more political stability.  One of the major acts by Ibn Saud was his decree that 
the king was the highest authority in the land.  He was bound only by the Shariah 
(Suweaigh, 1992: 31).  
Such an absolute monarchy was plainly evident during the reign of King Faisal as well 
(1964-1975).  He had at his disposal vast amounts of money generated by the huge surge 
in oil prices following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  One of the primary measures adopted 
by Faisal was the amendment of the cabinet system, which anchored the role of the 
monarchy.  The amendment decreed that the king was also the prime minister, and 
sessions of the COM were held only when he or his deputy chaired them.  Decisions 
may not be executed until they were signed by the king (Dahlan, 1984: 126, 204-9).  In 
short, under Faisal, the monarchy gained a firm grip on the Kingdom’s internal and 
external affairs. 
The monarchy’s central role in the Saudi political system has been accompanied by the 
influential position of the extended number of the ruling family’s members.  They would 
usually hold certain essential government posts, some of which have been exclusively 
reserved for them like the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and the interior.  The 
ruling family members, especially the seniors among them, provide important support to 
legitimise the king’s selection as well as his policies and actions (Quandt, 1981: 77). 
The power of monarchy did not noticeably change after Faisal died in 1975.  However, 
power within the monarchy itself changed.  It became more diffused (Quandt, 1981: 79).  
A collective leadership developed among the sons of the founder Abdul-Aziz 
(Glosemeyer, 2005: 219).  The situation became clearer during Fahd’s reign, and 
especially when he fell ill in the mid-1990s.  Thus, princes like Abdullah (the current 
king), Sultan (the current crown prince), and Nayif (the current second deputy prime 
minister and minister of the interior) bolstered their own power base (Glosemeyer, 2005: 
219).21  One of the main features of this is to have senior princes, like those mentioned, 
                                                 
21
 Sultan and Nayif have recently died and Salman became the current crown prince.  
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becoming sponsors or mentors of particular policies or projects.  Abdullah, for instance, 
sponsored opening the gas sector in the Kingdom to foreign investment.  Sultan 
supervised the progress of the Saudi relations with the Kingdom’s southern neighbour, 
Yemen.  Nayif was charged with the project called ‘Saudisation’ for nationalising the 
workforce in the Kingdom.  
Because of the political and economic effects of the Second Gulf War in Kuwait in 
1991, the Kingdom experienced domestic division over the government’s decision to 
invite foreign forces into the country, coupled with intermittent violence and debate 
about the way the state was ruled.  However, the question of whether to abolish the 
monarchy was not really raised.  What was sought was reform even if it was not plainly 
described at the time as such (Kechichian, 1993: 39-45; Al-Rasheed, 2005: 164-171).  In 
addition, these calls for better governance found support abroad, particularly in the U.S. 
(EIU, 2000: 6; Heradstveit and Haveem, 2003: 42).  Amidst such events, Fahd on 2 
March 1992 introduced a reform initiative through royal decrees embodying three laws, 
namely: the Basic Law of Governance (BLG), the Law of the Shura and the Law of the 
Provinces (Niblock, 2006: 104). 
In fact, since the establishment in 1932, the Kingdom had occasionally discussed the 
lack of a formal constitution for the state.  Some of the Saudi leaders sympathised with 
this issue to varying degrees, depending when the question was posed.  Where the 
pressure was less, they would commonly argue that there was no need to have such a 
formal document.  Their pretext would usually be the argument that the country was, in 
fact, guided by a sacred text: the holy Qur’an.22 
3.2.6 Basic Law of Governance  
As law is generally a structure, the BLG belongs in the same sphere as the previous two 
factors belong: to the realm of institutions.  It is similar to the constitutions known in 
many other countries.  Article 5-b of the BLG states that the dynastic succession is to 
                                                 
22The founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, used to say that his constitution, law, system and banner were 
Islam (see Dr. Al Traiki: 42{Arabic}).  When he ascended to the throne in 1964, King Faisal announced a 
ten-point programme for reform. The first of these was the promise to write a constitution for the country.  
This did not happen.   
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remain in Abdul Aziz’s sons and their male offspring, and the monarch is to be selected 
by consent of the ruling family.  Article 44 specifies the main branches of government as 
the judiciary, the executive and the regulatory.  The judiciary is, according to Article 46, 
an independent authority.  Judges are under no external control in the dispensation of 
their duties except the precepts of Shariah.  The appointment of judges and termination 
of their services is subject to royal decree, as specified in Article 52 (Saudi Embassy-
Washington, 2011). 
The executive authority is mainly composed of the king and the COM.  As head of this 
authority, the king is assisted, according to Article 56 of the BLG, by members of the 
COM in directing the internal and external affairs and in the organisation and 
coordination of functions among government agencies.  As noted in Article 57-b, the 
king appoints and dismisses the COM members, including his deputies, by royal decree.  
In this, the COM members are jointly and severally accountable to the king for 
implementing the Islamic Shariah, the statutes and regulations, and the general policy of 
the state (Saudi Embassy-Washington, 2011). 
The regulatory authority, according to Article 67 of the BLG, is entrusted with drafting 
statutes and regulations that achieve and protect the public interest in accordance with 
the Shariah.  It exercises its functions in conformity with the BLG and the rules of the 
COM.  However, upon closer examination, it seems that the BLG did not specify 
whether this authority was an exclusively legislative body. Rather, it purposely kept the 
text vague even when elaborating on its legislative functions.  Additionally, if avoidance 
of calling this authority a legislative body could evade sensitivities over its secular 
designation as the ‘legislative branch of government’, the fact remains that this authority 
is not an independent government body.  In reality, it comes under the COM, which 
assumes the main regulator authority in the Kingdom in addition to its responsibility as 
an executive authority.   
The reform that the BLG represented, as indicated above, was carefully designed in a 
way that would make it seem to be a positive response to public demands.  However, it 
maintained at the same time the status quo as far as the monarchy was concerned.  For 
example, the BLG emphasised the importance of the monarchy and assured that it 
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remained in the hands of the descendants of Abdul-Aziz.  Monarchs were given a great 
deal of executive power by virtue of presiding over the COM, which exercises executive 
power in addition to the legislative one. 
From a different perspective, it could be observed as well that the BLG has consolidated 
the status of monarchy.  It was, for the first time in Saudi Arabia, a man-made 
legislation.  In this, it reflected a modern state with executive, legislative (though not 
named as such) and judiciary branches of government.  In a way, the BLG added a 
secular political imprint that solidified the old political-religious legitimacy of the 
monarchy. 
3.2.7 The Majlis 
This is an informal institutional setting within which an important portion of the Saudi 
politics takes place.  It is at the heart of the Saudi political structure (Al-Saud, 2000).  It 
is where two fundamental concepts to Saudi politics operate: consensus-building and 
consultation.  The absolute power of the leadership represented by the king is restrained, 
as mentioned, by the Shariah.  In addition, the tradition of taking major decisions has, 
over the history of the country, been to work out a consensus and display a united front 
to the outside world.  Consensus is particularly important for rulers whose reigns, 
according to the political system in place, are indefinite.  In order to create such a 
consensus, there has traditionally been a need to engage in consultation. Consultation 
would usually be conducted with those of influential status like senior princes, the 
Ulama, tribal leaders, technocrats and leading businessmen. 
The Majlis is the framework where consensus and consultation take place.  The tradition 
of the Majlis is one of the time-honoured principles in the Kingdom.  However, the 
degree of a group’s involvement in policy-making through this frame varies according to 
the personality of the king and his style of handling internal and external affairs.  As 
mentioned, after Faisal, who felt less need to consult, the power was held by a collective 
leadership. 
The term Majlis refers to open courts where high-ranking officials met directly with 
ordinary citizens.  Such a traditional right to meet with people in charge includes those 
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on the top of the pyramid of authority like the king and the crown prince themselves.  
The Majlis is considered, at least by those in the government, to be a major pillar in the 
Saudi political system and one that has no equivalent entity in any other country (Al-
Saud, 2000: 135-137). 
The history of the Majlis in the Saudi politics goes back as far as the first Saudi state 
(1744-1818).  It is a vehicle, in the Saudi point of view, for direct interaction between 
the official and unofficial circles.  Hence, it is a unique means for Saudi citizens to take 
part in a process of political participation, allowing them to introduce their problems and 
concerns directly to decision-makers, including the monarch, and received, in many 
cases, direct and prompt response even if it was at a tentative level (Al-Saud, 2002: 
159). 
The procedures of the Majlis are rather simple.  The Majlis may take place in the royal 
court, the crown prince’s court or the courts of the different provinces’ governors, who 
are usually princes from the ruling family.  The most important Majlis, of course, is the 
one attended by the king and then the crown prince.  The king usually meets twice a 
week in a court of 5000 square feet with a large number of people representing a cross-
section of society, and has a weekly diner with his citizens.  He also has weekly private 
meetings with the religious scholars, the Ulama.  In the Majlis, different subjects are 
introduced.  Mainly, they relate to subjects of an immediate concern to the audience 
including subjects of exclusively individual interest.  Sometimes, however, subjects of a 
larger interest may also be introduced, such as issues of political nature (Al-Saud, 2000: 
135-165). 
Writers like Al-Saud and Huyette have argued that the Majlis is a democratic means 
unique to Saudi Arabia (2000; 1985).  This is largely also how the Saudi political system 
conceives of itself as well (Al-Saud, 2000: 135-163).  On the other hand, some have 
denied the quality of democracy to this Saudi entity.  Al-Rasheed claims that the Saudi 
rulers mainly use the conduct of the Majlis as an exhibition of power where citizens can 
witness the magnitude of their ruling family, including its wealth and authority.  She 
argues that the exhibition of power through the Majlis was important from the early days 
of the current third Saudi state.  According to her, Ibn Saud felt the need to continue 
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displaying his power before his subjects after the campaign of establishing his rule had 
come to an end in 1932.  As she puts it, “When military campaigns ceased, the Majlis 
became the stage on which the drama of power was acted for the populace to see” 
(2002: 80-86). 
Quandt agrees that the Majlis constitutes one of the few means of assessing public 
sentiment in Saudi society.  To him, however, the Majlis is not a forum for discussing 
constitutional reform or limits on the power of the ruling family.  In other words, it does 
not have the same functions as similar institutions in democratic settings.  Quandt 
merely views the Majlis as an Arabic traditional channel for the redress of specific 
individual grievances and bringing personal problems directly to the attention of rulers 
(1981: 92). 
The nature and work of the Majlis would seem to support the position of those who deny 
the Majlis has democratic quality.  First, the Majlis is an informal entity and, as such, 
there is no formal rule that the points discussed in them must be translated into rules and 
regulations, as is the case with parliamentary assemblies in democracies.  Second, and 
perhaps no less important, the subjects raised in the Majlis are usually concerned with 
individual matters, which do not become issues of collective concern to the society as 
whole, especially not issues of a political nature. 
3.2.8 Concerned Formal Agents 
As established earlier, institutions discussed in this thesis can be of a structural and 
agency nature.  The agents, as far as the study is concerned, are the formal bodies that 
were closely involved in the country’s WTO accession process that are listed in Chapter 
One: the COM, HMC, MC, and SNT.  The bulk of the official accession effort was 
largely confined, throughout the years, to the work of these four actors and their 
members.  Another important institution was the Shura.  Although not closely involved, 
it has, according to the BLG, the right, along with the COM, to ratify international 
agreements like the country’s WTO accession.  
The COM is the primary body that is led by the king and helps the king in the 
formulation and implementation of domestic and international policies.  The COM has a 
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clear responsibility in dealing with international treaties and agreements, and its 
approval is mandatory before a relevant royal decree is issued (Bin Baz, 1996: 202-3; 
ICL, 1993).  In addition to being headed by the king, the power of the members of the 
COM stems from the political, legislative and administrative roles they play (Assaf, 
1982:103).  
It is composed of a multitude of ministries.  Some experts classify them into five 
categories based on their significance and weight in decision-making (Khashuggy, 
2002).  The most important ones, described as the sovereign ministries, are the 
ministries of defence, the interior, foreign affairs and justice.  The first three ministries 
are always reserved for members of the ruling family.  As for the Justice Ministry, the 
post is usually reserved for a member of the Al-Sheik family, the offspring of 
Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab.  The second in terms of importance are those involved 
in production and services such as the ministries of petroleum, commerce, health and 
education. 
In her historical study on the COM, Huyette (1985) argued that the history of the COM 
indicated that foreign policy in Saudi Arabia was strictly the prerogative of the king and 
his closest private circle.  Nonetheless, the personality of the king has been crucial.  As 
Lackner (1978) pointed out, the monarch’s personality defines the manner in which the 
work of politics in the Kingdom is conducted.  The Saudi WTO accession process was 
influenced by two different kings: Fahd and Abdullah. 
In any event, the COM came to play a major role in the Saudi accession to the WTO 
since it was empowered to decide on issues such as the country’s trade policies and 
tariffs on goods and services.  Furthermore, since the COM can collectively deal with 
treaties and agreements (ICL, 1993), it had the ultimate say concerning WTO 
membership, as well as the right to steer some existing committees in that direction or 
establish new ones to deal with the accession process. 
The HMC was established in 1999, by a decision of the COM, to “follow up all 
decisions, policies and rules followed in the international trading system” for the 
purpose of securing maximum benefit of WTO membership (COM, 1999).  It was 
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chaired by the minister of the interior, the highest figure in rank after the king and the 
crown prince, to deal with the issue of accession, and that was mainly the reason, as far 
as this study is concerned, to refer to this committee as the ‘Higher Committee’.23  Its 
establishment in 1999 came approximately six years after Saudi Arabia’s official 
application to GATT/WTO in 1993, and around the end of the second phase of the 
Kingdom’s accession process.  According to the argument above, this phase experienced 
an increase in the influence of economic factors, but political factors were also at work.  
The latter worked as precautionary elements, and the make-up of the HMC reflected 
that: it consisted of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the 
MC’s members and three ministers of state. 
The MC was established prior to the start of the accession process to study international 
economic problems in general and submit recommendations about them to the COM 
(COM, 1983).  For this, it was normal to refer in 1988 the application candidate to 
GATT, during the first phase of the accession process, to this committee to submit the 
appropriate recommendation (Ministry of Commerce, [ca. 2000]).  From that point 
onwards, the MC became the most important actor in terms of the degree of involvement 
with the issue of accession.  Among the features of this involvement was the direct 
supervision of the SNT.  
The composition of the MC was generally an auxiliary factor for the aim of joining the 
WTO.  It was chaired by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the minister of foreign affairs (MOFA), 
by virtue of the COM’s decision establishing the MC.  He can be classified as a clear 
WTO advocate.  Equally important, the minister was also a senior member of the ruling 
family, a position that normally carries special weight.24  The rest of the MC members 
were ministries of direct concern with the country’s economy, and they were more or 
less pro-WTO largely by virtue of the fact that most of its members held high 
educational degrees from Western universities.  In addition to MOFA, the following 
ministries were members of the MC: the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the Ministry of 
                                                 
23
 Along with interior portfolio, the minister’s position was upgraded as he became the second premier as 
well before he died in 2012.   
24
 In her study of the development of the Saudi COM, Huyette emphasised the power gained from having 
an access to the king and crown prince.  Normally, princes and especially the senior ones among them 
have better access to such figures than others in the public.   
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Finance and National Economy (MFNE)25, the Ministry of Industry and Electricity 
(MIE)26, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR), the Ministry of 
Planning (MOP) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).27 
The SNT consisted of representatives from the ministries in the MC.  In its works, the 
SNT was supervised by the MC, and was chaired by the Minister of Commerce after the 
conversion of the application from the GATT to WTO28 (MOC, 1989; COM, 1992).  It 
was incumbent upon this team to conduct the actual multilateral and bilateral WTO 
negotiations (MOC, 1997).  Nonetheless, this team had only limited latitude to make 
decisions.   
As to the Shura, the BLG introduced a consultative body whose members and chairman 
were selected by the king.  The Shura, which had 60 members when announced, was 
expanded twice since then, to 90 members in 1997 and to 150 members in 2009.  The 
Shura was expected to serve the public interest, and to protect the unity of the nation and 
the structure of the state (MOFA, (2011) www.mofa.gov.sa).  Its consultative nature 
required that its members have a high level of education, expertise and knowledge.  
Therefore, its composition expanded the ruling class circle as it incorporated members 
who are scholars, academics, professionals, businessmen and economists, as well as 
mass communication experts outside the religious Ulama.  With this step, the Kingdom 
gave a new weight to the opinion of technocrats. 
The legislative and political roles of the Shura were exemplified by its right to express 
its views on the public policy of the COM (MOFA, (2011) www.mofa.gov.sa).  Laws, 
decrees, international treaties, agreements and privileges are to be issued or amended by 
royal decrees only after being studied by the Shura.  This body also has the right to 
interpret laws and examine reports referred to by the ministries and other government 
                                                 
25
 In a cabinet reshuffle, the ministry of Finance and National Economy was renamed the Ministry of 
Finance as economic responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of Planning, which subsequently 
became the Ministry of Economy and Planning.   
26
 In a cabinet reshuffle, the MIE was integrated with the MOC to become the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.  
27
 To avoid confusion, the thesis’s abbreviations will not be affected by the re-structuring of the ministries.  
28
 Until the conversion took place in 1995, the responsibility of the accession was attached to the MFNE 
and its minister. 
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agencies (Al-Rasheed, 2005: 173).  Its resolutions are submitted to the prime minister 
i.e. the king, who refers them to the COM.  If the views of the Shura and the COM 
coincide, a royal approval is issued.  If the views diverge, they will be referred to the 
king for a decision (Al-Farsy, 2004: 51). 
According to Bulloch, the basic power of the Shura rests on its authority to summon 
ministers for questioning.  The Shura also has the right to consider the Kingdom’s 
relations with other states and organisations, which means that foreign affairs form an 
important sector in its domain having the right to deal with related issues and matters 
(Bulloch, 1993: 6-16).  By extension, this included the country’s WTO accession. 
3.2.9 Role of Individuals 
There were some important figures whose engagement and non-engagement played a 
role in shaping the Saudi accession.  It is indicated in the discussion above about state-
centred approaches that there has been a trend of focus developed within these 
approaches, which directly concentrates on the role of politicians and administrators as 
autonomous in the policy process.  Although the country is not a unitary entity, as 
explained, the fact that the monarchy in Saudi Arabia maintains absolute authority 
would lead one to assume that some of its members could significantly influence the 
accession process.  In some instances, their roles were of a passive nature.  In this, not 
performing a role also created an impact, though not a positive one as far as the 
accession was concerned. Specifically, the main figures that actively shaped this process 
were the following: 
King Fahd: He was the king and prime minister from 1982-2005.  In other words, he 
was the head of state throughout the years of the Saudi WTO accession except for the 
last few months before the accession.  Unlike Faisal, Fahd was in favour of delegating 
more authority to the members of his cabinet, the ministers (Huyette, 1984: 165-166).  
Fahd suffered from poor health from 1995 until his death in 2005.  Thus, he had to leave 
much of the day-to-day running of government affairs to the crown prince (EIU, 2003: 
10). 
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King Abdullah: He was the crown prince during Fahd’s reign and commander of the 
National Guard since 1962.  As heir apparent, he was the first premier to the prime 
minister, the king.  In that capacity, he would head the COM in the king’s absence, 
which became frequent due to the latter’s health condition. Over the years, as the second 
man, Abdullah gained popularity on account of his probity and tendency to distance 
himself from the West.  When he became more in charge of the daily affairs of the 
country due to the illness of Fahd, Abdullah was behind the establishment of several 
governmental entities such as Higher Economic Council, of which he became the 
chairperson.  Politically, he backed Saudi Arabia’s Middle East peace proposal put 
forward in early 2002 (EIU, 2003: 10), which later became known as the Arab peace 
initiative.  In general, he took particular interest in advancing the country’s economy 
through reform. 
Prince Nayif29: He was the head of the HMC.  Nayif held the interior portfolio, 
including responsibility for internal security, since 1975.  He was in charge of 
‘Saudisation’, which is a governmental policy for replacing the Kingdom’s foreign 
workforce with a local workforce, as unemployment was growing critical.  Nayif was 
usually portrayed as being less enthusiastic for reform than Abdullah (EIU, 2003: 11). 
Prince Saud Al-Faisal: He is the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the MC.  He 
has been favourably disposed towards foreign involvement in the Kingdom’s economy, 
which meant that he was generally pro-WTO. 
Osama Faqeeh: He is the former minister of commerce.  Faqeeh assumed his 
responsibilities in 1995, the year when the Saudi government transferred responsibility 
for GATT from the MFNE to the MOC, and when it converted the GATT application 
into an accession request to the WTO.  Faqeeh was part of the accession experience 
during most of the first phase and the entire of the second one. 
Hashim Yamani: He was the minister of industry before becoming the minister of 
commerce and industry in the cabinet reshuffle referred to in footnote 26.  Thus, he was 
a member of the MC.  In 2003, when he was appointed minister of commerce and 
                                                 
29See footnote 21. 
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industry, he replaced Faqeeh as the person directly responsible for the country’s 
accession to the WTO. In 2003, the Saudi government resumed its accession negotiation 
after a pause.  Yamani supervised the accession file until the official accession in 2005. 
3.3 External Factors 
The fact that it is home to Makkah and Madinah, the two most holy places for Muslims, 
first exposed Saudi Arabia to the outside world.  However, such an exposure was mainly 
confined to the Arab and Islamic world.  The discovery of oil in 1938 brought a wider 
global exposure.  Although oil has been the bedrock of the domestic economy, it has 
also been the factor that made international trade indispensable for Saudi Arabia.  It has 
been the major factor that connected the Kingdom to the world economy, with 
concomitant political developments.  
3.3.1 Oil 
Oil has mostly been the financial engine of Saudi economy and the main source of the 
country’s export revenues.  It is the main reason why some classify the Kingdom as a 
‘rentier’ state as far as political economy is concerned.  According to Douglas, since the 
oil boom of the 1970s, in the country’s natural resources have supported huge spending 
by the government, in which the latter became an intermediary between oil and other 
sectors of the economy.  As such, the government was the prime distributor of oil 
revenues with the aim of stimulating the country’s macro-economy (1996).   
Saudi oil revenues have dramatically increased since the 1970s, and so have the 
allocations for national budgets.  Table 3-5 showed total oil export revenues increased 
from about 11billion Saudi Riyals (SR; equivalent to US$2.9 billion) in 1970 to SR 
654.3 billion (US$174.7 billion) in 2005, which increased 59-fold between 1970 and 
2005, while the contribution from oil revenues to the public budget stood between 78 
and 90 percent of the total revenues of the budget from 1970 to 2005. 
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Table 3-5: Oil Export Revenues and Oil Contribution to  









Oil % Other % 
1970 10907 7940 7122 89.7 818 10.3 
1975 104412 103384 93481 90.4 93481 9.6 
1980 362886 348100 319305 91.7 28795 8.3 
1985 99536 133565 88425 66.2 45140 33.8 
1990 166339 316639 246297 77.8 70342 22.2 
2000 290553 258065 214424 83.1 43641 16.9 
2001 254898 228159 183915 80.6 44244 19.4 
2002 271741 213000 166100 78.0 46900 22.0 
2003 349664 293000 231000 78.8 62000 21.2 
2004 472491 392291 330000 84.1 62291 15.9 
2005 654372 555000 491000 88.5 64000 11.5 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning “Achievements of Development Plans:  
Fact Sheet”, 23rd Edition, 2006 
 
It should be noted here that one of the characteristics of dependence on oil as the main 
source of income is the exposure of oil-producing states to external price shocks.  
According to Hausmann and Rigobon (2002), oil price volatility has a noticeable impact 
on the economic performance of the country.  They argued that a 1 percent standard 
deviation of oil prices represents about 6 percent shock of the GDP for a country when 
20 percent of its GDP revenues are oil-based. 
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Oil price fluctuation and market stability have been the main issues of the Saudi oil 
policy, which adopted a flexible pricing measurement to keep Saudi oil products 
competitive, to enable production capacity to cope with the global demand for oil and to 
meet oil shortages in the market to maintain the stability of the world oil markets 
(Ministry of Planning, 2005).  In other words, oil was a major reason for Saudi Arabia to 
open a window in its relations with the outside world. 
3.3.1.1 Oil and the World 
Crude oil is the single most important commodity in the economic life of industrialised 
and industrialising countries.  Its relative abundance, cheap prices, multiple usage and 
easy transportability made this resource a valuable asset in meeting energy needs for the 
development of economic sectors in any state. Accordingly the dependence on oil varied 
among states and across regions (Barrell and Pomerantz, 2004).  Oil has been an 
incentive for domination of the Middle East, an instrument for prestige and economic 
power, and a bridge between the global economy and the national economies of oil 
producers.   
Data from Table 3-6 shows the extent of oil dependence of many regional groupings.  
Taking the OECD as an example, the table illustrates that oil consumption of member 
countries ranged between 42 and 49 million barrels per day, which constituted around 
60% of the world oil demand in the period 1991-2004.  OECD group consumption was 
followed by the Asian countries and China, while Africa, the Middle East, and other 
European countries had lower levels of demand for oil.  
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Table 3-6: World Oil Demand Since 1991 




1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
*Q % *Q % *Q % *Q % *Q % *Q % *Q % *Q % 
OECD 41.9 62.6 44.6 63.7 47.9 62.6 47.9 62.1 47.9 61.6 48.6 61.3 49.3 59.8 49.5 59.2 
FSU** 8.1 12.1 4.4 6.3 3.7 4.8 3.7 4.8 3.5 4.5 3.6 4.5 3.8 4.6 3.8 4.5 
Europe 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 
China 2.5 3.7 3.3 4.7 4.3 5.6 4.7 6.1 5.0 6.4 5.6 7.1 6.5 7.9 6.6 7.9 
Asia 4.6 6.9 6.1 8.7 7.5 9.8 7.7 10.0 8.0 10.3 8.1 10.2 8.6 10.4 8.8 10.5 
L.America 3.6 5.3 4.3 6.1 4.8 6.3 4.8 6.2 4.8 6.2 4.7 5.9 5.0 6.1 5.1 6.1 
Mid. East 3.6 5.3 4.4 6.3 4.9 6.4 5.1 6.6 5.3 6.8 5.4 6.8 5.8 7.0 6.1 7.3 
Africa 2.0 3.0 2.2 3.1 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.2 2.7 3.5 2.7 3.4 2.8 3.4 2.9 4.7 
Total 67.0 100 70.0 100 76.5 100 77.1 100 77.8 100 79.3 100 82.5 100 83.6 100 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), August 2006, Autumnal Statistics Supplement for 2005. 
* Q= Quantity   ** FSU= Former Soviet Union  
 
Oil is also vital to the producing countries.  In addition to being a critical source for this 
product, the Kingdom was the main market stabiliser and swing producer.  Saudi Arabia 
provided the world with over 10% of its total oil needs in 2005 and 2007 respectively, 
according to the statistics of the US Department of Energy (DOE).  During the same 
time frame, the Kingdom also accounted for 20% of the world’s oil reserves, which was 
equivalent to 262 billion barrels (DOE, 2007). 
3.3.1.2 Oil and Relations with the U.S. 
Announcing a U.S. plan to sell to Saudi Arabia a significant defence package in 2010, 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence, Alexander Vershbow, commended the Kingdom’s 
decision: “to continue to strategically align itself with the United States” (U.S. 
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Department of State, 2010).  Such a statement summarised, in a way, the relationship 
between the two countries.  It has been strategic and continual.  In fact, it has been often 
described in the literature on Saudi Arabia as ‘special relationship’. 
In addition to have been instrumental throughout the years of this relationship, oil 
historically marked its start.  Throughout his military and political campaign, Ibn Saud 
constantly strived to prevent British hegemony in the region and to maintain his 
independence from foreign influence, as Saudi Arabia represented perhaps the only 
country that had kept its independence after the First World War.  A couple of years 
after the Kingdom had been founded, some American oil companies approached him 
seeking oil concessions.  Unlike Great Britain, the U.S. did not have a colonial history in 
the area and was encouraged to pursue its interests in the Gulf region behind commercial 
activities.  The request provided the king with an opportunity to play off this new 
emerging power against the influential British for the sake of preserving his nation’s 
independence. Thus, the Kingdom duly granted the American companies the main oil 
concession in the country in the 1930s (Noreng, 2006: 58). 
In return, and as it was in the middle of the WWII, those companies, which merged and 
named their subsidiary in Saudi Arabia in 1944 ARAMCO, called upon the U.S. 
administration to take active role in preserving the security and stability of Saudi Arabia 
and the region.  Relations between the two countries soon developed beyond the mere 
royalties paid for the concessions.  After all, the Saudi oil represented the first exclusive 
domain for the U.S. oil companies in the region (Noreng, 2006: 62).  For what that had 
increasingly proved strategically, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in 1943 
that defending Saudi Arabia was vital to American interests (Al-Hayat, 2003).  
Emphasised this was the acknowledgement of the president’s secretary of state, Cordell 
Hull, that countries like Saudi Arabia became through the demand of WWII a central 
area in the conduct of American foreign relations after being relatively neglected for a 
century and a half (Bronson, 2006: 20).  In fact, authors such as Rodriguez (2006) and 
Citino (2002) have argued that reconstruction of Europe after the WWII depended on the 
flow of oil from Saudi Arabia, a fact that also enhanced its position among the world’s 
oil producers.  
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Thus, the aforementioned ‘special relationship’ between the Kingdom and the new 
superpower began to emerge and was further cemented by a following meeting, after the 
announcement of the essentiality of defending Saudi Arabia, in 1945 between Roosevelt 
and Ibn Saud aboard an American destroyer in the Suez Canal (Al-Hayat, 2003).  The 
meeting laid the ground for the two countries’ bilateral alliance.  In a way, it became a 
mark for the commencement of the American close political involvement in the region 
as a whole.30 Though never been formalised, it has been widely acknowledged that this 
alliance was built, as it came in the meeting, on the equation of ‘oil for security’.  
According to Lippman, such a general perception about the nature of the U.S. and the 
Kingdom’s alliance has extrapolated from subsequent events, as every U.S. president 
since Harry Truman has undertaken one commitment or another to Saudi Arabia that 
collectively added up to the same arrangement, ‘oil for security’ (2012: 252). 
This equation, ensuring oil supply for providing protection, is basically representing 
what each party wanted from the other.  This, however, was to quickly ramified to 
include other strategic dimensions.  For a large part of the history of their relationship, a 
significant portion of the global interests of the two was defined by the Cold War.  Saudi 
Arabia’s political identity has very much been identified with religion.  This made of the 
Kingdom a natural ally to the U.S. in its global struggle with the old Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War era. 
After Truman, who wrote once to Ibn Saud saying that “No threat to your Kingdom 
could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States” 
(Wikipedia, 2012), President Dwight Eisenhower fully realised the importance of the 
Saudi religious aspect and he would deploy it (Citino, 2002), as mainly did other 
following American presidents, in the fight against communism.  The Saudi king was 
the only leader in the Middle East who would receive letters from Eisenhower that 
highlighted the shared interests of combating communism.  In the letters, the president 
would usually stress the phrase: the “godless communism”.  Further, Eisenhower 
                                                 
30
 In a speech at the American University in Cairo in June 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice indicated that the American engagement with the region for the sake of stability and 
democracy started 60 years ago.  In fact, the year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the meeting 
between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud. Available at www.arabist.net, accessed 15/11/2012. 
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administration began looking to the Saudi king, King Saud at the time who is the son of 
the founder Ibn Saud, to develop an ideological alternative to Pan-Arabism led by 
President Nasser of Egypt, which swept the Arab world during the 1950s and 1960s with 
Soviet-leaning and anti-western disposition endangering, in the process, Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab conservative monarchs with strong ties with the west.  The U.S. 
administration tried to use the Saudi king’s clout as the guardian of the Islamic holy 
cities in countering this Arab nationalism movement led by Nasser (Bronson, 2006: 45-
74). 
When John Kennedy became president, he started his early years in office with a little 
tilt towards regimes like the one of Nasser.  Kennedy came with a strong emphasis on 
supporting modernising states in the Middle East and beyond.  By doing this, the 
president was trying to engage rather than oppose the developing world’s nationalists 
and reformers, as he was of the opinion that nationalism and communism were not 
interchangeable and that nationalism could serve as a positive force for development.  
What it could not have been anticipated with such a start was that by the end of 
Kennedy’s tenure, the U.S. would be strongly backing Saudi Arabia against Egypt.  The 
change happened, as the latter crossed the American red line of protecting the territorial 
integrity of Saudi Arabia and bombed the Saudi side along the border with Yemen 
during the Saudi-Egyptian standoff over the kind of political system to rule in that 
country, which attracted the attention of both: the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Bronson, 
2006:78-87).  Having considered the protection of Saudi Arabia a red line, as did the 
Kennedy administration in spite of its early favourable attitude towards Nasser’s Egypt, 
emphasised the aforesaid argument of Lippman that every U.S. president has undertaken 
one commitment or another in relation to preserving the security of Saudi Arabia. 
More than the support it had received from Kennedy, Saudi Arabia became a reliable 
U.S. partner under the presidency of Lyndon Johnson in the struggle against both Nasser 
and communism.  However, during the time of Richard Nixon in office, the bilateral 
relationship would experience a sort of a fluctuation.  It would slide to a low point, 
perhaps the lowest up to the time, only to rise again to a very high one. 
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The U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia totalled $13.5 million in 1970, rose sixfold in 
1971 to $76.8 million, and surpassed $79 million in the first six months of 1972.  By 
autumn 1973, the Kingdom would be ‘the swing producer’ for the entire world.  As they 
were negotiating an increase in their share of their oil assets that it was still under the 
concession of  the American oil company, ARAMCO, the Saudis, led at the time by 
King Faisal, warned ARAMCO executives with extreme urgency that the Nixon 
administration should take notice of rising tensions in the Middle East.  Intelligence 
reports were coming out warring that an imminent war might break out between the 
Arabs and the Israelis over the issue of the occupation of Arab lands.  The king wanted 
ARAMCO’s executives to convey to the American government that he was under 
enormous pressure from other Arabs to turn the Kingdom’s oil resources against Israel 
and its friends.  What he called for, in this regard, was a more balanced U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East.  The king’s calls went unheeded, the war broke out on 
October 6, 19973.  On October 20, Saudi Arabia sharply responded to the airlift of 
American weapons and supplies to Israel by ending all shipments of oil to the U.S. 
(Cooper, 2011: 79-123). 
The Americans explored all possibilities including a show of force to restore at least the 
perception of American power in the Gulf area in light of the simultaneous Soviets 
probing at the periphery in Southeast Asia.  However, priority was to diplomacy.  The 
Nixon administration including Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, showed an 
understanding that Saudi Arabia in order to “survive in this kind of world” it had to be 
sometimes more radical than the radicals of the region.  A breakthrough to the stalemate 
came when Faisal conveyed a message that the Kingdom would like to ease the embargo 
if a peace conference on the Middle East is agreed.  Further, he quietly allowed 
deliveries of fuel to the U.S. navy as a gesture of goodwill.  He was convinced now that 
Nixon, who had assured the Saudi ambassador in Washington that he was the first 
president since Eisenhower who had no commitment to the Jewish community, was 
committed to finding a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Cooper, 2011: 
128-155). 
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Moreover, taking into account its by far longer term oil capacity than other producers 
and facing at the same time a constant challenge from shah Iran to increase oil prices, 
Nixon offered the Kingdom, at the direct level of the U.S.-Saudi relations, the equivalent 
of a grand bargain to end the embargo and start new chapter in the relationship.  The 
offer was to sign an economic and military co-operation agreement that guaranteed 
American support for Saudi Arabia in return for uninterrupted oil supplies (EIU, 2003: 
4-5).  This was like an American re-emphasis on the ‘special relations’ between the two 
countries.  Perhaps, this agreement represented the first comprehensive written 
arrangement that virtually, if not literally, embodied the equation of the U.S.-Saudi 
relations, ‘oil for security’.   
The Saudis loved the offer.  Kissinger said that they were “in fact so wildly enthusiastic” 
about it (Cooper, 2011: 158).  Accordingly, oil started to be released in March 1974 and 
the abovementioned agreement was signed during summer of the same year (EIU, 2003: 
3-4).  It was not long before the agreement began to be materialised.  Saudi Arabia 
started to play the leading role in OPEC and defied the tendency of Iran and other 
members to increase oil price.  For this, President Gerald Ford expressed his relief and 
gratitude to King Khalid who succeeded Faisal in 1975 (Cooper, 2011: 362-363). 
The events of the war, the embargo and the signing of the military and economic 
agreement, reflected at the end the strategic importance of each party to the other.  To 
the U.S., Saudi Arabia was the only country that could boost oil production so that oil 
prices could be held at internationally affordable rate.  On the contrary was its ally 
across the Gulf, the shah of Iran.  With much less production capacity, the shah was 
persistently arguing for his need for a high oil price.   
As to Saudi Arabia, it was from the beginning under neighbourly pressure to take a stand 
in the face of the U.S, as the U.S administration had noticed.  However, Faisal himself 
was all along convinced that the U.S. friendship was vital to his country.  For instance, 
he instructed his government during the negotiations with ARAMCO over the share of 
the Kingdom’s oil assets to protect not only Saudi Arabia’s interests, but also 
ARMCO’s.  The king, in fact, recognised that Saudi Arabia could not independently 
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produce its own oil, globally distribute it, defend its own interests and to continue 
modernise without outside assistance (Bronson, 2006: 82). 
The question is why it had to be the U.S. in seeking that kind of assistance.  Apart from 
its global technological superiority that is important in developing the oilfields and 
modernising the country, the U.S.-Saudi relationship began to take shape, as mentioned, 
amid a bi-polar system caused by the Cold War.  The experience showed that most 
states, even those members to the Non-Align Movement, had to lean on one of the two: 
the U.S. or the Soviet Union.  It was clear that the Soviet Union did not represent a 
natural party, with which Saudi Arabia would form an alliance because of the 
Kingdom’s religious identity.  The experience also showed that the consecutive leaders 
of Saudi Arabia had developed a perception of the necessity of the U.S. friendship.  The 
growing oil wealth of the country, according to some observers, increased the 
vulnerability of its political system and pressured the leadership to seek U.S. protection 
(Al-Rasheed, 2005: 51-52).  In addition to the aforementioned example of Faisal and the 
negotiations with ARAMCO, Fahd, minister of interior at the time, was stunned by the 
American airlift to Israel during the 1973 war.  It was said that he told his security 
officers that that was why we, in Saudi Arabia, need to maintain close relations with the 
U.S.  It was, according to him, the only one capable of saving us in this manner should 
we ever be at risk (Bronson, 2006: 118).             
As the 1970s was ending, the Cold War inflamed.  The Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan and became close to the oilfields in the Gulf.  President Jimmy Carter made 
a use of force threat.  In his State of the Union Address in January 23, 1980, Carter said 
“Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of 
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States” (Wikipedia, 2012).  In displaying force, he sent U.S. fighter jets to Saudi 
Arabia, which had already been concerned about the revolution in Iran (Sylvester, 2008: 
20). 
After Carter, the Soviets encountered a new American president with a tougher stand on 
how to direct the American foreign policy of containing the Soviet Union (Beshenich, 
1999: 25-27).  Ronald Reagan not only wanted to contain the Soviets, but also to reverse 
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the expansion of their control and military presence throughout the world.  His director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Bill Casey, realised that achieving Reagan’s 
goal would need finance.  Understanding that it was a natural ally in the battle against 
the “godless communism”, Casey saw a real possibility of Saudi assistance in this regard 
(Simpson, 2006: 68-69).  Indeed, the ownership of ARAMCO was completely 
transferred, around the arrival of Reagan, to Saudi Arabia with what it meant financially.  
As an indication to the importance that Reagan administration attached to this 
dimension, Reagan and his team planned to strengthen existing ties with the Saudi 
government since the presidential transition period from Carter to Reagan and before the 
latter even resided the White House (Beshenich, 1999: 28).  Although it was mainly in a 
covert manner, the mutual U.S.-Saudi co-operation, in this regard, went to a higher level 
during Reagan-Fahd era.  It transcended the limits of the Middle East to reach very far.  
The famous issue of the Saudi funding of the Contra rebels against the Sandinistas 
regime in Nicaragua was a case in point (Simpson, 2006: 113-122). 
The co-operation of Saudi Arabia was vital to the American Cold War victory in the 
beginning of the 1990s.  In addition to funding rebel forces against the Soviets in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola, the manipulation of the global oil 
price was just another important way in which Saudi Arabia supported Reagan and the 
U.S. during the 1980s.  The partnership between Reagan administration and the 
Kingdom set the scene for subsequent co-operative policies (Simpson, 2006: 112-113).  
Such co-operation reached, perhaps, its highest in the history of the relationship between 
the two countries during the time of President George H. Bush.  It was during the 
operations of the ‘Desert Shield’ when more than five hundred thousand U.S. troops 
stationed in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia to expel, with the assistance of the Kingdom 
and a coalition of many other different countries, the Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991. 
The Kingdom, which according to this study contemplated the decision of acceding to 
the WTO between 1985 and 1993, could have used this high level of co-operation with 
the U.S. during Bush administration to secure an easy accession.  However, it did not.  
When it did, the new President, Bill Clinton, was not willing to give it a leeway, as far as 
the WTO accession process was concerned. 
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This will be discussed later in the chapters along with the related events that took place 
during President George W. Bush’s tenure.  Over the years, however, the U.S-Saudi 
alliance had shown, up to the time of Phase Three (2001-2005) of this study, a general 
sustainability.  Though of a substantial effect, the two countries did not allow issues like 
the Arab-Israeli conflict to ruin that alliance.  In this, they largely kept the equation of 
‘oil for security’ in place.  The U.S. undertook the largest troops’ deployment since the 
WWII to protect the borders of Saudi Arabia in 1990. 
On the part of Saudi Arabia, Quandt (1982) argued that the alliance of the two 
influenced the adoption of Saudi oil policies that were consistent with American 
interests.  In this, Saudi Arabia made it its oil foreign policy to seek moderate oil prices.  
It generally opposed during the 1970s, 1980s and beyond the desire of other OPEC 
members for high prices (Al-Yousef, 1998; Farhan, 2003). 
Production was the other face of the coin of the Saudi oil policy.  In an assurance to keep 
up with its obligations with respect to production, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi 
(2006) pointed out that Saudi Arabia’s readily available capacity had eased the supply 
shortfalls during many events including the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War 
in the 1980s, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Venezuelan strikes of 2002.  The 
examples presented by the minister had, in fact, enhanced Saudi Arabia’s role as the oil 
world market stabiliser.  They represented a proof that the Kingdom could secure oil 
supplies in spite of any adverse circumstances engulfing the region. 
3.4 Historical Overview and Political Economy’s Perceptions 
This section can be divided into two sub-sections.  The first will provide a concise 
historical-political and economic background.  The second will shortly discuss how the 
Saudi political economy is viewed in the literature. 
3.4.1 Historical Backdrop 
The current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was officially proclaimed in 1932.  It is an 
Arab state where Islam constitutes the basic rules and guides its political and socio-
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economic life.  The Kingdom is the third consecutive state established in the Arabian 
Peninsula by the Al-Saud family, the ruling family, since the middle of the 18th century. 
The first Saudi state was established in 1744 by Muhammad ibn Saud, a tribal chieftain 
who was the ruler of a small town called Ad-Dar'iyah, in the plateau of Najd in central 
Arabia.  The first state was the culmination of a strong alliance between the tribal 
chieftain and a religious reformer named Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab.  Ibn Abdul-
Wahhab advocated a return to the teachings and practices of early Muslims and the 
abandonment of what he saw as a multitude of non-Islamic practices.  Under the 
alliance, Ibn Abdul-Wahhab promised to support Muhammad ibn Saud as a ruler of the 
people and lands.  In return, Muhammad ibn Saud committed himself to the religious 
reforming movement and pledged support for Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and his preaching(Al-
Aqili, 1980: 36).This political-religious accord set the stage for the ruler of Ad-Dar'iyah 
to expand his domain and with it the propagation of Islamic reforms, widely known as 
Wahhabi doctrine,31 throughout Arabia(Al-Farsy, 2004: 13-21). 
The alliance of Muhammad ibn Saud and Ibn Abdul-Wahhab led the Saudi forces in 
1803to conquer the Hejaz province, in the west of the peninsula, including the two holy 
cities of Makkah and Madina.  The peninsula at the time was generally under the rule of 
the Ottoman Empire, which however was unable to fully control it (Dahlan, 1887: 228-
9).  Disturbed by the turn of events, the Ottomans asked their strong ruler of Egypt, 
Muhammad Ali, to fight off the Saudi state and force it out of Hejaz.  In 1818, the army 
of Muhammad Ali defeated and destroyed the Saudi state and its capital, Ad-Dar'iyah 
(Sha’fi, 1995: 26-30). 
In 1824, the Al-Saud family undertook several steps to re-establish its state despite the 
Egyptian and Ottoman presence.  By 1830, Turki bin Abdullah Al-Saud was successful 
in his bid to reclaim much of the Najd plateau by evicting Muhammad Ali’s forces, and 
thus the second Saudi state was born.  Although adhering to the same principles, the 
                                                 
31
 The terms Wahhabi and Wahhabism are used here only because of the wide international familiarity 
with the terms and their association in the historical and political literature, in general, with Saudi Arabia.  
However, the usage herein does not have the same connotation as that in the West, in particular, which 
links the terms to fanaticism and extremism.  The true message of Sheikh ibn Abdul-Wahhab was for the 
people to adhere to the basic principles of Islam. 
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second state did not overtly use Wahhabism as an impetus to extend its authority over 
other parts of the Arabian Peninsula for fear of antagonising the Egyptians who were 
still in the Hejaz.  In the 1860s, conflict erupted within Al-Saud, which gave the strong 
rival family of Al-Rashid an opportunity to occupy the former’s capital of Riyadh and 
expel Al-Saud’s leaders, who took refuge in Kuwait in 1892 (Al-Rasheed, 2002: 23-5). 
The third and current Saudi state, the Kingdom, was established by prominent Al-Saud 
family leader Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman, better known as Ibn Saud, who waged 
military campaigns between 1902 and 1932.  The mixture of the Wahhabi doctrine and 
Al-Saud’s role in propagating and defending it proved to be an effective basis for 
securing loyalty and support, and a powerful means for uniting tribes and families in one 
religious grouping(Gold and Conant, 2002: 35-36; Kechichian, 2001: 3). 
As far as economics is concerned, oil has largely been as influential in Saudi history and 
politics as religion.  With it, the Kingdom experienced a tremendous physical 
transformation.  The infrastructure built through oil rents had the effect of integrating the 
economic life of different parts of the country.  Before the discovery of oil in 1938, the 
state mostly sustained itself by the Hajj32 and by extracting taxes, duties and fees from 
the population.  Nonetheless, the general structure of the economy had been fragmented, 
with different regions living off specific resources and a variety of activities.  For 
instance, the Hejaz depended chiefly on the provision of services to pilgrims travelling 
to the holy cities, whereas a plantation economy that grew dates and other cash crops 
dominated the eastern province of Al Ahsa (http://countrystudies.us/saudi; Champion, 
2003:9). 
In addition to integrating the economy domestically, the discovery of oil exposed the 
Kingdom to external interests.  The earlier contacts were with Britain, which held a 
dominant position in the Gulf sheikdoms on the borders of Saudi Arabia.  Ibn Saud, 
however, opted in 1933 to award a concession to an American oil company because it 
was bargaining on a commercial basis with little political involvement (Gold and 
Conant, 2002: 4-39).The concession eventually developed into a partnership represented 
                                                 
32
 The annual Muslim pilgrimage to Makkah. 
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by the Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), which became Saudi Aramco in 1980 
with a 100% Saudi ownership. 
3.4.2 Perceptions of Political Economy 
As is clear from the historical overview, religion has been essential for the Saudi state.  
Oil, as well, has been as important in affecting the life and wellbeing of the society.  
Probably, no study that has ever dealt with Saudi Arabia can skip discussing these two 
prominent elements.  The difference lies usually in the approaches.  
Because of the peculiarity of Saudi Arabia, in the sense that its political beliefs emerged 
virtually intact from an earlier colonial era, a useful approach to understand the country 
is through examining its culture, as followed by some scholars such as Huyette.  Islam 
has dictated culture and political norms in Saudi Arabia, according to Huyette.  In her 
view, the impact of Islam may have been more forceful in the Kingdom than in any 
other state.  Thus, she argued that it was very important to examine the beliefs and 
values of people when studying Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, her examination of the 
cultural system revealed that religion did not impede the process of modernising the 
country (Huyette, 1985: 5-128). 
The cultural approach adopted by Huyette partially fell into one of the theoretical 
categories that Fandy claimed was dominant in Middle Eastern and Arab studies. 
According to Fandy, modernisation theory has had a considerable weight in studying the 
Middle East and the Arab world.  The theory presented modernity and tradition as 
opposing poles on a universal development spectrum.  Progress in the theory’s 
viewpoint meant a leap from the pole of tradition to that of modernity.  In the process of 
such a move, obstacles like religious forces must be overcome (Fandy, 1999: 14-15).  
Huyette, as indicated, did not share this conclusion.  She thought that the Saudi political 
system, which is based on Islam, was responding to people’s demands and meeting their 
expectations (Huyette, 1985: 5-128). 
In his study of the Saudi political economy in the 1980s, Islami viewed Saudi Arabia as 
culturally traditional with weak institutions and considerable personalisation in running 
the affairs of the state.  However, Islami likewise did not consider religion to be an 
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obstacle to state-building efforts in Saudi Arabia.  Generally, as reflected in Fandy’s 
discussion, the theory of modernisation has considered religion to be part of societal 
traditions and hence an obstacle to modernisation.  In Islami’s account of the Kingdom’s 
political economy, religion played an essential role as an ideology by which the political 
system could unite the country by transcending in its legitimacy the traditional tribal 
association.  In other words, religion was a progressing step to an old traditional political 
practice of tribal legitimisation (Islami, 1984: 5-14). 
The cultural approach has been helpful in explaining Saudi Arabia.  However, a sole 
focus on culture could mislead theorising the country.  For instance, in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, the cultural approach usually focused on the religious aspects or on what made 
the Kingdom culturally distinctive.  At times, that was inadequate in analysing the 
country and portrayed it as if it was isolated from other influential internal and external 
elements.  Occasionally, the approach also implied that the Kingdom shared no common 
experience with others.  In her historical assessment of the Saudi political economy, for 
example, Lackner regarded Saudi Arabia as a unique country to the extent that relevant 
analysis could not fit into any pre-conceived model of development.  She pointed, for 
example, to the status of women and their exclusion from the labour force due to cultural 
reasons.33  Furthermore, Lackner saw in religion, as it was interpreted and applied by 
fundamentalist Wahhabi advocates, an opposing force to the modernisation of the 
country (Lackner, 1978: 40-74). 
Another example in this respect was Chaudhry.  In her work, The Price of Wealth, she 
argued that Saudi Arabia before the oil boom in the 1970s had been a closed society 
with a preserved culture.  This could partially be attributed to the fact that at the time of 
establishing the state, Saudi Arabia was free from foreign rule and influence.  
Consequently, it developed its economic administrative agencies in relative isolation 
(Chaudhry, 1997). This meant that exogenous factors were almost absent or at least 
neutral. 
                                                 
33
 Currently, the situation of women in the Saudi labour market is quite different from the time of 
Lackner’s writing.  
  134
According to Menoret, the Islamic discourse on Saudi Arabia could not be taken at face 
value.  To him, the focus on religion alone when studying the Kingdom could not 
explain everything about the country, for religion as seen through the prism of 
Wahhabism was conflated with traditions.  He also stated that various Islamist 
movements had recently expressed their abhorrence of the Saudi state for its excessive 
materialism and pragmatism to the degree that the regime had lost its religious 
legitimacy.  Menoret also claimed that the religious discourse on Saudi Arabia 
considered Wahhabism to have been immobile ever since the pact of 1744, which meant 
that Saudi culture and politics could be seen as an historical essence involving the 
alliance between the temporal and the spiritual powers.  This approach, according to 
Menoret, was misleading, as the relation between the two in contemporary Saudi Arabia 
has been suppressive and exploiting the latter in favour of the former (Menoret, 2005: 5-
61).  
As mentioned above, religion, as part of culture, has been influential in the discourse of 
Saudi Arabia.  As also indicated, oil has equally been influential in that discourse.  The 
beginning of the oil era in 1938 and the subsequent oil boom in the 1970s had enormous 
impacts on the Saudi political, social and economic life.  Theoretically, however, the oil 
experience placed the Kingdom in the paradigm of what came to be known in the 
literature of IPE as a ‘rentier’ economy. 
The theory of the ‘rentier’ state is a composite of correlated ideas pertaining to the 
nature of states in economies dominated by external rent.  In a broad sense, the theory 
defines ‘rentier’ states as those receiving substantial amounts of external economic rent 
on a regular basis.  Although all mono-producers could be described as having ‘rentier’ 
economies, the writings of ‘rentier’ theorists have focused on oil-exporting countries.  
There are some characteristics that must be present in order for a state to be classified as 
‘rentier’: the rent volume should dominate the economy, origin of the rent must be 
external, only few are engaged in the generation of rent, while the majority are involved 
in its distribution.  In addition to this, the government should be the principal recipient of 
the rent (Douglas, 1996: 11-22). 
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Because of the characteristics above, Wilson pointed out that Saudi Arabia has often 
been referred to as a classic example of a country with a ‘rentier’ economy (2004: 8).  
With the oil boom in the 1970s, the Kingdom relied almost exclusively on revenues 
received from the extraction and export of oil.  This gave rise to terms like ‘oil rents’.  
Such rents have been generated outside the domestic economy and were paid directly to 
the government.  Because the extraction and export of this resource has been a narrowly 
defined process that required little domestic development and production, only a small 
minority of the population have been involved in it (Champion, 2003: 9). 
This ‘rentier’ character, as Krimly pointed out, suggested that the Saudi state enjoyed 
almost an ideal condition for state autonomy.  He further explained that the work of the 
‘rentier’ theorists implied an economic dichotomy in the oil ‘rentier’ states because that 
the state became independent of the population (Krimly, 1993: 11-66).  This is an 
important political aspect of ‘rentier’ economies in general.  The oil money strengthened 
the state and created a distinctive political system based on the centrality of petroleum 
revenues within the state.  The abundance brought by oil led the Gulf states in particular 
to abandon direct tax collection, which in reality reduced the need for these states to 
prove their legitimacy to the population (Heradstveit and Haveem, 2003: 12). 
In a recent study, ‘rentier’ theorist Luciani argued that the paramount role of the oil-
producing states including Saudi Arabia and the considerable autonomy with respect to 
their societies is a fundamentally valid approach.  He also claimed that Saudi Arabia 
remained a ‘rentier’ state that enjoyed almost total fiscal independence and was able to 
engage in distributive politics to ensure political support.  However, the Kingdom’s 
development process simultaneously allowed the development of a strong private sector.  
This private sector eventually reached a stage where it became autonomous from the 
state itself.  Although Saudi business leaders, in Luciani’s view, continued to value 
proximity to the government, they did not accept that their success was exclusively due 
to their link to it (Luciani, 2006: 144-157). 
For Hertog, state-society links and interaction in Saudi Arabia have become more 
complex than the assumption of state autonomy, which the ‘rentier’ paradigm suggested.  
He argued that the distributional system of the Saudi state reached a breaking point with 
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each budget crisis particularly during the 1980s and 1990s.  As such, pressures to reform 
Saudi economic structures were indeed mounting.  Yet, the outcomes were not translated 
into significant systemic or political reforms.  In fact, the uneven results of reform 
indicated that some economic reform projects, for instance, were either implemented in 
a highly partial fashion or not at all, which suggests that stakes were created but the 
process gave veto power to a variety of groups in society (Hertog, 2006: 111-113-143). 
Luciani’s acknowledgment of the growing strength of the Kingdom’s business groups, 
and Hertog’s argument about the existence of a veto power for groups in Saudi society 
converged with what Krimly had elaborated.  Krimly pointed out that the central 
position of the ‘rentier’ state in the example of Saudi Arabia suggested that the state 
enjoyed a high degree of internal autonomy.  Nonetheless, he still rejected the 
dichotomy between the state and society while emphasising their inter-penetration and 
inter-twining (Krimly, 1993: 5-6). 
Each of the arguments above has a case in point and can partially explain the political 
economy in Saudi Arabia.  The discussion above illustrated that religion, representing 
traditions, and oil, representing modernism by introducing modern technology to the 
country, remained pivotal.  However, they alone cannot fully explain decisions made or 
policies enacted by the government, as some experts in Saudi affairs suggested (Niblock, 
1982: 75; Menoret, 2005: 60-61).   
Previewing the perceptions of the Saudi political economy in the literature will 
contribute to the understanding of how politics and economics worked in Saudi Arabia.  
The points made by Luciani and Hertog were important.  Although Luciani argued that 
the ‘rentier’ paradigm is valid as far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, he simultaneously 
acknowledged the increasing role of the private sector.  Such a role substantially 
supports the suggestion of Hertog that the Kingdom was growing more complex and 
stakes were created which concurrently gave veto power to a variety of groups in the 
society.  However, Hertog went too far in suggesting that the ‘rentier’ model for Saudi 
Arabia was a thing of the past. 
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Hertog studied the political economy of Saudi Arabia a little further with an application 
to its WTO accession.  He aimed at understanding the nature of domestic-international 
linkages in the Saudi political economy.  In his article of 2008 “Two-level negotiations 
in a fragmented system”, Hertog intended to show how specific state structure and state-
business relations can have very different outcomes depending on whether international 
pressure is applied.  In the approaches, he briefly looked at the factor-based and sector-
based models which deal with economic interests in terms of those seeking protection or 
free trade.  He considered at the same time the institutional approaches for the sake of 
understanding both: the interest-aggregation and decision-making mechanism.  
However, Hertog thought that the economic approaches have more predictions to offer 
on the Saudi case as they are more general, whereas institutional approaches focus on 
institutional mechanisms in western democracies (Hertog, 2008: 2-4). 
This article of Hertog might differ a little from his mentioned-above study of 2006 in 
terms of the image it transmits about the Saudi political economy.  His previous analysis 
reflected an increase in the internal politics in Saudi Arabia, which in itself would 
naturally lead to a situation where some groups could have a certain veto power over 
issues.  However, the analysis in “the two-level negotiations” very much portrayed the 
forces in the Saudi political economy as unable to get major projects done, for they are 
paralyzed by overwhelming fragmentation. 
In his latter analysis, Hertog came to a conclusion that Saudi institutions represented by 
the bureaucracy responsible for the WTO accession were too fragmented to the degree 
that agreeing on a policy or changing in the status quo was nearly impossible.  It was not 
only the bureaucracy. He argued that fragmentation characterised the private sector as 
well to the point that it was not able to represent stable counter-coalition with 
programmatic vision.  Crippled by such public-private fragmentation, it was only for 
external pressure combined with royal decision for the fragmented administration to fell 
in line and, then, for the accession to take place (Hertog, 2008). 
In general, the article of Hertog on the tow-level negotiations boosts this thesis in a very 
particular and indirect manner.  As it more or less tried to do the same, Hertog’s article 
emphasises the appropriateness of referring to interests and institutions as approaches to 
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study the political economy of the WTO accession, as this thesis has in fact done.  
Moreover, although less in his scope and primary documental sources, Hertog and this 
thesis came to agree on several points.  For instance, Hertog highlighted the importance 
of royal’s interference to push policies forward.  Such interference this study has 
labelled as royal ‘mentorship’.  Also, Hertog’s and this study approximately agreed that 
the Saudi business community was generally active on an ad hoc manner during the time 
of the country’s accession although this study saw that there were some changes in this 
societal group at the final stages of the accession process, as it will be discussed in 
Chapter Six.  Probably most important, both studies agreed on the importance of the 
U.S. role and the pressure it exerted around the end of the case. 
Disagreements between the arguments of the two studies exist, notwithstanding.  As in 
the abovementioned example of the role of the business community, this study, unlike 
Hertog’s, indicated that that role had experienced, around the end of the accession 
process, a sort of change relatively independent from external pressure.  In fact, this 
thesis stressed, given the Saudi drawn-out accession negotiations, the importance of the 
factor of time and anticipated from the outset that the positions of the official actors 
(institutions) and societal groups could not be static throughout such a lengthy process.  
Although Hertog briefly considered the chronological events of the negotiations, he 
hardly mentioned any apart from the change of the Saudi position as a whole at the end 
of the case. 
In addition, Hertog’s assessment of interest-aggregation with regard to Saudi Arabia and 
the WTO accession focused solely on interests in their economic form.  As far as this 
thesis is concerned, interests are not necessarily pecuniary especially that the WTO’s 
jurisdictions have expanded to include non-economic issues such as domestic legal 
systems.  The broader assessment of societal interests of this study allowed for the 
inclusion of the religious establishment as an important group in the Saudi accession 
process. 
Perhaps, the most important difference between the two studies is the degree of 
emphasis on the external factor.  Hertog thought it was the most important as it was the 
main reason for the change in the Saudi position, and then the accession itself.  As to this 
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study, the external pressure as a factor in the Kingdom’s accession was important.  
However, the thesis would call, in its argument, the factor that was decisive at the end of 
process a political factor.  In this study, the responsiveness of Saudi Arabia to the 
external pressure exerted mainly by the U.S. came largely out of an internal political 
concern.  For a moment around the end of the accession process, the Saudi government 
felt that the survival of the regime itself was probably at stake.  Thus, the rapid internal 
reform at the end of the process, as it will be mainly examined in Chapter Six, extended 
to include all that related to the WTO accession.  
Overall, the views of Krimly, Hertog and Luciani put together indicate the existence of 
internal politics in the Kingdom that should be reckoned with, as this study assumed 
from the outset, especially in making foreign trade policy like the decision to accede to 
the GATT/WTO and holding on to that decision over the lengthy accession years.  This 
highlights the importance of the attempt undertaken in this thesis to examine Saudi 
Arabia’s effort to join the WTO through internal politics. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Based on the assumption that studying domestic interplays can better explain the Saudi 
accession to the WTO, this chapter has defined Saudi Arabia’s state and society as the 
point of analysis of this study.  In the process, it highlighted that externalities would be 
taken into account as well.  For this purpose, the chapter discussed the IR approaches 
that focus specifically on state and society. 
Within those approaches, two concepts were of particular importance to the chapter: 
interests and institutions.  After the theoretical discussion of the concepts, the chapter 
considered their application to the Saudi accession case.  In this, it illustrated the 
relevant internal interests to the case, such as the business community and the religious 
establishment.  Also, the chapter presented the relevant domestic institutions, both 
structures and agents.  In taking into account the external factors, the chapter underlined 
the importance of oil and how it was a major link between Saudi Arabia and the outside 
world in a way that caused the country to be affected by external events.  In this regard, 
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the relations with the U.S. became vital, and the co-operation between the two countries 
has transcended mere oil deals to form a strategic connection. 
The last section of the chapter briefly reviewed the historical background of Saudi 
Arabia.  In addition, it discussed how the literature viewed the Saudi political economy.  
It was important to conduct such reviews as they could help to understand the 
application of theoretical concepts of stat/society approaches in the context of the Saudi 
accession case. 
The chapter, in short, set up the framework for analysing the interactions among these 
interest groups, institutions and external elements during the years of the Saudi WTO 
accession negotiations.  Such interactions will be the subject of the next three chapters 
where the case is divided, as indicated in the introductory chapter, into three phases.
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Chapter 4 Phase One: 1985-1996 
At the beginning of the first phase and during a large part of it, the multilateral trading 
system was still represented by the GATT.  As mentioned, the GATT was mainly 
concerned about reducing tariff rates, but that was changing in the run-up to establishing 
the WTO in 1995.  The phase witnessed the formal Saudi application to the GATT in 
1993 and the application’s conversion to the WTO after the latter came into being in 
1995.  No actual negotiations with the WTO incumbent members were held during this 
phase, as the encounters were generally confined to explaining the Saudi trading regime 
through question-and-answer sessions. 
The main argument of this chapter is that Phase One was generally characterised by a 
lack of enthusiasm particularly on the Saudi side.  Although externalities existed, the 
factors that contributed to the character of the phase were mostly internal.  For instance, 
one major reason for the phase’s character was the internal perception of the GATT; 
despite the existing economic challenges, that semi-organization did not come to be 
viewed as an opportunity around which interests might be formed.   
However, the presence of the GATT did not occupy the full period of the phase.  The 
GATT was transformed into the permanent organization of the WTO.  It is the 
contention of this thesis that the duration of the accession procedures had an effect.  It 
would be wrong to assume, as indicated earlier, that the positions of acceding countries 
towards accession were static throughout the usually long process.  Accession efforts are 
susceptible to internal and external developments.  As far as this chapter is concerned, 
the Saudi’s GATT/WTO position was changing as well.  During this phase, a 
momentum was building up, towards another, more intense phase. 
Thus, the chapter will attempt to produce an account of the reasons for the 
characteristics of this phase.  It will do so by examining several points that are of great 
importance to the phase, and as such, are of importance to the whole thesis as well.  In 
this, the chapter will consider the official management of the process until the accession 
application was converted in 1995.  It will also discuss the internal and external context 
and its impact on the Saudi accession attempt.  The chapter will also assess the concerns 
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of societal interest groups.  Finally, the chapter will describe the related momentum that 
emerged near the end of the phase. 
4.1 Managing the Process 
The Saudi application to the GATT/WTO suffered in general from structural and 
procedural arrangements.  These were partially due to the way in which major decisions 
were made.  Another was linked to the make-up of the governmental agents concerned.  
In addition, the way those agents proceeded occasionally reflected an experience deficit. 
4.1.1 The Application 
As the ministry responsible for devising tariff rates in Saudi Arabia, the MFNE was 
responsible for the file of this semi-organization that focused on tariff reduction.  To 
gain an understanding of the GATT, the MFNE sought the approval of the king (at the 
time, King Fahd) to apply for observer status in that trade organization.  The monarch 
granted approval in 1985, and Saudi Arabia became an observer in the same year (Al-
Sa’doun and Al-Aali, 1998: 83-84). 
In 1987, the Kingdom attended, as an observer, the GATT’s launch of the UR at the 
Ministerial Conference in the Uruguay.  From 1985 to 1987, various notions were 
considered regarding the Saudi stance towards the GATT.  These deliberations 
concerned the matter of whether to become a formal party to that semi-organization, or 
stay on as an observer and first be clear about the outcomes of the comprehensive new 
round that had just started (Office of Experts, 1991). 
The COM decided in that year of 1987 to refer the GATT issue to the MC, which had 
already been formed to advise on international economic affairs in general.  The 
decision came to mark the year 1987 as the first when the MC began to supervise Saudi 
Arabia’s accession to the GATT/WTO (COM, 1987).  After a couple of years of 
evaluation, the MC submitted its recommendation in 1989 to the COM, which supported 
the idea of joining the GATT.  The MC based its recommendation on the following:  
 The role of GATT was increasing; 
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 The absence of Saudi Arabia from such an international trading gathering did 
not reflect the country’s international economic weight; 
 Saudi Arabia was already more open, in terms of trade, than some countries 
party to the GATT; 
 Saudi Arabia would join as a developing country and would make use of the 
flexibilities permitted to such countries; 
 The procedures of GATT allowed countries to negotiate the moment of 
accession according to their convenient timing (MOFA, 1990). 
 
This was the basis for the decision to later join the multilateral trading system.  In this, 
the MC envisioned for itself the role of co-ordinating the political position with regard to 
issues introduced during this attempt to accede to the multilateral trading system.  
However, the COM forwarded the recommendation to the Office of Experts for further 
consideration.34  Accordingly, the Office of Experts requested that the MFNE, as the 
instance responsible for the file, provide the Office with all related statements and 
information.  The MFNE, however, responded that what was needed at that stage was 
authorisation to initiate preliminary negotiations with the GATT about the possibility of 
becoming a full party.  In this, a final decision to accede to this multilateral trading 
regime was not sought, according to the MFNE, as making such a final decision before 
the negotiations would weaken the country’s position.  Upon this, the Office of Experts 
in 1991 supported the aforementioned recommendation of the MC.  The Office, 
however, added that the endeavour of negotiating the Saudi application to the GATT 
should make use of qualified experts from universities and other institutions (Office of 
Experts, 1991). 
In April 1993, the COM approved the recommendations except the suggestion to consult 
qualified experts.  In giving its approval, the COM authorised the MFNE to commence 
initial negotiations with the GATT in order to assess the possibility of Saudi Arabia 
becoming a full contracting party (COM, 1993).  The following month, the MFNE 
                                                 
34
 The Office of Experts is a governmental body attached to the COM.  It comprises experts in different 
fields, who provide the necessary legal and technical advice to the COM.  
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communicated to the GATT Secretary-General that Saudi Arabia wished to be a party to 
the GATT Agreement (GATT, 1993).  Hence, a WP was set up to examine the Saudi 
application (Al-Sa’doun and Al-Aali, 1998: 85). 
Over the following two years, the decision in 1993 to join the GATT did not affect the 
pace with which the concerned governmental agents proceeded with the GATT 
accession in the pre-application.  They generally kept up the slow pace that had been 
obvious in the pre-application phase.  As a result, the Kingdom submitted its first draft 
of memorandum in 5 July 1994 (appendix 1-4), more than a year after the application 
(WTO, 2000).   
The memorandum declared from the outset the government’s preference for a free 
market economy and its support for the private sector’s participation in the development 
efforts.  In the details, the memorandum presented some of the main features of the 
Saudi economic regime at the time.  Tariff rates followed developments in the economy.  
In that, the government budget surpluses, due to increase in oil revenues and virtual 
absence of domestic industries seeking protection, resulted in a very low overall level of 
tariff rates in the 1970s, averaging 3%.  With the decline of oil revenues and the 
establishment of domestic industries in the 1980s, however, circumstances changed.  
They necessitated an upward revision of tariffs, and their average went up from 3% to 
12%.  A limited number of products were religiously prohibited, such as alcohol and 
products of pork, or economically restricted, such as dates and liquid milk.  By giving no 
direct subsidies, the government encouraged export-oriented industries, which had a 
comparative advantage.  Foreign investment was welcomed through joint ventures with 
Saudi involvement.  The Foreign Capital Investment Regulations at the time exempted 
foreign investments from income and corporate taxes for a period of ten years if 
nationals held at least 25% of the project’s capital.  State-trading enterprises existed, but 
they were few and worked on a commercial basis, such as ARAMCO (WTO, 1994: 14). 
The question–and-answer sessions began on 29 November 1994 (MOC, 2000: 2).  They 
included enquiries about Saudi Arabia’s position towards the imminent creation of the 
WTO.  They also included requests to elaborate on the Kingdom’s stance concerning 
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subjects essential to the new organization, such as services and intellectual property 
rights. 
The Saudi responses were prepared during a time of a rare cabinet reshuffle.  The 
responses came in 15 November 1995, a year after the enquiries were received, 11 
months after the WTO was officially established and less than two weeks before the 
MOC took over the responsibility of acceding to the GATT from the MFNE as a result 
of the cabinet reshuffle.  Addressing the concern of the WP regarding the stance towards 
the transformation in the multilateral trading system from the GATT to WTO, which 
was taking place, the Saudi reply indicated that the Kingdom intended to request a 
membership in the WTO after completing internal procedures (GATT, 1995:4).   
4.1.2 The Application’s Conversion  
The conversion of the application to the WTO came in December 1995 (appendix 2-4).  
It was shortly preceded by the COM’s decision to assign the file of acceding to the 
organisation to the MOC instead of the MFNE.  Nevertheless, the whole process would 
still be under the general direct supervision of the MC, according to the above-
mentioned decision of the COM in 1987.   
In addition to the MOC and the MOFA (the lead ministry), the MC at the time consisted 
of the MFNE, the MIE, the MPMR and the MOP.  As agriculture became a key issue in 
the newly created organization, the MC obtained the approval of the COM to have the 
MOA as a member.35  Two additional bodies existed under the MC: a working team and 
technical negotiating team.  The former comprised undersecretaries of the mentioned 
ministries and was chaired by the minister of commerce.  The latter was also chaired by 
the same minister, and subdivided into the following topical groups: TRIPS, goods, 
services, agriculture, customs valuation, import licensing, agreements and initiatives, 
technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary (MOFA, 1996; MOC 1998).   
                                                 
35
 This arrangement of ministries was changed years later due to structural reform in the COM.  For 
example, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) became the Ministry of Finance, and 
the Ministry of Planning became the Ministry of Economy and Planning.  
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The work of the two bodies was in practice quite closely linked, as the working team 
would always include experts in these subjects in the negotiations for accession.  Hence, 
they will be treated in this study as one group, which will be referred to as the Saudi 
Negotiating Team (SNT).  Chart 4-1 illustrates the structure of the governmental agents 
involved in the accession case. 
Figure 4-1: Structure of governmental agents 
 
 
Apart from the minister of foreign affairs, the MC’s members were newcomers to the 
COM.  All of them, including the minister of foreign affairs, who chaired the committee, 
were graduates of Western universities and free-market advocates.  As for the members 
of the SNT, they had to manage the accession responsibility along with their original 
responsibilities as officials in different departments of the government.  Due to shortages 
of resources at the time, the government could not afford to spare such officials to focus 
solely on the WTO accession (Al-Sa’doun, Interview, 26 April 2002; Faqeeh, Interview 
06April 2006). 
Regarding the workflow within this structure, it worked in an ascending manner: the 
SNT would classify replies to the WP and design initial offers for the negotiations 
before bringing them to the attention of the MC.  The MC would make decisions in 
procedural matters only.  Other than that, it would refer to the COM.  For example, the 
MC would decide whether, in the negotiations, the SNT should insist on an initial offer 
on a specific issue or concede a ‘fall-back position’.  However, setting the ‘fall-back 
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position’ itself was the prerogative of the COM (MOFA, 1997).  In the middle of the 
negotiations, an additional governmental agent was created to also deal with the 
accession process.  That was the HMC, to which the MC was supposed to report. 
In parallel with putting this process in order, an intensive bilateral political effort was to 
be undertaken.  From the beginning, the Saudi government had considerable faith that its 
good political relationships with the major trading nations would provide sufficient 
impetus to the Kingdom’s WTO bid.  Therefore, immediately after the conversion of the 
application, the Saudi officials viewed it as important to kick off the negotiation process 
by having the minister of commerce visit the capitals of the major WTO members to 
conduct preliminary talks for the sake of getting the necessary support for the 
Kingdom’s effort to join this organisation (MOFA, 1996). 
4.2 Internal and External Context 
Phase One went through some important internal and external, political and economic 
changes.  Internally, the Saudi economy was suffering some difficulties because of 
continual fluctuations in oil prices and productions.  Internationally, a significant part of 
the phase took place in the context of the Cold War. 
4.2.1 Domestic Economy 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the sharp increase in oil prices relieved the Kingdom 
of financial constraints.  Huge oil income, combined with the limited absorptive capacity 
of the local economy, created large financial surpluses.  However, government revenues 
began to recede with the downturn in oil prices that started in 1982.  From then up to 
1995, the oil market went through several fluctuating situations triggered by different 
political and economic events.   
After 1982, the Saudi government was obliged to change the emphasis from managing 
the surpluses accumulated during the 1970s and early 1980s to coping with growing 
budgetary and balance-of-payments shortfalls.  Therefore, it was forced to finance a 
large budget for the investments it had already committed to and current account deficits 
through foreign asset drawdown.  The situation was not improving.  As the biggest 
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producer, Saudi Arabia had to shoulder a large burden of reducing oil output under the 
newly installed quota system by OPEC.  The country’s oil revenues accordingly took a 
double blow from reduced prices and reduced exports.  Responding to domestic 
concerns, the government, with the king’s personal intervention, renounced OPEC’s 
quota in 1986 and sharply boosted oil output.  Such a change in the oil affairs was firstly 
to regain the Kingdom’s oil market share, and secondly to impose more production 
discipline on other OPEC members who did not show commitments to the quota system.  
This scheme worked relatively well.  Greater discipline on the part of OPEC and a 
revival in global demand stimulated by lower oil prices helped return some resilience to 
the market after 1986 (U.S. Library of Congress, 2008).   
In addition to this, the war prices caused by Saudis giving up the quota system hit the 
U.S. oil producers.  Hence, the Reagan administration intervened with Saudi Arabia by 
late 1986 to stabilise prices at a level closer to US$20 a barrel.  Their mutual 
understanding helped within matters of days to push the prices up from US$10 to US$17 
a barrel (Yamani, Interview, 06 October 2003).  Nevertheless, oil revenues in the late 
1980s remained insufficient to overcome the deficits caused by the oil prices’ drop in the 
early 1980s (U.S. Library of Congress, 2008). 
Following the end of Iran-Iraq war, oil output increased in 1990.  Shortly afterwards, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 caused oil prices and Saudi output to soar as 
the Saudi production replaced the embargoed Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil (U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2008).  Until 1995, the oil world market experienced no further major shocks.  
The optimism approximately continued after 1990-1991 up to 1993 (Demis, 2000).  
However, afterwards, there was a gradual drift downward until 1994.  Overall, as prices 
stabilised at a relatively higher level than in the late 1980s, the early 1990s appeared 
more favourable in terms of oil resources (Niblock and Malik, 2007: 100-101). 
Yet, this apparently favourable situation was in reality not as promising as it seemed.  
According to Niblock and Malik, the Saudi government had to spend at this time large 
sums of money earned by oil sales not on the economy, but on supporting the coalition 
confronting Iraq in the Second Gulf War (Gulf War II).  Estimations varied with regard 
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to the costs of the war to the Kingdom, but some put them at no less than US$65 billion 
(2007: 101-102).   
In 1995, a major event disturbed the previous moderate improvements.  As oil had been 
priced by the U.S. dollar, the collapse of the dollar’s value that year added to the 
problem of depriving the economy of the revenues generated by oil exports at that time 
(Demis, 2000).  Thus, although appearing a little more positive, the period from 1990-
1995 was also an economically challenging one for the Saudi economy.  
4.2.2 Regional and International Politics 
For most part of Phase One, Saudi Arabia was occupied with dealing and handling the 
consequences of major regional events.  At a wider level, for most of this phase, the 
Cold War dominated global politics. 
In the beginning of 1980s, there was a widespread feeling of insecurity in Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf countries due to the Iranian revolution in 1979 and Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
call to export his revolution together with his anti-monarchy ideas.  During this period, 
the political, ideological and territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq turned in 1980 
from tense relations to an all-out war between the two countries.  The escalating war had 
an impact on the security of other Gulf states and on the oil industry.  This led Saudi 
Arabia and five other Arab states in the Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman) to create the GCC, which many regarded as a political response to 
the on-going war at the time (Owen, 1997: 102). 
The assumption of the Iraqi leadership was that victory would be achieved quickly, as 
Iran was in domestic disarray because of the revolution.  However, the war dragged on 
throughout the 1980s as Iran absorbed the first attacks.  Overall, Saudi Arabia stood 
beside Iraq.  It provided the latter with huge financial and logistical support.  The 
reasons for Saudi Arabia’s stance were obvious.  It feared that Iran’s victory would 
stimulate its revolutionary aspiration in the whole region.  Also, Iranians were present in 
the Gulf in huge numbers, and the Kingdom was anxious about the sentiments of its 
sizable Shiite populations in the Eastern Province in the case of an Iranian victory. 
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In 1988, the Iran-Iraq War was finally ended as Iran agreed to the Security Council 
Resolution 598.  However, political turmoil did not stop there.  After a short period of 
time, Iraq turned its attention to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  Most prominent in this was 
the demand that Saudi and Kuwaiti war loans should be cancelled because Iraq had 
prevented an Islamic revolution that might have ousted the two governments.  The series 
of demands for several territorial oil fields concessions from Kuwait were followed by a 
revival of a claim that Kuwait was historically part of Iraqi territory.  On 2 August 1990 
Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.  The UN was swift to react, and the Security Council 
issued Resolution 660 calling for Iraq’s withdrawal.  On 3 August, Iraqi forces reached 
the Kuwaiti-Saudi border in an open bid for invasion.  Immediately, Fahd called for U.S. 
military assistance. 
The invitation of American forces to ward off Iraq opened an internal front critical of the 
government.  The stationing of large numbers of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the 
land of the two holy mosques, undermined the legitimacy of the ruling family and its 
prestige in the eyes of many.  Criticism of the government’s decision was not passive.  
For almost the first time, a cross-section of the Saudi society engaged in drafting, 
through some figureheads, consecutive petitions to the king along with some prominent 
princes calling, inter alia, for a judicial and administrative reform, more accountability 
and an elected assembly (Abedin, 2009: 34-35; Lacey, 2009).36 
The petitions took the government by surprise.  Quoted in Lacey, Al-Tuwayjri, an 
intellectual, says “The ideas had come from everywhere – from north, south, east and 
west, and from people of real weight, men who were very devout and conservative.  
There were famous judges, academics, successful businessmen and ulama” (2009:162).  
Yet, the intention was confined to seek changes in the government internal policies 
along with the foreign policy and its close relationship with the U.S., not to change the 
regime itself.  Indeed, the petitioners were anxious to convey the impression that they 
were a loyal opposition and to dispel fears that they wanted to overthrow the ruling 
family (Abedin, 2009: 35). 
                                                 
36
 Among those petitions, the famous “Letter of Demands”, which was signed in March 1991 by more 
than 400 notable members, including self-styled Islamists, and “the Memorandum of Advice”, which was 
prepared in September 1992 by 107 of mainly religious scholars.  
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The developments frustrated Fahd.  He thought he had taken a risk and had acted with 
rare speed and decisiveness to save the country, only to be thanked with criticism from 
almost all sides in the Kingdom.  Because of this, a number of arrests occurred (Lacey, 
2009: 164).  Nonetheless, the internal pressure backed by sympathies extended by some 
Western governments resulted in the king issuing government-related reform initiatives 
(Heradstveit and Haveem, 2003: 42).  What the ruling family considered to be 
concessions were in essence minor adjustments to the Saudi socio-political status quo.  
The most important among these was the establishment of the Shura Council in 1993 
(Champion, 2003: 191). 
Internationally, a significant part of Phase One took place at a time when the world was 
basically divided by the comprehensive bi-polar Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union.  In the Middle East, the Cold War transformed the terms of 
international interference in the affairs of the region.  It was, for a large part, to deny the 
Soviets control of the Middle East oil through which the latter could strangle Western 
Europe.  The polarisation in the region generally replicated the international pattern of 
superpower alliances, where conservative states became pro-Western, and radical states 
were pro-Soviet.  Thus, the conservative Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, were 
considered pro-Western, and the radical nationalist Arab states like Syria were regarded 
as pro-Soviet.  Such polarisation resulted in conditions that generally allowed the states 
of the region to maintain a relative autonomy, as they could counter the influence of one 
superpower with the influence of the other.  Sometimes, as a matter of fact, the smaller 
partner states could, given the Cold War competition, exercise influence over the 
superpower which needed it as part of global rivalries, especially if the smaller could 
threaten to switch sides (Hinnebusch, 2003: 4, 21-29). 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the GATT/WTO system was built on free-trade 
principles.  Interestingly, the inception of the GATT in 1947 coincided with the onset of 
the Cold War, which started around that year during the administration of President 
Truman.  Although some argued that the GATT carried on with trade liberalisation 
unaffected by the Cold War, the former did, in fact, mirror the underlying power 
relations caused by the latter.  As in the larger case of the Cold War, the U.S. stance in 
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the GATT was to isolate and contain the communist foes.  Because of this rivalry, 
nonetheless, neither the tactics nor the outlook of the U.S. were fixed.  President 
Eisenhower saw that commercial contacts with Soviet satellites would help them to 
break their economic dependency on Moscow, especially after the death of Joseph Stalin 
in 1953 and the ascendancy of the less heavy-handed Nikita Khrushchev.  Consequently, 
the aim of keeping communist countries out of that semi-organization became a more 
complex and pressing question in the late 1950s when countries like Poland and 
Yugoslavia applied to join.  Their economic situations, devoid of tariff structures or a 
free market, posed serious questions regarding the compatibility of their participation in 
trade negotiations, which by itself could have led to a fairly straightforward refusal of 
their applications.  Nonetheless, economic considerations were not the only factor, as the 
Cold War considerations introduced a strategic view.  Thus, instead of rejecting their 
applications outright, the GATT negotiators granted them provisional associate status 
(McKenzie, 2008: 78-104). 
Saudi Arabia’s first formal application to the multilateral trading system represented by 
the GATT was in 1993, a couple of years after the fall of Berlin Wall and the demise of 
the Soviet regime, which both marked the official end of the Cold War.  However, 
hypothetically, had Saudi Arabia, with its non-communist and more structurally 
developed economy in comparison to most of those in Eastern Europe, decided to join 
the GATT while the Cold War was on, it would most likely have had a much easier 
accession (Al-Alamy, Interview, 02 May 2002).   
4.3 Limited Interests – Limited Concerns 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the accession-related interests are one of the main 
focuses in this study.  This section will argue that Saudi Arabia showed little interest in 
the multilateral trading system during this phase and had little concern about it, to the 
extent that it contributed to the lack of enthusiasm that characterised the phase as a 
whole.  This argument will be examined by considering two points: the interaction with 
the government and the preliminary perceptions of those interests about the multilateral 
trading system at the time.  
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4.3.1 Interaction with Government 
Since 1970, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a programme of five-year comprehensive 
development plans.  Until 1985, when the Saudis began to contemplate joining the 
multilateral trading system represented at the time by the GATT, the Kingdom had 
already seen three five-year comprehensive development plans from 1970 to 1975, from 
1975 to 1980 and from 1980 to 1985.  The plans were introduced during the first oil 
boom, specifically between 1973 and1982, when oil revenues stood at US$328.6 billion 
in 1982, whereas in 1969 they had totalled only US$5.1.  These huge revenues allowed 
programmes for massive economic and social transformation to be included within those 
plans.  Main components of such programmes aimed at developing the oil industry, 
establishing a substantial industrial base through utilising hydrocarbon resources and 
energy for petrochemicals, promoting agriculture and a measure of agriculture self-
sufficiency, and creating physical infrastructure for a modern state.  In this, the 
government was not only shaping the vision of such an enormous transformation, but it 
was also its initiator and implementer (Niblock and Malik, 2007: 52-92). 
The dominance of the public sector, promoted by the government adopting the role of 
traditional entrepreneur in the development process at the time, indicated a weakness on 
the part of the private sector (Looney, 1982: 73).  As the first three five-year 
comprehensive development plans gave no significant attention to the role of the 
business community, the latter remained what it had been during the 1960s: an adjunct 
and beneficiary of the government projects, but not a critical instrument in creating the 
basis for an industrialised economy, as the responsibility for substantial industrial 
development lay with the government (Niblock and Malik, 2007: 53-58).  Therefore, the 
main feature of the business community’s influence in the Saudi economy during the 
1970s until the middle of the 1980s was directly related to its connection with the 
government (Islami, 1984: 10-14). 
Thus, the public sector had considerable dominance over the domestic economy.  At this 
stage in Saudi Arabia’s economic development, the ‘rentier state’ label was accurate, 
since almost the entire private sector of the Kingdom was living at some point in the 
shadow of the government developmental programmes, though it was simultaneously 
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growing in the process to reach its relatively current self-autonomy (Luciani, 2005: 144-
157).  Thus, the business community was nearly completely absent at the time when the 
government was deliberating from mid-1985 up to 1993 the idea of joining the GATT.  
In fact, there was no indication in the governmental documents that were available for 
this study that the government tried during that first phase of the accession to engage the 
business community over this issue. 
The fact that the government had such a clear upper hand in the economy might have 
led, according to a businessman, the governmental agents involved in the accession issue 
to keep the business community on the sidelines while they were considering the Saudi 
application (Kadi, Interview, 28 April 2004).  However, if the reason was not to involve 
the business community because of its dependency on the state, then the government 
was mistaken, according to another businessperson. If the national aim in the long-term 
was to enhance the role of the private sector in the economy, then issues as big as 
joining the multilateral trading system should not have been a government exclusive 
matter (K. Al-Rajhi, Interview, 5 May 2004).  In general, the business community was 
disappointed that there was no debate about becoming a party to the GATT, a grievance 
that continued for some time even after converting the Saudi application to accede to the 
WTO (Aqeel, Interview, 25 April 2004). 
The fact that the government was by far the main driving force of the economy in 
general could from an official viewpoint be counted as a possible factor in marginalising 
the business community at that stage.  However, there were some other elements that 
might have contributed to this as well.  For instance, the whole issue was new even to 
the government agents and they needed some time to adjust, as well.  Also, the GATT 
was not at that time a major concern for the government to get itself and others 
preoccupied about.  The general attitude of the state seems to have been that Saudi 
Arabia had little to gain from that semi-organization, as it largely exported one product, 
oil, where market access was not an issue (Al-Nujaidi, Interview, 06 May 2002; Al-
Muhana, Interview, 01 June 2002).  Similar viewpoint was discussed by the Director of 
the Division on International Trade in Goods and Services in the UNCTAD, J.D.A. 
Cuddy, in his examination of the subject of oil and the GATT.  Although talking not 
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exclusively about oil, but about energy in general, Cuddy indicated that petroleum at the 
time was treated as a special case, in a largely political context and not within the 
GATT’s framework (2000: 1-2).   
As for the other main societal interest group in this study, the religious establishment, 
the case was not much different with regard to its involvement during this phase of the 
accession.  The religious establishment was also absent while the governmental agents 
considered GATT membership.  Unlike the business community, however, it expressed 
no disappointment about this.  To the religious establishment, the prime concern with the 
accession effort to the GATT/WTO was to ensure compatibility with the Shariah.  That 
was the first issue that anyone of the Ulama cared about, regardless of the organisation 
at stake (Al-Ameen, Interview, 05 April 2006; Al-Dawood, Interview, 03 May 2004; Al-
Abduljabar, Interview, 03 May 2004).   
4.3.2 Preliminary Economic Perceptions 
The decision to join the GATT was taken in 1993.  When asked how much opportunity 
the business community thought it had to affect this decision, the majority of the 
businesspersons interviewed in this study indicated that they were unable to tell, as they 
were inadequately informed by the government at the time of pre-application.  That 
decision was made, according to them, during a low-profile period.  However, as the 
Saudi accession moved from the stage of contemplating the issue, starting from 1985, to 
the next stage of applying to the GATT in 1993 and then converting the application in 
1995 to accede to the WTO, the business community was concurrently developing a 
general acquaintance with the subject to the extent that their perceptions started to take 
shape (K. Kurdi, Interview, 20 April 2002). 
The word ‘perceptions’ is intentionally used in the plural form here, which agrees with 
the general line of this study.  As mentioned in Chapter Three, some have placed the 
Saudi political economy in the ‘rentier’ paradigm.  In this concept, the business 
community could be thought of as a unified body fighting for government protection 
(Wilson, 2004).  This study, however, is about the importance of the existing domestic 
institutions and interests, inherently refusing the idea of the state as a unified actor, and 
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thus supports the idea that the business community in any society would not usually 
reflect a single opinion about economic liberalisation, as already explained in Chapter 
Three.  Differences in perception largely depend on the general economic environment 
and the nature of the business practiced. 
When asked which potential benefits of accession either to the GATT in 1993 or the 
WTO in 1995 were considered at the time, several interviewees from the business 
community indicated the possibility of securing better access to foreign markets for 
Saudi petrochemical products.  However, the petrochemical industry was predominantly, 
and still is, in the possession of the government, not the private sector, as the 
government owned 70% of SABIC, the national producing company of petrochemicals.  
According to O. Kurdi, this answer reflected the difference in perceptions of two groups 
in the Saudi business community: those who worked in economic activities like trade 
and industry, and those who specialised in consultant services.  He pointed out that some 
in the first group would express a less cautious opinion, as the subject was almost totally 
new and they were less aware of the nature of the multilateral trading system than those 
in the consultancy business.  The responses of those who lacked insight into the greater 
picture, O. Kurdi stated, might be expected to conflate the benefits for the private sector 
in the Kingdom with the benefits for the government (O. Kurdi, Interview, 5 May 2004). 
Those who were less cautious in how they perceived the GATT/WTO system pointed 
out that the Saudi average tariff rate when the Kingdom was considering the application 
to the GATT in the 1980s was 12%.  To them, that was not a high rate.  In addition, even 
those 12% were in many cases not respected, as importers would frequently tamper with 
documents for customs clearance, causing foreign products to be imported with tariffs of 
less than 12% being levied.  Their point is that the Saudi market was already 
competitive, as it was considered open to foreign products due to the low average tariff 
rates.  Therefore, there was no need for apprehension about joining the multilateral 
trading system (Batterjee, Interview, 25 April 2004). 
Within this line of thinking, the relation of co-operation versus competition was 
discussed.  This view argued that having local agents or representatives of international 
businesses had been one of the traditional characteristics of the Saudi private sector.  
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Throughout their long history, relations between the foreign businesses and the Saudi 
representatives were usually marked by mutual co-operation and prosperity.  Within this 
framework, accession to the GATT/WTO should not only be thought of in light of the 
potential fierce competition with foreigners, but also in light of the possible new window 
for more co-operation with them (Tamer, Interview, 26 April 2004; Al-Yami, Interview, 
27 April 2004). 
The viewpoint that the less cautious opinions lacked clarity about the nature of the 
multilateral trading system suggests that those who were less alert had basically based 
their abovementioned explanations on the assumption that the Saudi economy was open.  
Therefore, its sensitivity to any future trade liberalisation would be low.  However, this 
was not, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, an accurate assumption, according to 
the more reserved point of view.  While it was true, as the advocates of this point of 
view argued, that tariff rates were generally low, many of the economic activities in the 
Kingdom were dependent not on the country’s competitive traits, but on being protected 
and subsidised.  Thus, the degree of sensitivity to trade liberalisation resulting from the 
accession to the GATT/WTO would not be low as some expected (O. Kurdi, Interview, 
5 May 2004). 
As these two general views echoed between being less or more cautious, there were 
those who decisively sensed the peril of joining the multilateral trading system 
represented by the GATT/WTO.  They thought that the long-standing dependence on the 
government’s expenditure had, in fact, crippled the business community to the point that 
it would be unable and unadjusted for future competition with multinational businesses.  
To this, they argued, was added the weak and underdeveloped condition of the legal 
framework of business at the time.  Also, the business community in the Kingdom had 
developed over the years of dependency on public spending an inclination towards 
making quick profits, which, unlike international businesses, lacked careful planning and 
long-term strategy.  The GATT/WTO in this opinion would divide the world into two 
large categories: producers and consumers.  Because of what this viewpoint explained 
about the condition of the Saudi economy and the legal framework it worked with, Saudi 
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Arabia would likely economically fall in the second category.  This was a negative 
prospect (Abduljawad, Interview, 24 April 2004; M. Hasan, Interview, 27 April 2004). 
At the level of the sectors of the economy, there were opinions that shared some of the 
pessimism mentioned above.  Phase One as designated in this study ended in 1996.  
Thus, issues such as trade in services and TRIPS, which became principal items in the 
WTO after its establishment in 1995, were hardly familiar to the Saudis, especially to 
the societal interest groups.  Hence, interests like the business community and religious 
establishment did not have sufficiently clear concerns yet either about the possible 
implications of such issues to form an opinion about them.  Nonetheless, the business 
community, in particular, was able to see signs of risk on some other sectors of the 
economy. 
For instance, the construction sector experienced a noticeable growth between the 1970s 
and the mid-1990s as the Kingdom embarked on major infrastructural projects.  The 
sector became a major element in the non-oil economy, accounting, for example, for 
8.5% of GDP in 1997 (EIU, 2000: 38).  As for the sector and accession to the 
GATT/WTO, the dominant opinion from the beginning among those involved had been 
that accession would constitute a difficult challenge especially to small-sized firms, 
which made up the majority among the firms working in this field (Riyadh Commerce, 
2001: 18). 
Although there were those who argued that the construction sector would not be 
attractive to foreign businesses because of its relatively slim margin of profits (Riyadh 
Commerce, 2001: 18), those who were heavily involved in the field argued otherwise.  
They believed that GATT/WTO accession would lead foreign contractors to crowd out 
the domestic ones.  Moreover, the Saudi construction sector was, unlike what some 
thought, still inexperienced when it came to building not housing units, but 
manufacturing plants, for example.  According to this view, except for two firms, the 
Bin Ladin Group and Saudi OJ, the Saudi construction companies lacked the expertise to 
undertake complicated projects such as building petrochemical complexes (Fayez, 
Interview, 29 April 2004). 
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Another example for the pessimistic views of some of the economic sectors was the non-
oil industry.  The non-oil industry includes all industrial activity except that related to 
exporting crude oil.  According to this definition, the petrochemical industry is included 
in this sector.  As mentioned, however, the petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia 
predominantly belonged to the government, not the private sector.  Therefore, the 
opinion expressed here by the businesspersons did not apply to this highly important 
portion of the non-oil sector. 
It has generally been believed in the circles of the economic decision-makers that the 
non-oil industry would be the answer to the Saudi economy’s dependency on the 
production and export of one commodity, oil.  From their inception in 1970, the 
government’s five-year comprehensive development plans indicated that diversifying 
the economy was a major goal.  To achieve it, the Kingdom needed a larger 
manufacturing base (Alsheik, Interview, 28 April 2004).  In this, Saudi Arabia was, to a 
large extent, no exception to other states in the developing world.  It concentrated on 
import substitution industry. 
To some in the business community, this non-oil sector was thought to be at the time 
negatively affected by the prospect of joining the GATT/WTO.  They thought that such 
negative effects were related to the nature of the Saudi economy.  Saudi Arabia, in this 
view, did not have the grounds for becoming an industrial-based economy.  This was 
due to the size of the domestic market that did not justify establishing a large-scale non-
oil industry.  In addition, the lack of a local skilled workforce was a chronic problem, 
which led industrial projects to depend on expatriates.  Furthermore, the Kingdom was a 
net-importer of high technology.  In the absence of an adequate base, it seemed obvious 
that becoming party to the GATT/WTO could make the domestic industrial sector 
vulnerable to international businesses (Anonymous, Interview, 26 April 2004; Al-Yami, 
Interview, 27 April 2004; K. Kurdi, Interview, 20 April 2002). 
A third example in this regard is the agricultural sector.  Although it only came into 
focus after the multilateral trading system was transformed from the GATT to the WTO 
in 1995, the fate of agricultural sector had been a source of worry for those in the 
agricultural business since the early days of the Saudi accession.  Much as in the case of 
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the non-oil industry, the pessimistic view in the agriculture sector was mainly due to the 
nature of agriculture in Saudi Arabia.  The country has a harsh environment, and 
because of this, the agricultural sector needed governmental support to grow.  Calls for 
such support should not be seen as strange, however, as subsiding agriculture was not 
internationally uncommon despite the existence of the GATT and the WTO (K. Al-
Rajhi, Interview, 5 May 2004).   
Worries about the WTO accession were aggravated because there had been a parallel 
questioning as far as the agricultural sector in the Kingdom was concerned (K. Al-Rajhi, 
Interview, 5 May 2004).  Over the last two decades, there was a debate about the 
practicality of having a subsidised national agricultural programme in a desert country.  
The government indicated that agriculture was strategically important, and had therefore 
generously subsidised wheat and poultry projects, for example, to achieve food security.  
As Elhadj argues, however, achieving food independence did not require the Kingdom 
to be, for instance, the world’s sixth largest wheat-exporting country, as it was in 1992 
(Elhadj, 2008: 29-37).  Some in the business community, though not in the agricultural 
business, would agree with this argument.  They questioned the government’s definition 
of food security.  To them, the agricultural items that the government was subsidising, 
such as wheat and milk, were produced in the world markets in abundance and could 
have been obtained easily and cheaply (O. Kurdi, Interview, 5 May 2004; Al-Ohaly, 
Interview, 5 May 2004; Al-Khuraiji, Interview, 25 April 2004). 
However, the implications of negative effects for the agricultural sector would have 
gone beyond the sector itself to affect the country’s economy as a whole.  In this point of 
view, small agricultural businesses might disappear because of WTO accession.  If such 
possible business closure happened on a large scale, it would add to the critical problem 
of unemployment, as the agricultural sector, in particular, was ahead of other sectors in 
implementing the ‘Saudisation’ programme.  According to this viewpoint, more than 
40% of those working in the agricultural sector were Saudis (K. Al-Rajhi, Interview, 5 
May 2004; K. Ghoth, Interview, 27 May 2004). 
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4.4 Momentum Building Up 
The lack of enthusiasm that characterised this phase changed towards the end of the 
phase because of a mixture of internal and external events that took place in the run up 
to establishing the WTO in 1995.  Although sometimes not directly related to the 
accession, they worked to enhance its importance. 
4.4.1 Crisis, the Downfall of Communism, Globalisation, Reform 
Starting from the 1980s, severe financial crises spread across developing countries, the 
chief example being the debt crisis in South America.  The expansion of these economic 
woes caused some to question the validity of developmental theories applied by many in 
the developing world, which generally argued for protection, governmentally guided 
economy and the adoption of strategies in favour of an import substitution industry.  In 
parallel to this, the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were facing serious 
challenges to their systems in the late 1980s, until the former collapsed in the early 
1990s.  The results were not merely confined to international politics, but had forceful 
effects on the global economy.  The abandonment of communist economic policies for 
free economy and trade liberalisation were conspicuous and important economic 
concomitant phenomena of the Soviet downfall. 
In the process, the world suddenly grew together as interdependence, or globalisation, 
grew more tangible from the 1980s onward.  As a side effect, as far as economic and 
trade international relations were concerned, the GATT was transformed during that 
period into a forceful permanent organization, the WTO.  Moreover, as democracy 
replaced the autocratic regimes of the Soviet era, scholars and policy-makers displayed 
an increasing interest in the politics of economic reform (Frye and Mansfield, 2003, 1). 
From their study of many cases, reform had been undertaken in settings in which 
economic condition were deteriorating (Bates and Krueger, 1993: 454).  In fact, the 
general international debt crisis and the decline of oil during the 1980s and the 1990s 
approximately coincided with the rise of this concept of economic reform.  According to 
Haggard, those two decades were a period of unprecedented economic reform in the 
history of the developing countries (1995: 6).  The typical kind of reform adopted was 
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basically based on a capitalist vision that preached opening the market and freeing trade.  
The strategic aim for most programmes of economic reform in the developing world and 
the post-communist world has been the integration of national economies with the global 
economy (Sachs et al., 1995: 1).   
Reform has almost always included policies that aim at macroeconomic stabilisation, 
internal liberalisation like ending price control, legal reform, extensive privatisation, and 
trade liberalisation.  Although only one part of a government’s overall reform plan, trade 
liberalisation is probably the most essential.  As some held, “it is the one that forces the 
government to take actions on other parts of reform” and “it is fairly accurate to gauge 
a country’s overall reform program according to the progress of its trade liberalisation” 
(Sachs et al., 1995: 2).  
Saudi Arabia was not immune to this broader trend of economic reform.  The economic 
challenges loomed large.  As mentioned, the collapse of the dollar in 1995 came as a last 
straw after the fluctuations in oil prices and productions that had occurred on 
approximately a yearly basis since the early 1980s.  In this situation, oil ceased to be the 
sole instrument in overcoming economic problems in Saudi Arabia.  In fact, 1995 may 
be seen as the starting point of the Saudi economic reform.  In that year, Saudi Arabia 
received unusual warnings from the IMF, which recommended that the country adjust to 
the new economic realities.  As an important indication for modifying a system of 
generous welfare policies, the government increased the very same year the domestic 
prices of petroleum products, electricity, telephone, water, visas, work permits and air 
travel (EIU, 2000: 22-23). 
4.4.2 Acting in the Face of Challenges 
Before 1995, Saudi senior officials would serve in the same position for much of their 
professional life.  A large number of appointments lasted 15 to 25 years.  That changed 
in 1995.  Ahead of the already mentioned first response to the enquiries made by the 
GATT, Fahd took dramatic action in spring of 1995 concerning high-ranking officials.  
A large-scale shift occurred in appointments within the bureaucracy affecting about 160 
of 250 top posts.  On 2 August 1995, the king made the first sweeping changes in the 
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COM in 20 years.  Apart from the royal members in the cabinet, the new ministers were 
mainly technocrats, with 15 out of approximately 25 members having postgraduate 
degrees from Western universities.  The change in the COM was principally undertaken 
in order to overcome institutional resistance against plans to adjust to the economic and 
social ramifications of the economic challenges caused by the deterioration in oil prices 
and the brunt of the cost of the Gulf War II, after some officials had been in office for 
too long.  The budget deficit was, in this respect, a major factor for the king’s action, as 
it rose well above the planned US$4 billion (Cordesman, 2003: 144-146). 
The economic challenges and the efforts to tackle them were accumulating and caused 
greater importance to be attached to the issue of the accession to the multilateral trading 
system.  In fact, the Sixth Five-Year Comprehensive Development Plan reflected this in 
a conspicuous manner.  The plan covered the period from 1995-2000.  It was the first 
designed while the country was in the process of applying to the WTO, as the fifth plan 
(1990-1995) was structured years before the Kingdom officially applied to the GATT in 
1993.  The sixth plan referred to the decrease experienced in the state’s revenues and the 
fact that the government expenditures in the budgets of 1993 and 1994 exceeded the 
returns needed for developmental projects, leading the government to use its financial 
reserves and to borrow from local sources.  It also referred to the population growth.  
Although this was not a new phenomenon, the plan decided that the demographics had 
now reached a stage of high impact on various economics and social aspects.  Hence, the 
plan emphasised the following general goals: diversifying the economy away from oil, 
enhancing the role of the private sector and the importance of ‘Saudisation’ of the work 
force.  It clearly indicated the Kingdom’s need to attract foreign investment and 
highlighted the completion of the UR that resulted in the creation of a new trading 
system (WTO) to which the Kingdom would apply (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 
2009). 
4.5 Analysis 
At an early stage in the Saudi Arabian accession to the multilateral trading system, there 
were very long deliberations over the idea of becoming a party to the GATT.  It took the 
government eight years from 1985 to 1993 to finally decide on acceding to that semi-
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organization.  In several instances, it took some of the above-named governmental 
agents several years to consider the issue before forwarding it to another agent for more 
years of consideration.  Why was this the case? 
This procedure is due to an internal institutional factor.  As indicated in the previous 
chapter, consultation and consensus are structurally important in Saudi politics.  The 
main problem is that they are not governed by regular guides or official procedures.  It is 
difficult to tell who would be consulted on a particular issue, how the consultation would 
be conducted, or how long it would take.  The Shura Council was established in 1992 to 
be the chief consultative body in the land.  Although it had not existed during most of 
the years when the GATT accession decision was contemplated, experiences indicated 
that the Shura was not always consulted, especially for issues with an international 
importance.  In fact, such issues would usually be subject to more monarchical 
discretion, and the monarchy, as discussed, has in reality been changed from a single and 
exclusive leadership during Faisal’s time to one of a more collective nature. 
In this overall situation, and in the absence of guidance and procedures, consultation and 
consensus took a long time.  Therefore, core projects required a political mentor, as 
mentioned in Chapter Three, to provide the necessary push.  The notion of becoming a 
GATT member did not have such a mentor (Al-Alamy, Interview, 2 May 2002).  The 
lack of a political mentor was most likely because the GATT was not officially or 
popularly perceived as being very important to the Kingdom’s economy at the time.  In 
any event, the extended years of deliberations, which took half of the 1980s and beyond, 
cost the Kingdom the opportunity to join the multilateral trading regime via a much 
more lenient process. 
As indicated earlier, the slowness that shaped the early stage of considering joining the 
GATT continued even after the Kingdom had applied for accession in 1993, which 
resulted in the passing of another whole year before the first memorandum was 
submitted in 1994.  In addition to the internal institutional factor mentioned above, the 
stance taken by the MFNE contributed to this continued tardiness.  The MFNE argued 
that the application was only “to initiate preliminary negotiations with the GATT about 
the possibility of becoming a full contracting party” (Office of Experts, 1991).   
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That stance represented two things: hesitance and ignorance of procedures.  It gave the 
impression that the country was approaching the GATT half-heartedly.  Furthermore, the 
GATT’s procedures made no provisions for such an initiation of preliminary 
negotiations for assessing the possibility of membership.  When a country did apply, it 
simply meant that it committed to be a member. 
This memorandum was, from the Saudi point of view, expected to receive a positive 
response from the WP.  In fact, the MFNE argued from the beginning that Saudi Arabia 
already had a more open trading system than some of the GATT’s contracting parties 
(MOFA, 1990).  However, timing was important in this respect.  The memorandum was 
only submitted six months before the WTO came into effect.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the transformation of the GATT into the WTO changed the nature of the 
organization in terms of complexity.  With the new organization’s wide range of 
subjects, the Saudi memorandum proved inadequate.  Indeed, this was reflected when 
the Kingdom began answering the WP’s questions pertaining to the memorandum. 
One clear example for this was when Saudi Arabia was asked about its position with 
respect to acceding to the newly established WTO.  The reply was that the Kingdom 
intended to request membership in the WTO after completing internal procedures 
(GATT, 1995: 4).  As the answer made no reference to internal rules or regulations to be 
enacted or modified for the sake of compatibility with the new organization, as was 
usually the case with other countries’ accessions, the question was what those ‘internal 
procedures’ might be.  
In fact, there is no reference in the primary sources that were available for this study to 
indicate that any particular effort was made at the time to complete any sort of internal 
procedures specifically related to the WTO.  This view is supported by the fact that the 
actual conversion of Saudi Arabia’s application from the GATT to the WTO came 
within one month of providing such an answer.  This short time suggested that there 
were in fact no internal procedures of any sort that needed to be processed.  If there had 
been, they must have been in their final stage of completion, given that it took only one 
month to formulate and convert the application.  Therefore, if this was the case, it should 
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not have been difficult for the Saudis to be more specific about their stance on joining 
the WTO, instead of providing a vague reply. 
Hence, aiming to satisfy the GATT while the GATT was transforming contributed to the 
inadequacy of the memorandum.  In addition to this, the answer to the GATT was 
happening amid the aforementioned rare reshuffle in the COM’s members.  This might 
have affected the focus of those who were working on the Saudi answers as 
responsibility for the accession was transferred from one ministry to another, which 
might have added to the difficulty of answering important questions such as the one 
about joining the newly created WTO.  
The conversion of the application was a very important step.  It helped to give the Saudis 
a better idea about the magnitude of liabilities that would emerge from the application to 
the multilateral trading regime.  Before the conversion, the Kingdom provided a 
memorandum and answered questions while having in mind an accession to a much 
smaller trading system, namely the GATT.  While it was engaged in this process, the 
system as a whole was on the verge of a massive transformation into the WTO that 
would include a whole set of new important subjects, and accordingly larger liabilities. 
The change of responsibility for the GATT/WTO from the MFNE to MOC was also 
important.  It took place on 28 November 1995 amid the aforementioned cabinet 
reshuffle (Secretariat of COM, 1995).  The change brought the Saudi application in line 
with those lodged with the WTO, where commerce ministries usually represented their 
states.  It gave the accession process fresh momentum as well, as it was an opportunity 
for the MOC members to prove their ability through an achievement.  In addition, the 
new minister of commerce was a technocrat with a background in business 
administration.  During his incumbency, Minister Faqeeh generally displayed a pro-
liberalisation and thus pro-WTO stance. 
The MOC was not the only institution that featured a newcomer minister.  The same 
applied to all members of the MC, apart from the minister of foreign affairs, who was 
the chairperson of the committee.  More importantly, all of them, including the foreign 
affairs minister, were graduates of Western universities and free-market advocates.  This 
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was an important factor for WTO accession.  As Kruger put it: “For liberalisation to 
occur, officials must believe in the long-term efficiency of the economic doctrine” (1998: 
145). 
However, there were several factors that counteracted this positive aspect.  The first of 
these was related to the structure of the workflow.  To numerously report to a higher 
body, from the SNT to the MC to the HMC and finally to the COM, made those that 
were reporting, especially the SNT and the MC where most of the Kingdom’s offers 
were designed, anxious about not looking as able to achieve favourable accession 
conditions at minimal concessions.  As will be treated in Chapter Five (Phase Two), the 
Kingdom continued for some time to repeat the submission of the same offers and to 
make the same requests that the WP was obviously in no position to accept.  
Secondly, accession was not a full-time task for the individuals who made up the SNT.  
They had to manage, as indicated earlier, this responsibility along with their original 
responsibilities in the government.  According to Al-Sa’doun and Faqeeh, this was 
because of resource difficulties at the time (Al-Sa’doun, Interview, 26 April 2002; 
Faqeeh, Interview 06 April 2006).  However, the lack of enthusiasm and mentorship 
during this phase meant that the importance of the accession had not reached a level that 
would qualify it, as far as those in charge were concerned, to be assigned to an official 
team free from other responsibilities. 
Thirdly, there was a lack of expertise.  As pointed out, while it was contemplating 
becoming a party to the GATT, the COM ruled out the recommendation to make use of 
experts from the Kingdom’s educational institutions (COM, 1993).  In fact, the 
magnitude of topics negotiated and their specificity and technicality were overwhelming.  
In some cases, an enquiry made by the WP would go unanswered for some time because 
of its technical nature (Al-Nujaidi, Interview, 06 May 2002).  The exclusion of outsiders 
was partially due to the secrecy that characterised the work of the WTO accession 
process, in general.  However, the secretive nature may have been more pronounced in 
the Saudi case because of the excessive secrecy that usually prevailed in Saudi politics 
more generally.  As mentioned, political interactions in the Kingdom were in some cases 
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undocumented.  Later on in the process, some of the concerned agents would, in fact, 
comment on the negative impact of such an exclusion of experts. 
Fourthly, the emphasis on the political endeavour started in this phase and continued for 
sometime during the process.  The start of gathering political support through visiting 
major trading capitals, as indicated above, was a case in point.  Here, the Saudis did not 
seem to have realised the changes that had taken place around this issue, particularly at 
the international level, as the Clinton administration assumed the role of championing 
global free trade.  Thus, the Kingdom wasted considerable time on promoting the 
political approach while the process of accession was becoming more economic and 
technical (K. Kurdi, Interview, 20 April 2002; Milthorp, Interview, 21 October 2003). 
Apart from these internal institutional factors that contributed to the overall slow pace of 
the accession process in Phase One, there were factors related to the internal and 
external setting of this process.  The first was the situation of the domestic economy.  
Generally, this phase was a challenging one in economic terms.  However, the GATT, 
which dominated most of that period, was not regarded at all as one of the means to face 
that economic test.  There was no indication in the available official documents that 
GATT membership was ever conceived as one of the possible solutions to the economic 
challenges the Kingdom face at that time.  For instance, the aforementioned 
recommendation made by the MC in 1989 to apply for becoming a party to the GATT, 
which was based on more than two years of deliberations with the MFNE, listed several 
reasons for this recommendation; none of them indicated that the GATT was seen as an 
answer to the Kingdom’s economic difficulties (MOFA, 1990). 
To further this argument, let us suppose hypothetically that the GATT had been 
perceived as a solution.  It could then be assumed that becoming a party to it should 
have made the concerned governmental agents to speed up the related work, not to wait, 
for example, for more than a year after the application in 1993 to submit the Kingdom’s 
first memorandum.  Moreover, it should have pushed them to accelerate their 
preparations for conducting the negotiations rather than taking approximately three years 
to do that, as it will be related in the next chapter.  
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The failure to perceive the GATT as an economic remedy then can be attributed, as far 
as this thesis is concerned, to several elements.  First, despite the general negative 
economic effects, the outlook for the oil market was relatively optimistic during the first 
half of the 1990s, when the Kingdom officially applied to the GATT.  As indicated, oil 
prices picked up between 1990 and 1993.   
Second, another element is related to the nature of the GATT itself.  Unlike the WTO, 
the GATT’s main focus was enhancing trade across borders by controlling and reducing 
tariff rates. Membership in the GATT was not important as a sign for economic 
commitments necessary for opening new markets and encouraging foreign investment, 
as was the case with the WTO.  Put differently, the nature of the GATT in comparison 
with the WTO did not present a significant potential economic solution to some troubled 
economies.  
Externally, the regional politics at the time, which witnessed dramatic events such as the 
Iraq-Iran War and the consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, might have diverted 
internal attention from big projects like joining the GATT/WTO system.  As to the effect 
of the bipolar world order that dominated a significant part of Phase One, Saudi Arabia 
could have joined the GATT with no trouble during the Cold War.  However, the 
context of the Cold War itself played a role in the absence of a decision by Saudi Arabia 
to join the multilateral trading regime represented by that semi-organization.  Unlike the 
WTO, where a membership served partially at a later stage to prevent international 
pressure, the GATT was not a politically pressing matter on an international level.  
Given the predominant competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, the 
U.S. would not have put pressure on an important ally such as Saudi Arabia to be part of 
that international trade gathering.  According to Al-Sa’doun, apart from the country’s 
trade partners’ wondering about the Saudi absence from the GATT, the Kingdom did not 
feel in the early years of its accession process any sort of international pressure to hasten 
the attempt of becoming a party to that semi-international organization (Al-Sa’doun, 
Interview, 26 April 2002).  
Hence, the internal and external context did not assist in advancing the Saudi 
GATT/WTO accession during Phase One.  The situation of the economy was a 
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challenge to the country, but governmental institutions, in particular, did not project the 
GATT as a solution.  As to the regional and international politics at the time, they kept 
the government busy.  In light of such dense political developments, it would have been 
difficult, for example, for the leadership to provide the issue of GATT/WTO with the 
political mentorship, as this study argued in Chapter Three, that was important for the 
advancement of important projects in Saudi Arabia. 
However, the disinterest in the system represented by the GATT was not confined to the 
government where the accession issue was bounced between different departments for 
years during this phase.  It was, in fact, shared by some of the societal interest groups as 
well.  For instance, during this phase, the religious establishment was almost completely 
absent from the debate over accession to the multilateral trading system.  
The main interests of the GATT in its early days were cross-border trade and related 
tariff reductions.  During that period, no concessions pertaining to religiously prohibited 
goods had been presented by that semi-organization or its contracting parties.  Neither 
were there any encroachments on the legal and cultural life of the acceding countries, as 
was later the case when the organization extended its jurisdictions over consecutive 
multilateral rounds of negotiations to other areas than tariff reductions.  Accordingly, at 
the time, the nature of the GATT did not attract the attention of this important societal 
group, which accordingly did not voice any concerns of the sort that it stated in Phase 
Two (Al-Dawood, Interview, 03 May 2004; Al-Abduljabar, Interview, 03 May 2004). 
Being always more concerned about the economy, including trade, the business 
community was, as indicated, less happy with the lack of debate about the GATT issue.  
Nonetheless, its weakness in comparison to the government and non-acquaintance with 
the accession issue, as it was at the time solely accessible to the government, limited the 
options for involvement of the business community.  The official application to the 
GATT in 1993 and the conversion of the application to the WTO in 1995 were 
opportunities to extend the boundaries of that involvement, not least because such events 
had by default improved familiarity with the developments of the global trading system, 
unlike when the governmental agents had previously been contemplating the accession 
issue. 
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The differences revealed in the business community’s perceptions about GATT/WTO 
emphasise the inconsistency indicated earlier with the general assumption of the ‘rentier’ 
paradigm of the business community displaying a unified attitude in resisting 
liberalisation and seeking government protection.  The perceptions collected here 
contradict the assumption of such a paradigm.  Some seemed to perceive the Saudi 
accession to the GATT/WTO in a less cautious light than others. 
In fact, liberalisation, whether it comes through the GATT/WTO or any other vehicle, 
should not lack appeal for even most protective economies.  With its possible 
consequences neutralised, it would be difficult for most businesspersons to oppose the 
idea of economic liberalisation.  Such an appeal should become clearer if it is placed in 
the context of the condition of the Saudi economy during most of the 1980s and 1990s.  
Due to the difficulties experienced by the oil market during that period, the Saudi 
government had to cut back on its expenditures, upon which the business community 
depended significantly.  In such a situation, the business community had to search harder 
for non-government opportunities and needed more liberty to move and operate. 
However, due to the actual application and the conversion of the application, improved 
acquaintance with the multilateral trading system was reserved to the end of this phase 
in the parameter of perceptions.  Yet, these perceptions, particularly the less cautious 
ones, were generally passive in their view.  In other words, those who were less reserved 
about the liberalisation promised by the multilateral trading system did not take into 
account the possibility of seizing the potentials of the system to expand and surpass 
international competition. Instead, they displayed an attitude of calmness, as they did not 
expect any real threat from acceding to this global trading system. 
Perceptions are distinctly different from actions.  During this phase, no action was taken 
on the part of the business community or the religious establishment as far as joining the 
GATT/WTO was concerned.  The issue was of no real interest to them, and no real 
moves were made to overtly advocate it or oppose it.  This was partially due to the 
aforementioned lack of familiarity with the possible implications of implementing new 
issues such as GATTS and TRIPS, as this phase ended shortly after those issues 
officially came into effect in 1995.  Also, until the end of Phase One, no actual 
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negotiations had taken place between the Saudis and the WP members.  The interaction 
between these two sides was predominantly limited to understanding the Saudi trading 
system through sessions of questions and answers. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia became an observer in the GATT in 1985.  For the following eight years, 
the government underwent a process of internal contemplation as to whether to join that 
semi-trade organization as a full contracting party or keep its status as an observer.  In 
1993, it decided to seek accession to the multilateral trading system represented by the 
GATT.  Afterwards, it took the government a whole year to submit its first 
memorandum to the WP.  Moreover, the memorandum was not decisive about the Saudi 
position with regard to the transformation that the organization was actually going 
through in its changing from the GATT to the WTO.  Thus, the Kingdom did not 
convert its application from the GATT to the WTO until after the latter was officially 
established in January 1995.  
This long period of deliberation did not generally reflect eagerness on the part of the 
governmental agents that were conducting the consideration process.  In fact, it reflected 
sluggishness.  There were several reasons for this attitude.  The consensus and 
consultation that had been of structural importance to the Saudi political system, as far 
as big decisions like joining the GATT/WTO were concerned, became more 
complicated as that system turned into a sort of collective leadership since the mid-
1970s.  In addition, the set-up of the governmental agents involved in the process 
suffered from the multiplicity of hierarchical levels.  In general, their workflow was to 
report upwards to four different levels of governmental agents.  Furthermore, 
particularly during this phase, those governmental agents lacked adequate knowledge 
about the global trading system in general, and due to being too much concerned with 
secrecy, they did not make good use of the available expertise.  To some, the apparently 
insufficient understanding of the system especially after the transformation in 1995 was 
demonstrated by the early attention the Saudis paid to the political effort in their bid to 
join the WTO. 
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Most importantly, perhaps, the government as represented by the governmental agents 
involved in the accession process did not regard the GATT, whose presence occupied 
most of Phase One before it was transformed at the end of the phase into the WTO, as a 
solution to the Kingdom’s economic problems, which were caused mainly by the 
fluctuations in oil prices and production.  In addition, the regional political events at the 
time diverted the attention of the government from projects like joining the 
GATT/WTO.  Also, as the Cold War was still in effect, no pressure was exerted on 
Saudi Arabia by major trading countries, particularly the U.S., to be part of the GATT. 
The business community generally concurred with the governmental agents in attaching 
limited importance to the GATT.  Although it did not outright reject the idea of joining 
the GATT, as suggested by the notion of Saudi Arabia as a ‘rentier’ state, the business 
community showed neither real interest nor real concern about the GATT during this 
phase.  In fact, during the entire contemplation period (1985-1993), the business 
community was almost completely absent from the debate concerning the prospect of 
the country becoming a party to the GATT. 
The religious establishment, too, cared little about the GATT at the time.  The religious 
establishment’s chief interest was preserving the Shariah and the society’s social code.  
As the GATT was mostly focused on tariff reductions, the religious establishment saw 
no encroachments on either the Shariah or the social life and thus perceived no reason to 
concern itself closely with the matter. 
However, this changed towards the end of the phase.  As the world witnessed a 
widespread economic crisis in the developing world and the downfall of communism, 
the concept of economic reform was gaining traction.  The year 1995, in which the WTO 
was established, was also the year when Saudi Arabia most likely started its own 
economic reform after years of consecutive fluctuations in oil prices and productions.  
Unlike the GATT, the new permanent organization offered a window of economic 
solution to the troubled Saudi economy, which began to take an interest in subjects 
championed by the WTO like attracting foreign investments and opening new foreign 
markets. 
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All in all, the main characteristic of Phase One was largely shaped by internal factors.  
Although regional and international circumstances could not be discounted, elements 
such as the make-up of the governmental agents involved and the lack of official interest 
in the multilateral trading system when it was represented by the GATT, which was 
shared by the business community and religious establishment, were the most decisive 
factors affecting this phase. 
Table 4-1 summarises the internal, external, political and economic elements that were 
important during Phase One. 
Table 4-1: Elements Important to Phase 1 







- Governmental Agents: GATT offering 
no economic solution 
- Business Community: A perception of 
little interests and little concerns 
 
 
- Lack of clear political commitment or the 
inexistence of political mentor 
- Governmental Agents: MFNE’s hesitance, 
and general little knowledge of accession 
requirements 
- Governmental Agents: faith in good political 
relationship with major WTO members in 
post-Cold War era 
- Religious Establishment: no interest and no 
concern 







- Failure to conduct accession 
negotiations with WP throughout the 
phase 
 
- Regional and international context diverting 
attention away from GATT/WTO 
- Cold War: no pressure on the Kingdom to be 





Chapter 5 Phase Two: 1997-2000 
The previous low-profile phase ended, as mentioned, with a momentum inciting more 
active engagement on the part of the Saudis.  Thus, while they were meeting with the 
WP members for the first rounds of negotiations starting from 1 May 1996, which were 
in fact rather question-and-answer sessions regarding the Kingdom’s trading regime, the 
governmental departments at home were preparing, upon request from the MOC, studies 
on Saudi Arabia’s position concerning some crucial subjects that were expected to be 
introduced by the WP members in the upcoming rounds of negotiations.  These were the 
prices of petrochemical feedstock, liberalising basic telecommunications, opening 
financial services and designing transitional periods needed by the Kingdom to apply 
different aspects of the WTO agreements (MOC, 2000). 
At the end of the third round of negotiations in 14 May 1997, which also dealt with 
revising the Saudi economic system, the WP incumbent members requested that Saudi 
Arabia should officially present its initial offers and commitments in goods and services 
so that the accession process could move to the virtual negotiations (MOFA, 1997).  
Such negotiations were commenced in Phase Two.  The start of negotiations gave a clear 
indication that this phase would be dense, given the difficulties in the accession 
negotiations that were discussed in Chapter Two.  In fact, five rounds of actual 
negotiations took place during this phase: the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth 
rounds.  Some of the rounds occurred relatively short succession.  For example, the sixth 
was convened in June 1999, the seventh took place in April 2000 and finally the eighth 
was held in October 2000. 
Another indication of a congested phase was the fact that Phase Two also witnessed 
around its end the formation of the HMC.  In June 1999, the COM decided to establish a 
new governmental body to take part in the effort of acceding to the WTO.  The minister 
of the interior was appointed as chairperson of the new committee.  The minister of the 
interior was considered, at the time, to be the fourth most important figure in the ruling 
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family and thus in the country.37  Without dissolving the MC, the new committee 
comprised the same members of the MC, but supplemented it with additional members.  
The new members were the minister of justice and three other ministers of state38.  
Overall, the changes seen towards the end of the previous phase, from the increase of 
international interdependence to the rise of economic reform and the reshuffle in the 
COM, indicated that Phase Two would be dominated by economic factors, as this 
chapter argues.  Nonetheless, the drive that economic factors were able to provide for 
this phase encountered some inhibitions, as this chapter will argue as well.  They were 
mainly internal and of a political manner.  These inhibitions caused Saudi Arabia to 
pause the whole negotiation process after the eighth round of negotiations in October 
2000. 
As negotiations are usually conducted over particular issues, the structure and focus of 
this chapter will be based on the interplay that took place during the phase between the 
issues negotiated and the context of the negotiations.  In doing so, the chapter will 
devote one sub-section to each important issue negotiated.  However, the chapter will 
start with an overview of the general context of the phase, which was moderately 
promising, given the positive momentum at the end of the previous phase.  In this, 
negotiating the various issues was for the first time confined to a general internal 
timeframe set up by the MC, which specified at the beginning of this phase the year 
2000 as the self-targeted deadline for accession (MOFA, 1998).   
5.1 The Phase’s Context 
Various important elements of an internal economic and political nature affected this 
phase as it progressed.  
                                                 
37
 Minister of the Interior Prince Nayif virtually became the third most important man after the death of 
King Fahd in 2005.  His position was officially promoted in 2009, when he became the Second Deputy 
Premier.  In 2011, he became the crown prince after the death of Prince Sultan.  Nayif died in 2012 
38
 The ministers were Muhammad Al-Sheik, Mutlab Al-Nafissah and Mosa’id Al-Aiyban.  
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5.1.1 Domestic Economy 
As time went on, concerns about the economy gradually increased. Phase One ended 
with a warning from the IMF that was the first of its kind as far as Saudi Arabia was 
concerned.  Accordingly, the government responded by increasing the fees for several 
important public services.  From that date onward, the Kingdom made serious efforts to 
adjust to the economic challenges it was facing. 
What made these challenges even more urgent were the new developments in the oil 
market during this second phase, which took a new direction that was very negative as 
far as the Saudi government was concerned.  Unlike in 1995, when the Kingdom had to 
pay heed to the IMF by making some economic adjustments, the sharp fall in nominal 
oil prices in 1998, which plummeted to US$11.9 per barrel, triggered an explicit 
governmental acknowledgement that the time had come for economic reform (EIU, 
2000: 22). 
One of the major effects of this economic dilemma was of a social concern.  The 
economy became unable to absorb the growing local labour force.  In an unofficial 
count, at the time, the unemployment rate had reached 15%.  According to this estimate, 
only less than half the 100,000 jobseekers entering the market every year found work.  
What exacerbated the problem was that Saudi Arabia’s population growth of 4.1% was 
one of the highest in the world.  A share of 43.4% of its 23 million people, around that 
time, were younger than 15 years, and it would not be not long before they entered the 
market looking for jobs. Abdullah, the king-to-be who was at the time still the crown 
prince, plainly acknowledged this economic crisis.  In a key speech, he told his audience 
for the first time that the era of the Saudi oil boom was over (The Economist, 2002: 11-
23). 
Thus, the solutions that the government found in this situation went beyond its previous 
reaction to economic problems, which had simply of raising fees for some public 
services.  This time, the government aimed at taking initiatives and adopting plans.  For 
instance, the crown prince, who warned the citizens in a manner unusual in Saudi Arabia 
about the critical condition of the economy, took the initiative in 1998 and extended, for 
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the first time, an invitation to foreign companies to invest in the Kingdom’s natural gas 
sector (Saudi American Bank, 2001: 2-7). 
This was an indication of a reforming attitude and an important step in that direction.  
Hence, as freeing markets and attracting investments were among the requirements of 
any reform project, Saudi Arabia was now ready to take additional reform steps.  To this 
end, it issued a new investment law in April 2000 (SAGIA, 2011). 
The new law was intended to improve the Kingdom’s foreign direct investment record, 
which had been poor in comparison to those of other developing countries such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia.  The law generally allowed for 100% foreign ownership of 
projects or industrial companies, eliminated the necessity of having a Saudi sponsor of a 
project and guaranteed that foreign and national investors would be treated equally.  In a 
complementary step around the same time, the government established the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to streamline the process of investment 
applications (Bhala, 2004:776-777). 
In the context of these developments, it was not surprising that increasing attention was 
given to the WTO.  There was an urge to weigh the benefits and costs of accession, so 
that the government could make the right decision on how to proceed in this process.  
The following table (5-1) was prepared by various departments involved, upon the 
instruction from the MC, in the Kingdom’s preparation for the sixth round of its WTO 
accession negotiations.  It summarises the general governmental assessment of the WTO 
accession up to that point. 
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Table 5-1: Benefits and Costs of Accession 
Benefits of Accession Costs of Accession 
1- It would allow better access to new markets for 
domestic industrial and agricultural goods, which would 
enhance the diversification of economy; 
2- It would enhance the competitive ability of domestic 
industries by improving production and encouraging 
mergers; 
3- It would enable the country to benefit from the MFN 
and national treatment especially for petrochemical 
industry; 
4- It would make the acquisition of advanced 
technology more easy; 
5- It would allow agreements such as the anti-dumping 
agreement to be applied in protecting domestic 
industries in special circumstances; 
6- It would give Saudi Arabia the right to use the WTO 
mechanisms for settlement of disputes; 
7- Abandoning agricultural subsidies internationally 
would help make domestic agricultural goods more 
competitive; 
8- Reducing internal agricultural subsidies would lead 
to rationalising the use of water resources and 
encourage the tendency to produce agricultural goods 
compatible with an arid environment; 
9- It would increase competition among services 
providers, which would lead to lower prices and 
diversify choices for consumers; 
10- It would cause expediting the revision and update of 
rules and regulations linked to sectors of goods and 
services in a manner consistent with international 
standards; 
11- It would enhance the country's position in attracting 
foreign investments; 
12- Through TRIPS, it would decrease the distribution 
of counterfeit goods in the local markets; 
13- It would allow Saudi Arabia to benefit from 
technical assistance provided by some advanced 
members in the organization. 
1- It would reduce revenues generated by 
tariffs; 
2- Some sectors would suffer in the shortrun 
from foreign competition; 
3- It would bind tariff protection within an 
agreed WTO framework; 
4- Reduction in agricultural subsidies would 
cause an increase of prices for consumers; 
5- Converting the restriction system for some 
vital items such as milk and dates into tariff 
system would expose them to competition; 
6- Competition with foreign providers of 
services would result in a decrease in the profit 
margins of local providers; 
7- It would add an administrative and 
scrutinising burden on the government; 
8- The WTO’s inherent requirement of 
transparency would cause a disclosure of 
commercial, financial and economic 
information in a manner that would affect the 
services sector overall; 
9- It might lead some foreign exporters to 
terminate contracts with Saudi agents, as the 
former would be allowed to sell directly in the 
domestic markets; 
10- Prices of important goods such as medicine 
might increase due to the application of TRIPS; 
11- The work to revise and modify rules and 
regulation would put a financial burden on the 
government.  
Source: MOC “Benefits and Costs of the WTO Accession” 20/2/1420H, 04 June 1999. 
  
 180
The assessment ended with the recommendation to join the WTO as soon as possible.  It 
justified this recommendation with the fact that a global interdependent system had 
consolidated through the successive rounds of this organization, and that its impact was 
increasing with the conclusion of every new international multilateral round of world 
trade negotiations.  By the time of the assessment’s release, the WTO members 
controlled 85% of the world trade, according to the assessment.  Thus, it became 
essential for Saudi Arabia to take its place in this gathering to participate in making 
decisions and policies of international trade (MOC, 1999). 
Thus, a further effort was made to accede to the organization.  An important sign was 
that the MC envisioned for the first time a specific role for the business community in 
parallel to the official endeavour.  It emphasised the need to form a consultant team from 
businesspersons to assist the SNT starting with the fifth round of the Saudi accession 
negotiations in 1998.  The business community aimed to put pressure on its foreign 
partners, for instance, in banks such as the Saudi American Bank and the Saudi French 
Bank to influence their native countries not to insist on a further liberalisation of the 
Saudi domestic financial market (MOFA, 1998).39 
5.1.2 Technocrats 
The development plans, which started in the mid-1970s coinciding with the first oil 
boom, recognised the importance of human resources as a valuable asset.  One of the 
development plans’ major objectives was to develop human resources, ensuring a 
constant supply of manpower to carry out the requirements of the national economy.  
Therefore, it was necessary for the Kingdom to create a pool of highly educated Saudi 
citizens capable of managing a complex modern economy.  In this context, the 
Kingdom, helped by its oil resources, decreed a massive expenditure on education (Al-
Farsy, 2004: 146-148, 239). 
In studying reform in the GCC countries, Nonneman found that the dramatic increase in 
education in those states, including Saudi Arabia, generally indicated a greater 
                                                 
39
 The Saudi American Bank was renamed the Samba Financial Group in 2003 after the withdrawal of the 
American partner, the City Bank, in the mid of the 9/11’s crisis. 
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propensity to reform (Nonneman, 2008: 20).  The massive expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
on education efforts, which consisted largely of sending students to universities abroad, 
began to bear fruits in the 1980s and the 1990s.  As indicated in Chapters Three and 
Four, the newcomers with degrees from Western universities had a large share in the 
first rare major reshuffle in the COM in 1995.  Their considerable influence extended, as 
explained in preceding chapters, to the MOC and the MC, the two main governmental 
bodies supervising the country’s WTO accession. 
The trend to fill high-ranking posts with people of high education was not restricted to 
the COM, but clearly also applied to the membership of the Shura Council that was first 
established in 1992 with 61 appointed members.  In 1997, Fahd expanded the Shura 
from 61 to 90 members.40  A study of the Shura at the time indicated that its members 
were relatively young and that 23% of them were modernising academics. Of these 
members, 64% had doctoral degrees, 14.4% had master’s degrees and about 80% of the 
total of the holders of doctoral and master’s degrees had been educated in the West 
(Cordesman, 2003: 147-150). 
In fact, this rate of educated persons in the COM and the Shura not only served an 
organisational and operational purpose, but it also became a source of pride to those in 
leadership positions.  For instance, in a press conference in the United Kingdom in 1996, 
the Chairman of the Shura at the time, Sheikh Muhammad bin Jubair, was asked whether 
his council would be elected in the future.  He answered that that was unlikely.  His 
justification was that any election might not provide the same level of expertise available 
in the current Shura Council, whose 61 members included 35 PhD holders (Saudi 
Embassy-Washington, 2011). 
In any event, the increasing presence of technocrats during that time, particularly in the 
COM, gave them a greater say in major policy decisions.  For instance, Western 
educated technocrats came to conduct much of the planning and management in the 
Kingdom (Cordesman, 2003: 144-145).  It is uncertain whether technocrats led the 
                                                 
40
 According to the rules and regulations, the Shura Council term is four years.  The king launched the 
first term in 1992 with a speaker and 60 members.  In the second term, the Shura consisted of a speaker 
and 90 members.  In the third term, the Shura included a speaker and 120 members.  In the fourth term, 
the Shura consisted of a speaker and 150 members.  
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country to a greater reform, as Nonneman assumed above, as a possible effect of 
increasing the number of educated people.  However, most technocrats, particularly in 
the COM and the Shura, have shown loyalty to the ruling family and to the political 
system in general over time.  Nonetheless, the knowledge and expertise they have gained 
contributed to making them more open to new ideas and to a greater integration with the 
world, at least in economic terms.  
5.1.3 King Fahd 
Fahd undertook several changes in the 1990s, particularly the unusual step of massively 
reshuffling the top posts in the government including ministers in the COM, which, as 
mentioned, was a promising step for the WTO.  However, these efforts were dealt a 
blow as far as the effort to accede to that very same organization was concerned.  As the 
MOC took over direct responsibility for the WTO file from the MFNE in 1995 and as 
the application for accession was being converted from the GATT to the WTO, Fahd fell 
seriously ill.  His health condition continued to deteriorate over the years until his death 
in 2005. 
Even before ascending to the throne in 1982, Fahd had been known for his strong 
personality.  In addition, he was known as a crown prince and king for his propensity to 
delegate power to his ministers to accomplish what they thought important for the 
country’s management and economy (Huyette, 1984: 165-166).  With such 
characteristics, he could have been a vital champion of WTO accession during this 
second phase.  However, his deteriorating health meant that he was absent from the 
process.  According to a top negotiator in the services issues, the virtual absence of the 
king at that time had a negative impact on the Kingdom’s effort to join the WTO 
because he might have provided the internal political push that the Saudi accession case 
lacked up to that point (Al-Jasir, Interview, 5 April 2006).  Sheikh Al-Ameen generally 
agreed that there was a lack of close political support as far as the WTO accession was 
concerned (Al-Ameen, Interview, 5 April 2006). 
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These were the relevant conditions, as far as this study is concerned, in which Phase 
Two took place.  All of these factors had a general impact on the progress of the phase, 
though not to an equal extent, as the examination of the following issues demonstrates.  
5.2 Issues 
The section will begin with the issues included in the first Saudi offer in 1997.  
Additional issues will follow as they were subsequently presented in the course of the 
accession negotiations.  In any event, the issues introduced herein are not inclusive.  
They were, however, the most important in terms of their intensity and decisiveness. 
As the mentioned offer was being prepared upon the request made by the WP members 
on 14 May 1997, Saudi Arabia aimed at maintaining the best interests of the Kingdom 
during accession negotiations.  To this end, it proclaimed itself a developing country so 
that it could enjoy the benefits and flexibilities granted to developing countries.  The 
Kingdom also endeavoured to bind its tariff rates to levels similar to those secured by 
other GCC states, which, in exception of Oman, had joined the multilateral trading 
system much earlier, and with high tariff rates binding.  It was critical for Saudi 
economic and social life that the Saudi negotiators should strive in the negotiation 
process to preserve the status quo of the services sector.  The Saudi officials therefore 
believed it was important, as mentioned in Chapter Four, to set out the accession process 
by gathering political support for the Kingdom’s bid to join the WTO (MOFA, 1996; 
MOC, 1997). 
As it was finalised, the offer was approved by the COM in 27 August 1997.  Table 5-2 
summarises the offer, which was to be presented for the fourth round of the Saudi 




Table 5-2: First Comprehensive Offer 
Agricultural Goods Industrial Goods Services Commitments 
Flexibilities and 
Transition Periods 
- Binding current tariff- 
free goods at a 
 negotiable initial rate 
of 
 20%. 
- Binding protected 
 goods (eggs and 
poultry) at 
 a negotiable initial rate 
of 50%. 
- Binding restricted 
 goods (dates and  
 milk) at a negotiable 
rate of 100%.   
- Covering about 95% 
  of industrial goods in 
this initial offer. 
- Binding current 
tariff- 
  free goods at a 
negotiable rate of 20%. 
- Binding goods on 
 which a tariff of 12% 
 is levied at a 
negotiable rate of 33%. 
- Binding goods on 
 which a tariff of 20% 
is 
 levied at a negotiable 
rate of 50%. 
- Binding goods on 
 which a tariff rate of 
 50% is levied at a 
 negotiable rate of 




sectors and excluding 
closed sectors. 
- Due to self-
proclaimed status as a 
developing country, the 
 offer would state: “The 
 Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia would enjoy 
 after acceding to the 
WTO all the rights and 
 meet all obligations 
 emerge from its 
membership”. 
- Requesting a ten-year 
  transition from the 
date 
 of accession to reduce 
 subsidies to agriculture 
by 13.3%. 
- Requesting a five-
year 
  transition period from 
 the date of accession 
to 
 revise and amend 
 regulations related to 
 TRIPS. 
- Requesting a five-
year 
 transition period from 
 the date of accession 
to 
revise and amend 
regulations related to 
customs valuation. 
Source: MOFA, Ministerial Minute, 7 July 1997 
 
It was understandable that the Kingdom, in carrying out its aim of maintaining the best 
interests of the country during accession, set its offered ceiling of tariff rates binding at 
higher levels than those applied at the time.  That is what most applicants did in the 
course of the negotiations for accession.  However, the strategy of implementing this 
aim might have gone wrong in attaching the Saudi effort to the request of having similar 
accession conditions secured by most GCC states, because most of the latter were 
already contracting parties to the GATT and succeeded to the WTO after its 
establishment.  Likewise, requesting long transitional periods was rather difficult 
because any transitional period requested by the Saudis was to begin from the official 
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date of the Kingdom’s accession, which at that early stage was very difficult to predict.  
In fact, the years for transitional periods, which were allocated flexibly by the 
organization, began to be counted starting on 01 January 1995 for all entitled acceding 
countries that were mainly least-developed.41 
5.2.1 Tariffs on Industrial Goods 
The tariff offer on industrial goods summarised in Table 5-2 received a great deal of 
criticism in the WP.  The U.S. and the EU had a major part in this disapproval. The EU 
charged that the offer did not appear to be in line with the Saudi’s industrial 
development, and noted that the Europeans had expected the Kingdom to adopt a 
different approach.  Their delegation stated that the offer was averaged at 33% across the 
board and there was not a great deal of differentiation between sensitive and insensitive 
domestic sectors (WTO, 1997: 7-8). 
From the Kingdom’s viewpoint, the offer was designed to meet the country’s future 
needs, especially in view of the fact that oil prices were declining. The offer, according 
to the Saudi negotiators, did not neglect the diversity of various sectors, as the EU had 
charged.  The SNT contended that having tariff offers at rates ranged between 20%, 33% 
and 50% did in fact reflect the sensitivity of the different sectors.  The SNT added that 
the Saudi offer compared favourably to those of other WTO members who were even at 
a higher stage of industrial development than Saudi Arabia (WTO, 1997: 7-8). 
The EU ended the negotiations relating to this point decisively.  As the head of its 
delegation said, “we agree to disagree”.  At this point, the Saudis questioned one of the 
WTO accession’s principles, the uniqueness of each accession case, in light of this 
European position. The SNT pointed out that the WTO always highlighted the fact that 
each accession was unique.  However, the EU was now asking the Kingdom to make 
commitments similar to those made by other acceding countries (WTO, 1997:8). 
                                                 
41
 There were different types of WTO transitional periods.  For example, TRIPS granted developing 
countries a five-year transition period, while least-developed economies were afforded up to 11 years to 
follow suit.  Another example was the Safeguard Agreement, which allowed developing countries to 
maintain safeguard measures for a period of ten years.  
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The U.S. also thought that there was a wide gap between the offered rates and currently 
applied rates.  Its representatives advised the Saudis that high tariffs were not the best 
method to protect and develop industries.  Therefore, the U.S. hoped to see a thorough 
revision of this initial offer by the Kingdom, which as it was did not serve as an 
acceptable basis for negotiations (WTO, 1997: 3-7; Greenidge, Interview, 21 October 
2003). 
Even taking into account the lack of experience with which the Kingdom had entered the 
accession negotiations, one might have expected that the WTO incumbent members 
would not embrace an initial offer presented by an acceding country.  The average 
accession duration of six years was by itself a clear indication that negotiations were 
almost never concluded based on the first offers.  Therefore, an acceding country such as 
Saudi Arabia could expect that it would most likely have to modify its first offer.   
The problem for the Kingdom was that it came at a time when oil prices were in decline 
and tariff revenues were seriously needed.  This problem was compounded by the fact 
that the U.S. asked the Kingdom, in the process of negotiating its tariff offer, to join the 
Zero for Zero agreement.  This agreement covered about 3000 products.  Binding duties 
on so many products at zero percent would mean, in the Kingdom’s viewpoint, a 
tremendous loss of revenues, which it would be almost impossible to make up, as the 
government did not apply direct taxes (WTO, 1997: 3). 
The MC discussed this issue back home and decided to downwardly amend the 
Kingdom’s binding rates in a way that would simultaneously preserve the macro 
interests of the country and respond to the demands of the WP members, who were at 
the same time the Kingdom’s trading partners (MOC, 1998).  This was virtually the first 
time that the Kingdom had changed the aim of getting the best terms and conditions out 
of the accession negotiations, with which it set out in the process, to the more practical 
one of preserving the country’s macro interests.  It was at the same time a plain sign that 
the Saudis had realised the impossibility of reaching in the accession negotiations the 
terms and conditions gained by some, like most of the GCC states, through the 
succession mechanism.   
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Accordingly, the MC prepared a modified offer for the fifth round of accession 
negotiations in Geneva in 1998.  The new offer covered no less than 90% of the 
industrial goods (MOC, 1998), and with an average binding rate of 25% instead of the 
33% that had previously been offered (MCO, 1998: 5).  Table 5-3 summarises the Saudi 
offer of industrial goods for this new round.  The table also includes the fall-back 
position, which of course the Saudi negotiators did not overtly present to their 
counterparts.  
Table 5-3: Industrial Goods 
Initial Offers 
Reducing tariff binding for (126) items gradually from 33% to 0% until 2005 
(goods included in the Agreement of Information Technology) 
Reducing tariff binding for (19) items from 20% to 0% gradually  
(some goods included in the Agreement of Chemical Understanding) 
Reducing tariff binding for (102) items from 20% to 12% 
Reducing tariff binding for (4218) items from 33% to 25 
Reducing exempted items from (1290) to (693) 
Fall Back Positions 
Keeping (158) items at 0% tariff rate 
Reducing tariff binding for (53) items from 25% to 0% 
Keeping tariff binding for (207) items at 5,5% 
Reducing tariff binding for (3961) items from 25% to 20% 
Reducing exempted items from (693) to (340) 
Source: MOC, draft of modified offer in goods and services, and the requested transitional periods for the 
fifth round of accession negotiations, 1998 (Arabic) 
In the round itself, the response was couched in positive terms, but it included no 
tangible commitments.  After praising the modifying effort, the U.S., the EU and Canada 
demanded that the Kingdom should lower its binding rates further in this area.  They 
wanted to see the offered average binding rate of 25% be reduced to a range between 10-
15% (MOC, 1998: 10-22).  Taking into account that this demand came in the year when 
oil prices reached their lowest point during the 1990s (US$11 per barrel) it was tough for 




Nonetheless, the MC argued that the cost of not considering such a demand would 
outweigh budgetary considerations.  Moreover, around the same time, it invited the 
chairperson of the WP of the Kingdom’s accession, Canadian Ambassador John Weeks, 
to make a checklist of the binding issues, including tariff rates, with the WP members 
and a summary of the latter’s demands along with his suggestions on how Saudi Arabia 
could best go about handling such demands.  Indeed, the MC adopted Weeks’s checklist 
as the base for designing the general offers as of the sixth round of the Saudi accession 
negotiations in 1999 (MOC, 1999).  
Accordingly, and in the face of the business community’s opposition to some of its 
aspects, the MC tried in the offer for the sixth round to accommodate the demands of the 
WP, particularly those of the Kingdom’s main trading partners.  In doing so, it generally 




Table 5-4: Industry 
Initial Positions 
Signing on to the plurilateral agreement of Petrochemical Understanding (1017 items) as follows: 
Reducing tariff bindings on (747) items (current average tariff applied 0-20%) from 0%, 5.5%, 6.5%, 
25% as in the previous offer to 0%, 5.5%, 6.5% and to be applied from 2010; 
Reducing tariff bindings on (270) items(current average tariff applied 0-20%)from 0%, 5.5%, 6.5%, 
25% as in the previous offer to 15%, 20%and to be applied from the date of accession; 
Signing on to the plurilateral agreement of Information Technology (179) as follows:  
Reducing tariff bindings on (152) items from 0-25% as in the previous offer to 0% to be applied from 
2005; 
Reducing tariff bindings on (27) items from 0-25% as in the previous offer to 15% (current applied rate 
12%); 
Reducing tariff binding on pharmaceutical items (59) subject to the sectoral agreement (0-0) from 0%, 
5%, 12% as in the previous offer to 5% to applied from 2005; 
Reducing tariff bindings on medical items (74) subject to the sectoral agreement (0-0) from 12%, 25% 
as in the previous offer to 5%, 15%, 10% to be applied from 2005; 
Reducing tariff bindings on sensitive industrial items (292) from 25% as in the previous offer to 20% 
(applied rate at the time 12%); 
Reducing tariff bindings on the rest of the industrial items (4094) from 12%-40% as in the previous 
offer to 7%-20% (applied rate at the time 0-20%); 




Binding the whole items subject to the Petrochemical Understanding (1017) at 0, 5.5, 6.5% from 2005; 
Signing to the whole agreement of Information Technology (179 items) at a rate 0% to be applied in 
three years from the date of accession; 
Placing pharmaceutical items subject to the agreement (0-0) at a 0% tariff rate from 2005; 
Placing medical items subject to the agreement (0-0) at 5% from the date of accession; 
Reducing tariff bindings on sensitive industrial items (292) from 20% to 15%; 
Keeping tariff bindings on the rest of industrial items (4094) at 7%-20%.   
Source: MOC, draft of offers of goods, services and transition periods for the sixth (6th offer) round, 04 
June 1999 
In bilateral meetings in July 1999, all of the WP’s delegations, except the U.S. 
delegation, agreed that setting the Saudi average bound rate at around 15% was a good 
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step for advancing the negotiations (MOC, 1999: 15-16).  Japan’s delegation particularly 
thought that the offer, as far as industrial goods were concerned, was satisfactory (Bhala, 
2004: 774).  In fact, at that time, relations between Saudi Arabia and Japan were 
reaching a high point.  The two countries were in the process of signing an agenda of 
mutual co-operation on a wide range of economic, social and cultural issues (MOFA, 
1999).  
However, some delegations demanded that the Kingdom lower the tariff rates that 
exceeded the average 15% on items important to them.  The EU, for instance, requested 
that the tariff bound at 20% on items such as paper, construction equipment, and cars 
should be reduced to the general average of 15%.  The Canadian delegation presented 
similar requests.  This Saudi step and the general praise it received from the members in 
the WP did not matter much to the U.S.  Its delegation wondered why some items of a 
current tariff rate of 12% were bound in the offer at 20% (MOC, 1999: 16-18). 
As to the plurilateral and sectoral agreements, most of the WP members insisted that the 
Kingdom shorten the expected dates that came in the offer for applying the reductions in 
tariffs related to such agreements (MOC, 1999: 15).  The SNT defended itself by 
pointing out that that the agreements of Information Technology (IT) and Chemical 
Harmonisation (CH), which the Kingdom agreed to apply to 85% and 75% of their items 
respectively, were not ultimately part of the single undertaking agreements.  
Nevertheless, there was a general consensus among the WP members that the Kingdom 
should fully subscribe to them (MOC, 2000: 12).  Overall, the U.S. warned Riyadh that 
further improvements were still needed on the goods side of the Saudi offer (Bhala, 
2004: 774). 
In reviewing the WP members’ attitudes towards the offer in general, the MC noticed a 
certain flexibility on the part of Japan, Canada and even the EU.  The MC advocated a 
strategy of making further general concessions, including an additional reduction in 
tariffs on industrial goods so that it might win over those countries to its side against the 
rigid position of the U.S. (MOC, 1999).  In fact, as far as Japan was concerned, the 
general Saudi offer thus far, including that of tariffs on industrial goods, and the bilateral 
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effort to strengthen the mutual co-operation resulted in both sides coming to a bilateral 
agreement on 15 January 2000 (MOC, 2000: 14).  
Domestically, however, the continual reduction of tariffs agonised the business 
community.  A report of the MOC indicated that the business community seriously 
criticized binding 1100 items below the currently applied rates, as a result of the table 
above (COM, 2001: 2).  K. Kurdi played down the importance of most other 
governmental protective procedures, including subsidies, to strengthen the private 
sector.  He said that they were more or less non-existent.  He pointed out, however, that 
imposing reasonably high tariff rates was the only effective method, which the people 
responsible for the accession process seemed to concede to in the negotiations (K. Kurdi, 
Interview, 20 April 2002).   
Despite such criticism, the MC decided to design a new scheme of tariffs that was in 
compliance with the framework of the offer for the seventh round of negotiations over 





Table 5-5: Offer in Tariffs on Industrial Goods 
Goods Number of Goods Current Rates Offer 
Chemicals 1017 0-20% 
Acceptance whole 
agreement according to its 
rates: 0%, 5.5%, 6.5%; 
Application: after five 
years (2005), could be 
applied incrementally 
depending on the 
negotiations 
IT 179 12% 
Acceptance of whole 
agreement at zero rate, but 
application after three 
years, or on the date of 
accession, but with 
exceptions (could be 
applied incrementally 
depending on the 
negotiations) 
Pharmaceutical 
Items 59 0-12% 
Zero rate, but after five 
years (2005), could be 
applied incrementally 
depending on the 
negotiations 
Medical Equipment 74 0-12% 5% on all items starting from the date of accession 
Wood 156 12-20% 
Acceptance of whole 
agreement upon the date of 
accession according to the 
tariffs in the old previous 
offer (5%, 15%, 20%) 
Construction 
Equipment 58 12% 
15-20%, or 8% as a fall-
back position 
Agricultural 
Equipment 22 12% 
15%, or 8% as a fall-back 
position 
Furniture 43 12-20% 
15-20%, or 15% but with 
incremental application 
over five years as a fall-
back position 
Sensitive Goods 292 12% 15% 
Other Industrial 
Goods 4093 0%-20% 7-20% 
Exempted Goods None   
Source: MOFA, Cable No. 92596, 1/12/1420H, 07 March 2000 
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Going beyond its previous offer, the Kingdom was ready to accept the whole CH 
agreement, whereas it had previously offered to accept only 75% of its items.  However, 
the new position came with a condition: a flexibility period of five years would be 
stipulated for implementation to take effect or for applying the agreement gradually.  A 
similar position was offered concerning the agreement on IT.  As for sensitive goods, the 
offer brought the bound rate closer to the applied one.  The applied rate, at the time, was 
12% and the new offer brought the rate down from the previously presented 20% to 
15%.  The Kingdom, in addition, did not exempt any industrial item from having a 
bound rate. 
However, this was still not good enough as far as the WP was concerned.  Although the 
aforementioned checklist that had been presented approximately one year previously by 
Weeks, which the Kingdom adopted after the sixth round as the base for designing offers 
in an attempt to speed up its accession process, indicated that an average bound rate of 
15% would be acceptable to the members of the WP, members like the U.S. requested 
that the Kingdom reduce the average to the applied rate of 12%.  Moreover, the U.S. and 
some other members demanded that the Kingdom should commit to the whole CH and 
IT agreements upon the date of accession (MOC, 2000: 15).  
After securing the approval of the COM, the SNT went to the eighth round of the 
Kingdom’s accession in Geneva in October 2000 with a slightly modified offer in tariffs 
on industrial goods.  The offer included having almost more than 40% of the 5895 
classified industrial goods bound at 7-20%.  Those of these items that currently had 12-
20% tariff rates would stay the same, and the items that currently had tariff rates of 0-7% 
would be bound at 7%.  This amounted roughly to applying the current tariff rates to half 
of the industrial goods.  To satisfy the aforementioned European demand to reduce 
substantially the tariff rates on all kinds of paper, which the EU delegation had once 
mentioned as a main obstacle to singing a bilateral agreement with the Saudis on this 
issue, the Kingdom was ready to have 180 paper items bound at 10%, 13 paper items 
bound at 15% and 20 paper items bound at 7%.  However, the related Saudi offer also 
insisted on its need to have a flexible time period to apply the whole agreements of CH 
and IT (MOFA, 2000). 
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Canada, one of the Quad countries, was flexible regarding the issue of tariffs on 
industrial goods even before the eighth round.  During multilateral and bilateral 
meetings in the round, however, the EU and the U.S. positions fell short of reaching a 
conclusion in this respect.  The EU added more items to the category of paper goods, 
and the U.S. maintained its opposition to allowing the Kingdom any flexible period 
(MOC, 2000: 5-10).  However, as the latter had brought the average tariff rates on a 
large section of industrial goods to the rate applied at the time over the successive 
rounds of accession negotiations, this issue became less of an obstacle to the Saudi 
accession at the end of this second phase. 
5.2.2 Agriculture 
Before it was submitted to the table of negotiations, the initial offer concerning 
agriculture in May 1997 (Table 5-2) had provoked an internal disagreement.  The 
minister of agriculture, who was absent from the meeting when the MC recommended 
the Kingdom’s initial offer, thought that the agricultural part was too generous.  Instead 
of debating the offer within the MC, the minister took his concerns directly to the COM.  
The latter was responsive and decided to raise the tariff rates offered for agricultural 
goods as follows: 
- Binding current tariff-free goods at a negotiable initial rate of 35% (20% in the 
initial offer). 
- Binding protected goods (eggs – poultry – wheat) at a negotiable initial rate of 
100% (50% in the initial offer). 
- Binding restricted goods (dates – milk) at a negotiable rate of 150% (100% in the 
initial offer) (COM, 1997). 
 
This caused a re-shuffling of the cards prepared for the fourth round of negotiations held 
in 1997.  In addition to this change, the Kingdom requested a transition period of ten 
years from the date of accession to reduce domestic subsidies for agriculture by 13.3%.  
This was the transition period given to developing countries.  In justifying what had 
been presented in the negotiations to the WP members in general, and the Quad 
countries in particular, the SNT indicated that the Saudi offer in this field had been 
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carefully designed to reflect the Kingdom’s long-term development interest.  The SNT 
argued that the country had to develop agriculture as one way of diversifying the 
economy away from being hugely dependent on oil, a resource that was gradually being 
depleted (WTO, 1997). 
Generally, the WP members, and particularly the EU and the U.S. did not consider the 
rates set out above to be suitable even as an acceptable ground for negotiations.  They 
unanimously agreed that the rates offered by the Saudi side were very high and that they 
had to be reduced to a level close to the 20% applied at the time.  As for the transition 
period requested, the EU delegation commented that it did not agree on allowing Saudi 
Arabia a longer period for reducing domestic support for the agricultural sector.  The 
Europeans stated that such an extension would create awkward problems as the 
requested ten-year period would exceed the period allowed to developing countries that 
would end in the year 2004.   
The SNT met with the Americans as well.  Debating the agricultural issue with the U.S. 
delegation was a bit different.  It commented on the Saudi programme of domestic 
support to agriculture in an extremely technical fashion.  Specifically, the U.S. 
delegations suggested that certain items classified by the Saudis in the ‘Green Box’ 
should be reclassified under the ‘Amber Box’.42  In responding, the SNT stated that 
agriculture was a minute issue, and that Saudi Arabia had spent only modest amounts on 
agricultural subsidies compared with the large subsidies received by some U.S. 
agriculture sectors.  At the same time, however, the Saudis told the U.S. representatives 
that agricultural issues were of more concern to them back home than to their trading 
partners (WTO, 1997). 
This contradiction inherent in the Saudi response was a reflection of the contradiction 
between the status of agriculture in the country’s economic policy and the way the MC 
considered it during the accession process.  As mentioned in Chapter Four, agriculture 
had already been a contentious issue before.  According to the majority of 
                                                 
42The Green Box contains items to be excluded from commitments to reduce subsidies such as public 
stockholding for food security purposes.  The Amber Box includes all domestic support measures 




businesspersons interviewed in this study, the agriculture sector was a candidate to 
suffer losses from the WTO accession.  They argued that the agricultural sector lived off 
subsidies.  In this view, the sector could not depend on itself for a sustainable growth 
because of the topographical determinants (Alkhuraiji, Interview, 25 April 2004; O. 
Kurdi, Interview, 5 May 2004). 
The MC and the SNT, whose members were mainly technocrats, showed a general 
inclination towards this argument. They would later justify suggestions to make some 
concessions in the agricultural sector in order to enhance the position of other more 
economically viable sectors in the negotiations.  In this regard, some in the MOA and 
business community with agricultural activities thought that the majority in the MC, and 
particularly the two ministers of commerce who supervised the Saudi accession process, 
came from a background in trade and industry and had practically no knowledge at all of 
agriculture.  Therefore, it was perhaps not surprising that the agricultural field was the 
first to come to their minds whenever they had to consider making concessions (Al-
Obaid, Interview, 08 May 2002; K. Al-Rajhi, Interview, 5 May 2004).   
The government’s general policy, however, treated agriculture as strategic issue that was 
important for security.  In fact, the government’s interest in agriculture over the years 
resulted in the Kingdom becoming, as already mentioned, the sixth-largest wheat 
exporting country in the world in 1992.  This development generated some questions.  
As indicated earlier, Elhadj commented that achieving food independence for security 
reasons did not require a country to assume such an advanced ranking in the 
international wheat market (2008).   
The fact of the matter was that fostering agriculture did not make sound economic sense; 
and the MC was willing to make concessions in this sector in a trade-off to strengthen of 
its hand concerning other issues that were economically more important to the Kingdom.  
Yet, agriculture seemed to have a measurable weight in the general government policy.  
Irrespective of the arguments and counterarguments over the strategic aspect of 
agriculture, it is important to revert to the characteristics of the Saudi economy.   
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The small and medium-sized businesses constituted the majority of business 
establishments in Saudi Arabia.  They made up 90% of the country’s firms (Riyadh 
Chamber of Commerce, 2001: 23; Al Hayat, 2004).  Nonetheless, they had less access to 
investment loans from local banks (Dr.Hasan, Interview, 27 April 2004; Arab news, 
2004) while large businesses received the bulk of government support.  In agriculture, 
the large companies belonged to investors who were financially sound and had 
substantial landholdings (Elhadj, 2008:35).43 
In light of the previous negotiations with the WP in the fourth round of the Saudi 
accession, in which the major members in the WP decided that the initial offer in 
agriculture did not constitute an acceptable groundwork for the negotiations, the MC 
instructed the SNT to rework the Kingdom’s overall offer, including agriculture.  The 
general trend in the MC was to re-adjust the overall tariff rates initially presented earlier.  
However, the minister of agriculture objected to this trend as far as agriculture was 
concerned.  He asked the other MC members to wait and see the results of the next 
round of negotiations.  As for the ten-year transition period, the MC took note of the 
firm position of the EU and the U.S., which objected to such flexibility.  Therefore, the 
majority within the MC also thought that the Kingdom would not be granted the 
requested period (MOC, 1998), especially since the WTO had set up a deadline for 
developing countries to reduce their agricultural subsidies by two-thirds (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2001: 219).  Yet, once again, the minister of agriculture did not agree and 
thought that this should be left to the coming negotiation rounds (MOC, 1998). 
Before the new round of negotiations, an external demand added to the difficulty of this 
internal rigidity and made the situation even more complicated.  Although it had not said 
so before, the U.S. thought in 1997 that the Saudi tariff-binding offer was not 
comprehensive enough.  Therefore, it emphasised that the offer should include all 
agricultural items including the 49 that had been excluded from the initial offer for 
religious reasons. 
                                                 
43Two examples of such companies are Al-Mara’i and Al-Safi.  They are the biggest agricultural 
companies in the Kingdom and are owned by members of the ruling family 
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This was a critical demand, because its implications went far beyond the issue of 
agriculture itself.  Islam forbids the production and consumption of pork and pork by-
products.  Because Islam is the basis of the legal system and a source of political 
legitimacy in Saudi Arabia, compromise over this matter seemed unlikely. 
In fact, the concept of exceptions was not completely alien to the WTO and its 
agreements.  The GATT Agreement, for example, allowed for exceptions on general 
grounds such as the protection of public morals and the achievement of security 
objectives (UNCTAD, 2003).  The Saudis could have argued that allowing those 
religiously prohibited items to be imported was tantamount to a disruption of the social 
order, which would affect the security in the country and the public morals.  There was a 
strong sense that this issue would constitute an unnecessary obstacle, especially as its 
importance in terms of trade was minimal.  
In spite of the minister of agriculture’s wish, the MC decided that it was necessary to 
adjust the tariff rates proposed in the Kingdom’s agricultural offer in 1998, in light of 
the reactions from the WP, and particularly from the EU and the U.S., in the fourth 
round of negotiations.  The offer did, however, maintain the average rate binding of 
35%.  In the context of this adjustment, the SNT had, in addition to the official offer, 
established internally certain positions to which the Saudi negotiators could fall back.  
As to the ten-year transition period requested by the minister of agriculture, the MC 
decided that this request would remain unchanged, and that the Saudi negotiators should 
work to achieve it.  With regard to religiously disputed items, the Saudi offer for this 
round indicated that there were 46 items that were prohibited under religious rules.  
Table 5-6 summarises the Saudi offer in agriculture, which was presented in the fifth 




Table 5-6: Agricultural Goods 
Initial Offers 
Reducing tariff binding for 62 items from 35% to 30%. 
Reducing tariff binding for 873 items from 50% to 35%. 
Reducing tariff binding for 10 items including dates and milk from 150% to 100%. 
Designate 46 items as religiously prohibited. 
Fall Back Positions 
Reducing tariff binding for 4 items from 30% to 0%. 
Reducing tariff binding for 13 items from 30% to 12%. 
Reducing tariff binding for 876 from 35% to 30%. 
No fall-back position concerning the 46 religiously prohibited items. 
Source: Results of the Fifth Round of Negotiations, MOC 10/8/1419H // 30/11/1998 
In presenting this revised offer, the Kingdom asked the members of the WP to examine 
it in light of the tariff rates virtually imposed on agricultural products by some of the 
WTO incumbent members.  For instance, the general rates binding a large number of 
agricultural products were 35% in Brazil, 100-150% in India and 40% in Venezuela.  As 
the Saudis pointed out, a developed country like Norway had 200 items with rates of 
100-600% (Saudi Arabia’s Mission to the UN-Geneva, 1998). 
The WP did not receive the offer very graciously, from the Saudi point of view.  Apart 
from Japan, where agriculture was not a matter of concern, the other Quad members 
found that the offer was higher than what they could accept (Al-Obaid, Interview, 08 
May 2002).  Instead of an average agricultural tariff rate of 35%, as the Kingdom 
proposed, they aimed at a lower level of 10-15%.  Australia, an agriculturally important 
country, echoed the U.S. request for an inclusive offer of items, which meant the 
inclusion of items prohibited by Islam (MOC, 1998).  Concerning the comparisons made 
by the SNT with regard to the average tariff rates applied by some WTO members, the 
U.S. delegation argued that any comparison should only be made with members of 
recent accessions (Greenidge, Interview, 21 October 2003). 
The MC had to deal with these positions in preparing the general Saudi offer for the 
sixth round in 1999.  Thus, the MC received the COM’s approval on an offer that 
contained some concessions (MOC, 1999).  The concessions applied to some of the 
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tariff bindings, as summarised in Table 5-7.  However, the concessions were associated 
with some reservations as well.  The best example for this was that the offer restated the 
request for a ten-year transition period to reduce agricultural subsidies. 
Table 5-7: Agriculture 
Initial Position 
Reducing tariff bindings on 190 sensitive items from 30-150% in the previous offer to 0-130% (applied 
rate at the time: 0-100%); 
Designating 48 items as religiously prohibited; 
Reducing tariff bindings on 894 items from 30-65% as in the previous offer to 0-25% (applied rate at 
the time: 0-20%). 
Flexibilities and Transition Periods Ten years from the date of accession to reduce subsidies by 
13.3%, as allowed to other developing countries. 
Fall-Back Positions 
Reducing tariff bindings on 190 sensitive items to 0-100%, which was the applied rate at the time; 
Reducing tariff bindings on 894 items to 0-20%, which was the applied rate at the time. 
Source: MOC, draft of offers of goods, services and transition periods for the sixth round, June 1999 
 
The obstacle of agriculture up to this point, including in the previous fifth round, related 
to three main aspects: market access for agricultural goods, the religiously prohibited 
line items and the requested transitional period.  Regarding market access, the 
abovementioned demand in the fifth round was that the Kingdom should lower its 
average bound rate to even less than the one applied at the time (20%) instead of the 
proposed 35%.  In this, the Saudi case would be comparable to other recent accessions, 
according to the U.S. delegation. 
The Saudi offer for the sixth round addressed this point, as shown in the table above.  
Although it did not reach the requested level, it reduced the average rate to 25%.  The 
Saudi delegation was ready in its fall-back position to lower the binding rates on 190 
sensitive items to the rates applied at the time, 0-100%.  It also presented in the fall back 
position to bind the rates on another 894 items to the ones applied, 0-20%. 
In spite of the reaction to the Saudi offer, which apart from the U.S. delegation was 
overall welcoming, the proposals outlined above in the area of agriculture met with 
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some resistance.  In general, further reductions were requested.  Specifically, the U.S., 
Canada and other important agricultural countries like Australia and New Zealand 
demanded additional tariff reductions on some items that were very important to Saudi 
Arabia, such as milk, poultry and wheat.  For example, New Zealand objected to the 
binding of milk products at 120%, as the Saudis had proposed.  The EU, in turn, 
demanded further tariff reductions on 189 items (MOC, 1999: 15-18). 
Unlike industrial goods, agriculture was important to developing countries as well.  
Many of them, including Argentina, Thailand and Pakistan, requested that the Kingdom 
bring down its tariff bound rates on various agricultural items of importance to them 
(MOC, 1999: 15-18).  The fact that even Pakistan, traditionally a strategic regional ally 
of the Kingdom, was among the members requesting reductions reflected the pressure 
applied to the SNT and the MC with regard to the agricultural sector. 
The second obstacle up to this point was related to religiously forbidden agricultural 
items.  Regarding this matter, the Kingdom’s position could not but remain steadfast.  It 
once again excluded 49 line items from its agricultural offer.  This time, however, there 
was a change in the Europeans’ stance. In the sixth round, the EU delegation was 
appreciative of the Saudi argument that it was unable for cultural and political reasons to 
include such items in its offers (MOC, 2001: 3).  The U.S. delegation showed no such 
appreciation and upheld the American request to have those items included with 
whatever bound rate the Kingdom wished to apply. 
To the religious establishment, which began to perceive the WTO negatively from this 
point of the second phase onwards, it seemed that the EU’s step only masked a 
negotiating game in which the EU and the U.S. had exchanged roles (Al-Dawood, 
Interview, 03 May 2004) to promote their hidden agenda of breaching the Islamic law of 
the country.  The MOJ prepared a report in which it indicated that the Kingdom’s 
sovereignty would be encroached upon by WTO accession (MOJ, 2001) – it was the 
only governmental entity to mention this fact. 
The claim that the Quad members, particularly the U.S. and the EU, were reversing their 
roles was not unfounded (Jawara and Kwa, 2003: 57-58).  One government official 
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agreed with the view of the religious establishment that it was a game, but he did not go 
so far as to agree that there was an intention to breach the law of the country.  He 
thought that it was a negotiating game played mainly by the U.S. to exhaust the SNT.  
The U.S., he said, cared more about economic issues, but used issues like the 49 
forbidden items as leverage to achieve better results from Saudi Arabia on other matters.  
Unfortunately, according to him, the SNT, and specifically those who negotiated the 
market access of agricultural goods, fell for this strategy.  They did not raise serious 
objections to putting this issue on the negotiating table in round after round (Al-Jasir, 
Interview, 5 April 2006). 
Concerning the third aspect that proved an obstacle caused by the issue of agriculture, 
restating the Saudi request for a ten-year transitional period to reduce agricultural 
subsidies for the third consecutive time demonstrated how the minister of agriculture 
could bypass the MC, the committee to which he belonged, and use the power of the 
COM.  As indicated, the MC was in favour of reconsidering this request even before the 
sixth round because of the firm objection of the WP members, particularly the major 
players among them, to relaxing their opposition and allowing the Kingdom any 
transitional period related to agriculture.  However, the minister of agriculture’s 
position, backed by the COM, repeatedly was to wait and see the results of the future 
rounds of negotiations. 
The seventh round took place in April 2000.  It was the first round of the Saudi 
accession negotiations after the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in November 
1999.  During the internal preparation for the round, the SNT, as the entity that 
performed the actual negotiations, asked the MC to reconsider the high bound tariff rates 
proposed by the Kingdom on some sensitive agricultural goods.  The MC assessed this 
request in the light of the minister of agriculture’s argument about why to suggest such 
high rates in comparison to the rates applied at the time (MOFA, 2000).  The MC came 
to the conclusion represented in the following table (5-8) of the Kingdom’s offer for the 
seventh round of the accession negotiations. 
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Table 5-8: Tariff Offer on Goods 
Goods NO. Current Tariff Initial Offer Fall-Back Position 
Sensitive Goods 190 0%-100% 0%-100% 
168 items between 
07%-100%.  22 
items between 15% 
(maximum) to 12% 
(minimum) 
Other Goods 895 0%-20% 0%-20% 
Goods with 20% 
tariff rate would 
stay the same.  
Goods with 12% 
tariff rate would 
range from 15% 
(maximum) to 10% 
(minimum).  Goods 
currently with 0% 
tariff rate and 
offered at 7% 
would be 7%.  
Goods currently 
with 0% and 
offered at 0% 
would be 0% 
Forbidden Goods 49    
Source: MOFA, minutes, 08/02/2000 (3/11/1420H) 
During the negotiations, the WP members demanded further reductions to the 
Kingdom’s proposed tariff rates.  They even suggested very low rates, in the Saudi’s 
view, for some sensitive goods.  For instance, they demanded bound rates of 5% on 
poultry and eggs, 10% on milk in containers of more than one litre, and 15% on wheat 
and flour (COM, 2000).  
More critically, the U.S. renewed its request about the religiously prohibited items.  As a 
compromise, from the Americans’ point of view, the U.S. delegation said that the Saudis 
could set a very high tariff rate like 1000%, for example, and indicate at the same time 
that import and entry of those goods to the Kingdom were banned.  To the U.S., that was 
more acceptable than not including them in the agricultural offer (MOC, 2000: 15). 
The MC and the SNT did not, of course, agree to such a compromise from the U.S.  To 
Saudi Arabia, this was a matter of principle and accepting a bound rate, no matter how 
high, would mean that it was abandoning its principles (Rajab, Interview, 2 May 2002).  
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As to tariff reductions, nonetheless, the MC worked out a new proposal and had it 
approved by the COM.  The following table (5-9) summarises the offer on agriculture 
that the MC prepared for the eighth round. 
Table 5-9: Tariff Offer on Agriculture 
Goods NO. Applied Tariff Rates Initial Offer 
Fall-Back 
Position 
Sensitive Goods 168 0%-100% 5%-50% 5%-50% 
Another Goods 898 0%-20% 0%-20% 0%-20%* 
Forbidden Goods 49 - - - 
Poultry and Eggs 22 20% 35% 20% 
Dairy Products 27 12% 15% 12% 
Milk in container 
over 1 litre 7 100% 40% 25% 
Wheat and Flour 8 100 50% 25% 
* Goods with current bound rate 20% would stay the same 
Goods with current bound rate 12% to be around 10% (minimum) 
Goods with current bound rate 0% to be 0%-7% 
Source: Minutes of MC, attached to COM cable NO.6574, 4/9/2000, 4/6/1421H 
 
When the MC agreed on this new offer, the minister of agriculture was absent.  Thus, the 
minister went, as had happened before, directly to the COM to revoke its approval of 
parts in the Saudi general offer related to some agriculturally sensitive goods.  This is 
indeed what happened, and the COM asked the minister of commerce not to design such 
offers without the support of all the MC’s members (COM, 2000).   
According to Al-Obaid, this was an important step.  As he said, some national 
agricultural companies, for example, had invested billions in processing milk in small 
containers for domestic household consumption, and could not, at that point, afford 
fierce foreign competition caused by lowering tariff rates from 100% to 25%, as in the 
last offer (Al-Obaid, Interview, 08 May 2002).   
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On the part of the agricultural businesses, they objected that such low tariff rates 
demanded by the WP were out of the question.  They witnessed that the demands of the 
WP members had extended from the general agricultural items to the sensitive ones.  
Although the community of agricultural businesses agreed that there were positive 
aspects to the accession such as the future possibility to make use of the rule of 
antidumping to protect the sensitive sector of poultry that had repeatedly been accused 
of dumping in foreign markets, it thought that the Kingdom’s position in the 
negotiations was hampered by the parallel negotiations to have a free trade area between 
the GCC and the EU.  As most of the GCC states, unlike Saudi Arabia, did not have 
agricultural sectors at all, it was likely that they would be inclined to put pressure on the 
Kingdom to make compromises with the Europeans, when needed in the process of the 
WTO accession, at the expense of agriculture.  Hence, as it was getting serious, 
businessperson involved in agriculture started to convey their concerns directly to the 
leadership of the country represented by the crown prince, not to the MC through the 
Council of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce (CSCC)  (K. Al-Rajhi, Interview, 5 May 
2004; K. Goth, Interview, 27 May 2004).  
Perhaps, the argument of Al-Obaid in defence of the agricultural sector, particularly in 
the aspect of sensitive items, and the attitude of the agricultural businesses expressed by 
Al-Rajhi and Goth, convinced the COM to withdraw its previous approval.  However, 
the COM’s instructions to the minister of commerce not to design in the future any offer 
without first the agreement of all of the MC’s members could be attributed to one of the 
characteristics of the political system of Saudi Arabia.  The COM was keen to preserve 
consensus among the governmental agents, as disagreement especially at the top level of 
government was something avoidable, as mentioned in Chapter Three.  
Fortunately for the Kingdom, the Saudi offer for the previous round, round seven, was 
good enough for many important agricultural members in the WP.  Thus, the agricultural 
tariff concessions proposed above by the MC for the eighth round, on which the COM 
revoked its approval, were not actually needed.  In fact, the MOC’s report on the results 
of the eighth round in October 2000 reflected that, apart from the dispute over the 
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religiously forbidden goods, agriculture did not constitute a major issue in the overall 
accession negotiations of round eight (MOC, 2000: 2-22).   
Concerning this, major agricultural countries such as Australia, Argentina and Brazil had 
already signed bilateral agreements with the Kingdom.  New Zealand, another major 
agricultural player, showed real flexibility in round eight.  Developing countries, to 
which agriculture was essential, showed similar flexibility.  Pakistan had already signed 
a bilateral agreement.  Malaysia signed an agreement immediately after round eight, and 
Thailand came very close to agreeing with the Kingdom on an acceptable position on 
agriculture.  Even the EU acknowledged the level which the Saudi average bound rate 
had reached.  However, it requested to have the initial negotiating rights (INR)44for all 
agricultural goods, but the SNT, led by the minister of commerce, indicated that it was 
difficult to accept this, and the matter should be considered in the next round (MOC, 
2000: 2-22).   
In light of this, the main single obstacle, as far as agriculture was concerned, became the 
American issue with excluding some agricultural items because of religion (Al-Alamy, 
interview, 02 May 2002).  In fact, the same year (2000), the two Muslim countries of 
Jordan and Oman acceded to the WTO.  Both contented themselves with applying a 
prohibitive tariff on alcohol, pork and pork products (Bhala, 2004: 790).  This was not 
helpful to the Saudi case.  It gave the U.S. an opportunity to pressure Saudi Arabia to 
accept what other Muslim countries had. 
5.2.3 Intellectual Property (IP) 
As the Kingdom aimed at the beginning of the negotiations to have the status of a 
developing country to enjoy the special and different treatment granted to this category 
of countries, it made it clear in its first offer in 1997 that it needed the five-year 
transition period given to developing countries in the area of TRIPS (MOFA, 1997).  It 
was obvious that there was little hope that this would be easy.  This was because just a 
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 INRs are the rights that have been negotiated with a WTO member.  They relate to tariff concession for 
given products.  Moreover, they may be offered by a current WTO member, or a country that will become 




year before the Saudis made their offer in 1997, the U.S. had placed the Kingdom on its 
black list of countries alleged to violate intellectual property rights (IPR), which was 
officially called the ‘Watch List’ (Bhala, 2004: 768). 
The main point of justification for requesting such a transitional period was that the 
Kingdom was not ready around that time to apply TRIPS.  The SNT stated in the 
negotiations in 1997 that a thorough revision of the existing laws and regulations on 
intellectual property, and drafting and enacting of new laws and regulations would be a 
time-consuming process.  After such laws had been revised and written, the SNT 
explained, the government would need to train the staff meticulously in the application 
and enforcement of those laws.  The Saudi negotiators pointed out that Saudi Arabia 
always kept its promises, and this is why it did not want to promise and commit itself to 
something it knew it could not deliver.  However, if the Kingdom, as the SNT 
concluded, completed the necessary legislative and training programmes before the end 
of the requested transitional period, it would implement the TRIPS agreement 
immediately (WTO, 1997). 
The U.S. remained resolute in its reaction that was expressed by the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) in Geneva at the time, Dorothy Dwoskin.  She stated that she 
had no leeway on this issue.  According to her, it was a congressional requirement not to 
allow acceding countries such a transitional period.  Dwoskin did not forget, at that 
point, to mention the special relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, but stated 
that she was mandated to treat all accession cases the same (WTO, 1997). 
What added to what seemed a difficult start, as far as TRIPS was concerned, was the fact 
that religion was at stake in this issue.  In fact, as the American request to include some 
items forbidden in Islam to the offer in agriculture came sometime later in the 
negotiations, the first worries of the religious establishment were mainly caused by 
TRIPS.  The religious establishment sensed that the implementation of parts of this 
agreement would probably cause a potential conflict with the Shariah.   
As the government was sensitive to this, the SNT announced from the beginning that the 
Shariah provided a significant protection to intellectual property rights.  However, the 
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Shariah was also, as the SNT indicated, the umbrella of the whole legal system in Saudi 
Arabia, which would not transgress against for the purpose of accommodating any 
TRIPS-related subjects that were contrary to the Shariah.  For instance, as for the 
protection of trademarks in the Kingdom, the nature of goods or services did not 
constitute an impediment for registration, unless the goods or services were inconsistent 
with the Shariah.  Also, although geographical indications were protected under the 
Saudi trademarks laws, as the SNT explained, alcoholic beverages, geographical 
indications of origin of wines and spirits were not protected due to religious prohibition 
(WTO, 1997: 26-27).   
Indeed, as indicated by Sheikh Al-Ameen, who was mainly responsible among the Saudi 
negotiators for studying compatibility between TRIPS and the Shariah, everyone in the 
government, including the king, crown prince, minister of interior and minister of 
foreign affairs were keen not to breach the Shariah in the process of accession.  In his 
words, “the Shariah was in fact a red line to everyone in the government”.  Thus, as an 
example, he noted it was important for the government to have the Board of Grievances 
from the beginning in the Technical Standing Committee established in 1996 to be 
consulted with regard to the issue of TRIPS (Al-Ameen, Interview, 5 April 2006)45. 
The year 1997 ended with not much progress on this issue.  In fact, Ambassador Weeks 
admitted as much in his closing remarks at the end of the third round of negotiations.  As 
an indication of the complexity of the issue, up to that date and after all the questions 
and answers’ sessions in the previous years, the WP was in perplexity with regard to 
TRIPS regulations in Saudi Arabia, as Weeks described it (Al-Shanbary, Interview, 11 
November 2005). 
With the beginning of 1998 and with the general intensification of the Saudi WTO 
accession attempt witnessed in this phase, the MC enhanced its effort as far as the issue 
of TRIPS was concerned.  One of the main demands made by the WP members was to 
know about the procedures taken by Saudi Arabia in this area and the respective timing.  
Thus, the MC instructed a technical team to prepare a report on the adopted procedures, 
                                                 
45
 The Board of Grievances is dominated by the Ulama.  
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current steps and a future working programme to present to the WP (MOC, 1998).  The 
programme, which as a whole was called an ‘action plan’, was the following: 
Table 5-10: Action Plan 
Areas of TRIPS What has already been done On-going work Future programme 
1. Copyright and 
related rights 
Law for the protection 
of Copyright already 
operative since 1990 
Conformity of Saudi 
law with TRIPS under 
study 
Amendments to the 
existing law will be 
made during the years 
1999 and 2000 
2. Trademarks 
Trademarks Law in 
force since 1939, as 
amended in 1984 
Conformity of Saudi 
law with TRIPS under 
study 
Amendments to the 
existing law will be 
made during the years 
1999 and 2000 
3. Patents Patent Law operative 
since 1989 
Conformity of Saudi 
law with TRIPS under 
study 
Amendments to the 
existing law will be 
made during the years 
1999 and 2000 
4. Geographical 
indications 
Provision exists in the 
present Trademarks 
Law 
The Technical Comity 
has studied the issue 
and is of the view that 
the provision is 
consistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement 
WIPO will be 
consulted and if it is 
determined that the 
existing provision is 
not fully consistent 
with the TRIPS 
Agreement, it will be 
suitably revised and 
incorporated in the 
revised Trademarks 
Law 
5. Industrial designs 
The Technical 
Committee discussed 
and examined the 
issue. No law at 
present 
Draft Law under 
preparation 
Law will be enacted by 
December 2001 
6. Plant varieties 
The Technical 
Committee discussed 
and examined the 
issue. No law at 
present 
Possible amendment to 
the existing Patent Law 
under study 
Provisions on plant 
varieties may either be 
incorporated in the 
Patent Law, or a 
separate law may be 
framed and enacted 
hopefully by December 
2002 
7. Layout designs of 
integrated circuits 
The Committee 
examined the issue. No 
law at present 
Consultations with 
WIPO on the drafting 
of a new law 
Law will be enacted 
hopefully by December 
2002 




Committee studied and 
examined the issue 




information is under 
preparation 
Law will be enacted 







piracy and counterfeit 
goods already taken. 
Existing laws provide 
penalties and 
punishment. 
In May 1997, the 
highest religious 
authorities in KSA 
issued a religious edict 
prohibiting software 
piracy. 
Officials of intellectual 
property authorities 
have been attending 
internal and external 
seminars on TRIPS. 
Conformity of Saudi 
Arabia’s existing 
enforcement laws and 
procedures with the 
provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement is 
under study by the 
Technical Committee. 
Points of conformity 
and non-conformity 
being identified. 
A plan for training of 
officials of different 
Ministries and 
Departments is under 
preparation for 
effective enforcement. 
Enforcement laws and 
procedures consistent 
with TRIPS Agreement 
including Customs 
procedures will be put 
in place hopefully be 
December 220. 
An intensive training 
programme for 
intellectual property 
officials of different 
Ministries and 
Departments, Customs 
officials and judges is 
envisaged to be 
ensured by December 
2003. 
WTO: WT/ACC/SAU/39, 27 October 1998 (Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement) 
More importantly, the MC decided for the sake of furthering the accession process to 
drop the assertion that Saudi Arabia was a developing country.  It did so implicitly 
through a statement saying, “Upon accession to the WTO, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
will assume obligations and acquire rights under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the WTO” without mentioning the country’s level of development.  With such a position, 
the MC recommended to the COM to lower the requested transitional period from five 
to three years from the date of accession as a new initial position in the negotiations.  
Moreover, if that did not work, the Kingdom would implement TRIPS from the date of 
accession without a transitional period, as a fall-back position in the negotiations (MOC, 
1998). 
The aforementioned ‘action plan’ specified that Saudi Arabia would fully implement 
TRIPS by the end of 2003, approximately five years from the date of presenting the plan 
in the fifth round in 1998.  The MC, in the preparation for the sixth round in June 1999, 
recommended bringing the suggested implementation date a year ahead, in an effort to 
mitigate the objection of the U.S. and the EU to any flexibility in this respect (WTO, 
1999). 
Such consecutive steps by the MC reflected an overall practical attitude towards WTO 
accession.  Dropping the proclamation of the Kingdom being a developing country was 
an important move in this regard.  The committee also showed that it did not want 
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rigidity in the matter of requesting transitional periods related to TRIPS to be a reason to 
hold back the process towards the accession.  Although the MC in its push for accession 
did not suggest a religious compromise, its attitude in furthering the case for accession 
resulted in the committee being blamed, even if not explicitly, for conceding too much 
to the WTO.  In this, the HMC would question after it was established, as will be seen 
later, why the Kingdom did not benefit from its status as a developing country.  
The progressive steps taken by the MC, which on the other hand was adding to the 
concerns in other areas, was followed in the preparation for the very same sixth round of 
the Saudi accession negotiations with a suggestion of a signalling effect.  As TRIPS was 
more about laws, the minister of commerce suggested to the MC to recommend setting 
up a tripartite committee consisting of the minister of justice, the president of the board 
of grievances and himself.  According to the MC’s minutes, the role envisioned for the 
‘committee’ was to “study the judicial procedures pertaining to trade issues to ensure 
their consistency with rules and regulations of the WTO” (MOC, 1998).   
Since this had religious implications, the COM, whose concerns as the highest political 
entity would go beyond the direct task of accession, agreed to establish the 
recommended committee, but with an amendment in the language defining its role.  The 
COM omitted the reference to ensuring constancy with the WTO (COM, 1999).  In this, 
the COM tried to disperse doubts of the religious establishment, which might have 
thought that the language suggested by the MC was incompatible with the Saudi inbuilt 
proclamation of the paramount of the Shariah (Anonymous, Interview, 06 April 2006). 
Despite the preparation on the part of the Saudi side, TRIPS did not receive its due 
attention in the sixth round, especially since it was clear from previous rounds that it 
would be one of the difficult issues in the negotiations due to its sensitivity to the Saudis.  
It simply did not receive such an attention because the WP members were not ready to 
discuss the ‘action plan’, which was the core of the Kingdom’s endeavour to handling 
this issue.  Their pretext was that they did not have enough time to study it.  
Nonetheless, this did not stop the U.S., the EU and New Zealand from presenting a 
provoking demand pertaining to that plan.  They requested in the round to review the 
drafts of TRIPS-related laws resulting from the ‘action plan’ before having them 
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officially enacted.  The reason for such a request was to ensure compatibility with 
TRIPS agreements (MOC, 1999: 23; MOC, 2000: 13).  
This new request by the WP members was nearly impossible to reconcile with the 
manner in which the government in general was trying to accommodate the concerns of 
the religious establishment in particular.  It would appear as a plain and direct 
interference in an internal regulatory matter, which came within the jurisdiction of the 
religious establishment.  Although anxious about such demands from the WTO 
members, the Ulama in Saudi Arabia were generally content that at the end of any 
negotiations over similar issues, the leadership of the country would ask their blessing.  
According to this view, there was in fact a Saudi tradition that the government would 
consult with the Ulama before signing international agreements (Al-Dawood, Interview, 
03 May 2004; Al-Abduljabar, Interview, 03 May 2004).  
Therefore, the position of the MC on this matter was always that it was non-negotiable.  
In addition to the argument that having laws reviewed by foreigners before being 
enacted was a breach to sovereignty, the MC and the SNT referred to a technical 
argument as well.  It simply asked why an issue should be negotiated that, in fact, came 
under the jurisdiction of another international organisation.  Namely, the Saudis would 
frequently bring up the functions of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) to the discussion with the WP members about handing over drafts of laws 
(MOC, 2000). 
As the WP members could not discuss the Saudi ‘action plan’ in the sixth round, the MC 
forwarded the same plan to the seventh round in April 2000 (MOFA, 2000).  In the 
round, however, the WP members, and especially the U.S. and the EU, insisted on not 
allowing the Kingdom any time of flexibility to implement TRIPS according to the 
provided ‘action plan’.  The U.S., once again, repeated the difficult demand of reviewing 
the Saudi laws pertaining to TRIPS before having them officially endorsed (MOC, 2000: 
16). 
Negotiations were acceptable to the Saudis as far as the issue of transitional periods was 
concerned.  However, the demand of handing internal drafts of laws to WP incumbent 
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members became a stumbling block.  In addition to the religious establishment, the 
HMC began around that time to submit its input, and one such demand was about 
penetrating the Kingdom’s sovereignty. 
However, the worries about TRIPS were not confined to the aspect of rules and 
regulations; they had spread, to some extent, to the business community as well.  
Although TRIPS was a big and complicated subject, and it was difficult to discern its 
direct effect on domestic businesses, unlike in the case of the tariffs, some in the 
business community sensed that it could be a possible threat.  In fact, it was of greater 
danger, according to this point of view, than tariffs on goods. 
This was particularly true in the case of some non-oil industries, especially the 
pharmaceutical sector.  Pharmaceuticals would be, according to this viewpoint, the most 
susceptible to the effects of TRIPS.  The pharmaceutical industry in Saudi Arabia was 
relatively new.  The short experience of the domestic industry in this field might lead 
foreign competitive companies with a long history in the business to claim precedence in 
some locally produced pharmaceutical goods.  Hence, they could impose through TRIPS 
royalty payments on the domestic industry for a very long time.  This was seen as being 
more dangerous to the budding pharmaceutical industry than allowing in competitive 
pharmaceutical products, even at a low tariff rate (M. Jamjoom, Interview, 15 January 
2005; Batterjee, Interview, 25 April 2004).  
By the eighth round in October 2000, the Saudis had done considerable work with 
regard to enacting TRIPS-related laws, especially in copyrights and patents.  They had 
sent them to WIPO to ensure conformity with TRIPS.  The SNT presented these facts to 
the round.  However, the U.S. and the EU re-requested to have such laws submitted to 
them before they became official.  The minister of commerce, who led the SNT in the 
round, responded that the Kingdom cooperated in this matter with the concerned 
international organisations such as the WIPO (MOC, 2000: 15).   
Connected to this, the U.S. delegation asked what should take precedence as far as laws 
in Saudi Arabia were concerned.  To this, the religious establishment adopted a decisive 
internal position and conveyed it to the leadership in the Kingdom: Saudi Arabia “could 
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not and would not accept any precedence to the Shariah” (Al-Dawood, Interview, 03 
May 2004; Al-Abduljabar, Interview, 03 May 2004).  This stance was echoed in the 
negotiation by the minister of commerce who told the Americans that the Shariah was 
the base of the system of the Saudi state, and in case of conflict with other laws, Shariah 
would take precedence (MOC, 2000: 15). 
In a closing meeting at the fringe of the eighth round to review where the Saudi 
accession stood, the minister of commerce informed the U.S. trade representative that 
the case was important to the Saudi leadership, which had been following its 
developments.  He pointed out, furthermore, that Saudi leaders wanted to see the case 
finalised.  However, the continued American demand to receive the laws’ drafts 
concerning TRIPS would make this accession, according to the minister, impossible 
(MOC, 2000: 29-30). 
Judging from the minister’s statements, the Kingdom was still hoping that the political 
approach, as far as its WTO accession bid was concerned, was valid.  The minister was 
trying to remind the American side, in negotiating this issue, of the special relationship 
between the Kingdom and the U.S.  Up to that point, however, that seemed not to work 
as well as the Saudis had hoped. 
5.2.4 Government Procurement 
In 1997, the U.S. and the EU added a major item to its demands.  That was a wider non-
discriminatory access to the market of government procurement in Saudi Arabia.  
Specifically, they wanted the Kingdom to sign on to the WTO’s GPA (Economist.com, 
1997). 
In most countries, government agencies procure goods and services as inputs to the 
government’s work of producing public goods and services.  Although it depends on the 
economic system and a country’s GDP, the size of the associated public procurement 
market is often large.  Theoretically, if the majority of countries pursued discriminatory 
procurement policies, the result for the world welfare would be less than if they 
cooperated to refrain from such discrimination.  Recognising this, governments 
attempted in the Tokyo Round and the UR to bring such procurement practices into the 
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multilateral trading system.  The result was that the GPA substantially extended its 
coverage.  However, the agreement’s membership was limited.  In the process of the 
WTO’s evolvement, the U.S. made the expansion of this membership a priority, linking 
the matter to the broader issue of combating corruption (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 
369-379).  
The government purchases were a remarkable field of activity in the Saudi Arabian 
economy.  In the early stages of the Kingdom’s development, the government took an 
active role in the establishment of enterprises in order to ensure the success of the 
development process.  Especially in the first four-plans of the comprehensive five-year 
development plans, the government was the power behind stimulating economic 
activities.  Therefore, it had to contract all sorts of works required for that purpose 
(GATT, 1995).  From the point of view of expenditures, the government accounted, 
around the end of the fourth plan in 1991, for 48% of consumption expenditure and 58% 
of gross fixed capital formation (Dr. Mahdy, Interview, 18 June 2009). 
The Government Purchases Law (GPL) governed the practices of government 
procurement in the Kingdom.  Under that law, the government would give priority in 
awarding contracts to qualified Saudi nationals and wholly Saudi-owned firms.  In 1993, 
the year of applying to the GATT, the COM issued a resolution which stipulated that 
foreign contractors as well as joint venture firms carrying out public works contracts 
must sub-contract at least 30% of the work to Saudi individuals or companies (WTO, 
1996: 21). 
In the light of the Kingdom’s substantial volumes of government procurement, such 
domestic rules did not square well with the WP members, particularly the U.S. and the 
EU.  In its reaction, the Kingdom relied on the legal aspect of the matter.  It should never 
be a condition for accession to sign to the GPA.  The GPA code was a plurilateral 
agreement, not part of the single undertaking required by founding or new WTO 
members, the Saudis argued (Rajab, Interview, 2 May 2002; Economist, 1997). 
In a move reflecting the complexity that characterised the accession process as a whole, 
the WP members broke down the issue of government procurement to its delicate 
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details.  To learn more about the government procurement in the Kingdom, which the 
U.S. claimed to be of substantial value, the other WP members demanded a collection of 
governmental data on procurement.  One of the key points was whether the word 
‘priority’ in the GPL meant an automatic exclusion of foreign bidders if one wholly 
Saudi owned firm placed a bid. 
In defending the Saudi position, the SNT stressed that the purchases of the government 
agencies of goods and services were for their direct consumption and were not hidden 
subsidies to domestic products.  To lessen the importance that some of the WP’s 
members, with the U.S. on top of them, attached to the volume of the government 
procurement, the SNT indicated that the market effect of the GPL was actually limited.  
It was so because the Kingdom’s base for services, as well as for manufacturing and 
agriculture, was not broad.  Thus, while there was a degree of preference for Saudi 
contractors and sub-contractors, the goods and services they furnished to government 
contracts would be predominantly of foreign origin (WTO, 1996: 10). 
The Kingdom constantly declined to provide statistical data on the government 
procurement.  The accustomed response was that it was not available because the 
government did not collect data on such procurement.  As for the concerns expressed by 
the members in the WP over the ‘priority’ given to Saudi firms, the SNT confirmed that 
there was no such thing as an automatic exclusion of a bidder.  All bids would be 
evaluated by the Bid Examination Committee for consistency with relevant conditions 
and specification, for reasonableness and for qualifications.  Those things being equal, 
then the government would give preference to Saudi bidders (Rajab, Interview, 2 May 
2002). 
It was crucial to the business community not to sign the GPA.  As one of the 
characteristics of the Saudi economy, the government was the main destination of the 
services and goods produced by the business community.  Likewise, it was a major 
method by which the political system was fulfilling its policy of enhancing the role of 
the business community, which was forcefully presented in the Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan that called for a bigger role for the private sector.  Joining that 
agreement at that stage would have been a hasty decision that would leave the Saudi 
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businesses vulnerable to better-equipped and more experienced foreign bidders (K. 
Jamjoom, Interview, 29 February 2005).  
As the accession negotiations were about to end in the year 1998, the WP, led by the 
U.S., pointed out that it would help the effort of seeking the accession if Saudi Arabia 
signed the GPA.  Despite the importance of this request, the Kingdom did not give in.  
In the fifth round of the multilateral negotiations of the Saudi accession in 1998, the 
Saudi minister of commerce told the members of the WP that the Kingdom would not 
join the agreement because it was a plurilateral one and membership in it was therefore 
not mandatory.   
In terms of legality, the Saudis thought that their case was solid.  However, the WP 
members thought otherwise.  Their point was linked to the WTO-plus status explained in 
Chapter Two.  The GPA was, in this view, one of the tickets that needed to be paid by 
latecomers (Milthorp, Interview, 21 October 2003).  Therefore, the fifth round ended 
with each party holding on to its position. 
The Kingdom did not change this position in the following rounds and remained 
steadfast throughout the rest of Phase Two.  The SNT repeated in the seventh and eighth 
rounds of the Saudi accession negotiations the same old argument. As far as Saudi 
Arabia was concerned, the GPA was a plurilateral agreement.  Therefore, the Kingdom 
did not have any intention of joining it (MOC, 2001: 7). 
According to Nicora, of the EU Mission in Geneva, it might have helped at least if Saudi 
Arabia had not doubted, like some other developing countries did, the related effort by 
the WTO to have an agreement on transparency in government procurement, which was 
one of the main items on the agenda of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 
1996.  She thought that Minister Faqeeh’s position was generally too rigid.  Unlike his 
successor, Minister Yamani, she said that Faqeeh could have convinced his leaders not 
to harden the Saudi stance, but the minister’s general attitude was “to adjust the WTO to 
Saudi Arabia’s positions, not otherwise” (Nicora, Interview, 21 October 2003).  
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The fiasco of the ministerial conference in Seattle in 1999 was a setback to the new 
agreement on transparency in government procurement, as it was one of the issues for 
negotiations on the conference’s agenda.  In any event, nonetheless, approving such an 
agreement was almost as difficult for Saudi Arabia as signing the GPA.  There has been 
no formal public accountability in the Kingdom with regard to the country’s budget or to 
the oil sales and revenues.  In many cases, the official and personal would intertwine 
with respect to spending the national revenue.  Therefore, being part of an agreement on 
transparency in the area of government procurement would likely cause embarrassments 
with regard to the practice of not differentiating, sometimes, between the official and the 
personal in the conduct of the government. 
5.2.5 Services 
As shown in Table 5-2 of the first Saudi offer in 1997, the Kingdom did not prepare a 
specific offer for the negotiations, and it virtually presented the status quo at the time as 
its offer in services for the fourth round.  On the part of the WP, it was not difficult to 
note and comment on this.  They criticised the absence of many sectors from what was 
presented as the Kingdom’s commitments in services.  Namely, the WP members 
stressed the importance of having the financial services, insurance, distribution and 
telecommunications sectors included in the Saudi commitments (Al-Nujaidi, Interview, 
06 May 2002). 
Unlike many other subjects, services represented a vast issue.  As an issue, services 
contained many sub-sector subjects.  That would normally add to the complexity of its 
related negotiations not only for Saudi Arabia, but also for any other acceding country. 
In addition to this, as far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, the condition of trade in 
services was generally in its early stage of development when the Kingdom first started 
the accession process.  The regulatory framework of the financial sector was 
undeveloped.  The sector of telecommunications was to undergo a major restructuring 
due to privatisation plans.  As for the labour market, the ‘Saudisation’ programme was 
receiving increasing attention from the government as a way to replace the foreign 
workforce with a local one to curb the rising rate of unemployment. 
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SAMA assumes the role of the central bank in the Kingdom.  It is a semi-independent 
governmental entity and reports directly to the king.  Prior to the accession negotiations 
in 1997, SAMA maintained that the overall condition of the financial services had been 
weak.  Many of the activities in the capital market, private depository, international 
brokerage services, and investment consultancy were still in their preliminary stage of 
development.  A significant volume of cross-border international participation in the 
financial market and insurance-related services occurred in the absence of a proper 
domestic legal system (MFNE, 1997). Insurance was a controversial issue.  Although 
some kinds of insurance products were offered in practice, there was a general public 
questioning about the compatibility of this concept with the Shariah.   
Although SAMA was fully aware that an eventual liberalisation of financial services 
was inevitable, it recommended that the MC have no commitments for the negotiations 
and maintain the status quo of the financial market, due to the reasons laid out above.  At 
the same time, SAMA provided the SNT with answers to some expected arguments in 
the negotiations.  In addition to the reason of the Saudi financial market’s state of 
development, SAMA advised the SNT to highlight that international financial 
institutions were, in fact, widely participating in the Kingdom’s financial market through 
the mode of cross-bordering.  Also, the banking industry was experiencing, according to 
SAMA, a good deal of foreign presence.  Foreign shareholders were allowed up to 40% 
of a bank ownership (MFNE, 1997). 
The telecommunications sector was, at the time, the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT).46  The PTT warned of the negative effect of 
opening up this sector and urged to delay any foreign attempts to do so.  The ministry 
justified its recommendation in light of the following: 
- The sector represented the biggest source of the ministry’s income; 
- The government had spent more than 100 billion SR (25 billion US$) 
on this sector and it had not yet paid this investment back; 
                                                 
46
 The ministry was dissolved in 1999 and was partly replaced by the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). 
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- The sector was undergoing a major process of restructuring, as it was 
going to be gradually changed from a public system into a private one; 
- The government would need at least seven years to earn back what it 
had invested in the sector (PTT, 1998). 
 
This position of the TPP was backed up by another governmental entity responsible for 
another means of telecommunications.  King Abdul Aziz City for Science and 
Technology (KACST) has been responsible for internet services.  As in the case of PTT, 
KACST did not recommend opening internet services.  It maintained that use of the 
network by many companies would affect the security of information and would allow 
foreigners to compete with KACST in offering internet services, which were still new in 
Saudi Arabia (KACST, 1998). 
As mentioned, unemployment of Saudi citizens was a critical challenge at the time when 
oil prices were going down.  Thus, the services sub-sector of work and movement of 
natural persons was growing into an obstacle in the Kingdom’s accession process.  This 
was the case not only for economic reasons, but for social ones as well.  Because of the 
importance attached to the social aspect, the minister of the interior, not the minister of 
planning, became, as indicated earlier, responsible for the policy of ‘Saudisation’. 
In the negotiations, the Quad countries, especially the EU and Canada, demanded the 
removal of the condition that joint ventures were the only method, through which 
foreigners could participate in establishing banks in Saudi Arabia (SNT, 1997; WTO, 
1997: 15).  For their part, the Australians were the first to have an actual plan to 
establish a branch of one of the biggest banks in Australia, Grindlays Bank.  In theory, 
the Kingdom would allow that.  However, the Australians said that allowing foreigners a 
banking presence through branches vehicle did not, in practice, amount to very much 
since no branch of a foreign bank had been licensed for the last 20 years (WTO, 1997). 
As for the U.S., it shared the position of the EU, Canada and Australia.  It thought that 
the state of the services sector in the Kingdom was far too restricted.  The U.S. had a 
particular interest in opening the telecommunications sector and was frustrated that no 
commitments were made regarding it.  This frustration extended to the financial product 
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of insurance as being absent from the commitments.  In a reflection to this, Charlene 
Barshefsky, who became the U.S. Trade Representative, described the overall 
commitments in services presented by the Saudis as disappointing (Saudi Arabian 
Permanent Mission to the UN-Geneva, 1998). 
In the rebound, the Saudi position was that the 40% limit on foreign ownership of banks 
was non-negotiable.  If the Kingdom eliminated the requirement of joint venturing, it 
would mean that it would not be able to require even a 1% national participation in 
establishing banks, which was unacceptable to the Saudi government.  In addition, the 
commitments offered by the Saudis were in line with the country’s plans to develop its 
banking system.  Assurances were given that there was no ban on banking licensing, but 
that for market saturation and prudential reasons, no new licences were being given at 
that point (WTO, 1997).  With respect to insurance as a financial product, the Kingdom 
indicated that it could not make commitments on it for religious reasons (MOC, 1998). 
As to telecommunications, the Saudis pointed out that basic telecommunications 
services were a state monopoly.  However, private-sector companies and foreigners were 
permitted to participate in supporting telecommunications services such as electronic 
mail, voice mail and fax, but in doing so they had to use the public telecommunication 
network upon an authorisation from national authorities (WTO, 1995: 18).  In light of 
the on-going plans at the time to incrementally privatise the basic telecommunications 
services, the Kingdom maintained the argument that it could not open this sector amidst 
such a restructuring effort (MOC, 1998). 
Concerning the movement of natural persons, the Saudis maintained throughout that 
there was no restriction on the entry into the Kingdom for business visitors who came 
for a short duration.  As a general rule, however, any enterprise, Saudi or foreign-owned, 
was to ensure that the percentage of the national workers engaged by the employer not 
be less than 75% of the total workforce.  Equally, the positions of personnel managers, 
treasurers, civilian security guards and transaction follow-up clerks to government 




In light of the arguments advanced by SAMA and the PTT, Saudi Arabia’s offer for the 
fifth round of the accession negotiations in November 1998 once more did not include 
any new commitments in the fields of financial services and telecommunications.  Apart 
from these two fields, including insurance, the Kingdom did make commitments 
regarding some other services.  With some restrictions, the commitments included sub-
sectors like accounting, legal consultancy, constructions, travel and tourism.47  As to the 
market access in the offer, it was subject to the applied investment law at the time and 
visa regulations.  With regard to national treatment, the offer kept the loans of SIDF 
confined to joint ventures with nationals (MOC, 1998). 
The Kingdom’s previous accession negotiations were difficult, and were becoming even 
more difficult, as the fifth round proved.  When all the parties convened in Geneva in 
November 1998, it was clear that the WP members did not accept the old Saudi 
justifications for maintaining the status quo of some important sub-sectors of services.  
Australia, for example, sought to revise this modified offer, in which the Kingdom 
would address the insurance sub-sector.  As in the previous round, the Australians also 
sought removal of the 40% limitation on foreign ownership of banks (WTO, 1998).  The 
Europeans looked for the same thing.  The EU delegation demanded the abandonment of 
joint venturing as the only legal entity of foreign participation in establishing banks in 
Saudi Arabia.  In the face of the Saudi argument that cross-border supply of financial 
services was in reality unrestricted because of the lack of regulations, the EU requested 
that the SNT make an official no-restriction commitment regarding the supply of such 
services (SNT, 1998).  Japan, which was not very interested in areas such as agriculture, 
demanded that the Kingdom should make commitments in the insurance sector including 
life insurance, non-life insurance and re-insurance.  In addition, Japan shared with the 
EU, the U.S. and Australia the objection to the 40% limitation on foreign ownership of 
banks.  It demanded that this limitation be relaxed to around 50% minimum (WTO, 
1998).  
                                                 
47
 The restrictions were in the sub-sectors of legal and tourism services.  For the former, they were 
confined to consultancy in the foreign partner’s country and in the area of international law.  For the latter, 
the commitments did apply to the Hajj (the yearly pilgrimage to the holy city of Makkah) and Umrah (a 
minor Hajj).  
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On some subjects, the SNT found itself in a problematic position in this fifth round.  
Religion had always been presented as a reason for prohibiting insurance in general.  
Yet, the Kingdom’s financial market had been experiencing practices of insurance 
services without regulations (Al-Alamy, Interview, 02 May 2002).  On a related matter, 
SAMA, as mentioned, had admitted that the financial market suffered from an 
insufficient legal framework.  As such, many sorts of services existed without a proper 
regulatory framework.  In this round, however, the WP members did not want such an 
explanation to be a reason for not making commitments. 
In responding to the issue of responsibility for services in the SNT, some of the WP 
members said, concerning permission for some non-permitted services to operate 
without a regulatory framework, that “if you have allowed market access without 
regulations, then put ‘Non’ in your offer in financial sector”.  They added that it was not 
necessary to regulate before making an offer or a commitment (SNT, 1998).  In this 
connection, the EU pointed out that GATS did not prevent the Kingdom from 
developing legislation as long as the new laws did not constitute an additional burden 
(SNT, 1998). 
The WP members took the same strong position with regard to telecommunications.  
The U.S., in particular, strenuously objected to the fact that the Saudi offer in 
telecommunications was not modified from the previous fourth round of the Kingdom 
accession negotiations.  The U.S. delegation in Geneva stressed that any Saudi 
commitments in the services sector would not be considered seriously without having 
the sub-sector of telecommunications included.  As the fifth round was finalising its 
works at the end of November 1998, the other major members in the WP, mainly in the 
Quad, echoed the American position concerning telecommunications (MOC, 1998). 
Compared to the fourth and fifth rounds of the Saudi accession negotiations, where 
commitments in services virtually did not go beyond the current status quo of the sector, 
the commitments offered in the sixth round constituted a step forward in the 
negotiations.  In this round, the Saudis were ready to commit themselves, as a fall-back 
position, to raising foreign ownership in investment projects to 51%.  They showed 
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readiness to open some sub-sectors in telecommunications, even though only after 
transitional periods suggested by the concerned authorities.  
In negotiating the new Saudi commitments for the sixth round, the Quad members 
generally adopted an inflexible position, except Japan.  For the financial sub-sector, for 
example, Japan was content to relax the restriction on banks ownership to 50% (WTO, 
1998), a level that the Kingdom was willing to accept as a fall-back position in this area.  
Canada requested additional liberalisation in sub-sectors like basic and enhanced 
telecommunications services (Saudi Arabia Resident Representative to the WTO, 1999).  
The EU and the U.S. stated that they could not allow the Kingdom the requested 
transitional periods for liberalising telecommunications, despite the argument that such 
periods were needed for the on-going restructuring of that sub-sector.  Although the 
newly proposed percentage share became 51%, the U.S., specifically, requested a 
commitment that would take the percentage of foreign ownership in investment projects 
as high as 100%.  The EU and particularly the U.S. also demanded an opening of the 
insurance sub-sector (MOC, 2000: 13). 
Around this stage of the Saudi accession process, the Quad countries introduced new 
services-related demands.  The demands were very critical as they related to the 
distribution sector, in which a large population of Saudis worked.  They related to 
religion as well.  In this, the U.S., along with some of the Quad members, insisted that 
the wholesale and retail services, which were part of the distribution sector, be fully 
opened to foreigners.  In addition, the U.S. charged that having two sorts of taxes, one 
applied to Saudi natural and legal services suppliers, in accordance with the Islamic 
edict of Zakat,48 and the other applied to foreign suppliers, in fact constituted a violation 
of national treatment in services. 
Thus, the sixth round and the bilateral consultations before the seventh round 
experienced a sort of a swelling in the services issues, in which economic, political and 
religious aspects intrinsically intersected.  The vice-governor of SAMA told the WP 
                                                 
48In “The New Encyclopedia of Islam” by Cyril Glasse, Zakat is one of the Five Pillars of Islam and is the 
giving up of a portion of the wealth one my posses, in excess of what is needed for sustenance, to “purify” 
or legitimise what one retains. 
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members that especially in the case of Saudi Arabia, economic issues could not be 
abstracted from religion, as some issues required religious permission.  He affirmed that 
the request of opening the insurance sub-sector would first need a religious consent 
(MOC, 1999: 12). 
As the Kingdom was debating the insurance issue from a wholly religious perspective, 
the subject of Zakat, which the WP newly introduced in the negotiations, came to extend 
this religious debate.  The SNT tried to clarify the distinction between this Islamic 
principle and taxes. Zakat was a religious edict.  It was collected annually from the first 
year on assets and earnings whereas tax was collected on distributed profit only (MOC, 
2001: 5).  As Zakat was levied on both assets and profits, the minister of commerce 
commented in the negotiations that if there was discrimination in national treatment, 
then it had been against the Saudi nationals, not foreigners. 
However, the other subject newly introduced had crucial economic implications.  Some 
entrepreneurs thought that completely opening wholesale and retail services, as 
demanded, would result in serious economic repercussions for the Kingdom due to the 
extreme sensitivity of this issue to the business community.  In fact, when it came to 
such a critical issue, a parallel informal attempt was undertaken to prevent any possible 
positive response, especially when it was felt that the SNT might not withstand the 
continual pressure of such prolonged and multi-dimension negotiations.  As the king at 
the time was ill, a group of prominent businessmen used the Majlis of the crown prince 
for this matter.  They attended his audience more than once to convey their concerns 
about the WTO in general, and the idea of opening the wholesale and retail services in 
particular (Bu-Hulaiga, Interview, 28 March 2010; CSCC, 1999). 
Although turning to the Majlis when something important happened was a traditional 
means of recourse in Saudi politics, it also indicated in this case that there was a lack of 
alternatives.  In its endeavour to stop the opening of the wholesale and retail services, 
the business community did not regard as effective other instruments such as the CSCC.  
Moreover, the business community made no attempt to reach out to the aforementioned 
group of businesspersons whom the MC had chosen as consultants.  Their mission was 
  
 226
also to make an effort with their foreign partners to convince the home countries of the 
latter not to put pressure on Saudi Arabia, particularly in the services sector. 
The justification for not reaching out to this team of businesspersons was twofold.  From 
a governmental perspective, the team did not take seriously the role envisioned for it by 
the MC.  Accordingly, the team generally had little appreciation of all WTO-related 
complications (Al-Alamy, Interview, 02 May 2002).  However, the case was different as 
far as the perspective of the business community was concerned.  There was no problem 
with the team, but it was the government that did not believe in its ability to accomplish 
something important (Al-Khuraiji, Interview, 25 April 2004).  The point of having such 
a team was in fact, as some in the business community put it, “for a decorative purpose” 
(K. Al-Rajihi, Interview, 5 May 2004).  
Although some in the business community believed that liberalising the services sector 
would benefit the purpose of job creation (Al-Yami, Interview, 27 April 2004), the case 
of the wholesale and retail sub-sector was different from the government’s perspective.  
Opening this sub-sector to foreign suppliers of services would have negative social 
outcomes, as it had been a major source of work creation for Saudi nationals.  Thus, 
many would be dislocated as a result of such an opening attempt (MOC, 2001: 5).  
Given the fact that unemployment was rising, this was not a light matter.  For its part, 
the MOI, as the entity responsible for ‘Saudisation’, was observing the situation, and its 
anxiety was no less than that of the religious establishment with regard to insurance, or 
the business community with regard to the retail sector, for example. 
By the seventh round of negotiating the Saudi accession in April 2000, the EU had 
relaxed its demands with respect to issues with religious aspects, including Zakat.  
Notwithstanding the strong political and economic ties, the U.S. kept its 
uncompromising position on such issues.  Ironically, at the time when the U.S. was 
charging that Zakat violated the WTO principle of national treatment, it was giving tax 
exemptions to U.S. companies on profits made abroad through Foreign Sales 
Corporations Law (FSC).  The U.S. considered the FSC part of the territorial system of 
taxation, which gave exporting firms advantages over taxation of worldwide systems.  In 
doing so, the U.S. was treating the case as if it was its national right 
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(trade.ec.europa.eu)49.  However, it was declining the Kingdom’s argument that the 
Zakat system was not even a national matter, but a religious principle. 
Without, of course, scrapping the Zakat tax scheme, the Kingdom introduced in the 
seventh round a new text to its general taxation rules to reassure the WTO principle of 
national treatment.  The text read, “Future changes in Saudi tax code will not be less 
favourable to foreign service providers than the existing code” (MOFA, 2000).  At the 
same time, the Kingdom deleted the condition that all services provided in the local 
market should first obtain authorisation from the concerned governmental departments, 
as this condition had previously been criticised as being too general and inconsistent 
with the WTO principle of transparency.  In addition, the Saudi commitments in services 
expanded in this seventh round by adding some telecommunications sub-sectors such as 
analogue-digital services and mobile data services.  The commitments also raised the 
foreign equity in franchising services from 25% to 49% and applied only one condition 
for economic need, which was the approval of one store for each province (MOFA, 
2000). 
In light of this improvement in the Kingdom services’ offer, another Quad member, after 
Japan, perceived the new Saudi commitments as generally reasonable: Canada signed a 
bilateral agreement with the Kingdom immediately after concluding the seventh round in 
April 2000.  A group of other important WTO members including Australia, Brazil and 
South Korea shared the Canadian view and signed bilateral agreements as well.  
Although the EU had relaxed its religiously related demands, it continued, along with 
the U.S., to request extended commitments such as in the foreign ownership of national 
banks and in the wholesale and retail services.  In addition to its earlier demands in the 
areas of insurance and audio-visual services, the U.S. added another serious request in 
this round.  It asked the SNT to declare the Kingdom’s commitment to a ‘trading right’ 
for foreigners, which would virtually give foreigners, either persons or firms, the right to 
export and market their products directly without the need for an official trading 
presence or a local trade agent (MOC, 2000: 16; Al-Eatani, 2006). 
                                                 
49
 The FSC was challenged, and the WTO declared in 2000 that it was illegal.  
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During the negotiations, the Saudi official stance towards the new demand of the 
‘trading right’ was that it was just as sensitive as opening the sub-sector of wholesale 
and retail services (Al-Eatani, Interview, 26 March 2006).  However, there was a major 
difference between the two, and that was their relation to creating jobs; the matter was of 
great concern to the Saudi government.  Unlike the wholesale and retail services, 
representing international firms locally through trade agencies had a smaller capacity to 
recruit employees.  In this light, the official position could be attributed to the traditional 
importance of trade agencies as one of the characteristics of the Saudi economy. 
Interestingly, the business community was generally less cautious about this issue.  
Although several businesspersons thought that allowing foreigners such a trading right 
might jeopardise the situation of local trade agents (Aqeel, Interview, 25 April 2004; 
Kadi, Interview, 28 April 2004; Batterjee, Interview, 25 April 2004; Al-Khuraiji, 
Interview, 25 April 2004), those in the trade agency business were more optimistic 
concerning the matter.  A prominent businessman representing a globally known foreign 
cars manufacturer indicated that the Saudi market of representative agencies was open, 
with no protection for registered commercial agencies.  By law, he asserted, any 
domestic firm with a commercial registration could import and distribute the products of 
the company he had been representing as its official agent in the Kingdom.  The case 
was different from that in the United Arab Emirates, for instance, where no one could 
import a product if the supplier of that product had an official agreement with a domestic 
representative.  Thus, in his opinion, official local trade agencies already experienced 
competition.  In fact, the operations of the non-official importers, which he called the 
“grey importers”, had flourished to the extent that they accounted for 30% of the 
market’s operations (Anonymous, Interview, 26 April 2004). 
In this opinion, acquiring local trade agencies as a result of the WTO accession would be 
a possible option for international firms.  However, some factors made such an option 
unlikely.  The slim margin of profits of this business, due to the existence of “grey 
importers”, would probably lead foreign suppliers to retain the existing arrangements of 
local commercial representatives.  Also, foreign suppliers fully understood that they 
would be not necessarily be more efficient than their domestic agents, who were closer 
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to the environment and culture they worked in.  Another factor was that foreign 
suppliers, who were mostly multinational companies, were fully aware that their strength 
as multinationals lay in their international networks where good associations with local 
entities would provide them with stronger local grounds (Anonymous, Interview, 26 
April 2004). 
Another interviewed businessperson who worked as an official commercial agent also 
agreed that the existing arrangements of having local trade agents for foreign suppliers 
were likely to continue.  Tamer, an agent for pharmaceutical foreign suppliers, said that 
multinational corporations were actually in need of local agents because they preferred 
not to start from scratch in the local market.  Foreign suppliers would also rather to 
avoid the need to put new investments in infrastructure if they dismantled their extant 
local official commercial agents (Tamer, Interview, 26 April 2004). 
K. Kurdi, head of a company working as an agent for international services companies, 
pointed out that some in the Kingdom had sometimes exaggerated the possibility of 
permitting foreign companies to do direct business operations in the local market as a 
result of the WTO accession.  In this connection, he cited the example of the successful 
local agent of Toyota, Abdul Latif Jameel Group.  He said that foreign corporations 
were more mature than to end the business relation with a successful agent who made a 
good name for their products.  “It was not about foreign suppliers taking over their local 
agents; it was about efficiency and success that would assure the continuation of the 
local trade agents business”, K. Kurdi stressed (K. Kurdi, Interview, 20 April 2002). 
Having emphasised that the international suppliers would find it difficult to desert their 
successful local trade agents, those who held an optimistic view about the future of 
domestic agencies believed, nonetheless, that the relations with foreign suppliers might 
experience a process of rehabilitation.  In other words, trade agencies would probably 
have to be prepared to adopt more of the international standards in terms of efficiency, 
transparency and communications.  They might also need to expect lower commission 
rates for selling and distributing products of their foreign suppliers (Anonymous, 
Interview, 26 April 2004; Tamer, Interview, 26 April 2004; K. Kurdi, Interview, 20 
April 2002).  Some went a little further and suggested that local agents should not just 
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adapt to externalities, but also develop their own label of products apart from the foreign 
products that they were commissioned to sell, as some agents were in fact doing 
especially in the food market (Kadi, Interview, 28 April 2004).  
The issuance of the new law of investment in April 2000 and the establishment of 
SAGIA, which both were to encourage foreign investments, coincided with the eighth 
round of the Kingdom’s WTO accession negotiations in October 2000.  Thus, they were 
important economic cards in the hands of the SNT.  However, this was not all, as the 
SNT went to the negotiations with a political card in their pockets, as well.  
The political card was the fact that the Kingdom had, as indicated, signed some 
important bilateral agreements with the WP members.  The Saudi negotiators hoped that 
this fact might lead to a breakthrough in the protracted negotiations.  Specifically, the 
MC and the SNT hoped that signing such agreements might put pressure on the U.S. to 
avoid being viewed by all parties as the stumbling block to the negotiations.   
Indeed, the impact of some of the economic and political cards, respectively, seemed to 
materialise in the negotiations with some members in the WP.  Thus, the Europeans 
stated during the round that the percentage share of foreign ownership was not a 
problem after the new investment law.  However, they demanded an increase in the 
percentage share of foreign workers in Saudi enterprises.  They renewed their objection 
to any of the proposed transitional periods to open the telecommunications sub-sector.  
In addition, they reinstated the originally American request concerning opening the 
wholesale and retail services sub-sector, making a commitment in insurance and raising 
the percentage share of foreign ownership of banks. 
The SNT, for its part, made it clear that the percentage of foreigners in Saudi working 
places and the wholesale and retail services sub-sector were particularly sensitive 
domestic topics.  Raising the percentage share of foreign ownership of local banks was 
no less difficult.  As to insurance, the Kingdom’s argument was the usual one: it was a 
critical issue because of the religious aspect.  This time, however, the Saudis were not 
too rigid about the insurance issue, as they implied a possible compromise. 
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As mentioned above, insurance was rather a controversial issue as far as the religious 
view was concerned.  Thus, there was no necessity for the Saudi negotiators to be 
decisive about an issue for a religious reason while the religion itself was not decisive 
about it.  It became clear by the eighth round of the Kingdom’s accession that the U.S., 
where insurance business was huge, would not under any circumstances accept the Saudi 
justification for not making any sort of commitment in insurance.  Accordingly, the SNT 
came to the eighth round with a proposal on this matter.  The proposal stated that “once 
an insurance law is promulgated in Saudi Arabia, we commit to ensure that foreign 
insurance service providers will not be treated less favourably than foreign providers of 
other financial services” (MOC, 2000: 6-7).   
That did not work very well with the U.S.  In the negotiations, the U.S. delegation 
restated its position concerning insurance along with other essential services subjects, 
including the Saudi taxation system, the audio-visual sub-sector and transitional periods 
suggested by the Kingdom to open the sub-sector of telecommunications.  In fact, the 
U.S. delegation even went on to express its disappointment with respect to the 
Kingdom’s position on opening the distribution sub-sector, including wholesale and 
retail services (MOC, 2000: 11-16; MOC, 2000: 29). 
In light of this stance, the aforementioned Saudi economic and political cards for this 
round played generally less well with the U.S.  Thus, the argument over the percentage 
share of foreign ownership of projects in the Kingdom took a different form.  After 
allowing 100% foreign ownership of projects in the domestic market, the U.S. 
delegation changed its disagreement with Saudi Arabia to the list of projects that were 
banned to non-Saudis, as they were included in the ‘negative list’ (Bhala, 2004). 
Playing the political card was unsuccessful during this round.  The Kingdom assumed 
that having completed several important bilateral agreements would enhance the Saudi 
position in the negotiations with the U.S., especially if such agreements included Quad 
members.  Unfortunately for the Saudis, Canada came back during the multilateral 
negotiations in the round and said that although it had signed a bilateral agreement with 
the Kingdom, there were in fact some outstanding issues, such as in the field of 
telecommunications (MOC, 2000: 8). 
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5.2.6 Dual Pricing of Gas 
The EU first presented this issue in the fifth round of the Kingdom’s accession 
negotiations in 1998.  It wanted the Kingdom to abolish what it claimed was a dual 
pricing of gas.  This was a fundamental issue to Saudi Arabia.  Because of its 
comparative advantage in the sector, the petrochemical sector was an essential factor in 
seeking accession to the WTO, as the latter promised better access to foreign markets 
(Arab News, 2004).  The intensity of the issue grew as the negotiations proceeded.  In 
fact, it was the last disputable issue before the Saudi accession date in 2005.  It was of a 
‘make or break’ nature, as far as the Saudis were concerned. 
As a background, the feedstock-pricing system particularly for propane, butane and 
naphtha was different, as far as the destination of production was concerned.  Production 
aimed at domestic markets would have a discount of 30%.  Saudi Arabia argued fiercely 
throughout the accession years that the discount was a necessary adjustment for 
domestic users.  These adjustments involved, according to the Saudis’ argument, 
operational, storage and terminalling costs, as well as costs exclusively associated with 
gas exports to the world markets (GATT, 1995: 53). 
This Saudi viewpoint was not decisive enough, however.  In other words, the Saudis 
spent a very long time defining precisely whether there was a system of dual pricing, but 
a justifiable one, or whether such a system did not, in fact, exist.  Among the position 
papers that the Kingdom had been preparing for the accession, the MC had instructed the 
concerned departments since the question–and-answer session (1996-1997) to prepare an 
elaborate paper on the Kingdom’s position pertaining to the prices of petrochemical 
feedstock.  Those departments, namely the MOP, MEI and MPMR, were unable until 25 
April 1999 to exactly outline the Kingdom’s position on this issue.  Accordingly, the 
MC reiterated the importance of having this study ready, and charged the MIE and the 
MPMR to work on a common recommendation with respect to the official position on 
this essential issue (MOC, 1999). 
The problem was that the work on such a recommendation entailed a conflict of 
business.  Under the umbrella of these two ministries (MIE-MPMR), there were two 
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giant Saudi companies, ARAMCO and SABIC.  ARAMCO was linked to the MPMR 
and, as indicated, held a monopoly in the production and export of oil.  With 70% 
governmental share, SABIC was also largely state-owned.  It came under the 
supervision of the MIE, and independently or jointly, with foreign partners, owned the 
petrochemical projects in the Kingdom.  The two ministries authorised the two 
companies to work out the Kingdom’s position with respect to the claim of gas dual 
pricing.   
SABIC argued consistently that the claim was baseless in the first place, as the indicated 
30% discount was for the saved costs from expenses associated with exports and did not 
constitute a de facto specific subsidy, as claimed by some members in the WP.  As to 
ARAMCO, it generally supported such an argument.  In case the argument was not 
acceptable, however, ARAMCO suggested an alternative that would scrap the discount 
and allow ARAMCO, as feedstock provider, to decide on the price of gas sold in both 
domestic and international markets at arms’ length50 (MOP, 1997).  
Mindful of the time pressure, the MC was generally in a situation to accept the 
alternative suggested by ARAMCO (MOFA, 1999), but there was no final decision at 
the time (1999).  SABIC firmly rejected the suggestion and made its reservation clear to 
the MC through the MIE (MOP, 1997).  As entities working on a commercial basis, the 
concerns of ARAMCO and SABIC should indeed have been different from those of the 
MC.   
For ARAMCO, scrapping the governmentally imposed 30% discount on feedstock, of 
which ARAMCO was the provider, would mean an increase in the company’s revenues, 
plus additional power with regard to a product that the company was producing.  On the 
other hand, the cancellation of the discount would bring an increase in the production 
costs for SABIC, and an expansion of ARAMCO’s power at its expense.  What made 
the reservations of SABIC strong, to the extent it could delay arriving at a conclusion, 
was that the given discount served the petrochemical industry to make use of the 
comparative advantage of the Kingdom in this field, as the production of feedstock was 
                                                 
50An ‘at arms’ length agreement’ is an agreement by which the price of a commodity is decided case by 
case according to an agreement between the seller and the buyer. 
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relatively cheap.  This, after all, was a major reason for Saudi Arabia to seek accession 
to the WTO.  Hence, arriving at an internal conclusion regarding dual pricing of gas was 
a long-drawn-out issue and was subject to negotiations right until the end. 
5.2.7 Israel 
As already argued, a number of issues of the Saudi Arabian WTO accession were at the 
intersection of economy, politics and religion.  The Israeli issue can be thought of as 
purely political.  As the WTO accession was distinctly composed of numerous issues 
and sub-issues, however, it could also be thought of as an issue presented not only for its 
own sake, but also to be used as an additional pressure card, or to be traded off against 
other issues. 
Although no political or trade relations existed between the two countries, Israel became 
a member in the WP for Saudi Arabia’s accession in 1996 (WTO, 1996) (appendix 3-5).  
This was a unique situation.  In other international organisations, the Saudis could 
simply avoid Israeli delegations due to the general state of the Arab-Israeli conflict over 
the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.  In the WTO, however, an acceding 
country could not prevent an incumbent member from taking part in the WP established 
to study the accession application.  Therefore, the case could entail not only a mere 
encounter with unfriendly states, but also even face-to-face negotiations. 
This was rather an uncomfortable prospect for the Kingdom.  Hence, the Kingdom tried 
to keep the issue out of the limelight to prevent any public discontent.  Fortunately for 
the Kingdom and the SNT, the Israelis in the WP did not attempt to go beyond attending 
the negotiation sessions.  They did not actively participate in the negotiations at the 
multilateral level, nor did they request bilateral talks.  All Israeli comments went, in fact, 
through the U.S. delegation (Rajab, Interview, 2 May 2002). 
The main Israeli-American concern was about the boycott of Israeli goods and services.  
This embargo policy used to be of three tiers.  The first was the primary, which 
prohibited the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services.  The so-called secondary 
boycott prohibited individuals, as well as private and public firms, from engaging in 
businesses with any entity that did business in the Israeli state.  The tertiary boycott 
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prohibited doing business with a company or individual that had business dealings with 
Israel.  Generally, the U.S. aimed at ending all these kinds of embargo, as part of its law 
of 1977 that made it illegal for American companies to cooperate with the boycott policy 
on Israel (CRS, 2006).   
The Kingdom’s argument was that the boycott was not a unilateral decision; it had been 
taken collectively by the Arab League.  The Saudis contended that the boycott was not 
for protecting local businesses, but for foreign policy purpose.  In this, they took refuge 
in the GATT’s non-application clause XXXV, which allowed an acceding country to opt 
out of obligations with respect to particular members (Kontorovich, 2003: 284-292). 
Saudi Arabia’s attempt not to bring the Israeli issue to the spotlight to avoid internal 
political questioning was not entirely successful.  It was hard to keep the case out of the 
public attention, as it remained an issue of negotiation for years.  Therefore, the 
argument that certain provisions in the WTO allowed the non-application of obligations 
toward particular members was used at the domestic level as well. To this effect, articles 
would be published in local newspapers introducing the existence of such non-
application clauses in the WTO for the purpose of dispersing the idea of possible 
dealings with Israel (Al-Watan, 2005). 
The strong U.S. objection to the boycott policy, in general, could be perceived in light of 
its unparalleled political alliance with the Israelis.  Nonetheless, since the boycott 
contained the secondary and tertiary tiers, businesses in the U.S. were suffering as well.  
The nature of those kinds of embargo, according to the abovementioned definitions, 
would normally touch a third party unlike the primary form, which would be confined to 
the concerned parties only.  Referring to sources from USTR, Kontorovich indicated that 
lost sales, foregone opportunities and distortion of investment decisions were examples 
of the harm experienced by many American firms (2003: 288). 
Like the aforementioned clause XXXV, the WTO also provided for non-application of 
requirements for national security purposes through the XXI article.  The U.S. justified 
its boycott measures against Cuba by reference to a national security exception and also 
invoked the purported foreign-policy exception (Kontorovich, 2003: 296-297).  If such 
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exceptions had in fact been practiced within the framework of the WTO, why would the 
U.S. describe similar practices by other countries like Saudi Arabia as violating the 
WTO’s principle of non-discrimination? 
According to Kasper of the U.S. Mission in Geneva, this analogy is not accurate.  The 
American motivated trade restrictions, as he explained, were imposed against non-WTO 
members, such as Cuba.  The case of the Saudi boycott was totally the opposite, he 
argued.  Israel was an incumbent member and Saudi Arabia was in the process of 
becoming one (Kasper, Interview, 21 October 2003). 
After the Gulf War in 1990, the Middle East witnessed increasing diplomatic efforts to 
settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The Madrid International Peace Conference in 1992 was 
the peak event on this front.  Plausibly, it was against this background that Saudi Arabia 
declared the abandonment of the boycott policy in its secondary and tertiary tiers in 
1994.  Announcing the abandonment came within the framework of a broader decision 
by the GCC states. 
If stripped from the declared purposes, the problem of this issue was that it was there for 
no real reason.  Despite the GCC’s announcement about abandoning the secondary and 
tertiary forms of boycott, and in spite of the argument that the remaining primary 
boycott did not constitute a WTO violation, the U.S. kept the issue on the agenda of the 
Kingdom’s accession negotiations.  It did so on the pretext that Congress did not 
differentiate between the different tiers of boycott against Israel.  Yet, even some of its 
accession negotiators revealed a conviction that this should not, in fact, be a fundamental 
issue, which supported the argument that there was no robust reason for keeping the 
issue alive.  Kasper pointed out the stance of Congress, but said that “We will find a way 
out of this because we are here to solve problems” (Kasper, Interview, 21 October 
2003).  
As time dragged on, however, the issue came slightly to the forefront, to the dislike of 
the Saudis who had wished to keep it out of the public eye, due to its political sensitivity.  
In the sixth round of the Kingdom’s accession in 1999, the U.S. delegation insisted that 
the Kingdom should abandon the boycott on Israeli products.  In addition, on a hearing 
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in the U.S. Congress in the beginning of 2000, Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative, 
told Congress that there were some political and diplomatic complications in the Saudi 
application to the WTO due to the Kingdom’s continuing boycott of Israeli products 
(MOC, 2000: 14).  What inflamed the case was the coincided breakout of the second 
Palestinian Intifada51 in 2000, which enhanced the general angry sentiments of Arabs 
against Israeli actions. 
Accordingly, this became an issue of domestic debate.  Some argued that it should not 
be taken lightly, despite the strong economic enthusiasm for joining the WTO during 
this second phase.  Specifically, the HMC thought, after starting its duties, that the issue 
of trade relations with Israel should be considered with strong reservations, as far as 
Saudi Arabia was concerned. 
Those were the most important issues shaping the course of Saudi Arabia’s accession 
negotiations during this second phase.  Some became less of an obstacle at the end of the 
phase, such as the issue of tariffs on industrial goods.  Others still looked difficult, such 
as the services and gas dual pricing issues. 
More than normal in the context of the accession to the WTO, the bulk of the 
complications in the negotiations of the Kingdom’s accession were encountered in 
dealing with the Quad countries.  From what preceded, the demands of the EU and the 
U.S. were the most difficult.  Moreover, a number of such demands were persistent to 
the extent that they contributed to the phase ending with a slim prospect that Saudi 
Arabia was close to joining the organization. 
5.3 The Pause 
The slim prospect of imminent accession turned into a real pause in the negotiations as 
no rounds of negotiations were going to be scheduled for a couple of years.  The 
economic factors that, at the start of the phase, had a large potential to bring the Saudi 
accession case to a conclusion could not transcend the inhibitions resulting from the 
internal-internal and internal-external interactions throughout the phase.  In addition, 
                                                 
51Intifada, as cited in the Oxford English Dictionary, is a noun of Arabic origin that refers to the 
Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, beginning in 1987. 
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related international events developed around the end of the phase in a manner that 
might have calmed the eagerness to join the WTO, which marked the beginning of the 
phase. 
5.3.1 HMC 
The formation of the HMC in 1999 contributed to the pause of the Kingdom’s accession 
negotiations after the eighth round in October 2000.  In fact, the establishment of this 
new governmental body and the circumstances that surrounded it were hesitant from the 
beginning.  This applied to the parameter of the committee’s task and its place in the 
hierarchy of the official accession effort as a whole.  Accordingly, its work sometimes 
seemed to fit individual timetables and revolve around personal interpretations. 
According to the decision of the COM, the assignment of the committee was to:  
“Follow up on all decisions taken and all policies and rules made in the 
international trading system.  After having them examined, 
recommendations of them should be submitted to the Council of Ministers 
with explanation of benefits and costs and the period of flexibilities required 
to ensure securing the maximum benefit of the accession and to avoid 
damages to the Kingdom’s economic interests” (COM, 1999). 
The text was characteristically unspecific in assigning such a responsibility.  In 
principle, the already existing MC had been handling matters related to the international 
trading system, the issue for which the text was creating the new committee.  In fact, the 
MC’s work within the framework of the WTO accession thus far had reflected just that.  
As to the references in the text about explaining the benefits and costs and making the 
related recommendations, the MC used to also do exactly that, as laid out above.  
However, the text did not refer to the MC and the new committee in terms of the 
relationship between these two institutional agents.  It did not, for instance, indicate the 
hierarchy in the workings of these two bodies and who, among them, would refer to 
whom.  
As the COM left the hierarchical matter undecided, the relational work between the new 
committee and the MC mechanically resembled the virtual political relations within 
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Saudi Arabia.  Chapter Three discussed the Kingdom’s monarchy and broadly broke it 
down into the ruler and his extended ruling family.  Seniority in age has long been very 
important factor in the relationships among the family’s figures, in addition, of course, 
to superiority in responsibilities, which have been very much related to the capabilities 
of individuals.  In the context of the relationship between the new committee and the 
MC, the head of the former, Prince Nayif, is the uncle of the chairperson of the MC, 
Prince Saud Al-Faisal, and older than the latter.52  Thus, he would preside, and a 
governmental body under him would generally by default chair a similar body under his 
younger nephew.  Interestingly, the literature of the MC was decisive in as much as the 
text of the COM was vague.  The writings of the MC’s work would frequently refer to 
the new committee as the Higher Ministerial Committee, which is why this thesis refers 
to the new committee as the HMC (MOC, 2000). 
Generally, the creation of the HMC had been connected to the perception of Saudi 
Arabia as unique, a perception that presented in the introductory chapter as one of the 
reasons for embarking on this study.  Throughout the WTO accession negotiations, the 
Saudi officials would emphasise the uniqueness of their country.  In doing so, they 
painted that quality with a religious colour.  They used such a character to defend, as it 
will be explained later, the Kingdom’s stance on issues like the demands of some 
members in the WP to include agricultural items in the Saudi’s offers, which were firmly 
prohibited by the Shariah.  In frequent cases, they would extend this position of defence 
to some religiously disputable issues, such as insurance and audio/visual services.53 
Another reason for establishing the HMC was the socio-political dimension of 
unemployment.  As mentioned, tackling the challenge of unemployment among young 
Saudis was one of the economic reasons in the effort made by the MC and the SNT, 
during this phase, to speed the process of the WTO accession.  There, however, the 
perception was different.  The solution to the problem was to come as a result of an 
economic expansion and diversification caused by attracting foreign investments and 
                                                 
52
 As to responsibilities, Saudi Arabia has generally resembled most Arab countries, where institutions of 
security, represented by interior ministries, have very superior positions in the states hierarchies.  
53
 There was a common understanding in Saudi Arabia, including the religious establishment, that 
commitments in the audio/visual sub-sector would lead to have cinemas in the country, which were 
officially illegal due to religious reasons that underlined the conservative nature of Saudi society. 
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finding new international markets through the aimed at accession.  In other words, the 
solution in this perception was a long-term one. 
However, the HMC was rather concerned about the unemployment problem in a much 
shorter span.  The best evidence of the impatience with regard to economic changes was 
that the minister of the interior was in charge of the employment programme, the 
‘Saudisation’, rather than the minister of economy and planning, for example.  This was 
an indication that the matter was considered as relating to security and stability.  In this, 
the interior minister would care more about imposing a quota of Saudi employees on 
businesses than about how qualified they were.  Amidst the perplexity caused by the 
continual protraction of accession, the interior minister probably feared that the 
generally pro-WTO teams in the SNT and the MC might sacrifice the issue of 
employment for the sake of accession.  While presiding over the new HMC, Nayif was 
giving statements to the media that ‘Saudisation’ was a strategic choice and that the 
objective was to fill all jobs with Saudis (Arab News, 2003).  Such statements reflected a 
rigid position towards the WTO, which would present itself in the dealing between the 
HMC and the MC in the beginning of the next phase. 
5.3.2 Associated External Developments 
In addition to the HMC and all associated political infringements, there were two 
international events that resulted in impeding the Saudi accession negotiations.  The first 
was the WTO third ministerial conference in Seattle late 1999, which was supposed to 
launch a new round of global trading negotiations after the UR.  The failure of the 
conference and the masses of public protest against it were a major setback for the 
organization as a whole.  Questions emerged regarding the validity of what it stood for.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the developments in Seattle, among others, 
gave rise among non-members to reflections about the necessity of joining the WTO.  
This was also true for Saudi Arabia (Al-Ohaly, Interview, 5 May 2004). 
The second factor was the new development in the oil market.  The advent of the new 
millennium saw an increase in oil prices after years of economic calamity.  As seeking 
the WTO accession was partially seen as an exit from the domestic economic problems 
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caused by the drop in oil prices, the improvement in such prices should have had a 
reverse effect.  Some began to voice their concerns about this internally and questioned 
the need for Saudi Arabia to join this demanding organization in light of the increase of 
oil prices (Al-Ohaly, Interview, 5 May 2004). 
5.4 Analysis 
Unlike during the first phase of the slow-paced proceedings, timing became a concern, 
particularly to the governmental agents.  There were indications that the MC sensed the 
importance of time with the beginning of the second phase.  Upon reaching this stage, 
the MC was more experienced as to what the accession negotiations really were about.  
The MC, along with the SNT, experienced at firsthand how the demands and positions 
of the WP members, especially the Quad countries, were becoming tougher as the 
negotiations proceeded (MOFA, 1997).  As the MC soon realised, the bar of demands 
was raised whenever an acceding country seemed to reach a requested target (Al-Jasir, 
Interview, 5 April 2006). 
In fact, it was at this time that the MC plainly pointed out for the first time that 
protraction in the WTO accession was not in the Kingdom’s best interests (MOFA, 
1997).  Even more significantly, the MC specified the year 2000 as a self-targeted 
deadline for accession.  Hence, this called for taking the particular steps that had so far 
proven, as in the first phase, an impediment to the Saudi accession (MOFA, 1998).  As 
an example, the MC reiterated the call to make the accession process a full-time job for 
the SNT members, since their work for the WTO accession came, as mentioned, in 
addition to their original official responsibilities (MOFA, 1997). 
To speed up the process even further, the MOC invited the chairperson of the WP of the 
Saudi accession case to make a checklist of the binding issues with the WP members and 
a summary of the latter’s demands, along with his suggestions on how Saudi Arabia 
could best go about handling such demands.  The MC adopted this checklist as the base 




Another important indication of the issue of time, the urgency of which was sensed by 
the MC, was the change in the Kingdom’s aim in the accession negotiations.  It set out 
the negotiations in this phase with the target of maintaining Saudi Arabia’s best 
interests, which in part was to achieve similar terms and conditions to those secured by 
some other GCC states that had joined the GATT/WTO system much earlier.  As this 
was proving a very difficult goal to achieve because most of those states had acceded to 
the multilateral trading system through succession not accession, as explained in Chapter 
Two, and for the sake of not delaying the process any longer, the MC changed the 
accession’s primary objective.  Thus, instead of repeatedly insisting on securing the best 
terms and conditions in the accession in a manner that would further the Kingdom’s 
interests, the Saudi negotiators were advised to focus on the macro interests of the 
country through trying to reduce any harmful conditions that might affect the country’s 
economy (MOC, 25 April1999; COM, 1999). 
In this light, the MC and the SNT were, apart from the problematic subjects, largely 
responsive to the demands made round after round by the WP members.  The 
Kingdom’s position on the issue of tariffs on industrial goods is a case in point.  
However important it was, the pressure of time was not the sole element in shaping such 
a positive position by the MC and the SNT. 
The benefit/cost assessment made in 1999 emphasised the importance of the WTO 
accession to the Saudi economy.  Well into the phase, the importance attached to the 
economic benefits from the WTO was still weighing out, in a period of economic 
reform, the reservations that were emerging about the accession.  Indications for this 
were the issuance of a new investment law in 2000 and the establishment of SAGIA. 
Indeed, economic factors became crucial, as far as the endeavour to join the WTO was 
concerned.  The Kingdom wanted to join the WTO to attract foreign investments and to 
have better international market access for its industry, particularly petrochemicals, so 
that it could diversify its economy and generate jobs for young Saudis.  Furthermore, the 
Kingdom conspicuously realised, as indicated in the assessment, that the WTO had 
already gone a long way in controlling world trade and this was becoming a pressing 
fact that the Kingdom, as a trading country itself, could not underestimate.   
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Even when the MC made the aforementioned change in the wording of the accession’s 
aim, the crucial importance of the economic factor remained, albeit in a passive manner.  
The change of the aim, which was made for the sake of speeding up the accession, 
basically meant that if the WTO could not benefit the domestic economy, then, at least it 
should not affect it negatively. 
Such general pragmatism on the part of the MC in responding to the WP’s demands and 
the importance that this committee attached to the economic aspect could largely be 
attributed to the nature of its membership.  As pointed out, the considerable portion of 
the major cabinet reshuffle in 1995 went to newcomers with high degrees from Western 
universities.  This trend extended to the MOC and the MC.  The availability of such 
individuals was an outcome of the policy started in the mid-1970s to enlarge the pool of 
technocrats to be able to run a modern economy that was expected to emerge out of the 
Kingdom’s era of oil boom.  In general, they demonstrated an understanding of the 
global developments that increased the importance of the multilateral trading system.  
As far as the developments of the accession negotiations allowed, they worked hard for 
some time to further the case of accession in a purely professional manner that tried to 
emphasise the benefit and costs of this accession. 
Despite these positive efforts from the MC, the Kingdom’s accession suffered, as 
reflected in this second phase, from its institutional fabric.  As pointed out in Chapter 
Three and early in this chapter, there was more than one formal agent in charge of the 
Saudi WTO accession.  This was what the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of 
commerce referred to, at a later stage of the accession process, as multiple points of 
reference and duplication of work.   
A closer look at the work of those agents from within will illustrate major defects.  A 
clear example for this was the position of the minister of agriculture and the COM.  
More than once, as discussed, the former would bypass the MC, a committee to which 
he belonged, and use the authority of the COM to change sometimes agricultural-related 
offers that had already been approved by the COM itself.  This, to a large extent, 
reflected an existing incoherence in the work of those agents.  In addition, it revealed 
that the MOC and the MC lacked the authority to push the process in a manner suitable 
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to the criticality of the time pressure.  The year 2000 was approaching, and with it the 
deadline set by the MC for Saudi Arabia to accede to the WTO.  Yet, the minister of 
agriculture and the COM behind him were still insisting on requests that plainly seemed 
unachievable, such as securing a long transitional period to reduce agricultural subsidies. 
However, the official stance with regard to the example of agriculture cannot be merely 
confined to the institutional defect and abstracted from the business situation.  In the 
case of the MOA’s defence of high tariff rates on some of the milk products, for 
instance, it is important to underline the already mentioned fact that the producers were 
large companies as far as the characteristics of the Saudi economy indicated earlier were 
concerned.  According to some of the interviewees, the government treated them 
advantageously.  Moreover, the biggest of these companies belonged, as mentioned in 
footnote (43), to individuals from the ruling family. 
Such a multiplicity of agents and the low level of coherence among them, which at 
points reduced progress in some areas to zero, is an indication of the effect of Tsebelis’ 
concept of veto players.  As in Chapter Three, the work of a policy was a function of the 
number of veto players and the cohesion among them.  In the case of the Saudi 
accession, the number of formal agents directly involved and the level of co-ordination 
among them, particularly the MC and the HMC, slowed the accession process and was 
one of the main reasons why the negotiations came to a halt after the negotiation round 
of October 2000. 
Apart from this flaw in the work of the institutional agents, there were complications at 
the level of negotiated issues.  The best example for this was the negotiations over the 
services sector.  For two consecutive rounds of the accession negotiations, the fourth and 
fifth, the related offer presented by the Kingdom was merely the current status quo at the 
time.  For an acceding country that only wanted to preserve the status quo, responding to 
the demands of the WP members to make commitments in areas such as financial 
services, distributions and telecommunications would have meant making a leap in 
opening this sector. 
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Thus, even those in the Kingdom who were in favour of an expeditious accession 
showed signs of caution.  As discussed, SAMA foresaw the eventual inevitability of 
services liberalisation, which was in itself a good indication that SAMA had understood 
the trajectory of international economy in a world that was growing more 
interdependent.  Moreover, SAMA’s deputy governor at the time headed the services 
issue team in the SNT, and he agreed with the general position of the MC to accelerate 
the Kingdom’s accession process (Al-Jasir, Interview, 05 April 2006) particularly during 
this phase, Phase Two.  
Yet, while the MC was reviewing the outcomes of the back-and-forth talks with the WP 
prior to going for the fifth round of the Kingdom’s WTO accession, SAMA was arguing 
that the status quo of the sector was still considered generous compared with many of 
the WTO incumbent members.  Therefore, it stressed that the Kingdom should make no 
new commitments.  Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s offer for the fifth round of the accession 
negotiations in November 1998 for the second time did not include any new 
commitments in the field of financial services.   
To some, this meant that SAMA could influence such a financial-services-free offer (Al-
Shanbary, Interview, 11 November 2005; Al-Hasher, Interview, 18 April 2002).  That 
was partly true.  However, it was also true that the MC should have demonstrated 
stronger leadership in this respect.  It was problematic to accept to enter a negotiation in 
1998 with no commitments in such an important sector to the WP members when the 
year 2000 had already been set as a deadline from the Saudi side to finalise the 
Kingdom’s accession to the WTO.  What made it even more difficult was the U.S.’s 
general firm position in the negotiations not to compare an offer made by an acceding 
country, as SAMA was internally arguing, with the current market situations in the 
WTO incumbent members.  According to the U.S., such comparisons should be 
confined to the market situations in other acceding states. 
As in the above-mentioned case of the MOA, whose behaviour has to be seen in the 
context of the agricultural business situation, this stance of SAMA could not be viewed 
independently of the Saudi banks.  Banks were in a strong position and their interests 
were well protected by SAMA.  In the negotiations, the SNT would present the 
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argument that the non-issuance of banking licenses was due to market saturation.  
However, the situation of the market was rather a sort of banking cartel.  In fact, from 
the 1980s to the beginnings of the new millennium, only seven banks operated in the 
Kingdom.  This was a relatively small number for the biggest economy in the Middle 
East. 
The complexity of the services sector was not confined to the financial services.  The 
MC found itself, upon the position taken by the PTT not to liberalise, defending the 
status quo of the telecommunications sector as well.  In fact, the economic factors 
related to services at some point during the phase seemed to push the Kingdom in two 
opposite directions.  On the one hand, the economic circumstances in the second half of 
the 1990s were provoking reform.  There was a perceivable need for reform to free 
markets and attract investments, and that was what Saudi Arabia was generally willing 
to do.  The investment law of 2000 and SAGIA are good examples for this.  On the other 
hand, the U.S. and the EU were persistent in making some very difficult demands from 
the Saudi point of view, especially with respect to opening the sensitive sub-sector of 
distribution, including the wholesale and retail services. 
Similar to the large impact of services on the accession process, the issue of TRIPS and 
its related developments was of a considerable effect as well, especially where it 
intersected with religion.  In 1998, the MC dropped the explicit request to have a 
developing country status and, hence, presented consecutive offers to reduce the 
transitional periods it requested for the purpose of implementing TRIPS-related 
agreements.  This stance adopted by the MC led to increasing internal concerns.  The 
best indication was the later implicit apportioning of blame from the HMC, which 
argued that the MC/SNT had not seized the benefit of proclaiming the Kingdom to be a 
developing country. 
However, the proposition of the minister of commerce to form a committee to ensure 
consistency between domestic regulations and the WTO was perhaps another aspect 
adding to the internal fear of the organization.  Unfortunately, the minister’s proposition 
came around the time when the U.S. introduced its provocative request concerning the 
forbidden agricultural goods.  This, as discussed, had religious implications.  In fact, the 
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adding of the precautionary text by the COM to the commerce minister’s 
recommendation, which maintained the supremacy of the Shariah, and the formation of 
the HMC, which asserted the country’s uniqueness, reflected that the concerns were 
serious. 
Nonetheless, the demands of the WP members, particularly the U.S., extended to include 
the request to review the drafts of TRIPS-related laws before having them officially 
approved.  As mentioned, this was impossible as far as the Saudi leadership was 
concerned.  However, it was not only the leadership or, in this case, the COM that was 
opposed.  It would have been a risky move if the MC had reflected on having the COM 
consider this demand, as it had previously suggested that the COM consider complying 
with the request for transitional periods to implement TRIPS.  The HMC was established 
by the COM just around that time in the light of demands of this kind.  For its part, the 
MC was aware that the HMC had been established because worries about the accession 
were mounting, particularly in the area of rules and regulations.  Had the MC 
recommended to the COM that the Kingdom contemplate the demand of handing its 
drafts of laws over to the WTO before formally endorsing them, it would probably have 
been taken as a sign of weakness. 
It is important to point out that, by the time the HMC was established, the MC had not 
made any major concession that would have jeopardised the Kingdom’s economy or 
compromised religious principles during the accession negotiations.  In fact, the 
domestic apprehension of the WTO thus far was largely due to speculation.  The 
speculation most likely resulted from the limited amount of information that was 
available to those not directly involved, and that was a result of the overall secret nature 
of the accession negotiations.  As the Kingdom’s accession attempt was still dragging on 
from 1993, outsiders were left to make their own assumptions and interpretations. 
Unfortunately for the accession, part of this apprehension was ‘home-made’ by the MC.  
In this, Saudi officials involved in the accession negotiations agitated, knowingly or 
unknowingly, the internal concern that the Kingdom was being pressured by the WTO to 
give up to some of its religious principles.  More than once around the end of the 1990s, 
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they would blame the protracted accession on the WTO’s pressure to yield in religious 
issues (Arab News, 2001). 
As a matter of fact, the MC and the SNT sometimes abused the religious argument, as in 
the sub-issue of insurance.  Although religion was generally fundamental to Saudi 
Arabia’s accession efforts, the religion’s own view of issues differed.  In other words, 
Islam is more decisive about some issues than others.  For example, the religious 
prohibition against alcohol and pork is more explicit than that against insurance.  
According to Sheikh Al-Dawood and Sheikh Al-Abduljabar, the issues perceived as 
important by the religious establishment, as far as the Kingdom’s accession was 
concerned, were related to two broad categories.  The first would include any subject 
that was deemed to be in direct conflict with the Shariah.  For instance, Saudi Arabia 
must not, because of religion, issue patents for equipment used in alcohol production.  
The second category contained religiously disputable subjects, which were therefore of 
secondary importance to the religious establishment.  Insurance was mentioned by both 
of the interviewees as an example of issues in the second category, as the matter was still 
disputable (Al-Dawood, Interview, 03 May 2004; Al-Abduljabar, Interview, 03 May 
2004). 
In fact, insurance had been a subject of religious considerations for years before the sixth 
round of the Saudi accession negotiations.  In 1994, the Commission of Higher Ulama 
decided that the concept of insurance was not wholly incompatible with the Shariah.  
The Ulama differentiated in this respect between two kinds of insurance: conventional, 
or commercial, and cooperative.54  It concluded that only the latter was acceptable as far 
as the Shariah was concerned (Al-Dawood, Interview, 02 April 2006). 
This emphasised that the stress on religion during the negotiations was sometimes raised 
in unnecessary situations.  As mentioned, the frequent statements by some of the SNT 
and the MC’s members that the Kingdom was being pressured to make concessions in 
religion-related matters led the religious establishment to develop a suspicious stance 
                                                 
54
 According to a prominent Saudi Muslim scholar, Sheikh Muhammad bin Saalih al-Uthaymeen, “The 
term cooperative does not mean compensation (as in commercial insurance), it only means mutual 
cooperation in times of affliction and accidents” FatwaIslam.com, last accessed 20/06/2011. 
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towards the WTO.  This, in turn, inhibited the Kingdom’s accession process, in general, 
and protracted this phase in particular, which, unlike the previous phase, experienced an 
active boost. 
Apart from the internal interaction, the fact that the demands of the WP touched some 
sensitive economic, political and cultural aspects of Saudi Arabia several times during 
this phase reflects the leverage that the WTO incumbent members could have in the 
accession negotiations over acceding countries.  It illustrates, at the same time, the lack 
of sufficient rules that would govern the accession negotiations, a point that was 
discussed in Chapter Two.  In this case, Canada took advantage of the general and 
unspecific accession rule about leaving the terms of any accession to the negotiations.  
As such, it could return to the multilateral negotiations of the eighth round and re-open 
some issues that Saudi Arabia thought it had finalised with Canada. 
Furthermore, the Canadian position of re-opening some issues proved to some in Saudi 
Arabia that the roles practiced in the accession negotiations by the Quad countries in 
particular were reversed.  While the Kingdom’s aforementioned economic and political 
cards for the eighth round of negotiations in October 2000 seemed to be playing 
relatively well with some of the Quad members, such as the EU, Canada unexpectedly 
surfaced around the end of this eighth round to stress that there were still some unsettled 
issues related to the Saudi commitments in the services sector. 
Concerning these positions from the WP members and particularly those of the Quad, 
one might question the justification of the U.S. position in the negotiations, which 
seemed, in a number of instances, to be inflexible and persistent.  It appeared as such 
despite the ‘special relationship’ between the two countries.  There were two plausible 
reasons for this.  One was linked to the changes in the international new configuration of 
power and priorities.  The other was related to changes at the top executive level of the 
U.S. 
As mentioned, the conclusion of the UR and the establishment of the WTO came after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of socialism as practiced by countries in 
the Soviet’s orbit, and others in the Third World.  With the disappearance of the only 
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strategically competitive state, the U.S. became the only superpower on the international 
stage.  More importantly, perhaps, the economic philosophy of liberalisation, which the 
U.S. represented, began to gain universal acceptance at the time. 
Hence, the U.S. felt it was not necessary anymore to accommodate acceding countries 
for political reasons.  It had previously done so, as indicated in the previous chapter, 
during the GATT era in an effort to weaken the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.  
Furthermore, in order to promote the spread of its economic ideas of free market and 
trade liberalisation, which were linked to the Soviet Union’s downfall, the U.S. had to 
enforce new rules for the accession game: economy and technicality. 
In fact, the Clinton administration took a clear interest in that, and championed global 
free trade.  This leads to the second part of the answer regarding the U.S. position 
towards the Kingdom’s WTO accession.  Unlike the intimate and personal relationship 
with the previous administration of George H.W. Bush, which reached a climax point, as 
indicated, in 1990 in the coalition to liberate Kuwait, the new Democratic 
administration, which came into office a year before Saudi Arabia applied to the GATT, 
showed less interest in keeping the bilateral relationship at such an intimate level.  One 
indication for this was that the White House became less accessible for the Saudi 
ambassador in Washington during this administration’s tenure (Unger, 2004)55. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Given the manner in which Phase One had ended, it was anticipated that Phase Two 
would be more intense in terms of mobilising the internal efforts to accede to the WTO.  
There is no better indication for the intensity of the phase, at least compared to Phase 
One, than the fact that the accession rounds with the WP moved during this phase from 
the question-and-answer sessions to the actual negotiations.  The phase had five rounds 
of negotiations, from round four to round eight.  They took place in a context that helped 
to enhance the case for a timely Saudi accession to the WTO. 
                                                 
55See also, in this regard, “The Vanishing Lobby”, www.economist.com, last access 27. 04. 2005. 
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Unlike the slow-paced proceedings that characterised Phase One, there were signs from 
the beginning of this phase that the governmental agents responsible for the Kingdom’s 
WTO accession had sensed the importance of the time factor.  Specifically, the MC and 
the SNT had experienced for themselves the complexity of the accession negotiations by 
directly encountering the WP incumbent members.  They realised that the demands and 
positions of the WP members, especially the Quad states among them, were becoming 
tougher as the negotiations proceeded.  Thus, they decided that the protraction of the 
accession would not serve Saudi Arabia’s interests, and specified the year 2000 as a self-
targeted deadline for the Kingdom to finalise the accession process. 
In addition, the critical economic situation worked to reinforce the economic argument 
for joining the organization.  As unemployment was rising phenomenally and oil 
revenues were unable to balance out the consecutive budget deficits due to the collapse 
of prices in 1998, the government had to turn seriously to economic reform.  Hence, for 
instance, a new investment law that provided for 100% foreign ownership was issued, 
and a general investment authority was established to streamline investment procedures.  
In addition to the fact that such developments helped in the process to improve the 
Kingdom’s offer in the negotiations in important areas like services, the whole context 
of economic difficulty worked as a catalyst to the calls to seize the economic benefits 
that the WTO promised.  Such calls came mainly from the MC and the SNT, and 
reflected at the same time a tendency in favour of economic liberalisation.  This 
tendency was boosted by the reshuffle in the top posts in the country in 1995, which 
largely filled such high-ranking positions with technocrats and applied to the COM, MC 
and the Shura council as well. 
Although the economic argument was salient, it was not inclusive.  The business 
community, for example, repeatedly displayed a strong resistance, e.g., regarding issues 
like opening the distribution services by making commitments in the negotiations on the 
wholesale and retail sub-sectors.  More importantly, however, the economic argument 
for the WTO accession met in the process with some cultural and political inhibitions.  
The uniqueness of Saudi Arabia, which stemmed from applying the Islamic Shariah, 
was thought domestically to be under threat.  The demands of the WP members 
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extended, as the religious establishment in the Kingdom perceived it, to encroach on the 
religion of the land.  Since this was important for the legitimacy of the regime itself, the 
government, represented by the COM, was sensitive to such a perception, which was 
spreading as the negotiations kept dragging on.  Hence, the COM decided in 1999 to 
establish the HMC, and furthermore, to issue a precautious directive stressing not to 
accept any WTO-related agreement that might violate the precedence of the Shariah. 
In addition to religion, the formation of the HMC also had a socio-political backdrop.  
Unemployment was not solely perceived as an economic problem, but as a social and 
political issue as well, as it might, if it kept increasing, endanger the country’s stability.  
In light of this, addressing the unemployment in the Kingdom through the ‘Saudisation’ 
programme became the responsibility of the MOI, which was also to lead the HMC.  At 
the same time as the WP members were demanding in the accession negotiations to 
increase the pool of foreign workers in Saudi companies and facilitate their entry into 
the Kingdom, the minister of the interior was saying that the aim was to fill all jobs with 
Saudi citizens. 
The difference in interests and perceptions, right after the establishment of the HMC, 
resulted in the abandonment of the deadline to accede to the WTO in 2000, which the 
MC had set itself.  In order to iron out such differences and proceed forcefully towards 
the accession, a political mentor would have been needed.  However, the deteriorating 
health of King Fahd at that time meant that the WTO issue was not provided with the 
needed political support. 
The WTO accession negotiations were not only difficult, but touched a wide range of 
issues as well.  Seven issues were important during this phase.  They were: tariffs on 
industrial goods, agriculture, intellectual property rights, government procurement, 
services, dual pricing of gas and Israel.  Although they were not the only issues, they 
were decisive in shaping Phase Two, and the whole Saudi accession issue as well. 
During the course of negotiating these issues, the Kingdom would usually start with a 
position, and then begin to modify it not only in the light of how uncompromising the 
position of the demander in the WP was, but also according to the domestic interplay 
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and the wider economic and political context.  At a later point of the phase, it was clear 
that negotiating these issues resulted in overlapping interests between economy, politics 
and religion.  The inflexibility of some of the Quad members, especially the U.S., and 
their disregard for the complexity that this intertwinement between the economic, 
political and religious factors was creating made it very difficult for the MC and the 
SNT to transcend the internal impediment, which was largely reflected by the 
establishment of the HMC. 
In addition, the fiasco with which the Ministerial Conference ended its work late 1999 
contributed to lessen the prestige of the organization as far as those who were interested 
were concerned.  Another factor that made accession again less mandatory was the 
upwards turn of oil prices in the beginning of 2000.  Accordingly, the Saudi people 
questioned the need to be a WTO member.  All these factors contributed to bringing the 
Kingdom’s accession negotiations to a halt in 2000. 
The following table will display the internal, external, political and economic elements 




Table 5-11: Elements Important to Phase 2 







- Cost and benefit analysis of accession: 
positive perception about the possibility of 
economic gain. 
- Issues overlapping: economic demands 
encroaching on some religious and political 
elements, signs of inhibitions. 
- Business community: showing at some 
point a resistance to some issues such as 
opening the distribution sub-sector.  
- Complexity of issues presented by U.S. and 
EU: promoting the focusing on economic and 
technical factors, but still no total 
abandonment of political effort. 
 
 
- Encroachment on religious and political 
domestic aspects: creating internal concerns 
pertaining to the WTO. 
- HMC: reflecting the mounting internal 
concerns regarding the accession.   
- A mentor of the efforts to accede: lack of 
such a political sponsor. 
- Incoherence and politics among 
governmental agents. 








- 1998 collapse in oil prices: looking for 
solutions to an ailing Saudi economy, the 
WTO accession as one option. 
- WP raising the bar of economic demands 
round after round: delaying accession not 
serving the Kingdom’s interests. 
- U.S.: Clinton administration championing 
global trade liberalisation based on the WTO 
principle of ‘single undertaking’  
- Oil prices increase with the commencement 
of the new millennium: suggestions of Saudis 
hardening their negotiating position. 
- Failure of Seattle: the WTO seemed less 
attractive. 
 
- WP requesting to review domestic rules 
before being officially endorsed: 
sovereignty’s breach.  
- Trading with Israel: a boycott applied 




Chapter 6 Phase Three 2001-2005 
The eighth round of the Kingdom’s accession negotiations in October 2000 was the last 
before the second phase came to an end.  The following few months were spent in 
arguments and counterarguments specifically between the MC and the newly established 
HMC, amid which the focus shifted to re-define priorities, and hence the negotiations 
with the WP to join the WTO were suspended.  The halt of the negotiations was mainly 
due to internal and external disputes over the issues that were the subject of the previous 
phase: Islamic principles, labour, TRIPS related laws, trade relations with Israel, some 
services sub-sectors (retailing trade – telecommunications – insurance) and gas pricing. 
Phase Two was generally characterised by the salience of economic elements.  Phase 
Three, however, would take a rather political turn.  It was intense in terms of internal 
politics especially between the MC and the HMC.  Moreover, political elements, 
including the emergence of a political mentor, were crucial in bringing Saudi Arabia 
closer to the WTO in the course of this phase.  They were essential to finally bringing 
Saudi Arabia to sign the protocol of the accession to the organization.  
6.1 Internal Situation after the ‘Pause’ 
In 2000, the oil markets witnessed a considerable upward turn.  The price of oil jumped 
approximately by US$10 per barrel from 1999.  As a result, the growth in the 
Kingdom’s GDP went from 0.4% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2000 (Saudi-American Bank, 
2001:1).  Some have argued, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that this led the 
Kingdom to harden its position in October 2000, when it last negotiated with the WP 
members. Al-Ohaly believes that this was in fact a reason for the freeze in the accession 
negotiations, as some in the Kingdom were saying that the country was doing pretty well 
without the WTO (Interview, 5 May 2004).  However, the actual measures taken by the 
government were rather pointing in the other direction.  
The government has worked since 1998 towards economic reform even if the 
improvement in the oil prices in 2000 slowed, as some argued, this process of economic 
change, partially represented by the weakened attempt to accede to the WTO.  
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Therefore, the government made it a strategic goal to attract investments regardless of 
the condition of the economy.  Even the business community, which had experienced the 
decrease in government spending in the previous two decades, now emphasised the 
importance of capital inflow through foreign investments.  Many in the business 
community, according to Al-Sheik, came to realise this.  In a nutshell, as he put it, “if we 
do not have investment, we do not have an economy” (Alsheik, Interview, 28 April 
2004).  
6.1.1 Reform Steps 
In addition to the aforementioned new investment law of April 2000 and SAGIA, the 
government aimed to manage its reform efforts by establishing new governmental 
bodies to streamline economic projects and avoid hectic bureaucratic procedures.  In 
August 1999, the government announced the formation of the Supreme Economic 
Council (SEC) to evaluate industrial, agricultural and labour policies.  The SEC was to 
supervise the privatisation policies as well.  Also, the government established in January 
2000 the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals (SCPM) as a body responsible 
for policymaking on petroleum, gas and other hydrocarbon materials.  The SCPM 
passed, to this effect, the gas initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah, the current king, 
which invited foreign companies to develop natural gas fields in the Kingdom.  
Moreover, the country for the first time moved towards openness in terms of tourism.  In 
April 2000, the government set up the Supreme Commission of Tourism (SCT) to 
exploit the potentials of the Kingdom in this area and to encourage investment from the 
private sector (Embassy of Saudi Arabia-Washington, 2004: 10-11) (appendix 4-6). 
The chain of reforming steps, embodied in issuing laws and setting up councils, that 
started around the end of the 1990s was mainly governmental.  As discussed in Chapter 
Three, major projects in the Kingdom – whether they were political, economic or social 
– would traditionally need a ‘mentor’ to create the momentum required.  As also 
mentioned in examining the previous two phases, the Kingdom’s WTO accession 
project lacked such a mentor.  This was not the case around the end of the 1990s, 
however.   
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Those reforming initiatives required significant political back-up, especially in light of 
the positive signs from the oil markets in 2000, which provided for the tendency to relax 
the new reforming efforts.  The crown prince at the time, King Abdullah, assumed the 
mentor’s role of economic reform in general.  Even before the SCPM passed it, he was 
the one who took the initiative to open the gas sector in the Kingdom for foreign 
investment when he invited international oil companies to submit their proposals in 
September 1998.  He himself became the head of the SEC, which after its establishment 
in August 1999 assumed the highest authority in directing the Kingdom’s economic 
policies.  Abdullah has since been the figure that officials and ordinary citizens would 
refer to when talking about reform in the Kingdom (MEMRI, 2009; Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, 2006; Times Online, 2004; The Financial Times, 2002).  As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the business community referred to his Majlis when 
the issue of opening the distribution services came up in the accession negotiations. 
The new atmosphere with respect to economic reform had a cumulative effect in the 
country.  Generally, the interviews conducted with the businesspersons in Chapter Four, 
Phase One, did not reflect an integrated fierce resistance to the idea of the WTO.  They 
had some concerns and acted upon them when they saw necessary, as seen in the 
examples in Phase Two.  Yet even when they acted, they did so in an ad-hoc manner, 
objecting to individual issues at particular points.  However, they were not against 
liberalisation per se.  As mentioned in that chapter, the concept of liberalisation, which 
the WTO promised to embody, was not devoid of appeal to any business community, 
including that of Saudi Arabia.  
Thus, the internal environment was suitable for a positive accumulation of economic 
liberalisation as far as the business community was concerned.  In fact, the 
aforementioned cuts in spending by the government, on which the business community 
had heavily depended, and the call of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan for the 
business community to play a rather larger role in the economy needed an official 
enhancing of the liberty of this community to act in a manner that would be responsive 
to such a call.  In this, several prominent businesspersons interviewed stressed the 
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importance of upgrading the condition of the regulatory system in the Kingdom, which 
was an important premise of any reforming attempt. 
Thus, the general internal atmosphere around the year 2000 was inclined towards 
reforming the economy.  The business community, which used Abdullah’s own Majlis 
several times to convey concerns about some aspects of the accession, seemed generally 
to support his latest reforming efforts.  In fact, it predicted some fruitful results of the 
reforming plans.  For instance, it was anticipated that the business community would 
have a high share of investment in the assets that the government would divest (Alsheik, 
Interview, 28 April 2004).  In a reception in his Majlis, Abdullah told a large group of 
businessmen: “[B]e assured, God willing, your government will continue to boost and 
facilitate investment” (Arab News, 2001).  In terms of numbers, the government gave 
away 583 projects to foreign and local investors through SAGIA between 2000 and 
2001, which was worth about US$10 billion (Arab News, 2001).   
On the regulatory part of this reforming attitude, strengthening economic and trade-
related rules and regulations became, as indicated, a frequent demand among the 
business community.  A member of a well-known business family in the Kingdom said 
that it was better for the Saudi business community to work in a strong regulated system, 
even if that would regulate the relation with the government, where some businesses in 
fact benefited from the current informality (Al-Zamil, Interview, 04 September 2000).  
This also demonstrated an increase of confidence on the part of the business community, 
which had doubled, according to the deputy minister of industry, the volume of its 
businesses in the previous ten years (Arab News, 2000).  In fact, the private-sector gross 
fixed capital formation by 2000was approximately three times as high as it had been in 
1986.  Moreover, as a proportion of total investment, the private sector accounted for 
more than three-quarters of all gross fixed capital formation in the Kingdom between 
1996 and 2000 (Niblock and Malik, 2007: 130). 
The business community’s increasingly positive attitude towards economic reform and 
its support of Abdullah’s effort resembled, to some extent, the business community and 
reform effort in Turkey.  There, the government had directed the economic activities 
until the 1970s, in accordance with the prevailing ideology of the time, which advocated 
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import-substitution policies.  As it became clear by the late 1970s that interventionist 
policies had exhausted their ability to deliver economic growth, the Businessmen’s 
Association deserted the old ideology and started to publicly advocate policy reform 
(Bates and Krueger, 1993: 450-451).  This new attitude in Turkey came in support of the 
new attitude towards economic opening adopted by the new political leader of the day, 
Turgut Ozal.  
The reforming attitude that was building up around that time had a technocratic link as 
well.  As it came in the previous two phases, the 1990s witnessed for the first time a 
sweeping trend towards filling high positions in the government with technocrats.  The 
same trend was experienced in the Shura since its establishment in 1992.  As many in 
the COM and the Shura had enjoyed a Western education, they were in general 
proponents of economic reform that was based on regulation and privatisation.  A vocal 
economist in the Shura, Bu Hulaiga, was continuously urging for adding momentum to 
the government’s privatisation project (Arab News, 2000).  Such calls resonated with the 
general attitude in the Shura, which acted promptly on the reform-related laws referred 
to it by the COM (Fadil, Interview, 03 February 2009).   
In broad terms, the attitude of the Saudi technocrats resembled that in the broader Arab 
world.  In a study on their position towards globalisation, Al-Said and Harrigan 
indicated that Arab technocrats were generally of same opinion as the IFI such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, which preached liberalisation and privatisation as an 
economic panacea (El-Said and Harrigan, 2006). 
6.1.2 Accession Issue during the ‘Pause’ 
The situation during this period experienced a parallel influence.  On one hand, the 
aforesaid drive for reform was incrementally taking shape.  On the other hand, the 
politics played by the MC and the HMC specifically began to make its mark.   
Establishing the HMC coincided with the sixth round of the Saudi accession 
negotiations in June 1999.  However, the first movement from the HMC came after the 
eighth round (October 2000).  It met in January 2001 and June 2001.  In the second 
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meeting, in which the minister of foreign affairs was absent, the HMC produced minutes 
of its convention that emphasised the following points: 
- The importance of acquaintance with the accession requirements and preparing 
for post-accession; 
- Some of the accession requirements needed revision in light of the principle of 
Shariah; 
- The commitment to some of the agreements might affect the ‘Saudisation’ 
policy; 
- The acceptance of some of the terms and conditions could be of importance for 
the state’s internal and external polices and its stability and security; 
- The MC had not included oil in the accession negotiations, although it was the 
single most important Saudi commodity;  
- The accession required removing the boycott on Israel; 
- The internal strategy of accession had not been clear thus far; 
- The internal process needed more transparency, discussion and participation of 
non-governmental bodies; 
- Some conditions imposed on the Kingdom went beyond trade; 
- The Kingdom did not secure the flexibilities enjoyed by developing states 
(HMC, 2001). 
 
The points reflect two main things: unawareness and imprecision.  Unawareness because 
the HMC seemed not only unfamiliar, as indicated in the first point of its minute, with 
the WTO requirements, but also with some of the domestic policies.  For example, the 
non-inclusion of oil in the accession process was not the MC’s decision; it was state 
policy consistent with a decision made by the GCC countries to avoid submitting this 
strategic commodity as a subject for negotiation.  Also, the MC had not ruled out the 
participation of non-governmental bodies; rather, this was an old decision made by the 
COM in the commencement of the process.  In fact, the MC took the initiative at some 
stage and invited, as mentioned, figures from the business community to take part in the 
accession’s effort.  As to imprecision, the minutes were too general in some parts, and 
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adopting them meant virtually demolishing an on-going process and starting all over 
again. 
In fact, this was what happened to a large extent.  Nayif was in charge of the 
‘Saudisation’ programme to solve the vastly increasing problem of unemployment.  The 
minutes plainly named this programme as an issue for the HMC.  As this was followed 
in the minutes by a point emphasising preserving the country’s security and stability, 
one could infer the connection between the worries that ‘Saudisation’ might fail because 
of the WTO accession and the possible consequences for the Kingdom’s stability.  
Furthermore, the fear of the accession’s effects on religion was mounting for the reasons 
previously explained, and rumours spread that alcohol and pork products might have to 
be licensed in the Kingdom.  Due to these and other issues discussed in the minutes, the 
HMC decided that several ministries should study the terms and conditions of accession 
and its related documents.  Subsequently, the ministries should assess the potential 
challenges and report them to the committee.  In addition, the HMC decided that the 
MC’s recommendations for the Saudi offers in the negotiations should go to the HMC 
before the COM (HMC, 2001). 
The points raised by the HMC did not go without a reaction from the MC.  Separate 
responses came from the minister of foreign affairs, as chairperson of the MC, and the 
minister of commerce, as the person immediately responsible for the accession file in the 
government.  The minister of foreign affairs explained some points and refuted others.  
He brought to the attention of the HMC the fact that the exclusion of oil in the 
negotiations was in conformity with a decision made by the higher council of the GCC.  
He also explained that the rules in the U.S. would not accept the accession of a state that 
exempted Israel from all trade.  As to the opaqueness of the strategy of accession thus 
far, the minister stated that this implied an accusation that the MC was not doing its job.  
Furthermore, he wondered how exactly the requirements of the WTO accession would 
affect the principles of the Shariah (MOFA, 2001).  In the process of this reaction, the 
MC’s chairperson asked the minister of the interior to defer the abovementioned study 
on assessing the anticipated challenges on the pretext that that was difficult before 
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signing bilateral agreements with some major trade partners to Saudi Arabia such as the 
EU and the U.S. (MOFA, 2001). 
For his part, the minister of commerce explained that the accession would not affect the 
‘Saudisation’ programme.  In this respect, he indicated that the MC and his ministry had 
always defended the Kingdom’s position concerning the degree of opening the Saudi 
markets to foreign labour.  He pointed out as well that the MC observed transparency in 
its work as it was composed of all closely related governmental ministries and that 
invitations to participate had been extended occasionally to some other governmental 
departments (MOC, 2001; MOC, 2001). 
In any event, both ministers agreed that what was stated in the minutes and the decisions 
of the HMC constituted multiple points of references, duplication of work and, in turn, 
would protract the Kingdom’s accession even more.  The chairperson of the HMC 
decided, however, to endorse the minute and to carry out those decisions.  For the Saudi 
political context, what mattered was that the minister of foreign affairs and the minister 
of commerce had to come to terms with what the chairperson of the HMC had decided. 
On the part of reforming efforts, according to the timeline offered in this thesis, the 
WTO accession was first contemplated in 1985.  The official decision to join the world 
multilateral trading system represented by the GATT came in 1993.  Between these two 
dates, and when the application was converted in 1995 to accede to the WTO, the 
accession issue was independent of the talks about reform.  In fact, the primary 
governmental sources gathered in this study did not refer to the reform efforts by name.  
Unlike experiences elsewhere, the concept of economic reform is relatively new in Saudi 
Arabia.  It began to take shape in the late 1990s. 
Indeed, the recent economic reforming attitude, which had begun to take shape, provided 
the aim of becoming part of the WTO with a new and wider framework.  In other words, 
the argument for accession became a component of the argument for reform (Arab 
News, 2000; MOFA, 2004; Bhala, 2004: 776; UNDP, 2000). 
  
 263
Around that time, a comprehensive economic reform took precedence over the issue of 
the WTO accession –which was basically a good thing for the accession.  The indirect 
talks about the accession did not provoke the same circumstances, e.g. religious 
objections, that had caused the negotiations with the WP to come to a stalemate around 
the end of Phase Two.  Surely, however, while the reform programme was broader than 
a narrow focus on WTO compliance, the changes in the economic regulatory framework 
had been undertaken with an eye to keeping them consistent with the WTO requirements 
(Chamber of Commerce & Industry - Eastern Province, 2006: 22). 
The former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who was stationed in Riyadh amidst those 
economic changes, stated that it was the right time to reassess the WTO accession with 
the Saudi officials as it was not only important to the Kingdom, but to U.S. interests as 
well.56  Realising that there had been no negotiations since October 2000, he asked 
Abdullah, as the crown prince at the time, how important accession still was to Saudi 
Arabia.  According to the ambassador, Abdullah assured him that although the accession 
negotiations were paused, the accession issue was rather high on the Saudi agenda 
(Middle East Policy Council, 2006: 6).  This position was accompanied by an important 
move.  The SEC, headed by Abdullah, decided in 2001 to slash the tariff rates on goods 
from 12% to 5% across the board, except for some protected items (MFNE, 2001).   
Meanwhile, the governmental agents concerned, mainly the MC and the HMC, were still 
continuing their internal deliberations and arguments.  As indicated above, different 
ministries, especially from the MC, had to deal with the disputed decision of the head of 
the HMC to embark individually on examining the expected challenges of the accession.  
That decision decreed that results should be first submitted to the HMC. 
In its study, the MFNE indicated that in light of the aforementioned recent general 
reduction in tariff rates (from 12% to 5%), only 256 industrial goods out of 
approximately 5600 items would suffer from the WTO accession, as the last fall-back 
                                                 
56
 Speaking about the economic importance of Muslim countries to his home state, Kansas, Bhala pointed 
out that the political spotlight on America’s support for “Israel” and its alliance with the EU 
overshadowed some economic facts.  For example, in the early 2000s, Kansas exported roughly the same 
range of values to Saudi Arabia, Ireland and “Israel”, with Kansas shipping nearly two-thirds as much to 
Saudi Arabia as to the other two countries (Bhala, 2004: 758).   
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position offered in a negotiation with regard to the tariff rates on those 5600 items was 
higher than the rates applied.  Thus, the accession would not have much of an effect on 
the revenues generated by tariffs (MFNE, 2001).   
As in the study of the MFNE, the MIE agreed that the general 5% tariff rate currently 
applied to most industrial items reduced the negative effect of the WTO in this matter.  
The ministry also reported that the Kingdom was 27th among the biggest importing 
nations, which made it an important market to the members of the WTO.  At the same 
time, however, the Kingdom’s production capacity was still limited, and its non-oil 
exports constituted only 11% of the country’s total exports.  It pointed out in this respect 
that accession to the WTO was an important means to increase the percentage share of 
non-oil exports, particularly petrochemicals.  To the MIE, the benefits to the 
petrochemical industry would outweigh the difficulties that medium-sized and small 
businesses were likely to face because of the WTO (MIE, 2001). 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was not a member in the MC, and therefore 
did not have a direct role in the accession issue.  However, the internal programme of 
‘Saudisation’ and the trend to standardise international labour environment, which 
started in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, made it important to 
receive this ministry’s input at this particular stage.  The ministry referred to the decision 
of the COM in April 2001 concerning the formation of labour committees in businesses 
that have more than 100 Saudi workers for the purpose of promoting the concept of 
collective bargaining.  It said that this method was compatible with the labour 
environment in Saudi Arabia, where the expatriate workforce outnumbered the national 
one, and that the International Labour Organisation had taken note of the Kingdom’s 
views on the matter (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2001). 
Regarding the important MPMR, its minister himself met with a sub-committee of the 
HMC that included three ministers of state, the minister of commerce and the deputy 
minister of finance.  The minister of petroleum highlighted that the WP members had 
not raised the issue of oil in the Kingdom’s accession negotiations except as it pertained 
to gas pricing.  In the issue of pricing of gas, the WP members and especially the EU 
and the U.S. criticised that the Kingdom had a double pricing policy in this area.  He 
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said, however, that the COM was about to approve his ministry’s proposal – explained 
in the previous chapter – of deciding the gas prices at arms’ length.  The minister added 
that such an approval would remove a major obstacle concerning the country’s 
accession. Reacting to another critical issue, the minister answered a question regarding 
the prospect of including energy services in any possible future negotiations with the 
Kingdom.  He stated that such services would relate to supporting activities like 
consulting, engineering, exploring, construction and pipelines.  According to his 
explanation, those kinds of services were complicated and highly specialised.  Thus, 
only a very limited number of international companies would be able to provide these 
services.  In addition, Saudi ARAMCO did in fact already sub-contract some of these 
services to foreign companies.  In light of all this, joining the WTO would not be a 
problem from the point of view of MPMR.  In fact, it would enable the Kingdom to be 
present when all issues relating to oil were being negotiated (HMC, 2001). 
The MOP, which was a member in the MC, spoke in its report about the pros and cons 
of the WTO.  According to the report, joining the WTO would have negative effects on 
the Kingdom’s macro economy, as it would reduce the GDP growth rate and increase 
inflation.  However, the effects on some sectors, particularly the petrochemical sector, 
would be positive (MOP, 2001). 
At the same time, remaining outside of the WTO would, according to the MOP, 
negatively impact the volume of investment, especially foreign investment.  It would 
also make Saudi businesses susceptible to foreign charges like those related to dumping.  
Moreover, remaining aloof from the organization would, in the long term, cause the 
Saudi economy to be isolated from the rest of the world.  Therefore, the MOP called for 
a contingency plan to deal with post-accession issues if accession was to take place 
(HMC, 2001). 
The HMC picked out the contingency plan proposed by the MOP and asked whether that 
ministry was able to handle the plan it suggested.  On behalf of his ministry, the minister 
of planning said that such a proposed plan would be better managed by the MOC 
because the issue of the WTO was its responsibility.  In addition, the MOC, according to 
the minister of planning, had over the years accumulated a great deal of experience 
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about the accession subject as a whole.  This provided an opportunity for the minister of 
commerce to reiterate the limitation of resources that the MOC had to work with during 
the negotiations years, e.g., not having a negotiating team whose members were devoted 
only to the accession job, as it was pointed out in Phase One.  The commerce minister 
stated further that this had been understandable when the Kingdom first started the 
accession negotiations due to the economic condition in the mid-1990s.  He expressed 
the hope that the establishment of the HMC, and particularly the chairmanship of the 
minister of interior, would increase the seriousness of approach towards the WTO, 
including allocating better resources to those responsible for managing the accession 
(HMC, 2001). 
It is clear that the accession was not a dead issue in the Kingdom even after the 
negotiations came to an impasse at the end of 2000.  Moreover, the majority still realised 
the importance of the WTO membership.  However, the internal talks concerning the 
accession were still to some extent circling around old points, instead of looking 
forward.  For instance, the HMC made a long gone topic resurface.  As mentioned in 
Phase Two, way before the ‘pause’, the MC dropped the request of considering the 
Kingdom a developing country.  Yet, during this stage of the post-‘pause’, the HMC 
again questioned why the Kingdom could not try to accede to the WTO as a developing 
country (HMC, 2001). 
On the other hand, it does not seem that the concerns of the religious establishment, 
which had been one of the reasons for the ‘pause’, were intensively addressed in those 
internal deliberations apart from what it came in the minutes of the June’s meeting 
headed by the HMC.  Even on the economic front, which had lately shown a new wave 
of inclination towards the WTO, there still was an uncertainty of some kind.  This was 
illustrated by the fact that, two months after its aforementioned decision to slash tariff 
rates across the board from 12% to 5%, the SEC revoked this decision with respect to 
many individual industrial and agricultural items.  After the decision was applied, 
complaints were heard that it had been taken in an overly hasty manner (Al-Obaid, 




The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. were so big as to 
mark a crucial turning point in international relations.  Saudi Arabia, in particular, was to 
face a serious challenge caused by the event.  The participation of 15 Saudis in the 
attacks, in addition to several Saudi nationals and organisations that were identified as 
alleged supporters of terrorism, have called into question the Kingdom’s international 
reliability.  The 9/11 events created an official atmosphere of scepticism about Saudi-
American relations that had previously been described as ‘special’.  Sceptics in Congress 
and the media began drawing uncomfortable attention to the Saudis’ role in general 
including the propagation of stark worldview among the world’s Muslims (TIME, 
2002).  On the whole, the events were “a disaster” for Saudi Arabia, as the current Saudi 
Ambassador to the U.S. described it (Congressional Research Service, 2009: 6-12). 
As a result, Saudi Arabia was no longer portrayed in the American political circles and 
in the internationally influential American media as simply a foreign country with 
massive oil resources.  Since the attacks, the image of the Kingdom has also been linked 
to terrorism.  In addition to the accusation of harbouring terrorism, the 9/11 events made 
the Kingdom face attacks on a host of issues ranging from child custody and women’s 
rights to education (Alyas, 2007:1). 
6.2.1 The Kingdom Exposed 
In an article in the Financial Times, Cordesman stated: 
“Since the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 
September 11 2001, there has been an increasing tendency to treat Saudi 
Arabia not Mr bin Laden, as the enemy.  The result has been a flood of 
criticism of the Saudi leadership, Saudi social practices and the Saudi 
interpretation of Islam.  In some cases, an entire society is treated as if it 
were composed of terrorists” (Financial Times, 2003). 
This reflects how encompassing the circle of criticism of the Kingdom became.  The 
U.S. Congress’s discourse on Saudi Arabia since late 2001 has been characterised by 
questioning the reliability of the Kingdom as an ally.  During the 107th and 108th 
Congresses, some members frequently criticised what they perceived to be Saudi 
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policies that might have contributed to the growth of terrorist threats to the U.S. and 
other states.  In the 109th Congress, some members continued to express concerns about 
the Saudi government’s counterterrorism policies and its domestic reform efforts 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009: 6-12). 
Some of the harshest critics in the media and on Capitol Hill sought to portray the 
Kingdom’s rulers as intimately involved with al-Qaeda.  The unconvincing evidences, in 
this regard, did not stop some in the Congress from believing in the existence of such a 
link between the Saudi government and al-Qaeda.  The Senate Intelligence Committee 
Chairman at the time, Bob Graham, did not dismiss the possibility that a foreign 
government (the Saudi government) provided support to some the Sept. 11 hijackers 
(TIME, 2002). 
The neo-conservatives whose influence became ubiquitous with the beginning of the 
new century and the arrival of George W. Bush to the White House took an antagonistic 
attitude towards Saudi Arabia.  Their representatives in and around the U.S. government 
kept reminding the world of the inherent evil of the Saudi regime.  Senior advisors close 
to the Bush administration, particularly from the Defence Policy Board, consistently 
argued that key figures in the Kingdom had funded Islamic extremists (Business 
Monitor International, 2003: 8).  In a presentation given to the Defence Policy Board in 
July 2002, the presenter analysed the Kingdom from within.  He maintained that the 
influential principles of Wahhabism loathed modernity, democracy and open society.  
He further charged that “Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from 
planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader” 
(Murawiec, 2002).  A notorious depiction of Saudi Arabia in a report prepared by a 
think-tank close to the neo-conservatives tells how far the sentiments had gone against 
the Kingdom.  In a report made by RAND Corporation, Saudi Arabia was described as 
“the kernel of evil” (The Independent, 2003).  In fact, the right-wing circles in 
Washington made their hankering for the overthrow of the ruling House of Saud itself 
quite palpable (Washington Post, 2002).  
In addition to such circles with governmental connection, pressure on Saudi Arabia 
mounted from all other sides.  The Western media in general, and the media in the U.S. 
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in particular, started, from 9/11 to approximately late 2004, a campaign of demonising 
Saudi Arabia.  Major international newspapers would carry extreme headlines about the 
Kingdom such as “Isolated abroad, hated at home: House of Saud faces uncertain 
future” (The Independent, 2004: 5); “The corrupt, feudal world of the House of Saud” 
(The Independent, 2003); “The US and Britain are straining to shore up a hated 
autocracy: Saudi Arabia created the monster now devouring it” (The Guardian, 2004); 
“Danger money for expats as the Saudi exodus grows” (The Guardian, 2004); “The 
House of Saud is doomed by its contradictions” (Times Online, 2004); “Saudi Arabia 
detains reformists” (Reuters, 2004); “Paying the price for incompetence” (The 
Guardian, 2004).  
This negative campaign, referred to by Cordesman as “The cycle of US ‘Saudi bashing’ 
by the Congress and US media” (Saudi-American Forum, 2004: 3), was anxiously 
observed in the Kingdom and at the highest level.  Talking in his Majlis to an audience 
of officials, Ulama and the business community, Abdullah lashed out against the foreign 
media campaign against the Kingdom.  He said “By now, you are aware of the situation 
and the deliberate and malicious campaign against your country.  You have a duty to 
explain to those you know the (real) situation in your country” (Arab News, 2001). 
The common denominator of the criticisms against the Kingdom was that the country 
needed to change.  They charged that Saudi Arabia had managed to fend off the waves 
of modernity and democracy for more than seven decades since the country’s 
foundation.  The lack of any outlet for political expression, the overwhelming weight of 
religion in all aspects of social life and the ruling family’s monopoly on politics had 
exacerbated the disillusionment of Saudi youth, who finding it increasingly difficult to 
secure jobs, as well as the radicalisation of society.  Among the features criticised, the 
spotlight was turned on the Kingdom’s educational system.  Because of its intensive 
religious curricula, commentators in the U.S. and the West charged that the system was 
breeding extremists.  As such, oil supplies in Saudi Arabia were in the hands of 
ideologically extremists and the politically corrupt, and hence they were in danger 
(Economist.com, 2004;Financial Times, 2002; Financial Times, 2002; Economist.com, 
2004; The Independent, 2004: 5; Daily Telegraph, 2004). 
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Combining what Cordesman had referred to as the cycle of “Saudi bashing” by the 
media with the neo-conservatives’ anti-Saudi position had a considerable impact on the 
Saudi government.  It probably was the greatest threat faced by the Saudi regime since 
the inception of the state (Business Monitor International, 2003: 7).  Both took place in a 
context of perilous developments.  The U.S.-U.K. campaign for war against Iraq was 
building up.  In March 2003, the war broke out and caused a regime change in Iraq.  In 
parallel, the Bush administration was preaching the importance of liberty for the whole 
region and spreading plans about a new Middle East.  Bush was quoted as saying: 
“As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and 
anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the 
safety of America and our friends.  So America is pursuing a forward 
strategy of freedom in the greater Middle East.  We will challenge the 
enemies of reform, confront the allies of terror, and expect a higher standard 
from our friend” (Zuhur, 2005). 
The pressure was not confined to this.  The Kingdom experienced a wave of an internal 
violence in the years following 9/11.  A series of Al-Qaeda-linked major bombing and 
clashes with security forces took place in the Saudi capital and other regions.  The 
violence mounted, in some opinions, to low-intensity civil war.  As a result, foreign 
companies offered to repatriate the families of their staff.  Some considered relocating to 
neighbouring Bahrain (The Guardian, 2004).  The situation led to the first meeting ever 
between the Saudi leadership, represented by Prince Saud Al-Faisal, and the foreign 
community in the Kingdom, in which the former agreed to improve security (Daily 
Telegraph, 2004).  Thus, when taken together with the external pressure, the internal 
challenge was, in fact, as the Business Monitor International described it, the greatest 
threat ever faced by the Kingdom. 
6.2.2 The Reaction 
In a speech to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Saudi Assistant Deputy 
Foreign Minister Prince Turki bin Muhammad maintained that “Saudi Arabia will not be 
dictated to by outside forces on reforms” (Arab News, 2004).  Similarly, in a lecture in 
the European Policy Centre in Brussels, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal commented on 
the talks about American plans to impose reforms on the Middle Eastern countries.  He 
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pointed out that he had no knowledge of such plans apart from what the international 
media was speculating.  He added that in any case, however, past experience suggested 
that attempts by external powers to impose reforms were doomed to failure (Asharq Al-
Awsat, 2004: 4). 
Such statements reflect the pressure that the Saudi government was under.  Unlike the 
former attempts of reform, however, the reform expected from Saudi Arabia amid these 
developments would go this time beyond fixing the economy, especially in view of the 
international criticism of the Kingdom in the aftermath of 9/11 on a host of issues, 
including politics and society.  More specifically, the focus of the period was subjects 
like freedom of speech, women’s equality and human rights (TIME, 2002; Washington 
Post, 2002).   
The general response from the Kingdom was not to stand up against such withering 
criticism and calls for change, especially since they mostly came from the U.S., the 
strategic superpower ally that was mobilising international forces to remove the 
leadership of the neighbouring Iraq and was forging, according to speculations, new 
schemes for the whole Middle East.  In addition, the Saudi government was not happy, 
or rather anxious, about the fact that the U.S. government was limited in explaining its 
real positions by what was being said in Washington’s official circles and in global 
media (MOFA, 2004).  In most of the time immediately after the 9/11 events, the U.S. 
administration stood by and left Saudi officials on their own to answer accusations of 
involvement in terrorism (Bronson, 2006: 233).  Thus, with a shaken sense of security, 
the Saudi leaders realised that they had to embark on a wider sort of reform, but, 
according to Abdullah’s view, a reform drive that was commensurate with the 
Kingdom’s circumstances and in accordance with its own pace.  In other words, the 
reform was to be gradual lest it disturb the status quo dramatically (Gulf Research 
Centre, 2003: 34-35; Economist.com, 2004).   
This view was echoed in statements by top officials.  For instance, Saud Al-Faisal, who 
argued against an externally imposed reform, did not deny the need of reform in the 
Arab world, including of course his country.  He did not rule out, in this respect, seeking 
outsider help particularly from Europe and the U.S.  Likewise, the Assistant Deputy 
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Foreign Minister stressed, in his rejection of foreign dictations, the Kingdom’s serious 
intent to draw upon the experience and knowledge of others (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004; 
Arab News, 2004). 
In dealing with this “suffocating crisis”, as Abdullah described it (Survey, 2002: 17), the 
government took some unprecedented steps.  The speech of King Fahd, who had 
suffered a series of strokes since 1995, to the Shura in 2003 indicated an official start of 
these steps.  The King outlined some reforming aspects for his government.  He first 
mentioned the Saudi people’s rejection of terrorism, and stated that the government 
would work to root it out in all of its forms.  Then he spoke about developing the judicial 
system within the framework of a political and administrative reform process in the 
country.  In this context, the King announced for the first time the establishment of a 
nongovernmental committee for human rights.  Socially, he pointed out that the 
government would broaden work opportunities for women (Gulf Research Centre, 2003: 
6-7). 
In addition, the leadership in the Kingdom moved to relax controls over public 
discourse, which triggered an outpouring of opinions and debate among intellectuals and 
leading figures from various segments of society.  The idea of permitting public 
dialogue was a sound policy for Abdullah, who was the crown prince at the time.  The 
National Dialogue Centre he sponsored provided a venue for the expression of social 
discontent, while demonstrating to a critical world the regime’s commitment to greater 
openness in Saudi society (Dekmejian, 2003: 404). 
Though in a limited manner, elections were introduced for the first time in the Saudi 
society.  In October 2003, the government approved groundbreaking plans to streamline 
local municipalities by introducing elections for half of the members of each municipal 
council to ensure that citizens have a voice in local affairs.  For the government, the 
proposal of elections marked an important step in the Kingdom’s on-going reform 
agenda, and it briefed a visiting team of UN experts on the measures completed relating 
the process (Embassy of Saudi Arabia-Washington, 2004: 3-4). 
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At the international level, and to ease the unprecedented American pressure, the 
Kingdom proposed in 2002 a peace initiative between Arabs and Israelis. Abdullah 
called for a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for full 
normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israelis (Congressional Research 
Service, 2009: 26).  This moderate position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was an essential 
trade-off between the Saudi government and the U.S. (The Guardian, 2003).  The peace 
initiative was a chance to enhance such a position, especially since it came to calm the 
inflammation of the situation caused by the breakout of the second Palestinian Intifada 
(Questia.com, 2007). 
More significantly, however, changes reached the realm of the religious establishment.  
The Wahhabi interpretation of Islam was, as mentioned, at the centre of the U.S. and the 
Western states’ criticism.  They charged that its rigid and narrow approach had isolated 
the Saudi society from the rest of the world and finally resulted in the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington.  Because of that, they did not only demand that the Saudis 
wage a security and financial war against terrorism, to which the latter was responding, 
but to wage a similar and simultaneous war on the intellectual front as well.  In other 
words, the Saudis were pressured to rein in Wahhabism and those who represented it, 
the religious establishment. 
According to Al-Rasheed, Wahhabism – which had served from the inception of the 
Saudi state as a source of the regime’s legitimacy – had in the meantime become a 
source of trouble and friction with the U.S. and the Western world (Al-Mushahid 
Assiyasi, 2004: 18-20).  It was believed that Abdullah, as a crown prince, had promised 
Bush when they met in Texas in April 2002 to restrain the “religious police” and to 
begin the process of reforming the educational curriculum to remove its fundamentalist 
tendencies (The Guardian, 2003; Bronson, 2006: 258).  In fact, many changes were 
introduced, in this respect, to school textbooks.  The Ministry of Education set up a 
special committee for this purpose.  Commenting on such moves, a professor at 
Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh said that this was a reaction to 
foreign attacks from Zionist institutions and the U.S., who were exploiting the events of 
9/11 to wage war against the Kingdom and its religious principles (Al-Hayat, 2004: 17).  
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At the level of curbing the activities of some of the Ulama, the Minister of Islamic 
affairs made a statement in May 2003 that the government would not tolerate 
unacceptable messages made by Saudi religious preachers operating abroad (Al-Watan, 
2003: 23). 
In agreement with what Al-Rasheed thought about Wahhabism becoming a source of 
friction with the outside world, Al-Shatti said that as international relations became more 
interdependent, the Kingdom could not hold on to this local and exclusive Wahhabism 
as the main source of its political system’s legitimacy.  He thought that the Saudi 
leadership was probably considering putting off some of the extremists, who saw in 
themselves representatives of Wahhabism, in an effort to widen the base of the political 
legitimacy (Al-Shatti, Interview, 16 June 2004).  Indeed, the developments that were 
taking place around that period indicated that the government was heading in that 
direction. 
The post-9/11 period was a propitious time for liberals in the Kingdom to stage a 
comeback after being marginalised by the religious establishment for decades 
(Dekmejian, 2003: 404).  In fact, the post-9/11 years were unprecedented in terms of the 
domestic criticism of the religious establishment in the Saudi press.  More importantly, 
the government itself diagnosed that the extreme positions taken by some in the religious 
establishment constituted an obstacle to the government’s reforming obligations.  Thus, 
it was in favour of encouraging the position of liberals and the moderates from the 
religious establishment who called for openness towards the world (MOFA, 2004). 
The continuous criticism of the religious establishment affected its societal status.  Its 
response, though, was obviously limited.  Sheikh Al-Dawood said that it was part of the 
Hanbali school of thought that the Ulama would preach the society and advise the ruler.  
However, irrespective of what the latter decides, they and the whole society, according 
to this school, should display obedience (Al-Dawood, Interview, 02 April 2006). 
6.3 Resuming Negotiations 
Saud Al-Faisal, minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the MC, surprised the Saudi 
economic circles in July 2003 by a statement in which he said that the Kingdom’s WTO 
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accession was coming closer (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2003: 18).  It was a surprise given the 
circumstances around the end of Phase Two, which had led to the ‘pause, and the 
arguments between the HMC and the MC at the start of this phase.  A month later, the 
Kingdom signed a bilateral agreement with none other than the EU, which had been one 
of the toughest parties in the Saudi accession negotiations (The EIU, 2003: 5).  In the 
light of such developments, Saudi officials began to announce expectations that the rest 
of the negotiations would not be complicated, including those with the U.S., and the 
country prepared itself to go for the ninth round of negotiations with the WP, the first 
since October 2000.57 
6.3.1 How Did the Resumption Come About? 
The post-9/11 context was undoubtedly different from the era that had preceded it.  At 
the end of Phase Two and the beginning of this phase, there were some disagreements 
between the MC and the HMC, internal controversies raised by the religious 
establishment over WTO religious-related subjects and a lack of a real political will to 
overcome some difficult issues in the negotiations.  The aim and steps of economic 
reform that started around the end of Phase Two were not strong and persistent enough 
to outweigh those complexities where religion, politics and economics had overlapped.  
What the 9/11 attacks had mainly achieved, during Phase Three, was to provide the 
political will needed for sometime as far as the WTO accession was concerned.   
The relation between reform and WTO accession has generally been one of mutual 
reinforcement in acceding countries.  In Phase Two, when economic reasons for joining 
the organization were salient, the Kingdom’s economic reforming procedures were 
sometimes taken into the process of negotiating the accession.  Well into Phase Three, as 
the country embarked on a much wider scope of reform, WTO accession became an 
integral part of that more comprehensive reform programme.58 The programme that had 
included evaluating the educational curriculum, opening national dialogue and holding 
local elections could not leave the issue of the WTO accession in the same static position 
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 Some of the writings that discussed different aspect of reform, the WTO and Saudi Arabia subscribed to 
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in which Phase Two had left it.  After all, the Kingdom was largely trying to ease the 
external and domestic pressures by embarking on those reforming steps, and remaining 
aloof from the WTO would have been inconsistent with such an effort.  Some foreign 
circles had charged that the Saudi society was generally closed, and thus incompatible 
with being part of this universal organization in terms of its membership and effect.  The 
organization had become, as the chief economist and vice-president of Riyadh Bank 
stated in discussing the Saudi accession, “a symbol of international respect and 
acceptance” (MEED, 2005). 
The impetus that reform plans in Saudi Arabia offered to the country’s WTO accession 
bid is demonstrated by the number of laws that were enacted for that purpose.  As 
argued in the literature on the WTO accession aspect presented in Chapter Two, the time 
period of negotiations, and particularly that of question-and-answer sessions, offered an 
opportunity for acceding countries to work on aligning laws and rules to the WTO 
standards.  The Kingdom officially applied to join the multilateral trading system in 
1993 and spent approximately seven years between responding to enquiries from the 
GATT/WTO members and actual negotiations until the ‘pause’ in 2000.  However, a 
limited number of laws and regulations were produced during that period.  In contrast, 
from the beginning of 2001 until 2003 and a little beyond, the Kingdom put into effect 
about 19 new WTO-related laws, including the essential one of the capital market.  
Those laws were part of a package of 42 laws covering various aspects of the 
government’s reform effort, according to Minister Yamani (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, 2006). 
In addition, the government reshuffle in the COM in 2003 was described in the Saudi 
media as a reforming reshuffle.  It was all the more so because of the structural change 
in some ministries, including the one responsible for the WTO accession file, the MOC.  
The MOC was merged with the MIE to become the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
with the electricity portfolio being detached and placed under the responsibility of 
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another ministry.59  The merger was associated with the appointment of the new 
minister, Dr. Hashim Yamani, who had been the minister of the old MIE.  The 
appointment of Yamani was not a coincidence.  His enthusiasm about the WTO made 
him the right person, according to some observers in the U.S. and the EU, to help 
Abdullah’s wider reforming agenda related to membership in that organization (Nicora, 
Interview, 21 October 2003; MEED, 2003). 
6.3.2 The Phase’s Negotiations 
Speaking to the WP members in the 9th session of the Kingdom’s accession negotiations 
on 23 October 2003, Yamani reminded them that this round came almost three years 
after the 8th session in October 2000.  From then up to this 9th meeting, according to the 
minister, the Kingdom had devoted its full attention to promulgating 25 trade-related 
laws and regulations.  In this address, Yamani made some important announcements.  
He said that Saudi Arabia agreed to the trading rights that the U.S. had added to the list 
of demands near the end of Phase Two.  The Kingdom, he said, would apply agreements 
such as TRIPS and Customs Valuation from the date of accession.  As to GPA, which 
had met with firm objection before, Yamani indicated that the Saudi government was 
willing to revise its position.  More important, however, was his announcement that the 
government had cancelled the natural gas liquid pricing system (WTO, 2003).  That 
system caused, as mainly the EU charged, a dual pricing of gas, which in turn created a 
major stumbling block to the negotiations, especially with the Europeans. 
Coinciding with these announcements in Geneva, the news came out from Riyadh that 
the Saudi government would open the telecommunications sector.  Therefore, the 
messages from Geneva and Riyadh put together removed some important obstacles that 
previous phases of negotiations had not been able to transcend.  As for the EU, the 
situation up to the end of Phase Two was that it showed understanding for the 
Kingdom’s positions with regard to excluding items incompatible with religion from the 
Saudi offer.  In addition, the new law of investment that allowed 100% foreign 
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ownership of businesses and the 2001 tariff reduction across the board drew the EU 
closer to the bilateral agreement.  It was, however, the Saudi’s revision of its gas pricing 
system that led to the actual signing with the Europeans, since this had been their most 
important request from the Kingdom for a considerable period of the negotiations. 
Likewise, the fresh momentum gained by the economic offers outlined above and the 
new political back-up helped to accelerate bilateral agreements with a large number of 
incumbent WTO members.  In fact, the Saudis signed more agreements in less than one 
year of this phase than they had in the previous two phases.  Between August 2003 and 
February 2004, the Kingdom signed 16 bilateral agreements, including that with the EU, 
as compared to 14 agreements signed from 1993 up to 2001 (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004: 
11).  The quick progress in the negotiations astonished even the WTO chief at the time, 
Supachai Panitchpadki.  He commented that “The bilateral negotiations that Saudi 
Arabia has been conducting have moved very quickly, rather more quickly than I have 
expected” (Reuters, 2004).  There were four more agreements to be signed, including the 
most important one with the U.S.  However, in light of the fast progress witnessed in the 
negotiations, the deputy minister of MOC expected a positive ending to the Saudi 
accession process in April 2004 (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004). 
6.3.2.1 Negotiations with the U.S. 
The bilateral negotiations with the U.S. ended in Phase Two with what the Saudis 
thought was an insensitive American position with respect to access to the Saudi market 
for religiously forbidden items.  As the American list of demands was the largest, the 
outstanding issues contained applying TRIPS from the date of accession, opening some 
services sub-sectors such as telecommunications, financial services and insurance.  The 
U.S. had requested opening the sub-sector of wholesale and retail trade as well, which in 
turn was a severe demand as far as the Saudi side was concerned.  In addition, the U.S. 
expressed worries about the legal system in the Kingdom that might negatively affect the 
rights of foreign investors. 
The announcements made above by Yamani and the news that Riyadh would open some 
services’ sub-sectors worked to remove a number of these pending topics. Specifically, 
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these were TRIPS, telecommunications and distribution services.  The announcement 
that the Saudi government intended to integrate all legal entities under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Justice aimed at mitigating the concerns about securing the legal rights 
of foreign investors (Asharq Al-Awsat, 1999: 14).  As to financial services and 
insurance, the Kingdom made some improvements to its former position up to the end of 
Phase Two.  It presented a new law for insurance as one of the 25 trade-related laws 
enacted during the period 2001-2003, according to the above-mentioned speech by 
Yamani to the 9th meeting of Saudi Arabia’s accession negotiations.  However, they 
were not good enough for the U.S. negotiators. 
Despite commending the latest progress, Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative 
at the time, insisted that the American side still had a problem with the Saudis’ position, 
particularly in the areas of services and insurance.  He mentioned, in this context, that 
the Saudis had lately adopted many trade-related laws, but what they needed, as far as 
the U.S. was concerned, was to start applying them (Al-Hayat, 2004).  For instance, 
although Saudi Arabia had completed its TRIPS-related laws and expressed the 
willingness to apply them from the date of accession with no transitional period, the U.S. 
was concerned about the Saudi mechanisms of combating illegal copying of American 
productions in the Kingdom’s market (Al-Watan, 2005). 
In an acknowledgement of the legal concerns, Al-Alamy proclaimed in a statement to 
the media that WTO-related laws had been officially endorsed.  What was expected to 
follow was a decision on the procedures of implementation that he expected would take 
several months (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004).  Concerning the financial services sub-sector, 
many restrictions on foreign entities that wished to provide banking services in the 
Kingdom were removed.  Whereas joint venture banking had previously been the only 
way for foreigners to provide financial services, the new regime allowed foreign entities 
to engage in direct branching.  Thus, a foreign bank could now establish and operate a 
branch in the Kingdom.  In joint venturing, the Saudi’s new offer for this phase 
permitted the foreign partner to hold up to 60% of the shares, compared to 49% in the 
offer of Phase Two (Rao, 2006: 5-6).  Although the American demand was to expand 
this percentage to 100%, some international banks began to benefit from such new 
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regulations.  For instance, SAMA approved branch licences for Deutsche Bank and 
HSBC during 2003-2004 (FT.com, 2004). 
Insurance was a particularly important subject to the U.S., according to Minister 
Yamani, because, as the biggest country in the world in this field, it had a large stake in 
it.  The minister pointed out that the U.S. wanted better opportunities for its insurance 
companies in the Saudi market than what the new insurance law offered (Al-Hayat, 
2004:11).  The new law of 2003 established a cooperative insurance system based on the 
Shariah.  One of the main features of the law allowed foreign insurance providers to 
establish and operate branches in the Kingdom.  It provided a three-year transition 
period during which foreign entities already providing non-cooperative insurance should 
convert to cooperative insurance companies60 (Rao, 2006: 6). 
Commenting on the U.S. position concerning insurance, which Zoellick had identified as 
a major obstacle at this stage of the negotiations, Yamani told the Saudi press that the 
Americans still had some enquiries about the new law (Al-Watan, 2004).  However, that 
position of the U.S. became even more difficult after the laws implementing regulations 
were announced in April 2004.  The regulations mandated that a foreign provider of 
insurance services should have a minimum capital of roughly US$25 million.  In 
addition, foreign providers of the service were allowed only one branch in a Saudi 
province (Arab News, 2004).  To the U.S. negotiators, this was a very high amount that 
would constitute an impediment to competition (Al-Watan, 2004). 
Along with insurance, there were a few topics that the two sides were still negotiating 
over.  For instance, the U.S. was concerned about the role of state-owned companies, 
whose trading activities the Saudi government later restricted (Al-Hayat, 2004: 11).  The 
Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation (GSFMO), which had been an issue since the 
early stages of questions and answers in the accession negotiations, was included on the 
list of government entities subject to privatisation.  Sanitary and phytosanitary issues 
were still contentious as well, particularly concerning food shelf-life restrictions (Al-
Watan, 2005).  The Kingdom had argued for a short shelf life due to the country’s hot 
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climate, but at the end, when both parties were finalising the accession deal in Phase 
Three, the Kingdom agreed to replace its standards in this area with the widely used 
system of ‘use-by-dates’ (Rao, 2006: 6).  Also, until the last stage of negotiations, the 
U.S. was requesting to see the Saudi negative list of investment reduced further (Al-
Hayat, 2005: 13) (appendix 5-6). 
At this point of Phase Three, however, insurance was the focus of bargaining, according 
to American and Saudi negotiators (Financial Times, 2004; Al-Watan, 2004).  The 
difficulty of this issue was reflected by the decision of the MOC to set up a committee to 
concentrate specifically on the arguments with the American side over insurance.  
Furthermore, in an interview, Zainal, the state minister at the time and the current 
minister of commerce and industry, said that if the U.S. could not understand the Saudi 
co-operative system of insurance, which was based on the principle of the Shariah, no 
bilateral agreement might be reached (Zainal, Interview, 17 June 2004)61. 
6.3.2.2 Gas Pricing System 
The issue of the pricing of gas was decisive around the end of Phase Two.  At this point, 
Saudi Arabia argued that accusing it of having a dual pricing system for gas was in fact 
an attempt to deny it the benefit of its comparative advantage in energy, which probably 
was the only significant comparative advantage held by the Kingdom.  Thus, it was 
striking, even with the aforesaid pressure of 9/11, to witness the Kingdom conceding in 
this area and making special arrangements with the Europeans who were, more than 
anyone else, pressing the Saudis in this issue.  This is what Yamani expressed in the 9th 
session of the Kingdom’s accession negotiations in October 2003 when he announced 
that the Saudi government had cancelled the natural gas liquid pricing system (WTO, 
2003:7). 
Al-Sadhan, Head of SABIC Legal Affairs, thought this was the wrong move on the part 
of the Kingdom.  He said that it was rushed by individuals in the MOC who thought that 
it would help to secure an agreement with the EU, and thus put pressure on the U.S.  In 
doing so, according to Al-Sadhan, they ignored the longstanding argument of SABIC, 
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which denied even the existence of any sort of dual pricing in the Saudi’s gas pricing 
policy.  However, in the middle of 2004, some influential officials concerned with the 
WTO accession realised that the Kingdom had made a mistake in this regard.  They 
called SABIC and asked it to revitalise its argument about gas pricing.  As it was still 
negotiating its accession, the Kingdom expressed that there was a misunderstanding 
pertaining to its policy of gas pricing (Al-Sadhan, Interview, 03 April 2006). 
The re-opening of the issue of gas pricing with the EU coincided with the complications 
in the negotiations with the U.S. over the issue of insurance. The U.S. had brought the 
matter of gas pricing up from time to time, but generally the U.S. was not as enthusiastic 
about the subject as the EU was.  In fact, the biggest future competition expected in this 
area was between the EU, represented by Germany, and Saudi Arabia, not between the 
latter and the U.S.  Saudi Arabia was the seventh biggest country in petrochemicals 
production; Germany was the first country in this field.  However, Saudi Arabia will 
replace Germany as the biggest petrochemical country by 2015.  Both were fighting over 
important markets such as China at the time, and still continue to do so (Middle East 
Policy Council, 2006: 10-11). 
Hence, the U.S. was relatively out of the picture as far as the issue of gas pricing was 
concerned.  In fact, the U.S. might have intended this state of affairs.  At a time when the 
two countries, Saudi Arabia and the U.S., were negotiating the Kingdom’s WTO 
accession, some giant American companies were negotiating gas exploration 
concessions in Saudi Arabia upon Abdullah’s aforementioned gas initiative.  If they 
were to succeed, they might themselves also benefit from the Kingdom’s comparative 
advantage in energy.62 
6.3.2.3 U.S. Reaction to Developments in Negotiations with Saudis 
Based on the difficulties that presented themselves at this late stage of the negotiations, 
the Kingdom decided in October 2004 to postpone the official accession effort until after 
the presidential elections in the U.S.  A Saudi official said that the Kingdom would 
resume the WTO accession negotiations with the U.S., the only country with which the 
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Kingdom had not yet signed a bilateral agreement, in December 2004.  Some observers 
thought that this would not change much (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2004: 11).  However, as the 
aftermath of 9/11 changed the Saudi position, it changed the respective U.S. position as 
well. 
Although Saudi Arabia was condemned because of 9/11, as explained earlier, it was a 
country that the U.S. could not afford not to have on board in the years following that 
event.  The Kingdom did have an important place in the American plans for the so-
called war on terrorism.  The U.S. thought that the role of Saudi Arabia would be crucial 
in cutting financial supplies to extremist groups in the Islamic world.  In fact, the 
Kingdom had already shown its importance in this respect, as the Financial Action Task 
Force of the OECD praised the Saudis in a confidential report for the world-class laws 
they had put in place to combat the financing of terrorism (Financial Times, 2004). 
The U.S. administration knew that unlike the agony inflected by the Saudi participation 
in 9/11, the leadership in the Kingdom had generally been of very much favourable 
attitude towards the U.S.  However, the return of the relationship to its old heights could 
not be a sudden after the tragic events.  The best political cover for amending the 
bilateral relations came through the 9/11 Commission Report issued in 2004.  It 
provided the Bush administration with the justification to re-engage and re-build the 
strong bonds with Saudi Arabia, a needed move that reached its peak in the Abdullah-
Bush’s summit in Texas summit in 2005.  The Report pointed out that Saudi Arabia had 
long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda, but concluded by stating that “we 
have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi 
officials individually funded the organization” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 
171).   
In addition, after 9/11 and the need for Saudi Arabia in the financial and intellectual 
combat against terrorism, the U.S. administration spread its vision of a policy on 
‘forwarding freedom’ in the Middle East.  Such a policy would overlap with the old 
built-in U.S. policy in the region, in which Israel constituted a key element (Zuhur, 
2005: 40).  Thus, the U.S. would need to co-ordinate with regional powers like Saudi 
Arabia.  In this connection, the very same Saudi Arabia had just issued a peace initiative 
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for the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was accepted by all Arab states and adopted in a 
summit in Beirut in 2002 as the Arab Peace Initiative.  Although the U.S. government 
did not adopt the initiative, it praised it and emphasised that it had important elements 
that all parties, including the U.S. as a broker, could build on. 
On another front, the U.S.’s need for Saudi oil was forecasted to increase.  The U.S. 
Department of Energy estimated that the global economy required Gulf oil production 
capacity to expand from 22.4 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2001 to 24.5 mbd in 2005, 
28.7 mbd in 2010, 33.0 mbd in 2015 and 45.2 mbd in 2025.  Saudi production alone 
must, according to the estimate, increase from 10.2 mbd in 2001 to 23.8 mbd in 2025 – 
an increase of 133% (Saudi-American Forum, 2004: 1).  This and the second oil boom, 
which began in 2001 and was illustrated by the upward spiral in oil prices, made it 
necessary for the U.S. government to seek the close co-operation of Saudi Arabia in this 
regard.  In a meeting in Texas in 2005, Bush urged Abdullah that the Kingdom should 
increase its oil production for the sake of calming down oil markets (Berman, 2005). 
The 2005 meeting took place in April, just seven months before the Saudi WTO 
accession was finalised.  One year earlier, a similar meeting had taken place between the 
two leaders, also in Texas.  Seizing the opportunity presented by the developments 
explained above, the Kingdom made some trade-offs as far as its WTO accession was 
concerned.  Whereas the summit of April 2004 was mainly devoted to ironing out the 
aftermath of 9/11, the April 2005 meeting had the WTO accession as a major agenda 
item.  According to Assistant Minister of Petroleum Prince Abdul Aziz bin Salman, 
“King Abdullah’s meeting with US President George W. Bush in his Texas ranch in 
April, while he was crown prince,63 had facilitated the Kingdom’s WTO entry” (Arab 
News, 2005). 
Around the two summits, the Saudi and U.S. negotiators would sit down to negotiate for 
extended period of times.  For instance, one set of these mutual meetings in Washington 
continued from April to September 2005 (Al-Watan, 2005).  The situation here was 
significantly different from that of Phase Two.  In that phase, it was not easy to get hold 
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of the U.S. negotiators.  A lot of time had been wasted on useless phone calls and faxes, 
but the Americans had dedicated only little time to extensive face-to-face negotiations 
(Faqeeh, Interview, 06 April 2006).  In fact, the former commerce minister brought this 
point up in his bilateral meeting with the USTR chief in Geneva at the conclusion of the 
8th session of the Kingdom’s accession negotiations in October 2000, which preceded the 
‘pause’.  Then, the minister emphasised the importance that both sides intensify the 
bilateral discussions over the pending issues between the two countries (MOC, 2000). 
This difference between the two phases was a sign that gaps were closing.  Along with 
Abdullah and Bush, other top politicians in the American administration became 
enthusiastic about having Saudi Arabia in the WTO, including Vice President Dick 
Cheney and State Secretary Colin Powell.  They thought the accession would help the 
Saudi effort for reform (Middle East Policy Council, 2006: 6).  At the time when the 
U.S. was challenged by fundamentalism, it was important to the Americans and the 
Europeans to draw the most influential Islamic state firmly into the Western-led web of 
multinational institutions like the WTO (Financial Times, 2003: 8).  Along these lines, 
U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman said that the Bush Administration had decided 
to sign a WTO accession deal with Saudi Arabia.  Portman stated: “We will see greater 
openness, further development of the rule of law and political and economic reform in 
Saudi Arabia” (aljazeera.net, 2005). 
6.4 The Membership 
On 11 November 2005, the organization’s General Council endorsed the entry terms of 
the Saudi WTO accession and the Kingdom officially became the 149th member of the 
WTO on 11 December 2005.  In this regard, Abdul Aziz bin Salman said that the 
Kingdom had received more concessions from the U.S. than any other acceding country.  
With respect to the issue of gas pricing, which the Europeans raised again near the end 
of Phase Three, bin Salman said that it had also been solved by a personal political 
intervention by Abdullah, the crown prince at the time, with Tony Blair, the former 
British prime minister.  As the latter’s country was at the time the chairing the EU, it 
played an important role in resolving this issue (Arab news, 2005).  Thus, the Kingdom 
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kept its current policy for gas pricing in place (SABIC, 2006: 22).  After all, co-
operating in combating terrorism and oil were no less important to the EU than the U.S. 
6.5 Analysis 
The pause of negotiations did not omit some of the important elements in pushing for the 
accession in the first place, especially in Phase Two.  Major economic reasons such as 
debt, unemployment and the need for fresh investments were all still in effect (Alsheik, 
Interview, 28 April 2004).  In fact, the positive economic change in 2000 could not 
conceal the reality that just a year earlier, the country’s debt had been larger than its 
economy (TIME, 2009: 44).  According to Champion, the oil crash of 1998 and its 
critical economic consequences provided the regime in Saudi Arabia with a renewed 
incentive to embark on the long-debated diversification of its economy (2003: 145).  
What emphasised Champion’s point is the statement indicated earlier by King Abdullah, 
the crown prince at the time, about the state of the economy in 1998.  Although it was 
quite unusual at the time for the leadership in the Kingdom to address economic issues, 
Abdullah told the Saudis that the boom era of the 1970s was officially over.  
Accordingly, what the economy needed at that time was economic reform, as indicated 
in the previous chapter. 
The reasons for Abdullah to assume this role of a reformer, as far as this thesis is 
concerned, are multiple.  He was the heir apparent at the time and officially the second-
ranking figure in the country.  When his elder brother, Fahd, became critically ill in 
1995, Abdullah assumed the role of the de facto leader.  The difficult economic situation 
required the mentorship of someone of his high profile to promote the attempts of 
repairing the economy–not least because the shape of the economy has always been 
important to the political system since distribution of largesse has been an element of 
enhancing political legitimacy (Champion, 2003: 77). 
It was a logical step to have Abdullah in particular sponsor the economic reforming 
efforts around that time.  As acting king, he demonstrated spending discipline.  As a 
result, over the years he gained a good reputation as being honest and austere 
(Economist.com, 2001; Times Online, 2004).  Such qualities seemed particularly 
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compatible when the issue at stake was how to treat an ailing economy, as disciplined 
spending would most likely be an element involved. 
Reform in its economic aspect continued and expanded to include other aspects as the 
years went by, until and after Abdullah officially acceded to the throne in 2005.  Chapter 
Three showed how after Faisal, the leadership in Saudi Arabia turned into a form of 
collective leadership where different senior princes bolstered their positions in the 
political life of the country.  Seizing the opportunities presented by the events that took 
place between 1995 and 2005, e.g. the economic crisis and the illness of Fahd, the 
entourage that surrounded Abdullah worked to project him as a reformer.  Portraying 
him as such gained him internal popularity and external respect, which in return 
enhanced his leadership.64 
Even with the ‘pause’ and stumbling internal and external circumstances of the 
accession negotiations discussed in Phase Two, it was difficult for the Kingdom 
completely to drop the idea of joining the WTO at this stage.  Such abstention would 
have obstructed the simultaneous general reforming attempts of the economy, which 
Abdullah was championing. 
The previous two phases lacked the political mentorship that, as the thesis argues, was 
particularly important to the Saudi accession process.  The diverging views between MC 
and HMC and the religious concerns were neither resolved nor disappeared.  However, 
the leadership in the Kingdom sensed that now the survival of the whole regime was 
probably at stake, and thus everything else could be postponed or pushed aside.  In that 
context, the government was willing to undertake reform that went for the first time 
beyond economic and administrative aspects to touch on some of the hitherto 
unthinkable subjects like restraining the powers of the religious establishment and 
widening the base of political legitimacy to include liberal voices.  In this light, the 
previous obstacles to the WTO accession, especially those encountered during Phase 
Two and the opening of Phase Three, appeared less difficult to transcend in the process 
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of undertaking such a wider reform that began to take place after the 9/11 period of 
Phase Three. 
As far as this study is concerned, the 9/11 and what came immediately after represented 
the most critical time in the Saudi-U.S. relationship.  The review of this relationship in 
Chapter Three reflected that it had experienced some difficult times like the ones during 
Kennedy and Nixon’s tenures.  In those examples, however, the divergence between the 
two was usually over issues that involved a third party, such as the Palestinians or the 
Israelis.  In 9/11 the collision was direct.  Thus, the threat to the relations was real 
especially to the Saudis who had invested a lot over the years to sustain the friendship of 
this strategic ally. 
There are writers who would deny a direct link between 9/11 and the Kingdom’s 
accession to the WTO.  Hertog, for instance, argued for such a denial on the basis that 
the push for accession came one and a half years after the 9/11 attacks (Hertog, 2008: 
19).  To this study, the immediate time after 9/11 was mainly devoted to iron out 
political disagreements with the U.S.  In the process, the Kingdom was engaging in a 
first of its kind political-economic reform, which included, as argued here, the serious 
work for joining this organization.  In other words, the push for accession did not start in 
2003, as Hertog argued.  It began earlier than that, but within a larger reforming 
framework, as this study argued. 
The late reforming effort on the part of Saudi Arabia fitted well the U.S. new approach 
to the bilateral relations with the Kingdom.  Reform became crucial in amending the 
relationship between the two countries.  As mentioned, the U.S. administration was 
more convinced at the final stages of the Saudi Arabian accession to the WTO that the 
accession would help the reforming efforts in the Kingdom.  In fact, even the 9/11 
Commission Report resonated with this new thought of the top officials in the 
administration and USTR.  In its recommendations, the Report stated that the U.S.-
Kingdom’s bilateral relations “should include shared commitment to political and 
economic reform” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 171-374). 
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Probably, such a new approach found its origin in the U.S. worldwide perspective that 
began to develop around the new millennium.  The perspective was basically about 
making a connection between trade and reform in its various forms.  Condoleezza Rice, 
former secretary of state and an advocate of the new Middle East, articulated such a 
perspective.  In an article on promoting national interests, she wrote “It is in America’s 
interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will 
probably lead to sustained and organized pressure for political liberalization”.  
Although no guarantees, Rice said that in many cases “the link between democracy and 
economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run”.  In her final analysis, in 
this regard, she stressed that “Trade and economic interaction are, in fact, good not only 
for America’s economic growth but for its political aims as well” (Rice, 2000: 55). 
The reform perceived by the West in general and the U.S. in particular was, in part, to 
impose some restrictions or modifications on some of the religious manifestations in the 
Kingdom.  It is like in the examples of the callings to restrain the ‘religious police’ or to 
change the education curricula.  Yet, the religious aspect turned out to be important even 
to these external powers themselves.  Their effort, particularly the U.S., to fight 
extremism would very much be in need to make use of the religious clout that the 
Kingdom represented in formulating an intellectual argument against this phenomenon. 
6.6 Conclusion 
After the halt of the accession negotiations at the end of Phase Two, many observers 
thought that some of the incentives for the Kingdom to join the WTO had evaporated.  
They attributed this to the turn in oil prices, which started to experience continual quick 
increases since the start of the year 2000. 
However, despite the halt in the negotiations, the fact that many serious economic 
problems remained could not be concealed.  In fact, the oil crisis of 1998 had already put 
the government on the path of reform, in which the government and the business 
community came to realise the importance of continuing the negotiations. 
Thus, several reforming steps were undertaken in addition to the new law of investment 
and SAGIA.  The establishments of the SEC, SCPM and SCT were a case in point.  In 
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Abdullah, these governmental reform initiatives found the mentor whose existence was 
important to advance major projects in the Kingdom, as this thesis has argued. 
As to the business community, the new atmosphere with respect to economic reform was 
making a cumulative positive effect on its part.  The business community’s objection to 
the WTO was not absolute from the beginning, but was argued in an ad-hoc manner.  By 
this time, this community was urging for more privatisation initiatives and seeking better 
governmental enhancement to the regulatory environment in the Kingdom, which in 
itself was fundamental to any reforming attempt.  Therefore, their newly developed 
attitude was generally in support of Abdullah’s reforming efforts. 
Abdullah’s effort found another important source of support.  It came from the 
technocrats that had filled most high-ranking posts in the country since 1995.  The best 
example for this was in the Shura, which acted promptly on the reform-related laws 
referred to it by the COM. 
In the course of such efforts, which reflected a reforming trend, it was difficult 
completely to drop the idea of joining the WTO.  In fact, any such act would contradict 
the simultaneous economic reforms.  Thus, the attempt to accede to the WTO coincided 
during that particular time with the wider reform efforts, and this simultaneity was in 
some ways good for the accession, inasmuch as the indirect proceedings with the WTO 
avoided provoking the internal elements that had caused the stalemate at the end of the 
previous phase. 
Hence, the MC and the HMC continued their deliberations and arguments.  In this 
situation, different concerned ministries were studying the situation and were reporting, 
as decided, to the HMC.  In general, they supported the proceedings related to the 
accession on economic grounds.  Such talks were important, as far as the accession issue 
was concerned, even if they were confined to the governmental agents.  They at least 
reflected that despite being ‘paused’, the issue was not dead. 
Amid this the event of 9/11 occurred.  As most of those who had carried out the attacks 
in New York and Washington were Saudis, Saudi Arabia was widely alleged, especially 
  
 291
in the West, to be a safe haven for terrorists.  Accordingly, the country was exposed to a 
massive international campaign of criticism, led by the U.S.  In the process, the 
campaign portrayed Saudi society as an isolated one that could not be integrated with the 
more interdependent world.  That situation, according to the allegations, was an ideal 
breeding ground for terrorists.   
As a consequence, a change that was not only economic, but also social and political in 
nature was inevitable.  The external developments resonated with increasing internal 
political demands to mitigate the eruption of domestic violence perpetrated by groups 
affiliated to Al-Qaeda.  As the situation turned, according to some analysts, into a low-
intensity civil war, many expatriates considered leaving the country. 
This was probably the most dangerous situation that Saudi Arabia had found itself in 
since its establishment in 1932.  Thus, it decided not to oppose such vociferous internal 
and external calls for a wider reform.  It relaxed control over the coverage of public 
discourse in the domestic media.  It announced reforms in the judicial system. Leading 
the reforming steps, Abdullah encouraged a public dialogue through the National 
Dialogue Centre that he established as a venue for the expression of social discontent.  
Elections were introduced for the first time by electing half of the members in municipal 
councils.  More significantly, perhaps, the Kingdom was responsive to the pressure, 
especially from the U.S., to rein in the religious establishment by limiting its influence in 
education, for example. 
The 9/11 attacks provided the Kingdom’s WTO accession effort with the political will 
that had been lacking for sometime during the previous two phases of the process.  In 
this situation, the religious establishment was willing to follow, as one of the 
fundamental precepts of the Hanbali school of thought was obedience to the leader of 
the nation.  
Joining the organization became an important step to disperse the impression that the 
Saudi society was isolated.  If it was possible to make some social and political 
compromises in responding to the internal and external events, then it should have been 
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easier, in the Saudi context, to make similar compromises on economic matters 
including the accession to the WTO. 
Table 6-1: Elements Important to Phase 3 






- 2nd oil boom: better momentum in the 
negotiations. 
- Business community: increasingly positive 
stance towards the WTO. 
- Technocrats: enhancement of reform efforts.  
 
- 9/11: internal calls for reform. 
- Political commitment: the emergence of a 
mentor. 
- Religious establishment: essentiality of 







 - 2nd oil boom: necessity of cooperation with 
the Kingdom.  
 
- 9/11: massive criticism and pressure for 
reform. 
- War on terrorism: necessity of cooperation 





Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Acceding to the WTO is a long and exhausting process.  An acceding country should 
expect to spend years in answering questions, negotiating demands and making 
concessions.  In light of this, what would be the factors that make an acceding country 
endure such a procedure? 
This thesis has posed this question with regard to the accession case of Saudi Arabia.  
The literature of the WTO accession provides a set of factors that can serve to answer 
the question in general.  For instance, it would attribute a country’s bid to accede to the 
organization to a desire for integration with the world economy, the chance to lock in 
domestic reforms and the prospect of opening new markets for domestic products. 
However, the length of time that accession processes normally take, which on average is 
several years, indicates, as far as this study is concerned, that the factors presented in the 
literature cannot be sufficient.  The years of accession negotiations and the fact that they 
widely differ from case to case – from two to 19 years – point to the importance of 
particular politics in the backdrop.  Such political factors affect the factors that shape an 
accession process in a manner that enhances their particular relevance to that specific 
case. 
Accordingly, the thesis aimed at demonstrating the real factors that shaped the accession 
of Saudi Arabia.  In this, the thesis broadly referred to the IR approaches that 
concentrate on domestic variables in making international policy decisions: society-
centred approaches and state-centred approaches.  More specifically, the thesis 
attempted to apply the concepts with which these approaches frequently operate: 
interests and institutions.  In addition, the thesis took into account the role of influential 
individuals, in accordance with one line of thinking within the state-centred approaches 
in particular.  
The reason for referring to such approaches and concepts is related to the nature of the 
decision to accede to the WTO.  If a state decides to join this organization, it means that 
this state is adjusting its trade policy to the rules and regulations of this international 
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multilateral trading system.  Perhaps more than any other policies, trade policy has direct 
domestic consequences.  Trade policy tools such as tariff rates, quotas and non-tariff 
barriers affect the interest of a broad range of groups in the society and can redistribute 
gains among them.  Hence, trade policy normally involves a great deal of internal 
politics.  In fact, it has been said that trade policy is the stuff of domestic politics. 
A focus on domestic elements should not, however, mean that the importance of external 
circumstances is discounted.  As an accession case cannot be isolated from the 
surrounding internal politics, it can neither be neutral towards international events.  In 
fact, focusing on state institutions and societal groups is one of the three levels of 
analysis in the IR.  The other two levels concentrate on international systems and the 
individual, respectively.  Adopting one of them in a study does not mean that the others 
are completely excluded. 
As such, the thesis hypothesised that studying domestic interactions that were at play 
throughout the years of the accession process can better explain the accession of Saudi 
Arabia to the WTO.  The factors that were anticipated by the thesis to have shaped the 
Kingdom’s accession were divided into two broad categories: internal and external.  The 
first category included societal interests, namely the business community and religious 
establishment.  It contained institutions as well.  As institutions can be conceptualised as 
both structures and agents, the sub-factors under this element were divided accordingly.  
Structurally, therefore, they comprised religion, the monarchy, the BLG and the Majlis.  
As to agency, they included the COM, HMC, MC, SNT, the Shura and some political 
figures closely involved in the country’s accession project.  In addition to interests and 
institutions, there were also elements that were decisive as far as the negotiations were 
concerned, namely, the petrochemical industry and the services sector. 
With regard to external factors that cannot be overlooked, the thesis highlighted the 
importance of oil and international market fluctuations in terms of prices and production.  
The factor of oil has had particularly far-reaching effects.  Specifically, its discovery in 
1938 exposed the Kingdom to the outside world and, by extension, made it relatively 
receptive to developments of international dimensions. 
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Some important characteristics of Saudi Arabia have, in fact, influenced how the thesis 
sub-hypothesised the effect of the abovementioned factors on the Kingdom’s WTO 
accession taking into account that the Saudi case was among the most protracted in spite 
of its relatively open economy that never experienced a communist activity such as in 
the other protracted cases of China and Russia.  Among these characteristics was the fact 
that Saudi Arabia represents one of the few monarchies in the world where monarchs 
possess absolute power especially in the area of formulating international-related 
policies.  In a similar regime, it would have been expected that one person or a small 
circle of persons unitarily make decisions.  The expectation reflected a limited internal 
politics. 
However, the extended years of the Saudi case, contradicted such an assumption.  As far 
as this study is concerned, there were, in fact, indications for the existence of such 
politics and they lied in the economic and legal systems of the country.  The ‘rentier’ 
paradigm, in which the Saudi Arabian economy has generally been placed in the 
literature, would assume a situation of resistance to the GATT/WTO by the business 
community that lived, according to that paradigm, off the government’s rents.  Similarly, 
the multilateral trading system’s expansion in terms of extending its legal authority 
indicated a provocation to particular groups in the Kingdom in light of the great legal 
and cultural regard to the principles of the Shariah.   
In addition, the central type of government that the Saudi authoritative monarchy 
represents could experience a political interaction within itself.  Although centrality 
might imply a limited number of effective agents, the number and nature of such agents 
would essentially depend on the issue at hand.  In the case of the Kingdom’s WTO 
accession, several governmental agents were directly involved.  They specifically were 
the abovementioned COM, HMC, MC and SNT.  The multiplicity of those agents led 
this study to sub-hypothesise the effect of the theory of ‘veto players’. 
According to the thesis, the element of time is important as far as accessions are 
concerned.  It exposes such processes to the surrounding internal and external changes.  
The years of the Saudi Arabian accession process have mostly coincided with the 
momentum gained by the concept of economic reform over the two previous decades, as 
  
 296
the 1980s and 1990s were a period of unprecedented economic reform in the history of 
developing countries.  After 9/11, the limits of reform extended, as far as the Kingdom 
was concerned, to include, in addition to economic, political dimensions as well.  For the 
generally intrinsic and correlated relations between reform and accession to the WTO, it 
was postulated that reform was of a positive effect on the Kingdom’s accession process. 
Lastly, in the course of generating sub-hypotheses, the jurisdictional expansion of the 
WTO over the years seemed to impinge on domestic legal affairs of acceding countries.  
In addition, although multilateral, the WTO gave way to the bilateral dimension when it 
came to the issue of accession specifically, as no application can be approved without 
being individually accepted by all interested incumbent members.  Customarily, the 
‘Quad’ countries, among the WTO’s members, have been influential in all accessions, as 
they have usually been able to push applicants to make very heavy commitments.  As 
such, it was assumed herein that this aspect of the WTO as an organization might have 
retarded the progress of the accession case of Saudi Arabia. 
The thesis divided the Saudi Arabian accession case into three main phases in examining 
the main and the sub-hypotheses recapitulated above.  This structure, far from being 
random, was essentially based on the observation of different metamorphoses in the 
Kingdom’s WTO accession, which are assumed herein to have resulted from indigenous 
interaction.  Due to such metamorphoses, each of the three phases was determined by a 
particular characteristic as far as this study is concerned. 
The first phase, which ran from 1985 to 1996, was marked by a low profile and a lack of 
real enthusiasm.  The second phase took place from 1997 to 2000, when the overall 
salience of economic factors came to the fore.  The third and last phase lasted from 2001 
to 2005, the date at which Saudi Arabia officially acceded to the WTO.  The phase was 
characterised by a weighted political involvement. 
To a large extent, internal politics moulded Phase One.  At this stage, the business 
community and religious establishment displayed limited interests and limited concerns 
as far as acceding to the GATT/WTO was concerned.  In the period of pre-official 
application, the business community received only little information about the 
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multilateral trading system and the Kingdom’s official attempt to become a member.  
After the application to the GATT in 1993 and its conversion to the WTO in 1995, the 
business community began to develop a general acquaintance with the accession issue. 
The ‘rentier’ paradigm would assume that the business community, as it lived off 
governmental subsidies, would ardently resist attempts like joining the GATT/WTO 
system.  However, the business community did not display such a stance in this phase.  
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the ‘rentier’ state paradigm, there were two 
plausible reasons for this position.  First, some of the issues that might have caused 
irritation, namely the GATTS and TRIPS, were only introduced after the transformation 
of the GATT into the WTO in 1995, at which point this phase was around ending.  Thus, 
the phase did not overall experience the difficulty of going through such extremely 
complicated issues.  Second, no actual negotiations were held throughout the phase.  The 
encounter with the WP was mainly confined to clarifying the Saudi trading system. 
In fact, the limited role for the business community during the phase was also, in the 
opinion of some, imposed by the government, which did not debate the case while 
contemplating the accession issue and after it had decided to accede to this global 
trading system.  This could partially be attributed to the state of the economy at a time 
when the government was not only managing the economy, but also assuming the role of 
the initiator and implementer of the economic transformation of the country after the 
first oil boom in the 1970s. 
The chief concern of the religious establishment during all the accession years was to 
prevent WTO rules and regulations from encroaching on the Kingdom’s legal and social 
codes.  There were no signs of such infringements during Phase One.  Until 1995, one 
year before the phase ended, the multilateral trading system was represented by the 
GATT, and concentrated on reducing tariff rates on products crossing borders.  In 
addition, there were no negotiations involving the Saudi application until the year of 
1997 that marked the beginning of the following phase, Phase Two, and hence no 
demands that might have been considered offensive as far as religion was concerned had 
been presented yet by the WP members. 
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The lack of overt engagement by the business community and religious establishment 
during this phase should have made it simple for the government to promptly put its 
attempt of acceding to the world trading system into action, especially considering the 
fact that it was in predominant control of the economy during that particular time.  
However, this did not happen.  A large number of governmental agents became directly 
involved.  Therefore, the important internal elements of consultation and consensus were 
sometimes difficult to obtain, particularly in the absence of real political support.  For 
instance, it took from 1985 to 1993 to finally come to the official decision of joining the 
GATT after the issue had been circulated among government departments for a whole 
eight years. 
More instrumental to this governmental agents’ failure to seize the opportunity presented 
by the relative neutrality of the business community and religious establishment during 
that phase was how those agents themselves perceived the GATT, whose presence 
occupied most of Phase One’s years.  Despite the economic challenges caused by the 
developments in oil markets until the mid-1990s, the government did not see the GATT 
as a real window for economic solutions, as the latter was primarily concerned with 
reductions in tariff rates. 
In addition, the regional and international politics had a direct and indirect impact with 
regard to the Kingdom’s official handling of the accession issue.  Regional events such 
as the Second Gulf War diverted the attention of the government from big projects like 
joining the GATT/WTO system.  As a result, the case found no political sponsor, which 
is usually an important aspect of advancing major initiatives in Saudi politics.  
Internationally, a significant part of Phase One took place during the Cold War.  During 
that time, the issue of acceding to the multilateral trading system was, to some extent, 
muddled up with strategic considerations.  As a major regional ally of the U.S., Saudi 
Arabia did not feel that becoming a party to the global trading system represented by the 
GATT was a compelling issue, or that its membership was in many areas a matter of 
international request. 
The turning point of this phase occurred towards its end.  The oil troubles were coupled 
with the major depreciation of the U.S. dollar in 1995.  That very same year, the IMF 
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issued an unprecedented warning about the perilous state of Saudi Arabia’s economy 
and its need for real adjustment.  At the same time, international economic 
interdependency was gaining ground, especially after the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
around the beginning of the 1990s.  One main result of this was the spread of the 
concept of economic reform in the developing world.  These developments signalled that 
the Saudi WTO accession case was about to change its course.  In fact, the atmosphere 
was building up momentum towards a more active upcoming phase. 
The first indicator that the second phase was more active was the start of the actual 
negotiations in 1997.  Furthermore, the changes that marked the end of the previous 
phase, such as the increasing momentum of economic reform, indicated that economic 
factors would be salient during this second phase –whether one argued in favour of 
accession in order to promote one economic sector, or whether one rejected accession in 
order to protect another. 
In addition to the concomitant increase in the attention devoted to WTO accession at the 
end of Phase One, some contextual elements intervened to further the case of the 
accession especially on economic grounds.  After years of decline, oil prices hit a rock 
bottom of nearly US$10 in 1998, probably the worst in decades. The formidable 
looming challenge in 1998 led the Kingdom to take remarkable economic initiatives like 
opening the gas sector and issuing new investment laws, which went far beyond 
previous policies implemented when faced with economic challenges.  This 
simultaneously helped to advance the WTO accession issue. 
This advancement of the case urged the government to weigh the importance of 
accession in terms of the benefits and costs expected.  Assisted by technocrats, who 
were at the time filling high posts in the COM, MC and other government departments, 
the benefits/costs analysis ended in 1999 with the recommendation to join the WTO as 
soon as possible.  The main justification was that the global interdependent system had 
reached a high level of formation through the successive rounds of the multilateral trade 
negotiations conducted by this organization.  In this, the governmental analysis indicated 
that the incumbent WTO members at the time controlled 85% of the world trade. 
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As part of this overall push, Saudi Arabia was making increasing effort to accede to the 
WTO.  In what was an important sign for this decision, the MC envisioned for the first 
time a specific role for the business community in parallel to the official endeavour.  It 
emphasised the need to form a consultation team consisting of business persons to assist 
the SNT.  The aim was that this team should pressure the foreign partners of the Saudi 
private sector to convince their native countries not to keep insisting on a further 
economic liberalisation in the Kingdom, especially with respect to the domestic financial 
market. 
This increase of importance in the economic aspect during this phase was associated 
with a very important factor: time.  Unlike the first phase of the slow-paced proceedings, 
the time factor became a matter of concern during this phase particularly to the 
governmental agents.  In this, the MC plainly pointed out that protraction in the 
accession was not in the best interests of the Kingdom.  Moreover, it set itself the year 
2000 as a deadline for acceding to the WTO. 
However, this active approach and economic saliency met with inhibitions at one stage 
towards the end of the phase.  The issues negotiated over the years of the phase 
proliferated in their ramifications to the degree that economy, politics and religion 
intrinsically intersected in a manner that complicated the negotiations, particularly in 
issues like the services sector and TRIPS.  In some other issues, such as agriculture, 
there were outright demands by the WP that plainly violated the Shariah. 
This resulted in the business community and religious establishment being outspoken 
about what concerned them.  They used the Majlis of the leaders, especially that of 
Abdullah, crown prince at the time, to express their anxiety.  Both groups were 
important and their demands had to be attended to by the leadership.  As the 
proclamation of implementing the Shariah was the main justification for establishing the 
Saudi state, the appeasement of the religious establishment had always been essential for 
maintaining political legitimacy.  As to the business community, Phase Two saw the 
government insisting on its vital role in enlarging the Saudi economy as stated in the 
five-year development plans.  Thus, it was also important to take into consideration the 
view of this group, as seen in the example of the distribution issue. 
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In addition to the concerns of the business community and religious establishment, the 
government had its own reservations.  It was thought that some of the WP members’ 
demands in services, such as opening the retail and wholesale trade, could jeopardise the 
official plans to address unemployment through the ‘Saudisation’ of the workforce.  
Since it owned 70% of the petrochemical industry, the government was also keen not to 
have the MC and the SNT yield to the demand of the WP, particularly the EU, to 
abandon the discount given to the local petrochemical industry so that it could benefit 
from the Kingdom’s comparative advantage in this area in finding new international 
markets.  This, after all, was one of the main factors driving Saudi Arabia to seek 
accession to the WTO.  The government regarded as a clear breach of its sovereignty the 
request by the U.S. and some other members to review the new Saudi WTO-related rules 
before they were officially enacted –a request that came late in the negotiations of the 
phase. 
The international political developments that accompanied the start of actual Saudi 
negotiations in 1997 did not help to lessen the WP’s rigid positions, particularly that of 
the U.S.  After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. did not feel that it was necessary 
anymore to accommodate acceding countries for political reasons, as had sometimes 
been the case during the GATT period.  In fact, the Clinton administration became a 
champion of trade liberalisation based on the rules and regulations of the WTO and the 
organization’s basic principle of single undertaken. 
In the light of such internal and external circumstances of the negotiations, the COM 
formed the HMC in 1999.  It was another governmental agent to participate in handling 
the Kingdom’s accession to the WTO.  Although it had not been precisely defined by the 
COM as being superior to the MC, the HMC assumed this position by default, in 
accordance with the conventions of internal politics in Saudi Arabia. 
This situation was coupled to other developments.  One was the failure of the conference 
in Seattle in 1999, which affected the image of the WTO and added to the arguments of 
the accession sceptics.  The other was the upward turn in oil prices at the end of 1999, 
which led some in the Kingdom to argue that Saudi Arabia could do better without being 
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a member to the WTO.  The result of all of that was the ‘pause’ in the negotiations with 
the WP in 2000. 
Over approximately the next two years, which marked the commencement of Phase 
Three, there was a wide gap between how both the MC and the HMC perceived the 
accession process and the progress made with regard to the Kingdom’s application.  To 
the MC, the new outlines set by the HMC on how to proceed virtually amounted to 
repealing all on-going efforts and starting all over again.  The disagreement on how best 
to continue the Saudi WTO accession process and the insistence of the HMC on some 
points that the WP would not agree to whatsoever, such as considering Saudi Arabia a 
developing country, were a case in point. 
The MC-HMC’s debate meant that the ‘pause’ did not indicate the death of the 
accession process.  In reality, the ‘pause’ of the negotiations did not conceal the fact that 
there was still a need for an economic reform as the country’s debt was greater than its 
GDP.  Such a reform was implemented by promoting economic initiatives, issuing laws 
and setting up councils.  More significantly, those reforming steps found in Crown 
Prince Abdullah, the later king, the kind of political mentor needed to promote issues in 
Saudi internal politics. 
The new atmosphere with respect to economic reform had a cumulative effect.  From the 
beginning, the business community’s position towards the GATT/WTO was not marked 
by integrated fierce resistance.  Largely, its objection to this multilateral trading system 
was related to the ad-hoc manner of dealing with particular issues of concern to it.  Thus, 
it did not take much for the business community at this stage (2000-2001) to become 
supporter of the reform steps sponsored by Abdullah.  In fact, as the government was 
cutting spending in the face of its financial problems, the business community needed 
the expansion in liberty that economic reform was expected to provide in order to have a 
better control in searching for new opportunities. 
A very important turn among these developments was that the issue of the WTO 
accession became part of the wider reforming attempt.  This was good for the accession 
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issue.  It was because the indirect talks about the issue did not cause provocation, e.g. of 
a religious nature, that a stalemate resulted at the end of Phase Two. 
The political elements that had hampered the economic salience around the end of the 
previous Phase Two worked to further the accession issue in Phase Three.  In addition to 
the appearance of the political mentor, the events of 9/11 were decisive in this regard.  
After the attacks in the U.S., the Kingdom came under a wide international criticism 
especially in the EU countries and the U.S.  It was unprecedented.  The criticism broadly 
portrayed the entire Saudi way of life as fertile ground for terrorism.  This international 
pressure was internally exploited by Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in the Kingdom, which 
targeted expatriates in aiming to further the international embarrassment of the 
government. 
The general response from the Saudi government was not to stand against such pressure.  
In fact, its stance was one of general responsiveness to the calls for change, especially 
since they mostly came from its strategic superpower ally, the U.S. Accordingly, under 
the circumstances prevailing in an increasingly volatile region, the leadership in the 
Kingdom decided to embark on a broader reform that would go beyond reforming the 
economy to include social and political aspects. 
Such a wider reform could not leave the issue of the WTO accession aside.  The new 
reform programme, which included sensitive issues such as evaluating the educational 
curriculum, starting a national dialogue and holding local elections, would surely 
overcome the political inhibitions that had caused delay in Phase Two.  Thus, under the 
circumstances, the chairman of the MC announced in July 2003 that the Kingdom was 
returning to the negotiations and that accession was expected to be imminent.  What was 
particularly striking about this was the pace at which this new phase proceeded.  
Embraced by political sponsorship, the rules and regulations enacted for the sake of the 
WTO accession during Phase Three (2001-2005) were by far more than the WTO-




The business community was moving at the time towards support for the reforming 
effort backed by Abdullah even before the event of 9/11.  The religious establishment, 
on the other hand, had its reservations and stated them vocally around the end of Phase 
Two.  Without neglecting its concerns, the religious establishment did not voice them 
excessively during Phase Three.  It saw that the political system had decided to amend 
the damage resulting from 9/11, as it was important for that system itself to survive.  
Based on the precepts of the Hanbali school of thought, which they belonged to, the 
Ulama decided that they ultimately had to show obedience to the path the leadership had 
chosen. 
In addition to this, the U.S. thought that it was important to have Saudi Arabia on board 
in its so-called war on terrorism, particularly on the financial front.  The U.S. and some 
of the EU states also felt the need to cooperate with the Kingdom as far as oil production 
was concerned, as oil prices had been rapidly increasing since the start of the 
21stcentury.  The Saudi government seized the circumstances to promote its own agenda 
of WTO accession.  In this context, Abdullah treated the accession matter as a main item 
on his agenda for the meeting with Bush in April 2005. 
The new Saudi internal reforming programme provoked by the event of 9/11, as well as 
the need of the West to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in order to combat terrorism and 
expand oil production to mitigate the rise in oil prices, brought the Kingdom’s WTO 
accession process to a formal positive ending in 2005. 
The analysis of the various phases clearly shows the relevance of the hypotheses that 
this thesis had spelled out.  Examining the internal interplay in light of the domestic and 
international developments that took place over the years of the accession process 
provided a plausible account of the factors that shaped Saudi Arabia’s accession, which 
was the main hypothesis of the thesis.  In essence, the resulting account is far more 
comprehensive than if the argument had only relied on the incentives for joining the 
WTO, which the literature on accession usually presents. 
In addition, the aspects of societal interests, formal institutions, reform and the WTO as 
an organization, which were underlined for the sake of generating some sub-hypotheses 
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out of the main hypothesis, resulted in, as far as this study is concerned, the following 
insights:  
1. The fact that Saudi Arabia is a ruling monarchy did not rule out the existence of 
internal politics that play a part in protracting the government’s decision to join the 
organization.  It took from 1993-2005 to have the government’s official decision to 
accede to the GATT/WTO executed, and this largely reflected a considerable 
significance of internal politics, indicating that societal interests were at work.  
However, there was a slight exception as far as the thesis’s sub-hypotheses were 
concerned.  The business community in the Kingdom did play politics in protracting the 
accession, particularly during Phase Two.  Its use of the crown prince’s Majlis in 
conveying concerns over issues such as distribution services can be regarded as an 
example in this respect.  Nonetheless, the business community’s objection to the WTO 
manifested itself in a rather ad-hoc manner and was not consistent throughout the 
process.  Such an initial position helped at the end (Phase Three) to make a change in the 
business community’s attitude, as it became generally of support to Abdullah’s attempts 
for reform. 
2. As to the factor of institutions, several governmental agents were directly involved in 
the Kingdom’s accession.  Such multiple veto points decreased the cohesion among the 
agents involved in a manner that protracted the case.  The examination of the thesis 
illustrated the effect of veto points, manifold instances of which negatively affected the 
WTO accession process (e.g. the position of minister of agriculture and the HMC-MC’s 
arguments). 
3. Fundamental internal and external developments, to which the Saudi accession case 
was sensitive, were of noticeable effect.  The sharp drop in oil revenues resulted in a 
responsive attitude to the concept of reform.  The pressure exerted on Saudi Arabia after 
the events of 9/11, particularly by the U.S., reinforced such an attitude.  It was seemed 
that the survival of the political system as a whole was at risk.  The outcome of both the 
economic and political pressure for reform, promoted the accession issue.  In the thesis’s 
third phase, the issue of the WTO accession was progressing within the wider 
framework of reform of its economic and political appearances.  This was good for the 
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accession process, as far as this study is concerned, because it saved the process the 
direct old criticism which had led to the earlier ‘pause’.    
4. The expansion of the multilateral trading system represented by the WTO did 
complicate the Saudi accession case as economic issues intersected with religious and 
political ones.  In connection with this effect, the ostensible leverage that the WTO 
incumbent members, particularly the Quad countries, had in the accession negotiations 
led them to raise the bar of demands constantly in a way that further complicated the 
bilateral negotiations over the Kingdom’s accession bid. 
Referring to the line of enquiry in IR that focuses on domestic politics in explaining 
international policy of a particular state was crucial for examining the aforementioned 
main and sub-hypotheses.  The importance and applicability of this approach is to a 
large extent due to the nature of the subject.  As established in the thesis, the decision to 
seek WTO accession is a form of international trade policy.  There may be no other 
foreign policy with more domestic consequences than external trade policy.   
Because accession to the WTO is different from many other policies in terms of the 
length of time involved, it is highly susceptible to the effects of internal politics – which 
without referring to domestic politics as a point of analysis would be left unexamined.  
In fact, the society-centred and the state-centred approaches applied herein by analysing 
the related interests and institutions allowed all essential domestic factors involved in the 
Kingdom’s accession to be listed, whether they were formal ones, like the governmental 
bodies, or informal ones, such as the business community.  For instance, the application 
of this approach underlined the role of a group that is specific to the Saudi case, the 
religious establishment.  Moreover, it allowed for discerning the roles– whether active or 
passive – of important individuals, such as Abdullah and Fahd. 
As adopting a level of analysis does not mean dismissing factors operating on other 
levels as far as IR is concerned, the thesis highlighted the benefits of referring to 
externalities as well in providing this account of the Saudi WTO accession.  Indeed, they 
proved essential.  There is no better example of this than the effect of the events of 9/11.  
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In fact, they constituted a turning point in the Kingdom’s accession, as was explained in 
the examination of Phase Three. 
There are several points that can be learned from this account of the WTO accession of 
Saudi Arabia. It set out on this investigation by basically asking what factors would 
shape a nation-state decision to accede to an international organisation like the WTO and 
perhaps cede, in the process of accession, some of its national authority in accordance 
with the WTO’s far-reaching demands.  The case of the Kingdom’s accession 
demonstrates that the answer to such a question can be given on two levels.   
The first level is that of the organization itself.  Since the transformation of the 
multilateral trading system from the GATT to the WTO in 1995, the accession to the 
organization has become a package deal under the ‘single undertaking’ principle.  
Therefore, an acceding country cannot pick and choose while negotiating its 
membership.  At some stage, membership in the WTO became indispensable to Saudi 
Arabia, as well as to other acceding countries, for reasons inherent in the organization 
itself.  For instance, joining the WTO became vital for attracting foreign investment and 
finding new world markets.  As these two components became key parts of the 
Kingdom’s strategy for economic reform, which started to take shape in the second half 
of the 1990s, it became necessary to make concessions on some of the parts that the 
Kingdom disagreed with. 
The second level touches upon the question of whether the WTO accession’s context 
was mainly dominated by internal or external factors.  Even with such a perceived 
economic necessity, the benefit of membership alone could not sometimes overcome the 
inhibitions resulting from the fact that its requirements encroached on matters of 
national sovereignty.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, the context of the accession made it 
very difficult for this trading country not to join the WTO.  The fact that the organization 
was becoming a universal institution, with its incumbent members controlling more than 
85% of the world trade as of 1998, created a great deal of pressure to propel the 
Kingdom’s accession effort forward.  Otherwise, the prospect for Saudi Arabia was to be 
isolated with a group mainly consisting of marginal economies.  More decisive, 
however, was the post-9/11 context.  When the survival of the political system as a 
  
 308
whole was at stake, the Saudi government yielded to some external demands that, in 
terms of their political nature, transcended what had previously been regarded as 
interference by the WTO in internal social and political affairs.  In view of this 
amenability to making concessions, it became more acceptable in Phase Three for the 
Kingdom to overcome the reservations towards the WTO that had prevailed during 
Phase Two. 
Another point worth emphasising in the framework of this study is that the 
conceptualisation of the state as a unitary actor is not applicable even in the case of an 
absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia.  Various interests can coexist and, more 
importantly, affect state policy.  The roles of the religious establishment and the business 
community in the process of the Saudi accession are cases in point. 
Related to the previous point, the interplay of various interests and the resulting internal 
politics are not exclusive features of democratic states.  The IR literature on the concepts 
of interests and institutions often confines the discussion of these concepts to democratic 
societies.  Though it is not always explicitly stated, most of the models and examples 
found in the literature relate to democratic features such as political parties, official 
interest groups and parliaments.  However, internal political dynamics similar to those of 
democratic countries can also exist in countries not internationally classified as 
democratic, as in the case of Saudi Arabia.  Hence, such countries can develop their own 
indigenous channels for internal politics like the Saudi Majlis, which became a feature 
specific to the Kingdom. 
Indeed, embarking on numerous studies on WTO accessions similar to this in-depth 
account can make a balance in literature, which focuses, as indicated above, on 
democratic examples.  By considering a diverse experiences, as acceding countries have 
mainly been either developing, least developed or countries in economic transition, 
similar studies will add a measurable value to the literature of the IR, especially that of 
concentration on society-centred and state-centred approaches, and the related concepts 
of interests and institutions. 
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In addition, conducting researches similar to this thesis will benefit the literature on the 
WTO in general.  As mentioned by one of the interviewees, accession experiences for 
the majority of the acceding countries are scattered in many formal and informal sources 
and are not usually found in integrated studies.  Let alone, in this regard, the secrecy 
with which accession processes has been dealt with on both sides: the acceding countries 
and the WTO.  For the WTO, as an organization, such comprehensive studies on 
accessions and the internal politics that take place in the process of negotiating those 
accessions will be of help in understanding the political economies of its prospect 
members.  As negotiations in the WTO are not confined to accessions but they are rather 
a continual process, such a better understanding of internal political economies might 
help the multilateral trading system, represented by the WTO, avoid future obstacles 
similar to the ones that have all along impeded accessions.  This is an essential matter, 
especially in light of the current general pause of the Doha round, which is affecting the 
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held in Riyadh after his departure from the MOC.  His position as a former minister of 
commerce gave the information he provided about the Saudi accession a valuable 
importance) 
Fayez,Z, Chief Executive Officer of Zuhair Fayez Partnership, 29 April 2004.  (The 
interview was conducted in Mr. Fayez office in Jeddah while the researcher was on a 
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Generally, Dr. Kurdi is a Saudi businessman with a good knowledge of international 
economic issues particularly that related to the WTO and the Saudis acceding to it) 
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significance of this interview came from the importance of that the EU represents in 
  
 338
every WTO accession negotiation.  Although short, the interview was important to see 
how the other side in the negotiations perceived the prolonged accession process of 
Saudi Arabia) 
Rajab, A, Ministry of Commerce Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, Riyadh, 2 May 2002. 
(The interview was conducted in his office at the ministry.  Dr. Rajab is currently a 
member in the Shura Council and was for sometime a member in the SNT.  According 
to his expertise in legal affairs, Dr. Rajab was a primary source to be asked about issues 
such as TRIPs and “Israel”) 
Tamer, F, Managing Partner of Tamer Group, Jeddah, 26 April 2004.  (The interview 
was held in Mr. Tamer’s office in Jeddah while on a fieldwork.  Trade agency 
constituted an essential element in the Saudi economy and, thus, knowing the opinion of 
an important Saudi Trade Agency like Tamer Group was of a particular importance) 
Yamani, SAZ, Former Saudi Minister of Oil, Seventh Annual Symposium of the Centre 
for Global Energy Studies (CGES): “What Future for OPEC?” 6th and 7th October 
2003, Bagshot, Surrey, UK, 6 October 2003. (Meeting with Sheikh Yamani was while 
attending the Seventh Annual Symposium of the Centre for Global Energy Studies 
(CGES): “What Future for OPEC?” 6th and 7th October 2003, Bagshot, Surrey, UK) 
Zainal, A, Current Saudi Minister of Commerce and Industry, London, 17 June 
2004.(The interview was in London while the minister was attending a conference on 
economic reform in the Arab world.  At the time of the interview, Mr. Zainal was a 
minister of state and not yet the commerce minister.  Talking to him was important in 
having a sense of the situation of negotiations at it very final stages) 
Newspapers, Broadcasts and News agencies 
Al Hayat, 28 January 2004,‘Saudi Arabia: Calls to create central commission to support 
small and medium firms’ Issue  14916, p. 12 (in Arabic) 
Al-Watan, 29 September 2004 'Mutual Meeting in Fall', Al-Jameel, M (in Arabic) 
Al-Eqtisadiah, 14 November 2005,'Deputy Governor of SAMA: No Possible Effects on 
Banking Sector', Issue: 4417, p. 1 (in Arabic) 
Al-Hayat, 9 November 2003,'Saudi-American Relations’, Al-Jasim, M, issue 14780, 
p.16 (in Arabic) 
Al-Hayat, 5 March 2004'Saudi Accession Request Made Progress', Issue 14952, p 11 (in 
Arabic) 
Al-Hayat , 31 March 2004,'Modifying Saudi Curricula between proponent and 
opponent”,  Issue 14978 (in Arabic) 




Al-Hayat, 6 June 2005, 'Seven Arab Countries Seek Membership to the WTO', Issue 
15406 (in Arabic) 
Al-Mushahid Assiyasi, 11-17 April 2004, 'Anthropologist Mai Yamani: the Regime in 
Saudi Arabia will not Last for Long', Yamani, M, 10 (422),   pp 11-17 
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 26 March 2004, Issue 9250, p.12 
Al-Watan, 18 May 2003,'Al-Sheik: we would not tolerate preachers’ approaches abroad', 
issue 961 (in Arabic) 
Al-Watan, 18 April 2005, 'Saudi Arabia and US Made Progress but without Trade 
Deal',Jameel, M , Issue 1662 (in Arabic) 
Al-Watan, 20 September 2005, 'The Hour of the WTO has Come', Khashoggi, J, Issue 
1817 (in Arabic) 
Al-Watan, 20 September 2005,'The Kingdom’s Legal Position on Israel as a Member in 
the WTO', Issue 1817 (in Arabic) 
Arabian Business Council 2004, Saudi Accession to WTO Now Imminent, Quarterly 
Newsletter of the US-Saudi, , Volume 9(2) 
Arab News, 24 February 2000,'A seminar on the Kingdom’s accession o the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in Jeddah', Al-Saadi, S  
Arab News, 1 April 2000,'Kingdom to hold new round of WTO talks with trade partners'  
Arab News, 4 April 2000,'Report by Javid Hassan',Hassan, J  
Arab News, 30 April 2001, 'No Compromise on Principles to Join WTO: 
Faqeeh',<http:// www.arabnews.com> (last accessed: 24 February 2002) 
Arab News, 4 December 2001,'Abdullah pledges more steps to encourage investors' 
Arab news, 21 April 2003, 'We’ll Fill All Jobs With Saudis, Says Naif', Ghafour, PKA 
<http://www.arabnews.com/Article.asp?ID=25442>( last accessed: 03 May 2003) 
Arab News, Top 100 Saudi Companies Supplement, 17 January 2004, 'Competition Will 
be Good for Business', Cousins, M, pp. 13-36,. 
Arabnews, 17 January 2004,'Joining the WTO', Munro, A, p. 14 
Arab News, Top 100 Saudi Companies Supplement,17 January 2004, 'Petrochemicals – 
the Key to Growth', Haider, S , pp. 13-36. 
Arab News, Top 100 Saudi Companies Supplement, 17 January 2004, Alshiek, S, 'The 
impact of financial liberalization on the economy', p. 22 
  
 340
Arab News, Top 100 Saudi Companies Supplement, 17 January 2004, 'WTO 
Membership will Speed Up Privatization', Al-Alamy, F, pp. 13-36 
Arab News, 18 March 2004,'We Will not Accept Outside Pressure, Says Prince Turki', 
Arab News, 28 April 2004, 'Kingdom’s Insurance Market Faces Changes', Hassan, J  
Arab News, 30 October 2005, 'Abdullah Played Big Role in WTO Accession', Ghafour, 
PKA    
Asharq Al-Awsat, 14 November 1999,'Saudi Arabia: Plan to Integrate Judicial 
Instruments in One Governmental Body prior to the Accession to the World Trade 
Organization', Issue No.8009 (in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 2 May2003,'Saudi Economists: Ministers Ought to Identify Growth 
Obstacles in Business', Issue 8921 
Asharq Ala-wsat, 26 July 2003, 'an official: Saudi Arabia did not concede to enter the 
WTO', (issue 9006) (in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 20 January 2004,'the Fifth Jeddah Forum concluded, Issue 9184, p13 
(in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 20 February 2004, 'Saud Al-Faisal: the Arab World needs reform but 
foreign attempt to impose reform proved failure', Issue 9215 (in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 February 2004,'Saudi gets closer from accession after successful 
negotiations in Geneva', Issue 9222, p11, (in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 March 2004,'Deputy Minister of Commerce: April’s meeting will 
be decisive', Issue 9227, p11 (in Arabic) 
Asharq Al-Awsat, 21 October 2004, 'Riyadh Postpones Negotiations with Washington', 
Issue 9459 (in Arabic) 
BBC News, 9 May 2001,US blocks Iran WTO application, Doole, C, Geneva,<http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk> (last accessed 9 May 2012) 
City AM, 4 April 2006, Bird R  
Financial Times, 20 November 2002,'Another small step along a very slow road'  
Financial Times,1 September 2003,'EU trade deal clears way for Saudi WTO entry', 
Buck, T  
Financial Times, 16 May 2003, 'Do not abandon Saudi Arabia', Cordesman, A 
Financial Times, 8 March 2004,'Saudis meet anti-terror finance benchmarks', Alden, E   
  
 341
Financial Times, 12 November 2005, 'Saudi Arabia to be 149th member of WTO', 
McSheehy, W & Williams, F  
Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 27 June 2003,'Kingdom prepares ground for 
WTO', 47(26), p 18 
Reuters, 19 January 2004, 'WTO chief sees Saudi membership this year', Evans, D 
Reuters, 16 March 2004,'Saudi Arabia detains reformists' 
Reuters, November 2005, 'Saudi Arabia to join the WTO in December', Waddington, R, 
Geneva 
Riyadh Commerce, March 2001, 'Saudi Contractors in their First Meeting: 
Globalisation, Financing, and Privatisation … Major Challenges in the Next Phase' 
SABIC Magazine, Gray Business Communications 2006, Issue: 77 (in Arabic)  
The Associated Press, 11 November 2005, 'WTO Approves Saudi Arabia Membership 
Bid', Klapper, KS 
The Banker, 1 March 2004,'Supplement: Saudi Arabia – Springboard for growth', 
Timewell, S, <http://www. FT.COM> (Last Accessed 01 April 2004) 
The Daily Telegraph, 2 June 2004, 'West must do all it can to keep the House of Saud in 
power', Bishop, P 
The Daily Telegraph, 28 June 2004, 'Saudis agree they need help to combat terrorists 
and clam expatriates', Gedye, R  
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2003, 'Saudi Arabia shortens odds on WTO 
membership', Business Middle East, September 16-30, 2003”  
The Economist, 15 May 1997,'The World Trade Organization: Enter the 
Saudis?',<http://Economist.Com> (Last Accessed 12 October 2003) 
The Economist, 8 November 2001, 'Saudi Arabia and Iran: Second thought on two 
Islamic states'. 
The Economist, March 23– 29, 2002 
The Economist, 21 May 2002,'No taxation, no representation' 
The Economist, 22 January 2004, The risk of reform, <http:// www.economist.co.uk>, 
(last access 27 March 2004) 
The Economist, 4 March 2004, Saudi Arabia Adapt or die, Economist.com, 4 March  
2004,  <http://www.economist.co.uk>, (last accessed 28 April 2005 ) 
  
 342
The Financial Times 18 June 2004,'Saudi Arabia’s WTO hopes put on hold', Williams, F 
The Financial Times, 20 November 2002, 'Plenty of debate but little action', Khalaf, R 
The Financial Times, 20 November 2002, 'Pressure on royals mounts from all sides', 
Khalaf, R  
The Guardian,16 May 2003, 'Saudi’s regime can’t please both the US and its people', 
Woollacott, M  
The Guardian, 31 May 2004,'Paying the price for incompetence', Whitaker, B  
The Guardian, 2 June 2004, 'Shaken expatriates rethink Saudi future', MacAskill, E & 
Whitaker, B  
The Guardian, 14 June 2004, 'The US and Britain are straining to shore up a hated 
autocracy: Saudi Arabia created the monster now devouring it”, Dalrymple, W 
The Guardian, 26 June 2004, 'Danger money for expats as the Saudi exodus grows', 
MacAskill, E 
The Independent,14 May 2003,'The Corrupt, feudal world of the House of Saud', Fisk, R  
The Independent, 1 June 2004,'Isolated abroad, hated at home: House of Saud faces 
uncertain future', Usborne, D  
The Washington Times  11 January 2007, Reform Strategy for Saudi Arabia,   
Kontorovich, E, <http://www.Qustia.com> 
Time, 5 December 2002, 'Person of the Week: Adel al-Jubeir', Karon, T, 
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/> (Last accessed 12 November 2012) 
Time, 2009,'Lessons Learned', Sfakianakis, J, 173(21) 
Times Online, 11 February 2004,'Prince Boosts Saudi Reformers', Theodoulou, M   
Times Online, 1 June 2004, The House of Saud is doomed by its contradictions, 
Binyon,M ,<http://www.timesonline.co.uk>(Last Accessed 1 June 2004) 
Times Online 27 June 2004, At last, Saudi wakes up to the terror in its midst, Zakaria, 
F,<http:// www.timesonline.co.uk>( Last Accessed 10 December 2011) 
Washington Post, 28 November 2002, 'Saudi Switcheroo', Cohen, R, 
<www.washingtonpost.com>, (Last accessed 12 November 2012) 
World Trade Organization 1998, WTO accessions gather pace, Focus Newsletter, 








Appendix 1-4: Saudi Arabia’s Memorandum ................................................................ 345 
Appendix 2-4: Conversion of the Saudi Application to GATT/WTO ........................... 364 
Appendix 3-5: Saudi WP ............................................................................................... 366 
Appendix 4-6: Saudi Reform Initiatives ........................................................................ 367 






































































































Appendix 5-6: Negative List 
 
 
  
 374
 
 
 
  
 375
 
